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The Class of 1903
Fund

THE WORKS OF

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

VOLUME I.

CONTAINING THE FIRST PART OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

DETROIT.
THORNDIKE NOURSE, PUBLISHER,
1882.

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INTRODUCTION.

In offering to the public a new edition of the writings of the late ORESTES A. BROWNSON a few remarks may be permitted by way of explanation and for the purpose of calling the reader's attention to certain of the more important points contained in them.

It should be borne in mind that the author of these volumes became a publicist at the age of only a little over twenty years, and for fifty years was before the public as a preacher, a lecturer, and a writer. Starting with a belief in the progressive perfectibility of the human race, and the denial of all authority except that of *humanity*, that is, of the people, or the masses, he did not claim that he was in possession of any truth to be taught, or that his views were either mature or sound. Humanity had outgrown the errors of its infancy and was moving on with an irresistible progress towards moral and intellectual truth; but as yet it had gone but a little way. Ages and ages were to elapse before it should attain its final destiny and its full development. The christianity of to-day was far in advance of what it was as taught by Jesus, for it had grown and developed with eighteen centuries of the growth and development of the race. All that the friends of moral and religious progress could do to hasten this growth was to direct the attention of the masses to the great questions of life, its aims and its duties, in order to excite their thought to greater

activity. On this theory it became the duty of every one who had views of his own to send them forth, right or wrong; the infallible instinct of humanity would preserve all that was good and true and the rest would perish. It was with this view Doctor Brownson began to preach and to write. His mind was almost constantly engaged with the great questions of philosophy, of religion, and of government, on which he published his views from day to day. Starting with no settled principles to direct his course he wandered from one doctrine to another, seeking for something to satisfy his mind, but meeting with disappointment after disappointment. To assert that all the writings of such a man were consistent would be to assert what every one knows must be false, and that he was as wise at twenty as he was at seventy. A careful study of all he wrote will, however, show that the changes in his opinions were never a departure from the truth once acquired, but a clearing away of the mists surrounding it in his own mind. They were a steady progress towards the clear perception of truth, and he is never found returning to an error he had once abandoned, or losing sight of a truth he had once perceived.

As fast as he detected an error in his own writings or those of another, he was anxious all the world should be warned against it, and he wrote in its refutation. If he caught a glimpse of a truth new to him, burning with the desire to communicate it to others, he wrote in its defence. His views being brought in this way before the public as they were forming in his own mind, he seemed to many that watched his course

to be constantly changing, and those who saw not that these changes were but the successive abandonment of errors and the acquisition of additional truths, called him fickle and inconstant.

The great aim of Doctor Brownson's life was the attainment of truth in matters of religion. What must he do, what must he believe, in order to be saved? He saw that he must either accept revealed authority that would lead to the Catholic Church and follow it thither, or else reject supernatural revelation altogether and look for the truth in infidelity. Catholicity was the less reasonable alternative in the opinion of one who had formed his notions of Catholic faith and morals from Presbyterian misrepresentation and had no other knowledge of Catholics or their books. He, therefore, first tried infidelity,—under the forms of Universalism and Unitarianism,—and for twenty years he wrote and preached the religion of humanity, philanthropy, and progress. Towards the end of this time he began to learn that the progress and perfection of the race, of which he had dreamed, required other light and aid than the race itself furnished. As he expressed it, "A man cannot lift himself by his own waistbands," and so neither could the human race by its own efforts alone rise above its natural condition. Some extrinsic aid and light, something outside of and above nature must be communicated to it to elevate, perfect, and enlighten it. This something he could find nowhere except in the supernatural life and divine doctrine of the Catholic Church. He had never read but two Catholic books, Milner's *End of Controversy* and the *Catechism of*

the Council of Trent, and even these only partially. He guessed at the Catholic doctrines from his knowledge of the Protestant doctrines opposed to them, and though he often guessed aright, he often blundered. Nevertheless, he had formed to himself an ideal Catholicity, demanded by his philosophy and sustained by it; and this ideal Catholicity he imagined was substantially what the Catholic Church believes, or really intends by her articles of faith. So he concluded that he was a Catholic, and had discovered a philosophy which would legitimate the Catholic Church, and give a scientific basis to all her doctrines. Such was the view he then took of the Church, that he fancied he might consistently, for a time, at least, stay outside of it, and labor to bring the Protestant public to right views of the Church in general. He thought he could do more good out of the Church than in it; and his dream was that he might by working in the bosom of the Protestant Churches, prepare them to return to the bosom of Catholic unity. But it was a brief dream. Logic demanded a plain, open avowal of Catholicity, and he always had a great horror of the sin of being inconsequent. Moreover, another question pressed hard, namely, the question of the salvation of his own soul. If the Catholic Church was the true Church, he could not be saved without being in her communion; for, admitting that the invincibly ignorant may be saved without being actually within her communion, the plea of invincible ignorance could not avail him, for he believed the Catholic Church to be the true Church. Then, again, he found himself in want of the helps that Church had to give. It was

idle to contend for the necessity of the Church, if, standing outside of it, he could yet maintain the personal integrity, and attain to the holiness of life, for which the Church with her sacraments was especially instituted.

Dr. Brownson had already convinced himself of the insufficiency of Naturalism, Rationalism, and Transcendentalism; he had also convinced himself of the necessity of divine revelation, and of the fact that the Christian revelation was such a revelation. From this, by a process of reasoning which may be seen in the article *The Church against no Church*, he arrived infallibly at the Catholic Church. The process is simple and easy. It requires no metaphysical subtilty, no long train of metaphysical reasoning. All it needs is good common sense, a reverent spirit, and a disposition to believe on sufficient evidence. Thus, after twenty years and more of wandering in search of a new and better way to the truth, he was forced to come back, to sit in humble docility at the feet of God's priests and learn of those sent by our Lord to teach. Fortunate was he in the teacher from whom he learnt Catholic doctrine and morals. Never again in the world did he find so true a friend, so patient and wise a teacher as his first instructor in the faith, the late Bishop Fitzpatrick of Boston. On being admitted into the Church Dr. Brownson wished to discontinue writing for the public until he should become more familiar with Catholic truth and Catholic habits of thought and expression. But Bishop Fitzpatrick urged him to continue to write on questions of theology, justly believing that he would be

of great service to the Church in addressing the Protestant public, which he understood, and laboring to convince non-Catholics that what they wanted, life and truth, can be found in the true Church and nowhere else.

Those who may read the essays on political matters contained in these volumes, will not fail to note that the author's political opinions or views of government ran parallel with his religious or theological convictions. At first he was a radical, a believer in the majesty, the infallibility,—the divinity, I may say,—of the masses, placing the origin of all authority in the individual man, attempting to establish the association or community system of government; seeking the overthrow of all priesthood because it binds the conscience; of the banks, because they are in the interest of the business class or employers and opposed to the laboring class or employed; of the transmission of property by will or descent, because a man's right to his property ceased with his death, and he would have the State apportion it amongst the most needy. As he came to acknowledge the authority of God in matters of religion, he saw that power too was from him and thenceforth held that government was necessary for the preservation of order and the restraining of license, and although the political people are the means or channel through which the State derives its power, yet that power, whether monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed, is from God, and he that resists it resists God. Thus from a radical, a destroyer of all authority, he came to see in human Government a likeness and imitation of Divine Providence; not an

evil to be hated and resisted, but a beneficent agent for the protection of right, the advancement of civilization, the aid of religion, science, art, and learning, and next to religion the greatest means by which man may attain his destiny, and as such to be loved, obeyed, and defended.

The essays of Dr. Brownson on theology, politics, and morals, are all based on his philosophy, according to which nature and grace, reason and revelation, the order of reality and that of science are brought into the harmony which for three hundred years had been the aim of thinking men.

The denial of authority in matters of revelation in the fifteenth century was soon followed by a philosophical system which logically leads to scepticism, —atheism, or pantheism. The Cartesian philosophy had reduced all science to the science of the subject, and found its last logical results in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*,—that the I is absolute and relative, in itself eternal, infinite, God; in its projections or manifestations only phenomenal.

The principal portion of the following volumes was written for a Quarterly Review, for a Monthly Magazine, or for a weekly paper, and should by no means be regarded as complete treatises on the various subjects discussed; but the attempt is here made to present them in such order and connection as to give a full view of the author's philosophical researches and their final result, of his argument for the Church and against heresy and infidelity, of the relation of Church and society, and of the origin of government and the principles of authority and liberty. The chronological

order has been followed as far as possible on each subject, as this more clearly exhibits the train of thought and argument by which the conclusions are reached, and better enables the reader to see what the author has discarded in his later writings. Where the earlier articles are inconsistent with the later and more deliberate convictions of the author, the reasons for the change are sufficiently explained to prevent any candid reader from regarding Dr Brownson as holding in his mature years the obscure and inadequate views of religion, philosophy, or politics expressed by him in his un-Catholic days. Especially is this to be remembered of his philosophy. It has been thought necessary for the full understanding of his philosophical writings to republish his earlier essays; but this has been done more for the purpose of showing how he arrived at his later conclusions and in what sense he understood them, than on account of any merit they have in themselves; for he himself expressly repudiates all his philosophical writings prior to his conversion. Still, while he disavowed these earlier writings, there was no time when he broke entirely away from them and started anew. In all his philosophical essays there is a slow and gradual elimination of previous erroneous thought and expression, and a clearer perception of the truth, growing brighter and brighter until in his *Essay in Refutation of Atheism* and the subsequent articles there is no longer any hesitancy or doubt, but he writes as one who has found the truth he has been seeking all his life long, and knows that he has found it. Many, too, of the fundamental doctrines of his philosophy are more

elaborately argued in the earlier essays than in the later writings; for in these he often assumes them as proved or only adduces the principles on which their demonstration depends, without digressing from the matter of which he is more especially treating.

To place the philosophical writings at the commencement of these volumes may be a great obstacle in the way of some readers who have no taste for such matters and may be repelled by the dryness of the subject. But it is the logical order, and though the author's philosophy is drawn from revelation or tradition as well as from reason, a full understanding of it is useful, if not necessary, for the complete appreciation of his controversial writings. If accepted, it is a more convincing refutation of the errors of the day than the arguments aimed directly at them; for in all these arguments it enters as an important element, and besides the ground has shifted and is shifting daily. In 1844 and the years immediately following there was a strong religious sentiment still remaining in the American people, and the attempt was made to defend Protestantism and attack Catholicity on religious or theological grounds. But Protestantism, as a religion, is now dead or in its last agony. The error of the age is not Protestantism. So far as it is intellectual, as distinguished from moral, it is infidelity, utter unbelief either in revelation or in God. So far as Protestantism is positive, or asserts any thing, it is true and is a part of Catholic doctrine. So far as it is Protestant and not Catholic, that is, so far as it is negative, it is infidel, and the very principles of science need to

be defended as much against it under the one form as the other.

Rationalists, Naturalists, Humanitarians, the followers of Darwin, Huxley, Compte, and Ingersoll, include the vast majority of our non-Catholics, and they are all atheists; for they deny God,—the God of revelation, the God Creator. They base their denial of God on science and philosophy, as they pretend; and it is on the field of philosophy and science they must be met. Philosophy cannot, of course, be substituted for faith, nor can it produce faith; but it is the preamble to faith, it removes the obstacles to faith, establishes the principles which faith presupposes, and which give to faith its scientific character. "Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest," said Pius IX, of glorious memory. These three truths demonstrable by reason, are the three truths most necessary to be proved against the errors of to-day. The field of controversy changes with every revolution of the earth or even with every waning of the moon. Bossnet's *History of the Variations of Protestantism* stands unrivalled as a refutation of the Protestantism of his time, but Protestantism to-day could not recognize itself in the doctrines of the first asserters of the right of private judgment. The protest of Luther and Calvin against the authority of revelation as interpreted by the divinely constituted authority, aided by the protest of Descartes and his successors against the authority of reason interpreting itself, and raising universal scepticism on the basis of philosophical doubt, has logically and necessarily produced in

all who were not restrained by their theological knowledge, a denial of all revelation and of all philosophy. It is now necessary to begin at the beginning. Every thing being denied, every thing must be proved. It is, therefore, both logical and proper that we should begin with the first principles of science.

In his earlier philosophical writings, Dr. Brownson should be classed with the Eclectics, and the first article in this volume is written from the stand-point of Cousin. In 1842 he disavowed Eclecticism and began to think out a philosophy for himself. The results of this attempt, so far as it went, may be seen in the articles on *Schmucker's Psychology*, the *Synthetic Philosophy*, and *Philosophy of History*. But in these there is little that is original, and in his later years he had neither the time nor the inclination to produce a new system of philosophy. So far as the details are concerned, the usual philosophy taught in Catholic schools is satisfactory in the main. The great objection brought against the accepted philosophy was not on account of its method or its results, but that since Descartes philosophers have occupied themselves with method rather than principles. The great question has been to prove that science is science, that when we know we know that we know. Logic as an art is correctly taught and there is no improvement to be made in it; but logic as a science should be reformed. As now taught it is substantially pagan, based on the Aristotelian notion of matter and form, by the union of which all things are produced. He earnestly wished some competent person would reconstruct the philosophy now taught so that it shall con-

form to the truth, and shall assert that the object of thought is the real, and that what is not is not intelligible. The person to whom he suggested to undertake this labor has been for many years considering the plan to be pursued, and it is very possible that before long he will give to the public a text-book of philosophy based on the principles defended in Dr. Brownson's later writings.

It was by a slow process and severe study that the author worked out his philosophical conclusions. Yet in every one of his philosophical essays there seems to be an advance. In the essay on *Philosophy and Common Sense* the distinction is pointed out between direct and reflex thought, between intuition and reflection. Intuition is identified with common sense, while philosophy is shown to be the result of reflection on the matter furnished by common sense. In the criticism of Schmucker's *Psychology* the writer holds that the human mind is in intimate relation with the necessary and eternal truth which it perceives in perceiving the variable, the finite, and the contingent, not as an abstraction, but as the basis of the perception, or as expressed in his later essays, the intelligible or ideal element. In the *Synthetic Psychology*, the reality of the object of thought is established, and the author shows true philosophy must start not from the subject alone, nor from the object alone; but from their synthesis, the subject, the object, and the relation of both.

In his criticism of Kant the author has made an immense advance on his previous writings. He becomes clearer both in thought and expression, and

at the same time more profound. He sees the absurdity of Kant's great problem of the possibility of science, which Kant denies, proving by science the impossibility of science. He shows that Kant, like most psychologists who seek for the object in the subject, errs in holding that in the fact of knowledge, the form under which the object is known, depends not on what the object is, but on the laws of the subject knowing it. In *An a priori Autobiography* the author demonstrates that we have direct and immediate intuition of real and necessary being; that abstractions are nullities; that ideas are not the product of the mind, but its real intelligible object, that they are in the Divine Reason, and are the Divine Reason. In the article on *The Existence of God*, it is proved from the fact of intuition of real being, which must be necessary and eternal, that we have intuition of that which is God; and therefore God is, and from this time on his philosophy is well settled in his own mind. At first he had held that all activity was in the subject; but when he reflected on the impossibility of the mind being its own object, or acting without the object, he easily proved the activity of the object presenting or affirming itself to the intellect, and then the reality of the object. Analyzing the object he finds the three elements: the ideal, without which the object would not be intelligible; the empirical, the fact of experience, the object as apprehended; and the relation of those two. In the ideal element he finds the necessary, the contingent, and their relation; the formula of which he makes: Being creates existences.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to prove the correctness of this analysis. Nothing can be added to the force of the arguments Dr. Brownson adduced in its proof. But the opponents of this formula who have reasoned against it, may not have understood exactly what Dr. Brownson meant by it. He did not maintain that the formula, as a formula, is intuitive, or given by intuition; but that it simply expresses what is given in ideal intuition. The formula itself is formed by reflection; or, in other words, the ideal formula is a formal and scientific statement of what is given intuitively as objective ideas, reduced by a mental process to a scientific formula or statement. There is nothing in it that supposes being or existences are not both presented to the mind as ideas. Indeed, it assumes that such is the fact, and this is wherefore the formula is termed ideal. It claims to embody in a complete formula the ideal element of all thought and what must be held by the mind as the condition of all science; and it maintains that this element, the principle and basis of all science, is given intuitively, in opposition to those who hold it to be innate, a form of the intellect, or obtained by the mind by its own action operating without ideas or principles. It has been misapprehended by having been confounded with the doctrine of the ontologists, from which it is essentially different; for the intuition they assert is not ideal, but a direct and immediate intuition of God. The formula itself is a synthesis of all that is given us in ideal intuition, and of the principles of all the real and all the knowable; but is not itself intuitive, and is obtained only by the most

careful and profound analysis of the principles of thought, or of human cognition, and is the *primum philosophicum* only because it states what philosophy must recognize as given intuitively, in order to render thought, cognition, or empirical intuition possible and real.

It is a simple process from *Being creates existences* to demonstrate that God creates all that exists, and that the first cause must be the final cause, that the creative act is not completed in the initial order, but requires the teleological as its complement. Irrational creatures are created for the rational and these find their perfection as their origin in God. The beatitude of rational creatures is union with God. In the creative act of God is the foundation of ethics, of the moral law, and while this establishes the obligation to obey, it is sanctioned by the beatitude or misery which follows obedience or disobedience.

Many of the controversies in which *Brownson's Quarterly Review* took part were waged *fortiter in modo* as well as *in re* and susceptibilities were wounded and prejudices aroused. So far as those controversies were against the theological errors of infidels, Protestants, or of some within the Church, there is no apology to make. Truth is stern and uncompromising, and neither the Apostles nor the Fathers speak or write very *suaviter in modo* when combating heresy or immorality. But in the discussions of nationality just before the breaking out of the civil war, fault was found with our foreign-born citizens that they retained their foreign nationality and did not assimilate with the American people. Later Dr. Brownson thought

they were Americanizing full fast enough, whether for the good of religion or the good of the nation. American national character, since the war, has not developed in a direction to make a natural-born citizen overproud of his American nationality. It is more necessary to guard Catholics of foreign birth against adopting the vices of the American character than it is to urge them to Americanize. The original American Constitution was a good one, worthy of the support of all good men, but as developed and applied by popular opinion and political parties, it can command the respect of no wise or thinking man. Much as he loved his country and venerated the Constitution as it was, he thoroughly detested the dominant radicalism, no matter of what party, which, if not checked, cannot fail to lead the nation to destruction, whither it is hastening with railroad speed.

In his earlier writings Dr. Brownson attempted to prove that the Church is compatible with American democracy; later he went further and insisted that without her, without her faith and discipline, her authority and influence, American democracy will go to destruction. No government, democratic, aristocratic, or monarchical, is or can be a good government if divorced from religion and moving on independently of the Church. No secular order suffices for itself or can sustain itself without the aid of the Catholic Church, nor even with her aid, if Catholics adopt the false maxim that their politics have nothing to do with their religion, or in politics act as if God had no rights and they no religion. The *Syllabus* condemns the separation of Church and State in the sense that

the State is independent of the Church or spiritual authority, or that politics is not subject to the law of God. God is King of kings and Lord of lords, and the State, whatever its constitution, is subject to his supreme and universal law, and bound by his law as declared by his Church as much as is the individual himself. It is the forgetfulness of this great truth, or the neglect of courtly prelates to insist on it with due emphasis that has brought the old Catholic nations of Europe into their present deplorable condition.

For two or three years before the suspension of his *Review* in 1864, Dr. Brownson favored the tendencies of the liberal Catholics at home and abroad, but he never went all lengths with them. He steadily maintained two essential points finally settled by the Holy Council of the Vatican,—the supremacy of the Pope as head of the Church, and his infallibility in teaching and in determining all questions pertaining to faith. His Review steadily maintained that Our Lord founded the Church on Peter, and that the papacy is at the base as well as at the summit, the foundation as well as the crown of the edifice, that all power or authority in the Church is derived from Christ through him, and that bishops hold and exercise their authority in their respective jurisdictions from him as the successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ. He had been taught that Gallicans were Catholics, and that he could not assert papal infallibility as a Catholic dogma, but he held it as true, and was never able to defend the infallibility of the Church to his own satisfaction without asserting it. Consequently he hailed with joy the definition of the Council of the Vatican.

Another point he always maintained and gave great offence to liberal Catholics by doing so, is the supremacy of the Pope as representative of the spiritual order over temporal princes. He maintained that the power assumed by the Pope to depose the German Emperors and other princes professing the Catholic faith belonged to him *jure divino*, not simply *jure humano*, that he held it not from the *jus publicum*, or by the consent of the nations, but as the Vicar of Christ and inherent in him as the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order on earth or in human affairs. The popes no doubt exercised often an arbitratorship in disputes between sovereign and sovereign, and between sovereigns and their subjects by common consent; the Popes also exercised authority in several states as feudal suzerain, for those states had by their own consent and desire become fiefs of the Holy See. In neither of these cases did the *Review* ever pretend that the power exercised was held *jure divino*. Nor that in other cases, as in that of Henry IV. and Frederick II. of Germany, when the Pope was neither feudal suzerain nor simple arbitrator, though he held as Vicar of Christ the power to depose the prince and absolve his subjects from their allegiance, he was obliged to exercise it unless he believed it necessary for the interest of religion or to maintain freedom of conscience, and believed his sentence would be carried into effect. The Pope still holds the power, but there are no subjects on whom to exercise it. The Popes might as well have attempted to exercise it on the pagan emperors of Rome who persecuted the Christians of the Empire, as to attempt to exercise it on

any of the sovereigns of the present day, for they have all emancipated themselves from the law of God.

Modern republicans were, no doubt, shocked at this doctrine, yet the republicans of England not only deposed, but beheaded their sovereign, Charles I. The republicans of France deposed and guillotined Louis XVI., deprived Louis Philippe of his crown, and declared the forfeiture of Napoleon III. The congress of the Anglo-American colonies deposed George III. as their sovereign, and absolved his subjects from their allegiance. Indeed, modern republicanism in both Europe and America asserts the sacred right of insurrection, and claims for any band of miscreants assuming to act in the name of the people, even more power than was ever exercised by the popes. This is natural enough, for the republicans of our day put the people in the place of God, and install demagogues as the ministers of the new religion.

There may have been little prudence, considering the state of the public mind, in broaching the doctrine, although true, but will those who object that it is inopportune, tell us how political atheism may be combated on Gallican principles, or how society may be protected from secularism and downright Godlessness, without asserting the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal, or the law of God when human laws conflict with it? Gallicanism, which asserted the independence of the secular order, was a species of political atheism and contained the germ of communism or socialism; and it is worthy of remark that Professor Döllinger made it a grave charge against the definition of papal infallibility that it struck at the

rights of the temporal power. We cannot, as Dr. Bownson said, obtain any practical safeguard against political atheism, the error that is ruining modern society, but in the recognition of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and consequently, of the Pope as its divinely instituted representative. Secularists, of course, were shocked; but truth is great and powerful, and to lack confidence in it, when fairly and honestly told, is to lack confidence in God, and is a dangerous as well as a cowardly species of infidelity.

In one respect Dr. Brownson never ceased to agree with Liberal Catholics. He differed from those Catholics who would restore Christendom on its old basis. He did not regard this as any longer practicable, or desirable even if practicable. All in that Christendom, which but too many confound with the Church, and which has now passed away, was not as the Church could wish, and under it, as now, she had to maintain an unceasing conflict with the powers of this world. There were princes who loyally served the Church, and with all their power executed her canons as far as they required the civil arm to enforce them, and willingly and faithfully protected her rights and interests; but there were many more who sought to destroy her independence, to subject her to their will, and to deprive her of her rights as the kingdom of God. The great Pope St. Gregory VII. had not an easier time than Pius IX., and the afflictions of Pascal II. were even greater, while his firmness was much less. Innocent III. found on his accession to the papal throne nearly the whole of Christendom in a state of revolt against the papacy, and Henry IV.,

Henry V., Henry VI., Frederick Barbarossa, and Frederick II. of Germany, the pretended successors of Cæsar Augustus, were hardly less formidable enemies of the Church than Victor Emanuel, Prince Bismark, or the revolution these inaugurated. The Church can hardly suffer more from the internationalists, socialists, and communists than she has at times from the Kings and Kaisers of the West, and especially from the Emperors of the East.

The Christendom that has passed away, dating from the conversion of the Franks, was based on the monarchical principle, and the Church to a great extent held her relations with the faithful in each kingdom through their sovereign, instead of through her own prelates, with whom, latterly at least, the Pope could communicate, or who could communicate with him only by permission of the king. In France, Spain, Austria, and Italy, the Church under the monarchy that succeeded to feudalism, has been bound hand and foot by the secular powers, and it is to this fact we owe the dissolution of Christendom and the present condition of the Church in those nations, nay, the anti-Christian revolution now everywhere in progress. It is hardly possible, humanly speaking, for the sovereigns to arrest that revolution, or to reinstate Christendom on its old basis. The sovereigns have succeeded in alienating the affections of their subjects from the Church and bringing her into contempt with the people, and to maintain their crowns they are obliged, or believe themselves obliged to support the revolution in its war against her.

But the sovereigns in doing this are depriving them-

selves of all power to suppress the revolution which after using them to suppress the Church will cast them away. The Liberal Catholics, a party created by the unhappy La Mennais, urge the Church to abandon the sovereigns, who have abandoned her, make peace with the revolution, give it her blessing, and labor to reconstruct Christendom on a popular basis. These are opposed by another party who hold that it is necessary to labor to reconstitute Christendom on its old monarchical and aristocratic basis. So far as this party labor to reëstablish order and the independence of the Church Dr. Brownson was with them heart and soul, but he abhorred any alliance with the revolution, or any concession to it. He could see no reason, supposing the people Catholic, why the Church cannot be as free and independent with a Christendom based on the republican principle as she ever has been under the Christendom which no longer exists. The Church has no more necessary alliance with monarchy and nobility than she has with republicanism. She cannot make common cause with modern liberalism, nor bless the atheistic revolution; but there is nothing in her doctrine or constitution that prevents her from accepting a republican Christendom, or giving her blessing to a Christian republic, when once constituted. The people are not less trustworthy than Kings and Kaisers, and let it be remembered that the revolution originated with the sovereigns, not with the people.

With these few remarks on some of the doctrines maintained in Brownson's Review and his other writings, this edition of his works is committed to

the intelligent and benevolent reader, who, it may be hoped, will more calmly than when they first appeared, consider the arguments of the author, whose aim in all he wrote was solely the exposition of truth and its defense against the numerous errors of his times which were leading so many away from God's Church, and endangering the pure doctrine of many more within the Church, whose faith was sincere, but inconsistent with their philosophical or theological defense of it. Now that the heat of controversy has cooled they may read again in a more permanent form what was written in the spirit of kindness and humility. To those who in no captious spirit, but with sympathy and encouragement sought in these writings, as they first appeared, the exposure of the concealed errors of incipient heresy or the assertion of Catholic and universal truth, there is due the deep-felt gratitude of the author and his editor.

Few can imagine the pleasure or pain with which these volumes have been prepared for the press. It is the quality of great minds to attach or repel those with whom they converse in a much stronger degree than can characters of weaker mould, and when to filial affection is added reverence for genius, for bold and honest defence of truth, unspotted virtue, and docile submission to the authority of the Church and her pastors, how dear must be the memory of a father! No more to hear his voice, or watch the ever-varying expression of his face, it is a consolation and a pleasure to read over again and again his writings, every sentence of which recalls the writer; it is a pleasure and a consolation to collect them so that they may be

preserved to future generations which shall better appreciate them. But at the same time there is the pain, the sorrow, the gloom of a perpetual funeral until these remains of a mighty intellect and a great head are placed in a worthy monument. Not till then are the last rites paid; not till then can I think only of the assurance of the Prophet Daniel that "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some unto life everlasting, and others unto reproach, to see it always. But they that are learned shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that instruct many to justice, as stars for all eternity."

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

DETROIT, October 12th, 1882.

PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE.

[From the Boston Quarterly Review for January, 1838.]

WE have read with some interest an article in the *Christian Examiner* for November last, on Locke and the Transcendentalists. The article is written with spirit, in a sincere

ERRATUM.

On page XXVIII of Introduction, fifth line, read "heart," instead of "head."

because he may chance to labor in a direction different from the one we have marked out for ourselves. They who cultivate philosophy must labor in peace. They must not call one another hard names, and seek to render one another odious to the public. Into all philosophical subjects we must carry calmness of mind, a catholic spirit, and a respect for every man's honest opinions. We must carry with us a disposition to seek for truth under the forms of gross error even, and that love for man and all that is human, which will prevent us from harboring, for one moment, a single intolerant feeling, and which will prevent a single harsh word from ever escaping us. We may subject, we ought to subject, all opinions to the most rigid investigation, not for the sake of triumphing over adversaries, not for the sake of proving others in the wrong; but for the purpose of discovering the truth, and quickening our love and reverence for mankind.

No greater evil can befall us, than that of entering into a

career of angry disputes, and of passing from the calm and rational inquiry after truth, to the violent and passionate crimination of individuals. In philosophizing, we ought to make an abstraction of individuals and their motives. Men honestly differ in their views. The views of all are more or less partial, and therefore defective, and therefore erroneous; and no one, therefore, has the right to condemn another. The philosopher, instead of complaining of men, charging them with folly, or with evil intentions, and seeking to render their views odious or suspicious, sets himself down to collect, quietly, the partial views of each, and to mould them into one systematic and harmonious whole. We insist on this point. A philosophical epoch for our country begins, and we would not have it disgraced by wrath and bitterness, by personal contentions, railings at individuals or systems. We would have every man, who enters the field of philosophy, enter it with a heart at peace with mankind, and solicitous only for the truth. Let every one guard against the trammels of a school, and the pride of system. Let him beware how he adopts a darling theory, which he shall be ambitious to make prevail. Let him beware how he looks on his fellow laborers as the disciples of another school, and therefore enemies to be fought and vanquished. Let him wed himself to the truth, and give it an uncompromising support; but let him, at the same time, expect truth in all theories, and be willing to receive it, let it come to him from what quarter it may.

We young Americans, who have the future glory of our country and of Humanity at heart, who would see our country taking the lead in modern civilization, and becoming as eminent for her literature, art, science, and philosophy, as she now is for her industrial activity and enterprise, must ever bear in mind the greatness and the sanctity of our mission. We must set an example worthy of being followed by the world. We must feel the dignity and immense reach of the work to which we are called. Into all our discussions we must carry a free, lofty, and earnest spirit; we must purge our hearts of all low ambition, of all selfish aims, of all wish for personal triumph. We must fix our eyes on the True, and aspire to the Holy. We must be invincible in our dialectics, but still more so in our love of truth, and in our sympathy with Humanity in all its forms. A great and glorious work is given us; may we be equal to it, and worthy of achieving it!

We say we have read this article in the *Examiner*, with some interest, and so we have; but not altogether on account of its intrinsic merit. It interests us mainly as one of the signs of the times, as an indication of a change which has been silently taking place among us, on philosophical matters, and as a proof that our countrymen are beginning to lose some portion of their hereditary contempt for abstract thought, and that they are preparing themselves to raise hereafter the study of metaphysical science to the rank it deserves. It proves to us, that the day for philosophical discussion is ready to dawn on our land, and that thought with us is about to assume new and nobler forms. Intellectual pursuits are beginning to have charms for us, and a Future, worthy our free institutions, is beginning to be elaborated. We need not say that this gives us joy. It is what we have for years been yearning and laboring for; but which we have not generally dared hope that we should live long enough to see realized. Discussion of the great problems of metaphysics must come, and we are glad of it; for discussion in this country, of whatever subject it may be, cannot fail to be followed by important and useful practical results.

The specific design of the author in this article we profess not to have discovered, and we think he himself would be somewhat puzzled to inform us. Apparently, however, the article was intended to vindicate the character of Locke as a metaphysician, and to put the community on its guard against certain individuals, whom its author denominates Transcendentalists. Who these Transcendentalists are, what is their number, and what are their principal tenets, the writer does not inform us. Nor does he tell us precisely the dangers we have to apprehend from their labors; but so far as we can collect his meaning, it would seem that these dangers consist in the fact that the Transcendentalists encourage the study of German literature and philosophy, and are introducing the habit of writing bad English. He may be right in this. It is a matter we do not feel ourselves competent to decide. So far, however, as our knowledge extends, there is no overweening fondness for German literature and philosophy. We know not of a single man in this country, who avows himself a disciple of what is properly called the Transcendental Philosophy. The genius of our countrymen is for Eclecticism. As to the bad English, we presume those, whom the writer calls Transcendentalists, may sometimes be

guilty of it, and we shall be happy to learn that they alone are guilty of it.

This writer may be correct in his estimate of the merits of Locke. If we understand him, he does not mean to defend Locke's philosophy—although we should think him partial to it—but merely his candid spirit, and the manner in which he wrote on metaphysics. He thinks Locke wrote on metaphysical subjects in a free and easy manner, altogether more in the manner of a man of the world, than of a cloistered monk. We agree with him in this; but we think several of Locke's predecessors and contemporaries are entitled to this praise as well as he. Hobbes, who preceded Locke, by some years, is much his superior, so far as style and language go, and so is Cudworth. Locke is transparent; there is seldom any difficulty in coming at his meaning: but he is diffuse, verbose, tedious, and altogether wanting in elegance, precision and vigor. Hobbes, while he is equally as transparent as Locke, infinitely surpasses him in strength, precision and compactness. He tells you more in a few short sentences, than Locke in the whole of a long chapter. If the proper style and language, the proper manner of writing on metaphysical subjects, be the matter in question, we think Locke should not be named in the same year with Hobbes, a man to whom justice has never yet been done; whose name is a term of reproach; but who as a philosopher, has exerted a thousand times more influence over the English mind, than Locke, and whom Locke himself reproduces much oftener that he acknowledges.

The writer in the *Examiner*, we think, also ascribes improperly to Locke the merit of delivering us from the technical phraseology and barren logic of the Scholastics. Between Locke and the Scholastics there intervened a considerable space of time, Descartes, Bacon, Gassendi, and Hobbes, and the most glorious period of English history and literature. The Scholastic philosophy was shaken and nearly destroyed by the Revival of Letters and the study of Antiquity, which so strongly marked the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The little dominion, it retained at the commencement of the seventeenth century, was completely overthrown by those two fathers of modern philosophy, Descartes and Bacon. The Scholastics were defunct in all the world—unless Oxford offers an exception—long before Locke began his philosophical career.

But these are small matters. The article, we are examining, appears to us to assume, that the metaphysician should always restrict himself to what may be called common sense modes of thought and expression, and that the highest philosophy may be so announced as to be comprehended at once, by any one of ordinary capacity, whether accustomed to philosophize or not. The article, it is true, does not expressly state the doctrine here implied; but it appears to us to proceed on the supposition of its truth, and we are unable to legitimate its reasonings without assuming it. Through the whole article, there seems to us to be a striking want of clear discernment of the difference between philosophy and common sense. The writer evidently wishes to reconcile common sense and philosophy, which is laudable; but he sees no way by which this can be done, save by reducing philosophy to common sense. He asks "what is common sense, but the highest philosophy, applied to the usual purposes of practical life? And what is philosophy, but common sense, employed in abstract investigations?" Do not these questions confound philosophy with common sense? or rather, instead of reconciling philosophy with common sense, do they not sink philosophy in common sense? To us they betray no slight confusion in the mind of him who puts them in earnest, and they are a very good proof that he does not discern clearly, if any difference at all, the difference there is between knowledge and philosophy, two things as far asunder as intuition and reflection.

But this writer is not the only one who does not discern distinctly the difference between common sense and philosophy, in whose mind the limits and precise characteristics of each are not determined. We trust, therefore, that we shall not be doing a needless work, if we undertake, in what follows, to aid our readers to draw the line between common sense and philosophy, and to determine what is the precise object of philosophy. Moreover, something of this is necessary, to serve as a sort of introduction to a series of articles on metaphysics, which we propose to lay before our readers in our future numbers.

The term *common sense* may be applied to what Hobbes calls the *cognitive faculty*, or faculty of knowing, which is common to all human beings. It is by this faculty, and only by this faculty, that we know either in the ordinary affairs of life or in abstract science. The faculty, by means of which we are capable of acquiring knowledge, is the

same in all cases. Knowledge then admits of no other divisions than those of the subjects with which we may seek to become acquainted. This is what the writer of the article we are reviewing, probably meant to assert. But knowledge is not philosophy; and though it is indispensable to philosophy, it can and does, in most men, exist without philosophy.

But the term common sense is also used to designate the common or universal beliefs of mankind, the simple spontaneous beliefs of Humanity. These beliefs may be true, they may be acted on; but with the multitude they are taken on trust, adopted without being legitimated. Philosophy is not a contradiction of these beliefs, a substitution of something else for them, but an explanation and verification of them. This is the precise object of philosophy.

Philosophy and common sense are not opposed to one another. There is no discrepancy between them. Common sense furnishes the philosopher all his knowledge, all the data from which he reasons. His sole mission is to clear up and legitimate the universal beliefs of mankind, or the facts of common sense. The common sense man is not in the wrong; he does not err; he has the truth, but he does not know that he has it. He believes the truth, but he does not comprehend what he believes, nor wherefore he believes. He cannot tell how he came to believe what he does believe; he knows not what right he has to believe it; and when asked, why he believes it, he can only answer, he believes it because he does believe it. The philosopher believes precisely the same things, as the common sense man, but he knows what he believes, and he can tell wherefore he believes. The common sense man believes, but does not comprehend; the philosopher comprehends, and therefore believes,

We may easily bring up to our minds the common sense man, by recalling our childhood and youth. In early life, faith is strong, and implicit. We believe. We are conscious of no thoughts and feelings too big for words, and which cannot be easily communicated to all who will give us their attention, We see no mysteries in nature, in man, or in God. All things appear to us open and plain. Things are to us what they seem. The primrose is a primrose, and nothing more. The sun and stars are beautiful, and the rain-bow is pleasant to look upon; but they contain no dark, perplexing mystery we are dying to wring out. Day and

night, summer and winter, spring and fall, sickness and health, life and death, are alternations to be welcomed, or not welcomed, but they are not mysteries. They are not a book we would learn to read; hieroglyphs we would be able to decipher. We see all. The outward, the sensible, sufficeth us. Common sense satisfies curiosity, and prevents inquiry from becoming doubt. This, which is a description of the childhood and youth of all, is also a description of the greater part of men through their whole lives. All who come under this description are common sense men.

But childhood and youth, with their ready answers to all inquiries, their open brow and laughing cheek and trusting heart, for whom life is all one holiday, and all things are but their morris-men, do not abide with us all forever. Some of us grow old, and lose the light which plays around our heads in our younger days. One day, one hour perhaps, never to be forgotten, a sudden darkness spreads over the universe, and we no longer see where we are, or what we are. The bright sun is extinguished; the stars no longer glimmer in the firmament, and the beacon-fires, which the philanthropic few had kindled here and there to cheer, to warn, or to guide the solitary traveller, are gone out. Friends drop away; we stand among the dead, by the graves of those we loved, surrounded by the ghosts of affections unrequited, hopes blasted, joys cut short, plans defeated; and—there are mysteries. The universe becomes to us a scroll, a book, like that which John saw in the right hand of Him who sat on the throne, sealed with seven seals. Every object we make out in the darkness is a hieroglyph, big with a meaning of fearful import, which we can divine not; we are to ourselves a riddle we can read not; and in tumult of soul, perplexity of mind, and sorrow of heart, we find ourselves standing face to face with the dread Unknown.

A change has come over us. Childhood and youth are gone forever. We have broken with the whole past. We stand alone; yet not alone, for the awful Mystery of the Universe is round, about, and within us. For a time our courage forsakes us; we can stand up no longer; we sink down, weak, helpless, forlorn. But this weakness passes away. After a while, in a sort of desperation, we draw ourselves up into ourselves, and bid the monster in whose presence we are, a "grim, fire-eyed defiance." Little by little, we become inured to the obscurity, and able to discern the outline of things in the dark. By straining, by recollecting,

by comparing, by reflecting, we become able to spell out, here and there, one of these fearful hieroglyphs, till we obtain the word of the universe—God. Then the darkness rolls back; things become plain again; conviction supplies the place of lost faith; and foresight makes amends for the inspiration of hope which returns no more forever. A change has indeed come over us. We are no longer in the trustingness of common sense. We have become philosophers. We have looked beneath the surface, beyond the shadows of sense; in the visible we have found the invisible; in the mutable, that which changes not; in the dying, the immortal; in the evanescent, the abiding and the eternal. We have seen the world of childhood and youth vanish in the darkness of doubt; but we have found a new world, the world of truth, a new universe which is really a universe. We see and comprehend the hidden sense of that of which we saw at first only the form, the shadow. We now know what we believe, and wherefore we believe it, and are able to legitimate our belief. He who has been through this scene of darkness, doubt, perplexity, grief, and has attained to a well grounded conviction of the great truths comprised in the universal beliefs of mankind is a philosopher.

Now, between this man whom we have pointed out as the philosopher, and the one we called the mere common sense man, is there no difference? and can they converse together with perfect ease? Can they utter themselves by means of the same symbols? Or, which is more to our purpose, will the same symbols have the same significance to them both?

Suppose a man, over whose mind and heart has passed the change of which we have spoken, a man truly born again, who has been able to see that there are mysteries, and who sees a little way into them, and who looks on man, nature, God, with other eyes and other feelings too, than those of childhood and youth; has he nothing within him, no thoughts, no spiritual facts, of which the mere common sense man knows nothing, has dreamt nothing; and which, therefore, he has not named; and which, therefore, are untranslated into his vocabulary? Can this man utter himself in the language of the market, in terms, the full import of which can be easily seized by them in whom no such change has been wrought? Would you talk with a blind man of colors? Couch his eyes. Will the miser comprehend you, when you speak to him of the pleasures of benevolence?

Can you, by any possible form of words, make the meaning of the word love obvious to him, whose heart has never thawed in presence of sweet and gentle affection? Whoever has had some little acquaintance with the world, knows to his sorrow, that he often fails to make himself understood, even when he adopts the commonest and simplest form of speech. The words a man utters are not measured, in the minds of those to whom he speaks, by his experience, but by theirs. Words are meaningless, save to those who have, in their own experience, a significance to give them. Be they as full of meaning as they may, in the mouth of him who utters them, they fall as empty sounds on the ears of those who listen unless they who listen have the same inward experience as he who speaks. How different is the import of the same words to different minds. How different is the import of that word death, when, with our childish simplicity and curiosity, we look from our mother's arms into the coffin to see the baby-corpse, from what it is in after life, when, one by one, all our early associates and friends and companions have dropped away, and we stand alone by the new-made grave of the last, the best loved one! And how different, too, is the meaning of that same word death, to him who looks upon the grave as the end of life, and sees buried, in its darkness and silence, all that which is to him but the dearer and lovelier and more beloved part of himself, from what it is to him who regards the grave merely as the door of entrance, through which we pass from this world of trial, sin, and suffering, to our everlasting Home, where is repose and joy and blessedness forever and ever! No matter what are the words one uses, nor what is the meaning he seems to himself to be conveying, if that particular fact, he would communicate, be not a fact of the experience of him to whom he would communicate it, let him be assured that to him it is incommunicable. No matter with what wisdom we speak, we can impart no more than they, to whom we speak, are prepared to interpret by what they have thought, felt, joyed, or sorrowed in themselves.

The darkness, we sometimes complain of in men's speech and in books, is not unfrequently the darkness of our own minds. To say of a book, that it is unintelligible, is seldom any thing more than to say, that we are aware of nothing in our experience, by which it can be interpreted. A wise man, especially a modest man, is slow to infer, from the fact that he does not comprehend a book, that it contains nothing to be

comprehended. We often fancy, too, that we understand an author, when we have not the remotest suspicion of his meaning. His words are so common, his manner is so familiar, he talks so much like one of our old friends, that we never think of asking ourselves, whether we understand him or not. One day we shall read him, and be startled at the new and unthought-of meaning we discover in his words, and we shall be filled with wonder that we did not see it before. We rarely understand one another. Only they who have a common experience are mutually intelligible. This is the reason why we are so estranged one from another. Two men meet for the first time, they converse together, understand each other, and they are friends forever. Let men but understand one another, and all strife, hatreds, contentions, wars, are at an end; and of this they seem to have a secret consciousness, for this is what they imply, whether they know it or not, when they say of two or more persons, "there is a good understanding between them."

They, who, like Nicodemus, sneer at the New Birth, have made as little proficiency in philosophy as in theology. No man, who has not been born again, been born spiritually as well as naturally, can see the kingdom of God, in a philosophical, any more than in a religious sense. There are some things which the natural man may understand, and there are some things which he cannot, for they are spiritually discerned. Spiritual things, be they expressed in what language they may, can be discerned only by spiritual men. Spiritual things are foolishness to the natural man, and the common sense man laughs outright at the profound words of the philosopher. When the natural man becomes a spiritual man, he finds that what he had called foolishness, are the deep and unsearchable things of God, and the common sense man, when he becomes a philosopher, stands in awe of that at which he had laughed. Let no man laugh at what he understands not, for the day may come when he shall weep at his folly; when he shall bitterly condemn himself, for his previous want of spiritual discernment.

We know no help for this difficulty, on the part of the unregenerate, to understand the regenerate. No matter what terms are used; the most common household words will be as dark, as unmeaning, as are said to be the most abstruse, the most far-fetched terms ever adopted by the most hopeless Germanizing Transcendentalist. Admitting then that Locke did write on metaphysical subjects in a sort of common

sense phraseology, we cannot esteem it a very great merit. We have sometimes thought that, by studying to adapt this style and language to the apprehension of the unlearned and the superficial, he retarded instead of accelerating the progress of metaphysical science. It is true, that the manner in which he treated metaphysics made his "Essay" somewhat popular, and secured it a much larger number of readers, than it probably would have had, if he had written more in the manner of the scholar; but we very much doubt whether he by this means added at all to the number of metaphysicians. He became popular because nobody found any thing in his "Essay," which made any body a whit the wiser. People read him and called themselves philosophers, without having one grain more of philosophic thought than they had before they read him. By creating the impression that men can become philosophers, without any severe mental discipline, he checked instead of encouraging that patient and laborious thought, without which no man becomes a philosopher; just as he, who is always telling what an easy thing it is to be a Christian, hinders those efforts which alone can make us Christians. We are far from thinking that Locke himself was superficial, but he helped to make others superficial, or rather he hindered others from becoming profound. The most striking characteristic of his followers has ever been their superficialness. Few of them have ever dreamed of penetrating beneath the surface of things. English literature, during the period of his reign, contrasts singularly enough with that of the epoch which preceded him. Saving the productions of those writers who were not of his school, of those whose hearts were touched with the coals from off religion's altar, or whose souls were kindled up by the great democratic movements of the time, English Literature of the eighteenth century is, to the earnest spirits of our times, after the age of childhood, or early youth, absolutely unreadable. It is as light, as shallow, as unproductive, as the soil on one of our immense pine barrens. We look into it in vain for a new or profound thought, for a thrilling remark, for something which goes down into the deep places of the heart, and moves the soul at its bottom. We grow weary of it, and pass it over in order to come at the richer and profounder and more living literature of the seventeenth century,—the literature of those "giants of old," as they have been called. How far the light and shallow, cold and lifeless literature of

England, during the eighteenth century, is to be attributed to the influence of Locke's philosophy, we shall not undertake to determine; but of this we are certain, that a different literature is never to be looked for, where that philosophy is the dominant one.

We trust that the design of these remarks will not be misinterpreted. We have no wish to dress up philosophy in the garb of the old Schoolmen. We are advocates for no technical phraseology, for no unintelligible jargon. We set our faces, as much as any one, against all affected or far-fetched modes of speech. We ask for naturalness and simplicity. We ask every man to make it a matter of conscience, to speak and write as intelligibly to even the undisciplined mind, as the nature of his subject will admit. But we insist upon it, that the interests of science, literature, philosophy, are never to be sacrificed for the sake of adapting ourselves to the apprehension of men of no spiritual experience. We need not "bring philosophy down from its high places, in order to add to its usefulness." This is a sort of levelling which is uncalled for. Bring the masses up, if you will, enable them to comprehend the highest philosophy, if you can; but never talk of bringing philosophy down to vulgar capacities. We have heard too much, in our day, about the necessity of "adapting ourselves to the capacity of the common people," and about the danger of "shooting over the heads of the people." We have no patience with this left-handed democracy. We have no patience with men who talk of letting themselves down. There has been quite too much letting down. We would not bring the great gods down to earth, even if we could; but we would raise men to heaven, and enable them to hold fellowship with the Divinity. Philosophy is not, and never was, too high; but the people are, and ever have been, too low. Let him, who would "enhance the dignity of philosophy by adding to its usefulness," set himself seriously and earnestly at work, to elevate the people. Let him, if his heart throb with genuine love of man, and his soul burn to augment the sum of human well-being, let him study to elevate the masses, to quicken their dormant energies, to create within them a craving for the loftiest range of thought, and to make them feel that they may aspire to it. But we pray him to withhold his condescension. Let him forget that the masses are below him; let him speak from his own full heart and strong convictions, to the uni-

versal heart and mind of Humanity, in his own natural tones, with all the power and depth and sublimity of thought and feeling he can command. Let him speak to all men as his equals, and speak out his ripest thoughts, his profoundest reflections, and have no fear that he will speak in vain.

Assuredly we would not seek obscure modes of expression; we would ever be as transparent as possible; but we cannot consent to sacrifice depth for the sake of clearness, to dilute our thoughts for fear that they may be too strong for the intellects of our readers. We will take no pains to supersede the necessity of severe thinking on the part of those, for whom we write. If we aid them, it is not by thinking for them, but by compelling them to think for themselves. There is no such thing as one man's thinking for another. The real difficulty in the way of acquiring a knowledge of a given science, does not consist, and never did consist, in the language adopted by its cultivators. There are difficulties which lie deeper than words, and which no form of words can remove. Set all the world a-talking metaphysics, and nothing is gained, unless the real metaphysical problems be clearly seen, and the bearings of the proffered solutions fully comprehended; and these problems—state them in what words you will—are not perceived, and these solutions—express them in the simplest terms you can—are not and cannot be appreciated, without severe mental discipline, without long, patient, and profound thought. And thought is one's own act. It cannot be imparted from one mind to another. It is impossible to form a tunnel out of common sense phraseology, by means of which, thought may be poured from one mind into another, as we pour wine into a demijohn. Knowledge, in its higher and nobler sense, is ever the mind's own creation. It is wrought out in the mind by the mind itself. Man was to gain his bread by the sweat of his face, by hard work; and it is only by hard work, by incessant toil and mental labor, that the mind can attain to true philosophical knowledge. This may be discouraging to the indolent, and frightful to all who are wanting in robust mental health; but so be it then. There is no help for it. There is no labor-saving machinery, that can be introduced into the mind's workshop, no locomotive to run by steam on the mind's rail-road to philosophy. The old way is still the only way. The various inventions, christened "Thinking made easy," so numerous of late, stand us in no stead.

The only machinery that will work at all, is that of patient and scrupulous observation, and calm and profound reflection. He who will not observe, he who will not reflect, can, by no process yet discovered, ever become a philosopher.

We have dwelt long on this point, not so much for the sake of replying to the writer in the *Examiner*, as because we deem it of some importance in itself; because we are fully convinced that a preparation is no less needed, in order to be a good hearer or a good reader, than in order to be a good speaker or a good writer; and because we have thought it neither mistimed nor misplaced, to admonish those—and many there are—who sneer at what they do not understand, and "speak evil of dignities," that

> "There are more things in heaven and earth—
> Than are dreamt of in" their "philosophy."

Still we wish it to be understood, that we do not look for this preparation exclusively in saloons or in universities. These are not the places in which we are most likely to find those, whose hearts and minds are best prepared to hear and comprehend the philosopher. They only have the preparation needed, whose hearts have sorrowed before the Mystery of the universe, and whose minds are scarred by their conflicts with Doubt. And these are not seldomest found in that mighty multitude, on whom we often look down, from our high places, in pity or in scorn. We shall, if we seek, often find those to have the inward experience required, who have been to no school but Nature's, and had no instructers but the internal whisperings of God's Spirit. Whoever has doubted, whoever has really sorrowed that there was no man found to open the book of God's providence, and read him the Destiny of Man and Society, is prepared to hear and to comprehend the philosopher.

Nor let it be supposed that we would debar the people at large from the truths the philosopher professes to have demonstrated. These truths are not the peculiar possessions of the philosopher. They are the truths of the universal reason, and are the property alike of all men. They are taught to all men by the spontaneous reason, which is the same in kind in every man. These truths are not philosophy. Philosophy is the explanation and verification of them. The masses, who see nothing mysterious in these truths, and who have never thought of questioning them, do not wish to have them explained or verified. The explanation and

verification, which is philosophy, are unintelligible to them. But the truths themselves, are not unintelligible to them. Whoever proclaims to the masses these truths which the philosopher has demonstrated, cleared up, and legitimated, is sure to be heard and believed and followed.

The fact is, the great mass of mankind are not, as to their beliefs, in so sad a condition, as schoolmen sometimes imagine. The educated, the scientific are prone to look upon the masses as possessing no ideas, as having no knowledge but that which they obtain from human teachers. This is peculiarly the case with Locke and his followers. According to them, the child receives no patrimony from his father; he is born into the world naked and destitute in soul as well as in body, and with no innate power to weave himself a garment. His mind is a *tabula rasa*, on which others indeed may write what they will, but upon which he himself can write nothing, save the summing up of what others have written thereon. Evil as well as good, falsehood as well as truth, may be written thereon. It depends wholly on the external circumstances, the quality of the masters secured, whether the mind's blank sheets shall be written over with truth or falsehood. The masses, after the flesh, it must be admitted are surrounded with unwholesome influences, and provided with most wretched teachers. They must then be filled with evil thoughts and false notions. Their beliefs, their hopes and fears, likes and dislikes, are deserving no respect. Hence, on the one hand, the contempt of the masses manifested by so large a portion of the educated, even in democratic America, and, on the other hand, the pity and commiseration, the great condescension, and vast amount of baby-talk, which equally characterize another, but more kind-hearted, portion of the more favored classes. Of this last division, we presume, is the writer on whom we are remarking. He is not a man to look with contempt on human beings; he feels that we ought to labor to benefit the masses; but we presume he has no suspicion that the masses have any correct beliefs, but such as they receive from the favored and superior few. Hence his strong desire that all men, who write, should write in a simple style, and so let themselves down, that they will not be above the capacities of the many. He would not, we presume, think of learning from them, or of verifying their beliefs; but merely of teaching them what they ought to believe. We bring not this as a charge against him. It speaks well for

his goodness of heart, and proves him to be as good a democrat as a follower of Locke consistently can be.

But in point of fact, the masses are not so poor and destitute as all this supposes. They are not so dependent on *us*, the enlightened few, as we sometimes think them. We need not feel that, if we should die, all wisdom would die with us, and that there would be henceforth no means by which the millions would be able to come at truth and virtue. Reason is the true light, and it enlighteneth every man who cometh into the world. It is, as we have said, the same in all men, and therefore it is that no man is left in darkness. The reason has two modes of activity, one the spontaneous, the other the reflective. In the great majority of men, the reflective reason, which gives philosophy, is never awakened, and consequently but a small minority of mankind ever become philosophers. But the spontaneous reason developes itself in all men, in the highest and the lowest, in the uneducated as well as in the educated. This reason, the spontaneous reason, furnishes the universal beliefs of mankind, which are termed common sense. It furnishes all the ideas we ever have; teaches us all the truths we ever know. As this reason is the same in all men, it gives to all men the same ideas, furnishes them with the same truths, the same beliefs. These masses then, on which we look down with contempt or with pity for their weakness and ignorance, have all the truths we who look down upon them have; they have the same ideas, and the same beliefs. They are not so destitute then as the Lockeites thought them; they are not so erroneous then as the self-complacent aristocrat judged them, nor so dependent on their betters, as *great* men have generally counted them. Their views, beliefs, hopes, fears, likes, dislikes, are worthy to be examined, are to be respected. The masses are not to be pitied then, but respected, and herein is laid the foundation of true philanthropy.

But we are controverted. We are met by men who have no confidence in the masses, no respect for their beliefs, and who regard them as blind, infatuated, bent on evil, and only evil, and that continually. Here comes then the doubt; common sense is suspected, and put on trial. We may ourselves doubt. That is, we may, in looking in upon ourselves, doubt the legitimacy of those beliefs we have had in common with the rest of mankind, or, looking abroad upon the immense masses of human beings, following blindly their

instincts, we may seriously doubt whether they are going in the right direction. There is a problem now in our minds. The reflective reason awakes, and we reflect on this problem, and seek its solution. This is to philosophize; and here is seen the utility of philosophy. We did not seek philosophy for the sake of instructing those masses; we do not need it, that we may communicate it to them; we merely desire to know whether their beliefs be well founded, whether relying, as they do, on common sense, following, as they do, the teachings of the spontaneous reason, they are safe or not. Shall we pity, or reverence them? War against them or become their allies? This is the problem. Philosophy is merely the solution we arrive at by reflection.

Well, what is this solution? Is common sense a liar? Are the teachings of the spontaneous reason false? Is Humanity doomed to everlasting and universal error? So says the sceptic, so say Locke and his followers, or so they must say, if faithful to the principles they avow. But so say not we. Different from this is the solution we have obtained. We cannot now undertake to prove that our solution is the true one; but the reflective reason has with us legitimated the teachings of the spontaneous reason, legitimated common sense, assured us that it is the voice of the spontaneous reason, and that the spontaneous reason is the voice of God. True and holy for us then are the instincts of the masses; true and holy for us then are the universal beliefs of mankind. We no longer pity the many, we no longer apologize for their conduct, no longer labor to change their faith. We stand in awe of them, and apply ourselves to the work of enabling them to march to the glorious destiny God hath appointed them, and to which his own hand is leading them.

Philosophy, as it is a solution of the problem which doubt has placed in the mind, can be understood only by those in whose minds the problem has been placed. By this fact the philosopher is, and must be, separated from the great mass of his brethren; but since the truths he has demonstrated, and which he believes, are precisely the truths of the spontaneous reason, precisely the universal beliefs of mankind, he is also connected with his race, and, by all the truth he believes intimately bound to the humblest, as well as to the proudest, member of the human family. No stranger is he then to Humanity. Not with contempt does he look on the masses, not with scorn does he treat their

instincts. Nothing that is human is foreign to him. He reverences in each human being the human nature he reverences in himself, and in each human being he finds all the elements of that truth and virtue, his own reason and conscience bid him believe and obey.

It will be seen from this, that our philosophy, notwithstanding certain aristocratic airs, is by no means wanting in its democratic tendencies. Its aim is not utility, but the establishment of truth, and that not for the many, but for the the few; nevertheless the truth established always benefits the world, and the truth established in this case, is the truth which every body is interested in. We by no means reject common sense; we love, we obey it, because we have legitimated its right to be loved and obeyed. All true philosophy accepts, and explains, and legitimates, the instinctive beliefs of mankind. Philosophy therefore, though it is not common sense, is in perfect harmony with it.

SCHMUCKER'S PSYCHOLOGY.*

[From the Democratic Review for October, 1842.]

Most Americans, and, we were about to say, all Englishmen, of the present day, who devote themselves to philosophic studies, take altogether too low and contracted views of philosophy; and seem to have no suspicion of the real grandeur and extent of its province. They make philosophy, even when wishing to commend it to our love and reverence, consist in mere speculation; or in the mere analysis and classification of dry abstractions, or the dead phenomena of our past lives, utterly incapable of affording us either light or warmth for the duties that lie before us.

Rightly defined, philosophy is so much of the religion of a given country, or of a given epoch, as the human mind in that country or epoch is able to understand and appropriate. It is the science of life, and embraces within its view God, Man, and Nature. Its aim is to enlighten the mind and warm the heart. It does not merely make discursions on what is, or what has been; it does not seek merely to explain and account for the past and the present, to make us familiar with the laws of Providence, of the universe, or of humanity; but aims to disclose to men a new and a loftier Ideal of wisdom, beauty and goodness; and, therefore, to have an immediate bearing on every-day life. It surveys the past and the present, it is true; is erudite and observant; inquires into the nature of man and the universe, into the origin and relations of their respective phenomena; but always with a view to practical life,—always with the sole aim of making mankind wiser and better; of ameliorating their moral, intellectual, or physical condition, and of inducing them to live in stricter obedience to the law of their being, and the will of their Maker.

They wholly mistake the nature and purpose of philosophy who define it to be a merely speculative science. It is

* Psychology; or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy, on the Basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies. By S. S. Schmucker, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa. New York: 1842.

not, as too many of our modern psychologists contend, the product of mere reflection, of what M. Cousin terms the reflective reason. Its province is precisely that of religion, of which it is merely a special phase; it embraces the same objects, contemplates the same ends, uses the same means, and relies on the same authority. The philosopher is never a cold, dry, withered-up being, without heart or soul, surveying with indifference, without passion or sympathy, all systems, all opinions, all beings, and all phenomena; but he is a living man, deeply, often terribly, in earnest, and manifesting in its most awful energy, man's threefold power to know, to love, and to do. He is no amateur, no dilettante; but a full grown man, hearty, robust, and resolute; meaning what he says, and doing what he means. He thinks, speculates, feels, acts, always to some end. He has always a point to carry—a purpose to accomplish. His philosophizing is never but a means to an end. He is one who is not and cannot be satisfied with what has already been gained. Prevalent systems of faith strike him as defective, false, or mischievous; approved practices as low, corrupt, and corrupting; established forms of worship as puerile, cold, and uninspiring; existing governments as oppressive, tyrannical, grinding, at best inadequate to man's wants, rights, duties, and destiny; and over them all, over the whole Actual, there hovers to his mind, a bright and kindling Ideal of something fairer, freer, loftier, wiser, and better; more conducive to the glory of God, and the relief of man. To this Ideal, seen clearly or dimly, which forsakes him never, his soul is wedded, for better or for worse, for life or for death, time or eternity; and he studies, toils, struggles, suffers, lives, dies, but to realize it in the practical life of his race. No man is a philosopher who has not an ideal Good, as well as an ideal Truth or Beauty, which he burns to realize, and which he will realize, cost what it may. Something more than reflection, then, is necessary to make the philosopher. He needs to be inspired, as much as does the genuine poet, the prophet, or the founder of a Church.

Philosophy is not merely the science of man, of nature, or of God. It is the science of sciences; that which brings all the special sciences up to a common unity, disclosing the common basis of them all, and directing their cultivation and application to a common end,—the continued progress of mankind, or the uninterrupted amelioration, in the speed-

iest manner possible, of their moral, intellectual, and physical condition.

In this high, this religious sense, we have no generally recognized philosophy among us. We have sciences, but no science. All is special, individual, anarchical; nothing general, catholic, orderly. Thought has no unity, either in aim or result. The special sciences we cultivate are not subjected to one and the same law of thought—are not pervaded by one and the same living idea—and do not conspire to one and the same social and religious end. Theology, geology, chemistry, physiology, psychology, ethics, politics, are treated as so many distinct and separate sciences; not merely as different branches of one and the same science. In studying one of them, we must learn what we must unlearn in studying another,—receive in this as true what in that we must reject as false. Contradiction, confusion, falsehood, therefore, reign in our scientific world, and science is able to do comparatively little for the advancement of the race.

In consequence of this anarchy, arising from the *individualism* which predominates, all the sciences, not excepting even theology, have with us somewhat of an irreligious tendency. The radical conception of religion is that something which binds, lays under obligation, is authoritative, has the right to legislate, to command. Religion is always authoritative, always legislative; it imposes the law; commands, nay, enforces us to do our best to realize the ideal it proposes. Of this ideal it permits us to lose sight never; but compels us to seek it, though at the risk of being scorned and derided, though we must brave exile and the dungeon, the scaffold, or the cross. But none of our sciences are authoritative; none of them propose an ideal and bind us, *in foro conscientiæ*, to realize it. They have, then, no religious, but an irreligious character. Their authority is lost by the fact, that they are mere individual sciences, wanting a common bond of unity, a vivifying principal, embracing, explaining, and uniting them all in one uniform and catholic science. They are now weak, and mutually destructive, like a mass of individuals thrown together, and striving to exist together without any power of cohesion, or principle of social order, which is out of the question; for each is infinitely repellant of the other, and one perpetually neutralizes or thwarts the efforts of another.

The secret of this scientific anarchy may be found in the

separation which has for a long time been attempted between religion and philosophy. Philosophy is asserted to be of human origin, and religion to be of divine origin. Religious people formerly condemned philosophy as repugnant to religion; philosophers have latterly condemned religion as repugnant to what they have been pleased to call philosophy. More lately still, the rational and better-informed among religious people have contended that God cannot teach through nature one doctrine, and an opposite doctrine through Revelation; and they therefore, have sought to harmonize religion and philosophy, by making the teachings of the one quadrate with those of the other. This is what Leibnitz attempts in his "Theodicea."

But these last fall into as great, though not so obvious, an error as the other two; and do equally separate religion and philosophy. Philosophy is said to be that amount of truth to which we attain by the natural exercise of our faculties, without any special aid from our Maker: religion is the truth which we are taught by supernatural revelation. Here are then two systems of truth, and, if we examine their contents, we shall find them treating precisely the same questions. Now these two systems must needs be either opposing systems or parallel systems. If philosophy, acknowledged to be of human origin, be true, what need of divine revelation? If divine revelation be necessary to teach us the truth, what is the use of philosophy? Or how can philosophy, resting upon a basis independent of revelation, possibly be true? The separation of religion and philosophy, then, necessarily declares, to say the least, that one or the other is superfluous.

But there is no separation between religion and philosophy admissible. We do not mean to say by this, that the two coincide or harmonize in their teaching; but that the two are not two, but one. *We have no original means of arriving at the knowledge of truth but the supernatural revelation of God.* This revelation is the necessary basis of all that can be received as truth, whether termed religious truth or philosophical truth. Revelation is as necessary to furnish the basis of philosophy, as it is to furnish the basis of religion. Philosophy, then, is not a system of truth built up on a separate foundation, independent of religion, and able, and therefore having the right, to sit in judgment on religion, to overthrow it, or to explain and verify it; but is, if it be philosophy, identical with religion—the form

which religion necessarily assumes when subjected to the action of the human mind. Instead, then, of seeking to reconcile religion and philosophy, we should seek their synthesis, to resolve philosophy into religion, and to find in divine revelation the one solid basis for our whole faith, whether termed religious or philosophical.

A people believing in the Christian religion can have, can at least tolerate, no philosophy resting on a basis independent of Christianity, and contemplating any Ideal but the Christian. Christianity is the philosophy, and the sole philosophy of Christendom. It is with all Christian people the supreme law of life. It has then the right to preside over the whole moral, intellectual, and physical development of humanity. Its Ideal is the only authorized Ideal. In Christianity, then, we must seek the science of sciences, the common bond, the catholic principle, that raises up all special sciences to a common unity, vivifies them, and directs their application to a common end. The anarchy and irreligious tendency of modern sciences grow out of the fact, that the authority of Christianity in regard to them is denied, and the principle of individual liberty, in its most unrestricted sense, is affirmed. This must be corrected. For after all, we cannot get rid of Christianity, nor of its authority, even if we would; and our efforts to do so only confuse our language, and render us unintelligible each to himself, and all to one another. Christianity has become our life; it lies at the bottom of all our literature; and we cannot think, feel, or act, without thinking, feeling, acting it. It, so far as we have realized it, has become human nature, natural reason, the soul, the heart, the mind of all men. What is needed, then, in the philosophical world, is the reassertion of the legitimate authority of Christianity, in all that pertains to human development. By this reassertion we shall attain to a complete and living synthesis of every branch of human science; and the whole of life will be harmonious and consistent, and society in all its departments will be subordinated to the one catholic principle of the Gospel, for the realization on earth of the true Christian Ideal, that is, the establishment of the reign of God in all human affairs.

The work before us is a sincere effort of its author to contribute his quota towards advancing our knowledge of ourselves; and, as such, whatever estimate may be formed

of its positive merits, deserves to be cordially welcomed, and honestly considered. We have read the work with some interest. We like its spirit; its general tone and sentiment. It has given us a favorable opinion of the worth and ability of its author, as a man whose personal influence on the young men committed to his care must be pure and elevating. As a work on an interesting branch of science, it displays more than ordinary capacity, and makes us regret that the author did not enlarge his views, adopt a more comprehensive plan, and take in a wider range of topics. Still, it bears on its face, and we are able to find, after the most diligent search, no proofs that its author has any tolerable conceptions of philosophy in the broad, catholic sense in which we have defined it. It is true that he professedly treats only a special department of philosophy, and it would be unjust to demand, in a work intended to discuss merely a particular science, all that belongs to science in general. We do not, therefore, complain of the book because it treats merely a special branch of general science, nor because it confines itself to what properly belongs to that special branch; but because it does not treat that special branch in the light of general philosophy. The author does not show us its precise place in universal science; its relation to the Christian Ideal; nor its practical bearing on the great duties of every-day life.

A genuine psychology—one worth the writing or the reading—cannot possibly be written but in the light of a general philosophy of God, man, and nature. Such a work must answer the questions of man's wants, rights, duties, and destiny. But these questions are never answered by studying man in the abstract, as isolated from nature, from his race, and his God; but by studying him in the concrete, as a living man, as existing in God, in nature, in humanity; that is, in his actual relations, connexions, and dependencies. To study man in these relations, connexions, and dependencies, is to study him in the light of a general philosophy. Dr. Schmucker does not so study him, and therefore leaves all these great questions of man's wants, rights, duties, and destiny, not only unanswered, but even unasked.

A psychology which leaves out these questions, the only questions of any practical importance in the conduct of life, is, to say the least, of questionable utility, and by no means precisely the psychology a wise man would wish to have studied in our colleges and academies. For, after all, what

is its subject-matter? Man as a living being? a social being? a moral being? a religious being? Not at all; but simply man as an abstraction, as isolated from God, nature, and humanity; in which sense he has no actual existence, does not *live* at all, and is at best a mere possibility or virtuality. To know man in this isolated and abstract sense, in which the questions of his wants, his rights, his duties, and his destiny, find no appropriate place, is no more to know man in any true and worthy sense of the term, than knowledge of the properties of the triangle is knowledge of that threefold energy of our natures by which we are able to *act*, to *know*, and to *love*. Dr. Schmucker seems to us, therefore, like a great many others, to have mistaken in the outset the real significance of psychology, and the real questions it ought to discuss. By rejecting the concrete man—the living man—man in his relations with God, with nature, and with other men, and confining him solely to the mere isolated and abstract man, he has given us not psychology, but at best a mere *psycho-anatomy*, bearing no more relation to psychology, properly so called, than anatomy does to physiology. It is a mere dissection of the dead subject, an analysis and classification of the phenomena of the dead subject, which can throw little or no light on the living.

But not to cavil at a term—admitting that the work before us is rightly named psychology, or an analysis and classification of the phenomena of the soul, we may still ask, what is its use, if it leave out all religious, ethical, social, and political questions? What does man live for? In relation to what should he be instructed? Is a work which throws no light, which does not even profess to throw any light, on any of the great practical questions of real life, precisely the work for our young men to study—a work that indicates no lofty social, political, moral, or religious Ideal on the part of the author, and that demands no pure, deep, serious purpose, no high, holy, and moral aspirations on the part of the student? What, again, do we live for? Has life no purpose? Was man made merely to play at marbles? If man was made for an end more serious, high, and solemn, what is it? "What is the chief end of man?" That end once determined, should not all instruction, all education, nay, all life, be directed to its fulfilment? Will Dr. Schmucker tell us what relation there is between making ourselves familiar with these psychological abstractions,

distinct from all the great practical questions of life, and living to fulfil the end for which God made us, and clothed us with the power to do, to know, and to love? The author who leaves all the great moral, religious, social, and political questions by the way, and passes over untouched all that concerns us in the daily conduct of life, is infinitely removed, in our judgment, from producing a work of practical utility, and from the right to call himself a philosopher, or his speculations philosophy.

To have gone further, to have left the abstract regions to which he for the most part confines himself, and to have entered upon the great concrete questions of actual life, would, no doubt, have compelled Dr. Schmucker to touch upon debateable ground, perhaps to stir up long and bitter controversy. It would very likely have involved him in the party and sectarian conflicts of the day, and have effectually excluded his book from colleges and academies. But what then? What is the use of books or of essays that touch no practical question, that throw, or attempt to throw, light on no doubtful or still unsettled point of moral, religious, social, or political faith? No man who speaks freely, boldly, and honestly, on questions which really concern us in the conduct of life, in which men do really take an interest, questions on which it is worth one's while to speak at all, but must run athwart somebody's convictions or prejudices; but must stir up somebody's angry feeling; because there will always be somebody indicted by what he says. He must necessarily tread on somebody's corns. But what then? This is the risk every man who is really in earnest to spread truth, and ameliorate the moral, intellectual, or physical condition of his race, must run. It is only at this price, that he purchases the opportunity to labor for human progress. Whoso counts this price too high, or feels unwilling or unable to pay it,—let him hold his peace. His silence will hardly prove to be a public calamity.

All faith, if genuine, if deep, if earnest, if living, is, say what we will to the contrary, exclusive and intolerant. Nothing is so exclusive and intolerant as truth, which has no patience with error, but excludes the semblance even of falsehood. This excessive liberality, about which some men take it into their heads to talk, which regards all opinions with equal respect, and alike proper to be inculcated, is not liberality but indifferency, and more to be dreaded in Society, in Church or State, than the most narrow-minded

bigotry, or the most ranting fanaticism. There is no sound morality nor practical wisdom in the remark, "I care not what a man's opinions are, if his conduct be good." Just as if a man's opinions were not a part of his conduct, and usually the most important part of it. The events of history are nothing but so many experiments, successful or unsuccessful, of the race to embody its opinions, to realize its faith. Men's beliefs are powers, and the only earthly powers of which the wise man stands in awe. A simple geographical opinion entering and germinating in the breast of a bold mariner, discovers a new continent, and changes the direction of the whole industrial activity of the race. A simple belief, that we should obey God, rather than kings, parliaments, and prelates, taking possession of a few honest, earnest-minded men in the western and midland counties of England, sends them on board the Mayflower, lands them one cold December's day on our bleak and rock-bound coast, and makes them the instruments of laying the foundation of a free republic, of opening a new school of social and political science for the world, and of demonstrating what man is and may be, when and where he has free scope to be what his Creator designed him to be. Faith is every thing. There is not a single act of ordinary and every-day life, that could be done without faith on the part of the actor. Every honest man does and cannot but hold his own faith to be the true faith; and therefore does and cannot but hold every opposing faith to be false. To be as willing to see that opposing faith prevail, as to see his own prevail, would imply on his part, as much respect for falsehood as for truth; that in his estimation, falsehood is as good as truth, and worth as much to mankind. A man who is as willing to see falsehood as truth propagated, is no true man. He may be learned, polite, decorous, but God, truth, righteousness, have no greater enemy than he, on earth, or under the earth. Such are the men who are always in our way. They care for none of these things. They chill our hearts; they damp our zeal; they weaken our hands. They belong to the race of Do-nothings. The advancement of mankind owes nothing to their exertions. Never out of their class does God raise up prophets, sages, heroes, and martyrs, by whose unwearied efforts, generous self-immolation, and unshrinking obedience to a high and living faith, the race is enabled to advance towards a higher and happier state. They are the lukewarm, the neither-cold-or-hot,

insipid and nauseating, whom God, in addressing the angel of the churches declares he will "spew out of his mouth."

But happily for the cause of truth and righteousness, the bulk of mankind are sincere and earnest, and are strongly attached to their faith. Their opinions are to them serious matters, matters to be lived for, or if need be, died for. They do not and cannot hold it a matter of indifference to individual or social, to temporal or eternal well-being, what a man believes; and so long as this is the fact, no man will be able to put forth on practical questions, new, uncommon, or unpopular opinions, without stirring up controversy, without encountering serious opposition, and most likely not without calling down upon his head, many a shower of wrath and abuse. This result is inevitable, unless mankind be reduced to that state of perfect indifferency, in which the opinions one puts forth, whatever their character, can excite no interest, command no attention. But, once more, what then? If we are to refrain from discussing in our elementary works the great questions of practical life, which "come home to men's bosoms and business," through fear of this controversy, opposition, wrath, abuse, what will be the advantage of a free press? Nay, in such case, what will be the meaning of a free press? Public opinion would control it more effectually than the edicts of tyrants, backed by an armed police, fines, dungeons, and gibbets. A true man will never be rash; will never forget that his opinions are deeds, for which he is accountable to God and to society; but having done his best to ascertain the truth, fully assured of the purity and sincerity of his purpose, and having a word pressing upon his heart for utterance, he will go forth, modestly, reverently, and utter it, fearlessly and honestly, without stopping for one moment to confer with flesh and blood. He knows that he speaks at his own peril; but he takes the responsibility, and asks not that it be less. He knows the penalty he must pay for daring to be true to his own convictions of duty; but he is willing and able to pay it. He who shrinks from it, has no reason to applaud himself for the manliness of his soul. He may be assured, that he is held in no high repute in the City of God, and is by no means chosen by Providence to be an instructor of his race. Were he to speak, it would be to tell us, that which can have no practical bearing on life, or the truth long since told and realized.

Admitting, then, that Dr. Schmucker could not have constructed a system of mental philosophy, in the full signifi-

cance of the term, without touching on debateable ground, and giving rise to long and even bitter controversy, we are far from holding him excusable in sending us forth such a work as this—a work scrupulously avoiding the discussion of the only questions for the discussion of which philosophical works should be written or are needed.

Thus far we have objected to this work, on the ground that it is not a part of a general system of philosophy; that it is mere speculation on naked psychological abstractions, which have no real existence; that it leaves out of view all the great philosophical questions which relate to man's wants, rights, duties, and destiny; and therefore, leaves out the only *religious* object for which a work on philosophy can be written. But we do not stop here. Passing over these grounds of objection, taking the work as psychology in the most restricted sense possible, we hold it defective and false, and were it likely to be introduced very extensively as a text-book in colleges and academies, we should hold it to be not only defective and false, but mischievous.

The very title-page creates a presumption against it. The author calls it "The Elements of a *New* System of Mental Philosophy." A new system of mental philosophy, if by system is meant any-thing more that the order and dress in which old doctrines are presented, can hardly be looked for. Additions may be made to the old, but nothing *radically* new can be obtained. The human race is subjected to a law of continuity, which presides over all its development and growth, whether considered generically or individually. From this law human thought does not and cannot escape. The present was elaborated in, and evolved from the past. The future must be—so far as human effort is concerned—the elaboration and evolution of the present. The law of progress is that of continuous growth, which is in no case interrupted or disturbed, save as Providence aids it on, by granting, at such intervals as seems to it good, supernatural accessions of moral and intellectual strength. But these special grants, accessions, revelations, which God makes to us from time to time, as the conditions of our progress, do not break the law of continuity. They are all made in harmony with one and the same Divine Thought, of which human nature, as well as they, is an expression. They merely swell the tide of life; or as fine musical accompaniments blend in with the tones of the human

voice, swell and enrich their melody, without being in ordinary cases distinguishable from them. Jesus does not build on the ruins of Moses: Christianity does not supplant Judaism; but generalizes and fulfils it. From the first to the last, the life of humanity is a continuous growth, not strictly speaking, by development, but by assimilation, accretion.

According to this law, all radicalism, that is to say, all destruction of what was fundamental in that which has preceded, or the creation of an order of life, religious, social, or philosophical, that is new in its fundamental elements, is necessarily condemned. What is, must be always our point of departure. This is the principle that must govern us in relation to the race at large, and also in relation to a particular nation or country. Each reformer must connect his proposed reforms with the past of his own church, school, or nation; so that the continuity between its past and its future may be preserved. If he do not, he will labor to no end; he will fail in his projects, and deservedly fail. The American philosopher, then, must not attempt a *new* system of philosophy; but must seek to continue uninterruptedly, by improving it, the philosophy the race has always embraced, and as modified by the faith and practice of his own nation. In other words, the American philosopher cannot transplant into his own country the philosophy of France or Germany, nor will it answer for him to seek to construct a philosophy for his countrymen from the French or German point of view. He must construct it from the English point of view, and continue English philosophy, as modified, as we may say, by Jonathan Edwards, our only American metaphysician, and by our peculiar civil, political, social, and religious institutions. Our philosophy must be English philosophy Americanized, like the great mass of our population. We do not, then, want, as we cannot have, a new system of philosophy. Locke, Reid, and Jonathan Edwards, have laid the foundation for us, have begun the work, which we are merely to continue.

But even if a new system of philosophy were needed, and could be looked for, we must assure Dr. Schmucker that he deceives himself if he thinks that he has furnished such a system. Saving his terminology, in some instances barbarous, and rarely felicitous, the distribution of the several parts, for the most part immethodical except in appearance, and now and then a statement no other philoso-

pher would willingly hazard, we not recollect a single portion of the work, either as to its thought, reasoning, or illustration, that can be called new. The author is rarely up with the Scottish school of Reid and Stewart, and is far below, as a mere psychologist, the Eclectic school of modern Germany and France. Even Upham's Philosophy, superficial and meagre as it unquestionably is, taken as a whole, is altogether superior to this, which throws no new light on a single metaphysical question, sets in a clearer point of view not a single fact of human nature, and adds nothing to our knowledge of the laws of the production or association of the psychological phenomena. If the author had spent less time in studying his own mind, and more in making himself acquainted with the views of such men as Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Reid, and Kant, to say nothing of Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, he would hardly have ventured to call his crude notions a new system of mental philosophy. They can be new only to those who are not at all in the habit of reading on metaphysical subjects.

Dr. Schmucker not only tells us that his system is new, but that it is constructed on the basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Has he any clear and definite notion of the sense in which he uses these terms, when he declares them the basis of his system?—or has he adopted them, without reflecting much on their import, from Dr. Reid, in whose philosophy they play so conspicuous a part? We have looked through his book without finding any clear or exact definition of them; and in any sense in which either is intelligible or acceptable to us, neither constitutes a basis of his system.

Common Sense, as the term is used by Dr. Reid, does not properly designate, as he supposed, a distinct and separate faculty of human nature, but a special degree of our general faculty of intelligence. Man by nature, in his very essence, is intelligent, capable of knowing, and intelligent to the requisite degree for seeing, perceiving, or knowing, in the three worlds of space, time, and eternity. The world which we call the world of eternity, is sometimes called the transcendental world, because its realities transcend those of time and space; and also, sometimes, the world of absolute, universal, immutable and necessary truth. The contents of this world, after Plato and Platonists, we call IDEAS; Reid

called them constituent elements of human nature, first principles of human belief; Aristotle and Kant term them categories of the reason, and in their view categories of the reason as a faculty of human nature. They are the first principles of all science, and of each of the sciences. They, however, do not, as some moderns seem to suppose, reside in the mind, but out of it, in what Plato and the Greeks call the Logos (λογος) and which we may call, with M. Cousin, "the world of Reason," of absolute, universal, and necessary Truth. But, though these ideas or first principles, do not subsist *in* the human mind, the human mind is constructed in accordance, and placed in intimate relation with them; so as to be always capable of perceiving them, not detached, not as mere abstractions, but so far as they enter into, and constitute the basis of the finite, particular, contingent, concrete objects of time and space, save in connexion with which we never recognize them. The power to perceive these ideas, or first principles of belief, is what Dr. Reid really understood by Common Sense; that is, not merely a sense common to all men, but a power in each man to perceive, to entertain, or to assume certain first principles, *common and indispensable to every act of intellectual life.*

The reality of this power cannot be questioned. Without it, as Dr. Reid has shown over and over again, man could have not only no firm basis for metaphysical science, no recognition of objects transcending time and space, but in point of fact no science at all; but would be incapable of a single act of cognition whatever. But this power, the reason (*Vernunft*) of Coleridge and the Germans, which they seek to distinguish from the understanding (*Verstand*), is not a distinct and separate faculty of human nature, but, as we have said, merely a special degree of the general faculty of intelligence. To know may indeed have various conditions and degrees, but, as M. Cousin has well remarked, it is always one and the same phenomenon, whatever its sphere or degree. I know always by virtue of one and the same faculty of intelligence, whether the objects of my knowledge be the contents of space, of time, or of eternity; that is, whether these objects be bodies, events, or ideas; or whether I know mediately through external bodily organs, or immediately by intuition. Had Dr. Reid carried his analysis a little farther, he would have perceived that his "first principles" are *objects* of the mind, not *laws* of human belief; and he might then have escaped the error of calling

Common Sense a distinct and separate faculty of human nature.

Does Dr. Schmucker understand by Common Sense this power of human nature to perceive ideas or objects which transcend the worlds of space and time? In this sense, it is the power to perceive substance in the cause, being in the phenomenon, the infinite in the finite, the universal in the particular, the absolute in the relative, the necessary in the contingent, the permanent in the transient. But this power he denies from the beginning of his book to the end, and admits as objects of knowledge, of cognition, only the objects of space. His pretension then to have based his philosophy on Common Sense, according to Dr. Reid's use, or virtual use, of the term, is wholly unfounded. He goes right in the face and eyes of Common Sense.

The only other intelligible sense of the term, is the common or universal *assent* of mankind. We have no objections to using the term in this sense, and none to making it in this sense authoritative. We know in matters pertaining to politics, and morals, matters pertaining to the race, no higher authority, under divine revelation, than the common assent of mankind. But what is the exponent of this common assent? Whence shall we collect this universal assent of the race? Unquestionably from tradition. The universal assent of the race, is the universal tradition of the race, and the authority of the race is nothing else than the authority of tradition. Tradition taken in the true and large sense of the term, and so as to include not only what may be termed natural, but supernatural, or Providential tradition, in all that relates to politics, morals, and society generally, we recognize and hold to be authoritative. But we do not find Dr. Schmucker appealing to tradition; nay, he rejects it, in calling his system *new*, and in seeking, as he tells us was the case with him, to construct his system, not by consulting the philosophical monuments of the race, but by refusing for ten years to read any work on the subject, and by devoting himself solely to the study of his own mind. We must needs believe, then, that he deceives himself, when he thinks that he has made Common Sense a basis of his system.

The author's claims to having made Consciousness another of the bases of his system, we apprehend, in any sense acceptable even to himself, are no better founded. Consciousness is not, as Dr. Reid seems to have taught, a dis-

tinct and separate faculty of the human mind; nor is it a peculiar act of the mind, by which it not only knows, but takes note of the fact that it knows, as seems to be Dr. Schmucker's own opinion. The precise fact of consciousness is not the mind taking cognizance of its own operations, but of *itself*, in its operations, as their subject, as the operator. We perceive always; for we are by nature and essence active and percipient; and nature, sensible and transcendental, is at all times around us, and streaming into us with its influences: but we are not always conscious; we are conscious only in those more vivid, more distinct perceptions, in which we comprehend in one view, by *one simple act* of the percipient agent, both the object perceived, and the ME as subject perceiving it. Consciousness is therefore simply the recognition by the ME of itself, in the fact of perception, as the agent perceiving; in thought as the subject thinking; in love as the subject loving; in contradistinction from the *object* perceived, thought, or loved.

A system of philosophy based on Consciousness, must be based on the agent revealed by Consciousness, that is to say, the ME, or subject. A system of philosophy based on the ME must be purely subjective, and incapable of attaining to existence exterior to the ME. It would be then the reduction of all our knowledge to the sentimental affections of the sentient subject, the last word of the Sensual school: or the irresistible categories of the reason, or forms of the understanding, the last result of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason—a rationalistic idealism; or to mere volitions or voluntary creations of the ME itself, with Fichte, or an Egoistic Idealism, if the expression will be permitted us. Is it in either of these results that Dr. Schmucker would end? Is his philosophy purely subjective? So far as it is systematic, it is so, in our view of it; but he has not intended it to be so, for he asserts objective reality, the independent existence of entities out of the ME, though by what authority he does not inform us.

But in saying that his philosophy is based on Consciousness, we suppose the author intends that we should understand, that in constructing it he has had direct recourse to the facts of human nature, the phenomena of his own mind, as revealed to him by immediate consciousness. On this point he is nowhere very explicit; but we presume that we do him no injustice, when we say that he probably adopts what is called the psychological method of studying

the phenomena of the human soul. M. Jouffroy, the pupil, friend, and successor of M. Cousin in the department of the History of Modern Philosophy, in the Faculty of Letters at Paris, who, we regret, has, by his premature death within the year, been lost to philosophy, is, perhaps, the best exponent of this method. He tells us that there are two classes of facts; each class alike real, each alike open to our inspection;—facts of the outward, material universe, and the facts of that interior, but nevertheless important world which each man carries in himself. The first class we observe by our outward senses, the second by means of an interior light, or sense, called consciousness. Is this Dr. Schmucker's method? And is the adoption of this method what he means by constructing his philosophy on the basis of consciousness? If so, perhaps he is not aware of all the consequences of this method.

This method never carries us out of the subjective; but let that pass. We deceive ourselves, if we suppose the light by which we see in the external world, is different from the light by which we are conscious, or by which we observe in the world within. The percipient agent is the same in both cases; and it is by virtue of the same faculty of intelligence that he observes or knows in one world and the other. The external senses do not observe, nor are they the light by which the man observes; the man himself observes through his external organs by means of his own inherent power of knowing, or faculty of intelligence; and it is by virtue of the same power of knowing, or faculty of intelligence, that he observes in the bosom of consciousness itself.

In the second place, what is called *internal* observation is not, strictly speaking, internal. If by *within* is meant within the ME itself, we have no power with which to look within. The ME is the observer, and, therefore, must needs be distinct from the object observed. It is all on the side of the *subject*, and do the best it can, it cannot, turn it ever so swiftly, get on the side of the *object*. The object observed, be it then what it may, must be, strictly speaking, exterior to the ME, and, therefore, veritably NOT-ME.

In the third place, these facts, which are called, though improperly, internal facts, are never observed, that is, studied, by immediate consciousness. The fact of consciousness, is the recognition of myself in the intellectual phenomenon, as the subject of the phenomenon; that is, as

the subject thinking. The moment I seize this fact, and attempt to examine it, it ceases to be a fact of consciousness; for the fact of consciousness is now myself thinking on this fact, which I remember was a fact of consciousness a moment ago. It is impossible, then, to observe, analyse, and classify the facts of consciousness.

What psychologists study for the facts of consciousness, are the facts of memory. They are, no doubt, an important class of facts; but they are not, and cannot be observed, studied, by immediate consciousness. We can, no doubt, study them by means of memory; but our knowledge of them cannot be more immediate and certain than is our knowledge of many other things. Memory is not always faithful. It does not always, nay it rarely, if ever, reproduces the fact exactly as it was, in all its relations and connexions; and one grand cause, perhaps the chief cause, of the failures of psychologists, has been in the fact that they attempt to construct their systems with these facts alone. If Dr. Schmucker means, then, that he makes the facts of consciousness the basis of his system, he deceives himself; for, instead of observing the facts which he studies, by immediate consciousness, he studies them only by means of the memory.

But this is lingering too long on the very title-page of the work. It is time to proceed at least as far as the Introduction. This the author devotes to what he calls *methodology*, and to the difference between mathematical and metaphysical reasoning. "It has long been a subject of remark," says the author, "that while the science of mathematics, which discusses the properties and relations of space and number, is accompanied by the most conclusive evidence, and bears conviction with it at every step of its progress, the philosophy of the mind still remains enveloped in comparative darkness and uncertainty, after the intellect of ages has been expended in its investigation. The question arises, are not both similar in their nature, and alike susceptible of demonstrative evidence?" Dr. Schmucker, while he admits that the two sciences may be dissimilar in their nature, yet considers the difference of the results obtained in the one from those obtained in the other, as owing to the different method of investigation adopted in mental science, from that pursued by mathematicians. "The superior force of mathematical reasoning arises," he says, "from

three sources. *First*, from an intrinsic difference in the nature of the subjects discussed. *Secondly*, from the more rigidly analytic method of investigation pursued in mathematics. And, *thirdly*, from a less elegant, indeed, but more precise and perspicuous method of conveying to others the knowledge we have acquired."

The first of these reasons for the superiority of mathematics in clearness and evidence, may have some force; the other two, none. The third is dwelt upon much by English philosophers, and it held a conspicuous rank in the estimation of Leibnitz. But it is a great mistake to attribute the clearness and evidence of mathematics to the peculiar language adopted by mathematicians. Their signs, no doubt, abridge the labor of recording their results, and also the mechanical process of obtaining them; but their science is in no sense dependent upon them, and there is not a mathematical problem the solution of which cannot be obtained and given out in the ordinary language of reasoning. Then, again, the adoption of a precise, exact, definite, technical language for metaphysics, similar in its character and office to the algebraic signs, as Leibnitz wished, and as some modern metaphysicians seem to judge desirable, would avail us very little. A sign is no sign to us, till we know that it stands for something; and it tells us nothing till we know what that something is which it stands for Philosophy is not a purely verbal science. It deals with realities, and it is and can be intelligible no further than these realities themselves are known.

Nor do we perceive the force of the *second* reason assigned for the superiority of mathematical reasoning. Reference had to the nature of the subject, mathematical reasoning is not more rigidly analytic than metaphysical reasoning. The human mind is so constituted that, whatever the subject of its investigations, it must pursue one and the same method, what the Greeks called analysis and synthesis, and we, after the Latins, observation and induction. To hear some Englishmen talk, we might be led to attribute the invention of this method to Lord Bacon; but we may as well attribute to Lord Bacon the invention of the human mind itself. Bacon was no doubt a great man, and rendered important service, if not to science, at least to the sciences; but his merit was not precisely that of the invention of a method of philosophizing. The true method, and the only possible method, is given in the human mind

itself. Every operation performed by the mind is performed by virtue of this method; without it the mind cannot operate. It cannot observe a fact, declare it to be a fact, or even to appear to be a fact, without a synthetic judgment, which is to a greater or less extent an induction; and without facts, real or supposed, it has no possible basis for any synthetic or inductive operation whatever. There has been a great deal of learned nonsense uttered about the inductive method, especially by Englishmen and their descendant Americans—a method always observed by the human mind in all its investigations, and as faithfully observed and as rigidly followed, in proportion to the extent of his ability and mental operations, by the simplest ploughboy as by a Newton or a Laplace.

The real cause of the difference between the results of mathematics and of metaphysics is, in the fact that mathematics require acquaintance with but a small number of facts, and of facts which are obvious to every eye, and can be learned in a few moments; whereas metaphysical science, dealing with actual life, requires acquaintance with all reality, which is infinite. Mathematical science is merely the science of quantities. Quantity can differ from quantity only in more or less. He then who has the conception of more or less, has all the conceptions essential to mathematics; and he who knows how to measure *more* and *less*, in any conceivable degree, comprehends the science of mathematics. All beyond this in the whole science is, as it were, identical proposition piled upon identical proposition. No wonder, then, that mathematics were cultivated at an early day, and soon arrived at a high degree of perfection. We say high *degree* of perfection; for the science is not yet perfected, and it is far from having reached the utmost limits of its applications. But its further progress, or the progress of its applications, will be found to depend in no small degree on the progress of metaphysics.

With philosophy the case is quite different. Here, instead of two, or at most three ideas, which are all that are required by mathematics, which may be obtained by acquaintance with a single concrete existence besides ourselves, and from which we may proceed by the calculus to the system of the universe, we have an infinite variety of complex ideas, which we can fully master only by an actual acquaintance with all contingent existences. The purpose of philosophy is not, as too many fancy, acquaintance with the

relations of abstract ideas, which would give us for resultant only dead abstractions, not of the least conceivable value; but acquaintance with life—acquaintance with all that lives—to know really and truly the nature and law of every living being, from God himself to the veriest monad of his creation. A child can master all the facts essential to the science of mathematics; none but God himself has or can have the knowledge requisite for the construction of a perfect system of philosophy.

Philosophy, then, is and always must be imperfect. Its subject-matter is all Infinity, in all its unity and multiplicity. Man is finite, and can have only a finite knowledge. He can, therefore, never take into his view the whole subject-matter of philosophy, the infinite reality that underlies it. He can see this reality only on the side turned towards him, and comprehend it only under a single aspect. His system, then, though woven with infinite pains, can be at best only relatively true. It will always be defective, inadequate,—falling short of the reality to be comprehended. But man is, through Providence, progressive—has a continuous growth, and therefore becomes able every day to enlighten a larger portion of reality, and to comprehend more and more of it in his systems. Yet never will he advance so far as to be able to construct a system of philosophy that will abide for ever. The systems of to-day, as mere systems, will always be absorbed by the discoveries and necessary modifications of to-morrow.

This is no doubt a sad conclusion, well adapted to check our pride and presumption, and to teach us modesty and humility in our theorizing; but it is warranted by the whole history of the past, and is a legitimate inference from the finiteness of all our faculties. Saddening, then, as it may be, we must accept it. It is not given to man to build a tower that shall reach to heaven. There is no escaping the floods that will sooner or later come, in some sense, to swallow up our old world. There is no help for it. All that we can ask, then, of the philosopher of to-day is, that he embrace in his system, not absolute truth, but all the truth, in relation to God, man, and the universe, to which the human race has, thus far, whether naturally or Providentially, attained.

Passing over now the difference between mathematics and philosophy, we touch more especially what Dr. Schmucker

calls Methodology. *Methodology!* Why could he not have used, with Descartes and all the masters of the science, the simple term method? Methodology, if it mean any-thing, means a discourse on method; but it was not a discourse on method, but method itself, that Dr. Schmucker was to consider. But what is his Methodology, or simply, his method of philosophizing? No man can tell from this Introduction, nor from reading the whole book, or at best can only guess it.

Method is given in the human mind itself; that needs no discussion. What Dr. Schmucker means by Methodology, is doubtless what we should term the *application of method.* All philosophers, in the strictest sense of the term, adopt one and the same method; they differ, however—and in this consists the difference of their systems—in their mode of applying this one and the same method. The mode of applying method to the construction of philosophical science, is the important matter. Descartes began in doubt, by doubting all existences but his own. To follow his example, we must begin by doubting all that can be doubted, push doubt to its furthest limits, till we come to that which cannot be doubted, and then admit into our system only what rigidly follows from what has been ascertained to be not doubtful. This is well enough for all those who really entertain the doubt recommended; but all men do not entertain this doubt; and we deceive ourselves whenever we think we have assumed in our system a doubt which we do not in reality feel. No man can take an artificial point of departure. A man who believes in the existence of God, cannot, even in thought, divest himself of that belief, and place himself in the position of him who really doubts that existence. In his arguments to prove the existence of God, he invariably and inevitably assumes the point to be proved, as the basis on which to rest his argument. A man, do his best, cannot divest himself of himself. He cannot assume, really and truly, as his logical point of departure, what is not his real and true point of departure; for he cannot both be and not be at the same moment, as would necessarily be the case were this possible.

The human race has lived a long while, and not altogether in vain. It has ascertained some things; settled some truths. These, in all our philosophizing, we necessarily assume, whether we know it or not, and have the right to assume, as our point of departure. The existence of God has

become to the race a fact, which it is no longer necessary to attempt to prove, nor allowable to call in question. Any alleged facts which go to contradict it, or to make it doubtful, are by that fact proved to be no facts; for *it* is more certain than any fact which can be brought against it. The same may be said of man's unity, personal identity, moral freedom, and accountability. No matter what may be alleged against these facts, for we have for them the highest degree of certainty that we can have in any case whatever. Your science, or your fact, which contradicts them, is proved, by its contradicting them, to be no science, no fact. All facts of a similar nature the philosopher has the right to assume as so many points settled. His business then, instead of seeking to create and answer a doubt that he does not feel, is to ascertain what the human race has thus far established. This has not to be established over again. When ascertained, it is so much capital in advance. Our business is merely to add to it, and transmit it to our successors enlarged, to be transmitted by them to their successors still more enlarged.

The next thing with regard to method—and concerning this as well as the foregoing Dr. Schmucker is silent—is that we confine ourselves to the order of facts which belong to the special science we are constructing, and not conclude to one subject from the facts of another and a different subject. This rule is violated by phrenologists, who are perpetually concluding to what must be true of man, from what they observe, or fancy they observe, to be true of animals, forgetting that between man and animals there is a distance, and that man has and can have no animal nature. Man is not an animal, but an animal transformed. The great merit of Bacon, under the head of method, consists in his having contended earnestly for this rule. He has been called the father of the inductive method, simply and solely, we apprehend, from his having laid down, and insisted on this rule.

This rule, all important as it may be when rigidly understood and applied, has been too strenuously insisted on in English and American science. Each special science is supposed to have a separate and an independent foundation, to the confusion and virtual destruction, as we have already seen, of all catholic science. This has come from a too violent and too long continued reaction against the Scholastics. The Scholastics were said, and to some extent justly

said, to subject physics to their metaphysics, and their metaphysics to their theology. They concluded from their theology to their metaphysics, and from their metaphysics to what must be true in nature; instead of going forth into nature, and ascertaining with open eyes what she contained. In this way they committed some gross errors, for which, however, science has amply avenged herself. It was against this method of studying nature that Bacon entered his protest.

In point of principle, however, the much decried Scholastics were by no means so far in the wrong as the disciples of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac, have supposed. The universe is constructed by Intelligence, in its own image, or after one and the same divine Idea. Man was made in the image of God. The human soul is the finite representative of the Infinite Intelligence, to which it corresponds in all respects; that is, so far as the finite can correspond to the infinite. The universe, outward nature, corresponds to man, and is therefore, as we may say, the image of the image of God. There is, then, one and the same law of intelligence running from the Infinite Reason down to the faintest echo of it, in the simplest monad God has created. All things are created according to one and the same law, and this law is the law of all intelligence. We may say, then, with the Hegelians, though not, if we understand them, precisely in their sense, that a perfect system of logic were a complete system of the universe. The universe, if we may so speak, is the logic of the Creator, and a perfect system of logic would be a key to all its mysteries, and enable us to comprehend as thoroughly the operations of the material universe, as the operations of the human mind itself.

There is nothing extravagant or unheard of in this statement. It contains nothing not in a degree verified by Naturalists every-day. Fulton constructs his steamboat by his logic, before he does by his handicraft; and Franklin establishes by reasoning the indentity of lightning and the electric fluid, before he draws the lightning from the cloud, and makes it run down the silken cord of his kite and charge his Leyden Jar. Every scientific man, for the most part, succeeds in his theory before he does in his experiments. Very few important scientific discoveries are made by accident, or without having been, to some extent, predicted. Naturalists reason and say, "It *must* be so;" and then go

forth and interrogate Nature, who answers, "It *is* so." These, and similar facts which might be indefinitely multiplied, prove not merely the uniformity of nature, and that its order does not change; but that nature has, if we may so speak, a rational basis, is made in the image of mind, and that its laws are, as Plato asserted, *ideas* or images of the laws or principles of Intelligence, Reason, *Νους, Λογος*.

Assuming the fact, for which we here contend, and which we hold to be unquestionable, the Scholastics were far from being wrong in principle. So far as we have a *true* system of theology we have the right to conclude from it to metaphysics. So far as we have a true system of metaphysics, we have the right to conclude from it to the facts of physical science. Metaphysical science has the right to preside over all mathematical and physical science. It does and will give the law to the mathematical and physical sciences, even if we try to have it otherwise, for it determines the character of the facts on which they are founded. We do not see the *whole* fact; and the fact we see and analyze varies as varies the metaphysical light in which we contemplate it; as the landscape varies as we shift the position from which we view it. But as our metaphysics are by no means perfect, we must never venture to rely solely on conclusions from metaphysical science to the facts of physical nature, till we have, to the best of our ability, corrected or modified them by actual observation and experiment in the bosom of nature herself.

Dr. Schmucker's error, under the head of method, seems to us to be in attempting to construct a science of the human mind by confining himself to a single class of facts, namely, the mere facts of memory, called by our modern psychologues, facts of consciousness, and which we have seen are insufficient for his purpose. Speaking of himself, in his preface, he says, "He then resolved to study exclusively his own mind, and for ten years he read no book on this subject. During this period, he spent much of his time in examination of *his own mental phenomena*, and having travelled over the *whole* ground, and employed the leisure of several additional years, to review and mature his views, he now presents to the public the following outline of a system as in all its parts the result of original, analytic induction." But it does not seem to have occurred to him, that he might possibly have overlooked some one or more of the mental phenomena, and seen some of them but

dimly, in a partial or even a false light; that in a word no analysis of one's own mental phenomena is or can be an adequate basis for a genuine psychology. Is there no difference in individuals? Are the mental phenomena of a New Hollander and of a Leibnitz the same? Is Dr. Schmucker the standard-man, for all men? He would have done well to have conformed to the method of M. Cousin, which, though on one side too exclusively psychological, seeks always to correct or verify the psychology of the individual, by history, or the psychology of the race. M. Cousin really does what Dr. Schmucker professes to do, constructs his philosophy on the basis of consciousness and common sense, or what the individual can ascertain by the study of his own mental phenomena as presented, not indeed really by consciousness, but by memory, and by the study of the phenomena of the race, as presented in history in general, and that of philosophy in particular. He is therefore protected against taking the peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of his own mind, for universal and permanent laws of human nature. But Dr. Schmucker does not seem to have ever heard of M. Cousin, or his school.

In concluding our criticism, on what Dr. Schmucker calls methodology, we will add that, in order to construct a true system of mental philosophy, or a psychology at all worthy of the name, we must, in addition to what Dr. Schmucker calls the mental phenomena, study—

1. PHYSIOLOGY, and in that enlarged sense in which it includes not only the functions of the human body, or organism, but nature in general. Man is not body, but he is, as Bossuet has finely expressed it, made to live in a body, and to manifest himself through bodily organs. By virtue of his union with a body, man is placed in relation with external nature. The body has in some way or other, not explicable to us, an influence on the mental and moral manifestations of the man; and nature an influence on the body. The relation then between the soul and body, and the body and nature, becomes an indispensable subject of study, in the construction of an adequate psychology. Climate, soil, productions, have a decided influence on our bodies, and therefore on our characters. There is a marked difference between the inhabitants of mountainous districts and those of the plains; between the dwellers in the interior and the dwellers on the coast; between those who live amid laughing landscapes, under a sky ever serene, and those who live

in regions of perpetual storm and mist. Under the head of physiology, then, we must study not only the human organism, but all nature so far as it affects that organism.

2. SOCIETY. Man is not only made to live in a body, and through that in relation with other men, in the bosom of society. The individual does not, and cannot exist isolated from his race, but has his life and being in the race, as the race has its in God. God makes and sustains all creatures "after their kind," as races, and it is only by a knowledge of *genera* and *species* that we can come to a knowledge of individuals. In constructing our philosophy of man, we must study him as a race, or the individual as a member of the race, in his relations to other men, living one and the same life with them, and as modified by friendship and love, patriotism and philanthropy, by the Family, the Church, and the State.

3. HISTORY. Man, we have said, has a progress, a continuous growth, and therefore changes from age to age, and that too as a race no less than as an individual. He has an existence, therefore, in time, as well as in space. The study of physiology and society, gives what concerns him as living in the world of space; the study of history, what concerns him as a being of time. History is three-fold—individual, general, and natural. The first is what is ordinarily termed *memory*, and comprises what are usually treated as facts of consciousness, or mental phenomena. General (from *genus*) history is the history of the race, and is the memory of the individual enlarged into the memory of the race, and records the changes and modifications which humanity, human nature, has itself undergone. The law of human life, by virtue of which human nature is manifested, is in all ages the same; but the actual volume of human nature, so to speak, is perpetually enlarging, so that we must always have regard to chronology in what we affirm or deny of it. Between the human nature of the Hottentot, and the human nature of a Newton, there is a distance of many centuries. Moreover, nature, the outward material universe, has a growth, is successively ameliorated, so that it is ever exerting a kindlier influence on human organism, and therefore on human character. The history of these successive ameliorations, or the history of nature, is then essential to a complete system of mental philosophy.

4. INSPIRATION. We have no confidence in the philosopher who believes himself able to explain the phenomena

of human life, whether in space or time, without assuming the special intervention of Providence. "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." The acorn must be quickened and fed by foreign influences, or it grows not into the oak; so man must be quickened by the spirit of God, and fed by divine revelations. Through the aid of Providential men, prophets, Messiahs, and God's Only Begotten Son, the human soul has been quickened into life, human nature redeemed, and humanity advanced by the infusion into its life, successively, of new and higher manifestations of life. The modifications and growth of human nature, effected by these supernatural communications, must be studied in order to have a complete knowledge of the actual, concrete, living man, as we find him to-day, in the bosom of Christian Civilization.

Here is the vast field which he who would give us a psychology worthy of the name, must cultivate; and he who has not cultivated it long and assiduously, has no right to call himself a philosopher. To become even tolerably acquainted with this vast range of studies will require more than ten years devoted exclusively to the study of the phenomena of one's own mind.

After having dwelt so long on the general method and design of this new system of philosophy, it cannot be necessary to spend much time in disposing of its details. These are at best of moderate value, rarely new, and when new, just as rarely true. The author does not appear to have sufficient acquaintance with the thoughts of others, to be able to form any tolerable appreciation of his own. His reading is very far from having brought him up to the present state of metaphysical science, even in this country and England, to say nothing of France and Germany. In running over the whole work, we have found nothing worthy of special commendation, unless it be a single remark respecting what he makes the third division of the mental phenomena. He divides the mental phenomena into three classes:

1. Cognitive Ideas;
2. Sentient Ideas;
3. Active Operations.

In this third division he includes the unconscious, the spontaneous operations of the mind, as well as the phenomena of the will proper, which are operations performed

with consciousness, and reflection, and which are all that Upham and some of the Germans include under the third division. Dr. Schmucker is more correct than they; for I am active in as true and high a sense in my unconscious operations, as in what are properly called my volitions. If this were not so, moral character could attach only to those acts which are performed after deliberation, which is not true. The real moral character of the man is determined, almost solely, by his spontaneous operations, the unconscious motions of his soul. So far, then, we find Dr. Schmucker in the right.

But we do not accept the terminology of this classification. What is the meaning of *cognitive* Ideas? Surely, not ideas that know; why not then say simply *cognitions*, the only proper word in our language for what Dr. Schmucker probably means. *Sentient* Ideas certainly are not ideas that feel. Then they are simply sensations, sentiments, or feelings. But who before, ever dreamed of calling a sensation, sentiment, or feeling, an *idea?* Locke uses the term *idea*, to express the objects about which the mind in its operations is immediately conversant. We do not accept this use of the term, the most favorable to Dr. Schmucker of any authorized use he can find; but even according to this use, the feeling is never an idea, because the moment it becomes an object with which the mind is conversant, it has ceased to be a feeling, and become merely the memory of a feeling. Then, again, what is the use of saying *active* operations? Just as if there could be any operations that were not active, or did not imply activity on the part of their subject, or the operator.

Again, we protest against Dr. Schmucker's use of the word *idea* in general. The terminology of a science is not, we own, of the highest, but it is of some importance; and it is desirable that it should be as uniform as possible. For ourselves, we are no friends to neologism, either in the coinage of new words, or new senses to old words. It is rarely necessary to introduce a new term into our philosophical language, and the only novelty allowable in the use of an old term is its restriction as much possible to its primitive, radical meaning. This radical meaning, guard against it ever so carefully, will always accompany the use of the word, and mislead both writer and reader, when it is not the exact meaning intended. The nearer we keep to the etymological meaning of a term, the more distinctly we

express that meaning, the more just and proper will be our use of the term. Every language, too, has a genius of its own, and certain indestructible laws, which can never be offended or transgressed with impunity. There is no wisdom in the common sneers against a studied nicety in the use of words; and he who seeks to express his ideas in terms which are, as he would say, free, general, and familiar, will find, if he reflects, that his objections to this nicety arose from the very great vagueness and looseness of his thoughts.

The term *idea* was originally used in philosophy to designate that *objective* reality we take cognizance of in all our mental operations, which transcends what are called sensible objects, though never seen but in connexion with them. This objective reality was originally termed *idea* by Plato, because he held it to be an image of the Logos, or Divine Mind. Now this conception of image goes, and always will go, with this word idea. It is impossible to get rid of it, because it is the radical, the primitive sense of the word. When, then, we call our notions of the objects of time and space, *ideas*, as does Dr. Schmucker, we shall always, whether we so intend or not, teach that by *idea* we understand that the mental phenomenon we so name, is in some sort a representative or image, of the object concerned. Thus, the *idea* of a book will be the *image* of a book in the mind; the idea of a horse will be a little picture or likeness of a horse; the wound by a sword will cause pain, which pain will give us an idea, that is, a mental image, or copy of the sword. This is precisely Dr. Schmucker's own philosophy, with this exception, that he does not contend that the idea is an image or likeness of the object, but merely a *representation* of it.

Accept this, call our notions, representations, and then say, with Dr. Schmucker, that the immediate objects of the mind are not the entities themselves, but their mental representatives, and you have the very idealism which Berkely deduced from Locke's philosophy, and which Reid spent so much time, and not without success, in overthrowing. Since Dr. Reid's Inquiry, it has not been allowable to talk of mental representatives, or ideas, as *objects of the mind*, separate from the external realities themselves. The mind does not hold communion with the external world through the medium of ideas, but converses directly with it; and what Dr. Schmucker calls ideas or representations of that

world, are merely the notions we obtain by conversing with it, the form our thonghts assume, when we think it. By his use of the term *idea*, he revives an old error, long since exploded, and for which we had supposed no new champion would ever be found.

Moreover, we object to the principle on which Dr. Schmucker makes his classification of the mental phenomena. "The proper materials of this science, doubtless are," he says, "not the supposed faculties, of which we know nothing directly but the known phenomena of the mind." It is true we know nothing directly of ourselves or our faculties; but who ever contended that we do not know ourselves, or our faculties, as well as the effect of the exercise of these faculties, indirectly, by studying the phenomena of life? If we can know nothing of our faculties, what is the use of trying to obey the injunction, "Know thyself"? But we do know ourselves; that is, indirectly, so far as realized in the phenomena of life. In every act of life, of which we are conscious, we recognize always ourselves as the subject; in cognition the subject that knows; in feeling the subject that feels; in love the subject that loves; in action, the subject or agent that acts. In every phenomenon we recognize, back of the phenomenon, the subject of the phenomenon, that which manifests itself in the phenomenon, the being, cause, or agency producing the phenomenon. Thus, in every one of the mental phenomena, we recognize, in addition, if we may so speak, to the phenomenon itself, the invariable, persisting subject of the phenomenon. This subject is always our *self*, the ME. The power of the ME, (what I mean when I say, *I* am, *I* think, *I* love, &c.,) to exhibit, produce, or cause this phenomenon, or more accurately to manifest itself in it, is precisely what we mean by the term faculty.

Now, if we can know nothing of the faculties of the ME, how can we classify its phenomena? What will be the basis of our classification? If we cannot know the fact that we have the faculty of knowing, we can know nothing at all; and then how can we call a portion of our mental phenomena, cognitions, or "cognitive ideas"? When we assert that a portion of our mental phenomena are cognitions, do we not thereby assert that we have the power to know, and, therefore, that we have the faculty of intelligence? The same questions may be asked in reference to what Dr. Schmucker calls "sentient ideas" and "active operations;"

that is, feelings and operations. Can a phenomenon be known to be an *operation*, without the recognition of that which is the operator? Is it not the perception in the phenomenon of the operator, that leads us and enables us to call it an operation?

Dr. Schmucker must pardon us for asking, if he has ever read Plato? We presume that he has not, and we therefore recommend him to do it forthwith, or at least some portions of Plato; and without referring him to any difficult portions, we would mention the Hippias, which is on the Beautiful. From that he may learn that to be able to call a particular thing beautiful, we must needs know that by virtue of which it is beautiful; that to be able to say of this or that act, it is just, wise, or virtuous, we must be able to conceive of justice, wisdom, and virtue. He who knows not the *general*, (the *genus*), cannot know the special and the individual. We know only by ascending from individuals to species and genera. Thus, we know an individual to be a man only by virtue of our ability to detect in him the genus, the race, humanity or human nature; for in affirming him to be a man we affirm him to partake of this race, that is, of humanity, human nature. It is only by our power of perceiving genera and species, what Plato would call, and what we ought to call, the power of perceiving *ideas*, that we can know at all, that we can say of this individual he is a man, it is a horse, an ox, or a dog. Our modern metaphysicians who neglect the study of the ancients, show more self-reliance than true wisdom. In all that belongs to pure metaphysics, so far as the science concerns or rests on abstract principles, powers, or reasoning, no additions have been made since the time of Plato and Aristotle, unless Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Cousin's *Reduction of the Categories*, be exceptions. Our advance on the ancients is no doubt great, but it does not consist in the fact that we surpass them in our knowledge of the conditions of knowledge, of first principles of science, or in the strength, subtlety, or soundness of our reasoning; but in a wider range of observation, in a richer experience, and a more thorough knowledge of life. Descartes in his doctrine of Innate Ideas, or more properly innate capacities or faculties, Reid, in his constituent principles of human nature, or first principles of human belief, virtually, even Kant in his Categories, and Cousin avowedly in his Absolute Ideas, have done nothing but reproduce, and, in our

judgment, not in improved forms, Plato's doctrine of ideas, which asserts in all cases the reality of genera, ideas, or objects transcending time and space, and of our power to perceive them, as the absolutely indispensable conditions of all science. Against this doctrine we find the old Epicureans, and Sceptics, the Nominalists among the Scholastics, Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, Locke, Condillac, Hume, and Dr. *Schmucker*, among the moderns; although this must not be said of Bacon and Locke without some important reservations, owing to the fact that they were both as men and as practical philosophers, broader, richer, and truer than their official theorizing. We side with Plato, and in fact with Aristotle, who on this point is virtually a Platonist. All we contend is, that we never perceive genera, ideas, separate, detached from the individuals in which they are concreted, or actualized; but we do really perceive them in these individuals; and it is only by virtue of this fact, that the individuals themselves are objects of knowledge. But we are wandering too far from our present purpose. We will only add that the principle involved in Dr. Schmucker's assertion, that the proper materials of mental philosophy are the mental phenomena themselves, considered independent of their relation to the faculties of which they are the manifestations, involves, as all who are really masters of metaphysical science know full well, the denial of all solid basis of knowledge, the possibility of science, and therefore plunges us, theoretically, into absolute Pyrrhonism, or universal scepticism. He takes the side taken by all the philosophers whose speculations have led to the denial of religion, and the assertion of atheism. We are far from thinking, and far from intending even to intimate that we think, Dr. Schmucker is aware of this fact, or that he would not recoil from it with horror. But he who denies man's power to know any-thing in the phenomenon, but the phenomenon itself, has made a denial which involves the denial of the possibility of recognizing in any or all of the phenomena of man, or of the universe, the power, or even to be made acquainted with the power, being, agency or cause, on which they depend for their existence, and from which they receive their birth, their reality, and their law.

But waiving even this, we are far from adopting Dr. Schmucker's classification of the mental phenomena; not, indeed, because we hold it less correct than the classification proposed by others, for we really know of none that we

should be more willing to adopt; but because we hold that no classification of the kind is admissible. There are no mental phenomena that are purely actions, purely cognitions, or purely feelings. The ME acts always as the living and indestructible synthesis of all its faculties. It is in its essence a unity, with the threefold power to *act*, to *know*, and to *feel;* but not to act without knowing and feeling, to know without acting and feeling, nor to feel without acting and knowing; but always all three in each and every phenomenon. The mental phenomenon, then, whatever it be, is primitively a complex fact, at once and indivisibly *action, cognition, feeling,*—complex but not composite, nor susceptible of being resolved into distinct and separate elements, without ceasing to be a fact of actual life.

We state here a fact of very great importance, to the ignorance or neglect of which may be attributed nearly all the errors of psychologists. Psychologists have never, or at least rarely, been willing to accept the primitive fact of consciousness, as the primitive fact. What is complex or manifold, they have supposed must needs be composite; therefore, secondary; therefore, susceptible of being decomposed and resolved into its primitive elements. Their great study has, therefore, been to decompose the primitive mental phenomenon, and to reduce it to a lower denomination than the lowest. They have been able to do this only by assuming that the *distinction* of a plurality of faculties in the ME, is a *division* of the ME into a plurality of faculties; that is, they have been able to decompose the phenomenon only by dividing the ME into distinct, separate, and in some sort independent faculties, each able, as it were, to act independently and alone. Thus, the ME may act as pure activity, and give us pure actions, in which nothing of cognition or sentiment mingles; as pure intelligence, and give us pure cognitions, pure intellections, in which enters nothing of action or feeling,—hence the talk about and sometimes the condemnation of *mere intellect;* and finally, as pure sensibility, giving us mere feeling in which there is no action, no cognition. But having divided the ME, as it were, into three separate *mes*, or *sub-mes*, they have not been slow to mutilate it, by retrenching one faculty after another, under the pretence of resolving one into another; and in this way, among them all, they have retrenched the whole ME, and left nothing remaining. The Sensists, of the school of Condillac, resolve intelligence and activity into sensibility, and,

therefore, retrench all of the ME but the sensibility; Idealists retrench all but the power to know; and the Egoists, the Fichteans, retrench all but the activity. Every system of philosophy constructed in this way, on the hypothesis that the primitive fact of consciousness is a simple fact, the product of a single faculty of the soul, acting independently of the other two, is necessarily false, for its basis is a fact, not of life, but of death.

We cannot avoid remarking, by the way, that we are unable to account for the fact that M. Cousin, entitled to a high rank among the most eminent philosophers of any age or nation, while he recognizes the complexity of the primitive fact of consciousness, and even makes it the basis of what he improperly calls Eclecticism, should yet countenance the division of the mental phenomena into three classes, corresponding very nearly to the division proposed by Dr. Schmucker. It is a singular inconsequence, and one which has led him and his readers into some grave errors. No man can more distinctly assert the primitive synthesis of the phenomenon of actual life; nay, we are aware of no one before him who has stated it at all; it is of the most vital importance in his system; and yet he seems perpetually, when analyzing and classifying the mental phenomena, to have forgotten it. Is this owing to the fact that from his admiration of Proclus, he was led, without due reflection, to call his philosophy Eclecticism? Has this name misled himself, as it has others? Be this as it may, we regret that he has ever done himself the wrong to call his philosophy Eclecticism, from the Greek, signifying to *choose* or *select*, and, therefore, implying that it is made up of selections from other systems. In consequence of his adopting this name, the public believe, and in spite of all explanations will continue to believe, this to be the actual character of his philosophy; yet nothing is further from the truth. His philosophy is really and truly *synthetic*, as it should be, founded on the primitive synthesis we have pointed out in the mental phenomenon itself. If he had always remembered this, he would never, it seems to us, have given the sanction of his authority to the attempted decomposition of the primitive fact, against which, even in his own name, we protest.

Nevertheless, if M. Cousin divides the mental phenomena into three classes, corresponding to the three fundamental faculties of the soul,—activity, intelligence, and sensibility,

—he takes care always to tell us that this division never takes place in actual life, for the mental phenomenon is always a product of the joint and simultaneous action of all the faculties. M. Leroux, therefore, in his very acute, able, ingenious, and instructive *Refutation de l' Eclecticisme*, a work to which we have been largely indebted in the composition of this article, has been wrong to accuse M. Cousin of overlooking this primitive synthesis, and to reason against his system as if it were a system of mere Eclecticism. M. Leroux is not more synthetic in his own system than is M. Cousin. On this point both, in fact, adopt the same philosophy, for both belong to the nineteenth century, which demands a synthetic philosophy, and requires the philosopher to cease "murdering to dissect," to cease his fruitless efforts to decompose what is already ultimate, and to find out the primitive synthesis of actual life, and to make that the basis of a system of science which shall possess at once life, unity, and catholicity.

No doubt the mental phenomena vary among themselves. Every phenomenon is, indeed, the joint product of all the faculties, acting at once in the unity and multiplicity of the ME; but in some of the phenomena one faculty, without excluding the others, predominates, and in others another. How this can be, perhaps philosophy is not in a condition to explain. Perhaps at bottom the power to do, the power to know, and the power to feel, are one and the same, and all force, in proportion to the quantity of being in the subject of which it is affirmed, is essentially sentient and percipient—that all beings, the minutest even, in proportion to the quantity of their being, are active, percipient, and sentient beings, as Leibnitz teaches in his "Monadology," and as seems to us to be taught in the Proem to St. John's Gospel. But be this as it may, our phenomena differ among themselves, and by virtue of the differing degrees in which one or another of the faculties predominates in their production.

Also, men themselves differ one from another, in the same way. In some the faculty to act—activity, seems predominant, in others the faculty to know; in others still, the sensibility. This fact has given rise to the St. Simonian classification of mankind into three classes:

1. Men of Action—*les Industriels;*
2. Men of Science—*les Savans;*
3. Men of Art—*les Artistes.*

M. Leroux, in his work entitled *l'Humanite*, thinks this classification was well known to the ancients, and that he finds it in the *Bereshith* of the Hebrews, concealed in the names Cain, Abel, and Seth, in the first series, and Shem, Ham, and Japhet, in the second; and it is worthy of note, that the meaning of these names in the original seems to afford no little support to his conjecture; and moreover, we should always expect to find in a book given by divine inspiration, the profoundest philosophy. But without assuming to decide whether M. Leroux is correct or not, this much we may assert, that the classification is not without foundation. Men, if born with equal—which is questionable—are born with different capacities. No training can make every boy a poet, a painter, a musician, a mathematician, an expert handicraftsman, or a successful merchant. There is a class who of choice would be and by nature are fitted to be, active business men, traders, manufacturers, mechanics, cultivators of the earth; another class, whose great want is to know, who would spend their life in investigating, in acquiring and communicating knowledge; and still another class, who are of a plastic nature, whose souls are alive to the Beautiful; who contemplate truth, goodness, holiness, always under the aspect of beauty, of which they become impassioned, and which they seek to embody in song, melody, picture, statue, column, or dome. This distinction of men into three general classes, should be recognized in all our educational provisions, and our statesmen should be unwearied in their efforts so to perfect our social arrangements, as to suffer each one in life to fall into the class to which he naturally belongs, to pursue the calling for which he has a natural aptitude, and to receive according to his CAPACITY and his WORKS.

We would proceed further in the examination of the details of Dr. Schmucker's system, but it could serve no purpose, save to give us an occasion of expressing our own views on the points concerned, in opposition; and this we shall have, hereafter, a more fitting opportunity to do, in reviewing several other philosophical works which we intend to bring, *seriatim*, to the notice of the readers of the Democratic Review. We have found already as much fault with Dr. Schmucker as we are willing to find with any one man, and we could do nothing but continue to find fault were we to proceed. If his work had been on any other subject, we should not have felt ourselves called upon

to notice its errors; for we could have safely trusted to the good sense of the people at large to correct it; but works on metaphysical science are precisely the works to which the good sense of the people is the least capable of administering the necessary correctives. They must be examined and judged by persons whose habits, tastes, and studies have in some sort qualified them to judge wisely and correctly. We have no disrespect for Dr. Schmucker, but his work is precisely one of that kind which seems to us, from its size, its method, and its apparent simplicity, likely to take with the public. We have felt, therefore, that it was our duty to warn our countrymen against making it, as the author has designed it, a text-book in our colleges and academies. The author himself, of whom we know nothing but what this book tells us, we hold to be a very estimable man; and we doubt not that if he had written the Institutes of the Christian Religion, instead of the Elements of a new system of Mental Philosophy, we should have approved his work—at least have had no serious objections to urge against it; for, in the preparation of such a work he would have studied the Bible still more than the phenomena of his own mind; and he who studies diligently and prayerfully the Bible, we may add, will be as little likely, after all, to err in his philosophy as in his theology. The New Testament is the best manual of philosophy we are acquainted with.

The space we have appropriated to the subject of this book, and that which we propose for some time to come to devote to it, we cannot believe misapplied. The taste for philosophical studies in this country is evidently on the increase; and we are preparing to become really a philosophical people. "Young America," the America of the nineteenth century, is not fuller of life than of thought. Thousands of young hearts all over the country are gushing out with love of truth and humanity. Thousands of young minds, with a maturity beyond their years, are buckling on the harness, eager to go forth to investigate, to explore Providence, man, and nature, and to win glorious laurels, in their battles with darkness and error. God's blessing on these noble young hearts, and brave young minds! Something will come of their efforts. We as a people are becoming more thoughtful, more profound; are acquiring a rich and varied experience; and we cannot fail to create a literature as much in advance of all the literatures of the

most admired nations of ancient or modern times, as our political institutions are in advance of the old world, where the millions are still pressed to the earth by the overwhelming weight of kings, hierarchies, and nobilities. We are becoming an earnest people, feeling that we are to live, toil, suffer, die—if need be—for the growth of universal humanity; that it is ours to take the initiative in the new school of science which is to be instituted for the world, and to formulate the new thought that is to rule the future. We are THE PEOPLE OF THE FUTURE, and to us the scholars of all nations must ere long look. This is our high destiny. We are not, then, warring against our destiny in seeking to engage our countrymen in the study of the profoundest subjects, and in calling upon them to grapple with the gravest problems of science. There is for us no time to trifle, and we have no thought to waste on what is frivolous and ephemeral. We must be great, grand, solemn. We rejoice in this increased attention to philosophical subjects; in all these new works on philosophy issuing from our teeming press; in the philosophical essays which are beginning to make so large a part of our periodical literature. All augurs well, and is significant of good. We are evidently preparing ourselves for the high mission which God has given us as a people, and unless we strive hard to fail, we shall ere long be found in the front rank of the nations, our faces and our step onward, and still onward towards the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.

SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY.

[From the Democratic Review for December, 1842, January and March, 1843.]

I.

THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT.

Philosophy is the science of Life. Its problem is to find the Ultimate from which we may explain the origin of man and nature, determine the laws of their growth, obtain a presentiment of their destiny, and become inspired with a pure and noble zeal to live and die for the glory of God, and the progress of mankind.

There is and can be no higher problem than this,—none more worthy to engage the whole force of our minds and our hearts. It is the problem of problems; it includes all other problems; and on its solution depend all other problems for theirs. We have answered no question, whether of man or nature, of society, religion, or morals, till we have traced it to the Ultimate, beyond which there is no question to be asked, or to be answered.

But the Ultimate for ever escapes us. It recedes always in proportion as we advance; and is never seized save in a finite and relative form. The complete solution, therefore, transcends, and for ever must transcend, the reach of our powers. All that we can do, and all that we should attempt, is to obtain the solution that shall meet the wants and satisfy the heart of our own epoch. This solution, though it must one day needs be outgrown, as we outgrow the garments of our childhood, will, nevertheless, bring us a measure of peace, become the point of departure for new inquirers, and pave the way for new and more adequate solutions.

Philosophy is the creation of the human understanding, naturally or supernaturally enlarged and enlightened. All begins and ends with Thought, our only medium of knowledge, whatever its sphere or its degree. Thought is, for us, always ultimate. We cannot go before nor behind Thought; for we have nothing but thought with which to go before or behind it. What, then, is Thought? What is its reach? What are its conditions? "For I thought," says Locke,

"that the first step towards satisfying certain inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our powers, and see to what things they were adapted."

Thought implies both Subject and Object, that which thinks and that which is thought. What, then, is the Subject? What is the Object?

The SUBJECT is the me, that which I call myself, and express by the pronoun *I* in the phrases I am, I think, I will, I love; or by the pronoun *me*, when I say of some particular thing, it pleases me, grieves me, injures me, does me good.

I do not know myself by direct immediate knowledge; I come to a knowledge of myself only in the phenomenon, in which I see myself reflected as in a glass. I am never my own immediate object. "The understanding," Locke very properly remarks, "like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object." This, if we substitute *no direct notice* for "no notice," is as true when affirmed of me, as when affirmed of my understanding. I never stand face to face with myself, looking into my own eyes. The Seer and the Seen, the Subject and the Object, are as distinct in psychology as they are in logic; and they are distinct in logic, because they are distinct in the nature of things.

Yet some modern psychologists, misapprehending the fact of consciousness, have questioned this statement, and contended that the Subject may be its own object, and that I may know myself by direct, immediate knowledge. But if this were so, I could know at once, and prior to experience, all that I am, and all that I can do or become. I could know myself active without having acted; thinking without having thought; sentient without having felt. I should know beforehand the nature and the reach of the passions;—love without having ever loved; hatred without having ever hated; grief without having ever grieved. I should know at once all that I ever can know, whether of myself or of that which is not myself. But it is only God who can know himself by direct immediate knowledge; for only that which is independent, self-existent, and self-living, can contain in itself its own object.

No man knows thoroughly himself, or can say, till enlightened by experience, what he is able to do, or to

become. Even they who best obey the injunction, "Know thyself," are but slight proficients in self-knowledge. The bulk of mankind are grossly ignorant of themselves. Moreover, we *advance* in the knowledge of ourselves. Every day reveals us to ourselves under some new aspect. The older we grow, the more varied our experience, severe our struggles, and trying the vicissitudes of life, the better do we come to know and comprehend ourselves. But did we know ourselves by direct, immediate knowledge, what room would there be for this progress? and how could this varied experience, and these struggles, trials, and vicissitudes, become the medium of advancing us in the knowledge of ourselves?

But, though I know not myself by direct, immediate knowledge, yet I know myself mediately, indirectly, through the medium of my acts. Whenever I think, I find myself as one of the elements of the thought. I never think without knowing that it is I and not another that thinks. This is the meaning of the "*Cogito, ergo sum*" of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am." Descartes did not offer in this, nor pretend to offer, as he himself expressly tells us, an argument for his existence; but merely stated the fact in which he found it. Not being able to see or to recognize myself in myself, to see, as it were, my own eye, I should be to myself as if I were not, did I not think. When I do not think, I do not exist to my own apprehension. How know I then that I exist at all? I cannot prove my existence; but I have no need to prove it, for whenever I think, I always find myself in the thought as THAT-WHICH-THINKS. As certain as it is that I think, so certain is it then that I am; for I always think myself as the subject of the thought.

I do not *infer* my existence from the fact of thinking. I do not infer it at all; but in the act of thinking I find it. My existence is never an inference, and logic has nothing to do with establishing it. I cannot prove my existence, neither can I deny it, nor doubt it. To doubt is to think. But I never think without finding myself as the one who thinks. Consequently, in doubting my existence I should find it. I cannot deny my own existence; not only because in denying it I should logically affirm it, by affirming the existence of the denier, but I should be conscious of myself, in the act of denying, as the one who makes the denial.

This finding of myself in the phenomenon, or as the one who thinks, is precisely what is meant by the term con-

SCIOUSNESS. Consciousness is not a faculty, nor even an act of a peculiar sort. It is simply a higher degree of what philosophers call *perception*. As its name implies—*cum scientia*,—it is something that goes along with knowledge, or something in addition to simple perception,—*ad-perceptio*, *ap*perception,—and is easily comprehended. I think a rose. This is a simple phenomenon, or rather a single act of the mind; but, in addition to the perception of the rose, the object of the thought, I recognize, but as an integral part of the same phenomenon, myself as the agent thinking, or the one who perceives the rose. This recognition of myself is the consciousness. All acts in which I so recognize myself as actor or thinker, are called by Leibnitz APPERCEPTIONS. All thoughts are properly apperceptions, for they all include in the view of the thinker, both the subject thinking and the object thought.

But according to this, consciousness is not, as is sometimes supposed, the immediate perception of myself in myself. I am conscious of myself only in the phenomenon, and even then only under the relation of its *subject*. I can speak, I can think, or even conceive of myself only as the subject of an act. I can define myself only by referring to my acts. I express myself, indeed, by the personal pronoun, but never without joining it to the verb. *I*, *me*, taken alone, without a verb, expressed or understood, means nothing. It must be always I *am*, I *do*, I *think*, I *will*, I *love*, or I *hate*. In my essence, save so far as my *being* is revealed in my *doing*, I never know or apprehend myself. I find myself never as pure essence, but always as cause, and as being only so far forth as cause; that is to say, I find myself, exist to myself, only in my efforts, productions, or phenomena. I am conscious, therefore, of myself only under the relation of subject or cause; and, therefore, it is only under this relation of subject or cause, only as projected into the phenomenon, that I can be my own object, that I can study myself, and learn what I am and of what I am capable.

But the phenomenon is never the SOLE product of the subject. There is and can be no thought with a single term. It is impossible to think without thinking an OBJECT as well as a subject. I never think without encountering an object, and only in concurrence with the object. But in the act of thinking where I find myself, and where only I find myself, I always find myself as subject, never as OBJECT. I find

the OBJECT always, invariably opposed to the subject, and, therefore, never as me, but ALWAYS AS NOT ME.

II.

REALITY OF THE OBJECT.

I recognize myself, am conscious of my own existence, am able to affirm that I am, only in the act of thinking. But I can think only on condition of encountering in the phenomenon an object which, as opposed to the subject or me, must needs be not me. Then I can never find myself without finding at the same time, and in the same phenomenon, that which is not myself. But I do find myself in *every* thought. It follows, then, that both myself and that which is not myself, the me and the not me, are given in each and every thought, in the first and simplest, as well as in the last and most complex.

The highest degree of certainty I ever have or can aspire to, is that of my own existence. This is merely the certainty I have that in thinking I recognize myself as the subject of the thought. But the certainty I have, that in thinking I encounter an object, which is not me, is precisely equal to this. Consequently, the certainty I have of the existence of the Object, in all cases as not me, is precisely, objectively and subjectively, the certainty I have of my own existence, that is, my highest degree of certainty.

The object is no creature of the subject; for it is as essential to the production of the phenomenon we term thought, as is the subject itself. Where there is no subject, of course there is no thought; where no object, equally no thought. Since the object precedes thought as one of its conditions, it cannot be a product of thought; since its existence is essential to the activity or to the manifestation of the subject, it must be independent of the subject, and therefore not me. If not me, it must be what I find it in the phenomenon; that is to say, it must be in itself what I think it, or what it enters for into the thought as one of its elements. For, if it were not what I think it; if it entered into the phenomenon for what it is not in itself, it would not be not me, but me; and therefore not object but subject, which were a contradiction in terms. Every thought contains an object; and this object, whatever it be, is therefore not me, but exists really out of me, and independent

of me. The object I think then really is; and is, not because I think it, but I think it because it is, and could not think it, if it were not. Whatever then I think exists, and independent of me. If I think an external world, then is there an external world; the finite, then is there the finite; the infinite, then is there the infinite; God, then God is.

The great problem with philosophers has always been to establish the objective validity of our knowledge; that is, the existence of the not me. We are conscious of our own feelings, beliefs, and convictions; but is there any-thing out of us, and independent of us, to respond to these subjective affections? How know I that God and nature are not mere modes or affections of my subjective life? How know I that aught exists beside this subject which I call myself? and how know I that the outward universe, with all its wondrous beauty and variety, is any-thing more than myself projected, or taken as my own object?

Here is the problem which has always in some form or other tormented the metaphysicians; and yet this is a problem that cannot be solved. There is no passage possible between the subjective and the objective. There is no possible equation between me and not me, by which one may be obtained from the other. It is impossible to conclude from my own existence to that of another. There is here no room for logic. Logic can operate only on data previously assumed or established; and it never does and never can operate with only a single factor. Unity multiplied by unity gives unity, and nothing more, is as true in logic as in arithmetic, which is only a special application of logic. With the me alone, or with the not me alone, logic can obtain no result. God, man, and nature, instead of being results logically obtained, are in fact the necessary bases of logic, and must be found, or assumed, before logic can commence its process of demonstrating them.

Nevertheless, the human race has contrived, some way or other, to open relations with the objective world. From the first day of its conscious existence, it has not ceased to believe itself in strict relation with a world out and independent of itself. God and nature have been and are realities to it, as much so as its own existence. Strange! The human race, the savage in his forest, the shepherd on his hillside, the rustic following his plough,—all believing what the metaphysicians have hitherto been unable to demonstrate, and what the more sober-minded among them con-

tend cannot be demonstrated! This fact should have induced them to inquire, if, after all, they have not erred in assuming any demonstration to be necessary.

When Dr. Johnson was asked what answer he would use against those who denied the reality of the external universe, he replied by striking his foot against a stone. This reply was not logical, but it was philosophical and just. It recognized this fundamental fact, namely, that I find myself only in opposition to that which is not myself; and directed the inquirer to the simple fact in which originates all faith in external realities. In striking his foot against the stone, Dr. Johnson had as positive evidence that the stone was not himself, and therefore that it was in relation to him, an external reality, as he had that it was he and not another who performed the act of striking his foot against it; or that the act of striking his foot against it was followed by an affection of his sensibility.

The cause of this error of the metaphysicians, in seeking a passage where none can be found, and where none is possible or needed, must be looked for in their assumption of a false point of departure of philosophy. They have supposed that philosophy must begin either with the subject, that is, with the me; or with the object, that is, with the not me. But when we begin with the subject we can never get to the object, as Hume and all the sceptical philosophers but too easily demonstrate. When we so begin we necessarily end in Idealism. When we begin with the object, the not me, taking our point of sight in God, as do the larger part of theologians, we necessarily end in Pantheism, with Spinoza; or taking our point of sight in nature, the effect, we end necessarily in Atheism with Evhemere* and D'Holbach; for it is as impossible to go from the object to the subject, as from the subject to the object.

The true point of departure of philosophy is never in BEING, in the ESSE, DAS REINE SEYN of the Hegelians, whether of the subject or of the object; but in LIFE, which is the manifestation of Being. And in LIFE, according to

*Or Euhemerus, usually classed with Bion Borysthenita, the Sophist, as a disciple of Theodorus, the Atheist; but who probably lived earlier. His Ἱερα ἀναγραφή may be found in Diodorus Siculus, vol. 2, part 2, p. 180. He is said to have started from sensibility and denied all objective reality. Virtue and truth consisted only in pleasure, vice and error in pain.—Ed.

what we have established, THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT, ME AND NOT ME, ARE ONE AND INDISSOLUBLE.*

To make this still plainer: Kant, in his Critique, has with masterly skill and wonderful exactness, drawn up a complete list of the categories of Reason. His analysis of Reason may be regarded as complete and final. Cousin has followed him, and, with true metaphysical sagacity, reduced these categories to two,—the category of SUBSTANCE, and that of CAUSE; or, as I prefer to say, the category of BEING and that of PHENOMENON. Whatever we conceive of, we must conceive of it existing either as being or as phenomenon. Being or substance, in itself, transcends the reach of the human mind: we can know it, can conceive of it, only in the phenomenon; or, as M. Cousin would say, only under the category, or relation of cause. I find myself, as we have already seen, only as the subject of the phenomenon; that is, only so far as I do something. In like manner do we know or conceive of nature only under the relation of cause, only as it manifests, and therefore as that-which-manifests itself, in the phenomenon,—as the object which opposes or resists the subject. God is never seen or conceived of in himself. He is to us only in his DOING, only as cause, or creator; though as wise, holy, good, and all-powerful Cause or Creator. The category of substance is then conceivable only in the category of cause: that is, we know being only as cause, and only so far forth as it is a cause. We seize it only in the phenomenon, the manifestation, not in itself.

The manifestation of being, that is, being putting itself forth in the phenomenon, is what I term LIFE; and when this life is so intense that the subject recognizes itself as well as that which is not itself, I term the phenomenon, THOUGHT, or apperception. Now Thought, and, as we shall hereafter see, all Life, is the JOINT PRODUCT of both subject and object. I know myself indeed as subject or cause; but never as able to cause or produce without the CONCURRENCE of that which is not myself. In other words, the subject, as we have seen, cannot manifest itself without an object; and the object cannot manifest itself without a subject, which, of course, relatively to it will be object. Now, as the phe-

* This is not only contrary to the author's later views, but was not the exact expression of his thought then. He did not mean to assert the unity and indissolubility of subject and object, of the me and the not me, but only that they are indissolubly united in thought.—ED.

nomenon is single and indissoluble, and yet the joint product of both subject and object, it follows that both subject and object are, though distinct, one and inseparable in the phenomenon or fact of life. Here, in the phenomenal, in the fact of Life, where only we are able to seize either the subjective world or the objective world, the subject and object are given, not as separate, not one to be obtained from the other, but in an INDISSOLUBLE SYNTHESIS. This is wherefore I call philosophy not the science of BEING, but the science of LIFE; and also wherefore I add to it the epithet, SYNTHETIC.

If metaphysicians had begun in the fact of life, instead of trying to begin with pure being, the ESSE, the REINE SEYN, they would have found, as data already furnished to their hands, both the objective and the subjective; and finding them both in the indestructible synthesis of thought, they would never have conceived the problem—The one being given, how to obtain the other? In point of fact, this problem is really inconceivable, and philosophers have been for ages asking, not so much an unanswerable, as, if we may so speak, an unaskable question; for the one term is never found without the other, or conceived of, save in conjunction with the other. This is what we must mean when we say that we never find ourselves but as the subject of the phenomenon, and never as subject without finding ourselves in conjunction with that which is not ourselves, as object.

There has been no error in asserting the existence of God, man, and nature. We are not to arraign the faith of mankind in this three-fold existence, because philosophers have been unable to legitimate it. It needs no legitimating; and we have erred only in attempting to legitimate it. Mankind believe in God, in themselves, and in nature, for the best of all possible reasons, BECAUSE THEY THINK THEM, AND CANNOT THINK WITHOUT THINKING THEM. Here is the whole mystery of the matter. The profoundest philosophy can add nothing to this, and take nothing from it. All that philosophy is called upon to do in relation to it, is simply by reflection to place the fact that the me alone is incapable of generating a single phenomenon, in a light so clear that none can mistake it.

Taking this view, there ceases to be any discrepancy between philosophy and what is called common sense. Humanity is never a sceptic. Even the sceptical philosophers themselves, are practically no sceptics. Hume, not-

withstanding his philosophical doubts, believes as firmly in God, nature, and the necessary connection between cause and effect, as his great opponent, Dr. Reid himself. Both admitted that the reality of this connection, and that of an external world, could not be demonstrated; both also contended that neither could be disbelieved. The only difference there was between the sceptic Hume, and the realist Reed, was that the former thought the demonstration in question essential to a scientific belief, while the latter stoutly maintained, but without showing any great reason for so maintaining, that it was not.

There is much misconception about this matter of proving or demonstrating. Nothing is more absurd than to conclude that whatever cannot be *proved* true, must therefore be regarded as false. That which is less evident, is proved by that which is more evident. But when the fact alleged is of itself of the highest degree of evidence we can have, it is incapable of proof. What is more evident than the circular appearance of the sun? Yet how can I *prove* to myself or to another, that the sun appears to me of a circular form? But facts of this kind need no proof. EVERY FACT IS INCAPABLE OF PROOF JUST IN PROPORTION TO ITS CERTAINTY. A proposition is demonstrated by being resolved into another proposition more ultimate, or by being shown to be involved in another proposition held to be true. But when the proposition is itself ultimate, when there is no proposition more ultimate into which it can be resolved, or from which it can be obtained, it is, and must needs be, incapable of demonstration. But then it needs no demonstration. It is certain of itself, and one of the grounds of certainty in regard to other propositions. Now, the ground we assume is that both the me and the not me are ultimate, and both being found in the same phenomenon as the essential conditions of its production, are incapable of demonstration or of proof, but are sufficiently evident without either.

III.

RELATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT.

The subject and object cannot meet in the fact of life without generating a result. Their shock one against the other cannot take place without an echo. This echo adds another to the elements of thought. Thought may therefore be defined to be a phenomenon with three indestructible

elements, all equally essential to its production; no one of which can be abstracted without destroying thought and the possibility of thought.

These three elements are, 1. SUBJECT; 2. OBJECT; 3. FORM. The Subject is always ME; the Object always NOT ME; the Form is the NOTION, or what the subject notes, in the act of thinking, of both subject and object.

Subject and object are the bases of thought, and necessarily precede the phenomenon. The subject must exist before it can think, the object before it can be thought. Neither then is produced by thought. Both do and must remain in themselves what they are, be the notion the mind takes of them, or the Form of the thought, what it may. The subject generates neither, nor determines the office of either in the generation of thought, for it cannot think without including both as the necessary conditions on which it thinks.

But with the FORM of the thought, or Notion, it is altogether different. This is the product of the subject; not indeed of the subject alone, as free, voluntary cause; but of the subject acting in conjunction with the object. It is the view which the subject takes of both itself and the object, and according to the conditions of thought cannot be produced without the presence, and so to speak, co-operation of the object or not me. But the intelligence that notes, views, or perceives, is the subject exclusively. The conjunction of subject and object can generate thought only on condition that the subject is intelligent. In thought there is always intelligence; as we have seen, always direct perception of the object, and a reflected perception of the subject. This intelligence is the subject. The form of the thought, being the notion which the subject takes of both subject and object, is therefore the product of the intelligence of the subject, only of the subject displaying itself in conjunction with the object.

The subject taking note of both subject and object, in the fact of life, is called the fact of consciousness. Consciousness is myself perceiving that which is not myself, and recognizing myself as the agent perceiving. It is not one thing to perceive, and another to be conscious. It is not correct to say that I am conscious of my perceptions. Consciousness is not a phenomenon separate or even distinguishable from perception, unless it be in the fact that it marks a certain degree or intenseness of perception. Both

perception and consciousness are the subject displaying itself in conjunction with the object; both are manifestations of one and the same intelligent subject. In every fact of consciousness I perceive; though I am not *conscious* in every fact of perception. But those perceptions in which I am not conscious, differ from those in which I am, that is, from my thoughts or apperceptions, only in being feebler, more confused, less marked or distinct. They, in like manner as thought, imply both subject and object, but in them the subject perceives the object, without any reflected perception of itself as the percipient agent. Not seeing itself in those perceptions, the subject is unable to give them form, or to note distinctly what they reveal of either subject or object. Add another degree of perception, render the perception sufficiently vivid and distinct to be what I call thought or apperception, and it is instantly clothed with a form; the mind notes, marks or distinguishes both itself and the object. It follows from this that the Form or Notion is merely that higher *degree* of intelligence which includes in one view both subject and object, and therefore is identical with the fact of consciousness.

The Form of the thought, or notion, is often taken for the whole of the phenomenon. Thought is indeed impossible without form, and where there is no notion of either subject or object, or of both, there is no thought; but if the form, or the notion, were the whole phenomenon, thought would be a mere empty form, a notion where nothing is noted. Locke called the form of the thought or notion, *Idea*, which would have been well enough, if he had not made ideas a sort of intermediary between the subject and the object. Locke does not teach that we perceive the object, but an idea or notion of the object. This was his fundamental error. We perceive the object itself, never a notion of it, for the notion, instead of being the immediate object of the perception, is simply what, in perceiving, we note of the subject and the object of perception, the form which by virtue of our intelligence we are able to give to the perception.

In the fact of consciousness, or under the form of the thought, are always, as has been said over and over again, both me and not me. Then under the form of every thought, even the simplest, the feeblest, lies always absolute truth. Me and not me, these two certainly embrace all reality. These both are essential to the production of the

least conceivable thought. All reality lies then under every notion as its conditions. God, man, and nature, all three conspire to produce each one of our thoughts, and each one of our thoughts reflects them all three. Without the combined activity of them all, no thought, nor even possibility of thought. How wonderful a creation then is thought! Of what inconceivable grandeur! Before it the wise stand in awe, or bow down and revere as before the transparent symbol of the Almighty.

But, if absolute truth enters into every thought as its basis, is essential to its production, yet no more of this truth is expressed by the form of the thought than comes within the scope of the intelligence of the subject. This intelligence, in the case of all beings but One, is and must be limited. Man is an intelligence, or else he could not think; but he is a finite intelligence. His light is a true light, as far as it is light; but it is feeble and dim. It shines only a little way into the darkness, and even that little way merely as a sudden flash, permitting us to see that there are objects there, but vanishing too soon to enable us to see what they are. It cannot enlighten all reality.* It can enlighten only that side of reality which is turned towards us; that turned from us it throws into shade. The smaller body can never illumine at once all sides of the larger body. Man, therefore, cannot comprehend the infinity which lies at the bottom of his thoughts. Always then must his NOTIONS, or views of that infinity, partake of his own feebleness, and be inadequate, dim, and partial.

With these dim, inadequate, partial, one-sided views, man constructs, and must construct, his systems of religion, morals, and politics. Compelled by the necessities of his nature, to conclude from the luminous to the dark, from the known to the unknown, the certain to the uncertain, error is the inevitable consequence, and his systems reared with honestest intention, and infinite pains, can be, even while they stand, little else than monuments to the wide disparity there is, and ever must be, between his ambition and his strength.

But this, while it may well humble pride, and check theoretic presumption, need not alarm or dishearten the inquirer. Thought, owing to the finiteness of the human

*The author here thinks the light the product of the subject, not of the object, as shown in later essays.—ED.

intelligence, is always inadequate, and therefore has and must have its face of error; but since it necessarily includes under its form both the ME and NOT ME, and therefore the infinite, the absolute, it must also have always its face of truth.

IV.

FORMULA OF THE ME, OR SUBJECT.

I am revealed to myself only as the subject of an act; that is, as agent or actor. We find ourselves only in acting, and only so far forth as we act. To act is to cause, create, or produce. The ME, then, since it acts, must be a cause, a creative or productive Force.

If a cause, it must be a real, substantive being. That which is not, cannot act. In order to do, it is necessary to be. Being necessarily precedes Doing; but it is only in Doing that Being is made known. In recognizing myself to be active, I necessarily recognize myself to be a real existence—a limited, relative substance, no doubt; but still a substance capable of supporting accidents or phenomena; and, therefore, not myself a phenomenon, nor a collection of phenomena, whether of matter or of spirit.

The substantiality of the me affirms its UNITY. If I am substantial, I am *one* substance; for two substances would be two mes, instead of one. Moreover, I am always revealed to myself as one. My phenomena may vary, but I do not vary with them. They may pass away, but I survive. We never confound ourselves with our phenomena. We think, but are not the thought; are pleased, but are not the pleasure; are pained, but are not the pain; nor do we become it when pained. There is always unity of consciousness. The me that wills, knows, feels, is always one and the same me. The me, then, is a unity; that is, a simple substance, being, cause, or force.

But I am not a mere naked substance; that is, a mere abstraction. I am a living substance, clothed with attributes. I find myself in the act of thinking. But to think is to perceive, no less than to act. An unintelligent actor would not be a thinking actor. No being but an intelligent being can think. The ME, then, since it thinks, must be INTELLIGENT.

I am also capable of feeling. The naked conception of substance does not necessarily involve the power to feel;

nor does it imply that of intelligence. The fact that I am intelligent is learned by experience, not deduced from the nature of being or substance, considered apart from its manifestations. There is do particular substance or being whose attributes or properties can be known, *a priori*. The naked idea of being—the *reine Seyn* of Hegel—is simply the idea of something which is, and does not necessarily suppose the being to possess any other quality, property, or attribute, than that of being able simply to be. From this idea, some philosophers have, indeed, attempted to deduce, logically, the universe, with all its infinite variety of phenomena. But from being, nothing but being can be obtained; and the universe constructed with this simple idea would be the veriest abstraction, and in the last analysis identical with no universe at all. The faculties of the particular being in question must always be learned empirically, and be taken as facts of experience, and not as facts of reasoning. It would not be difficult to conceive of beings created with the simple FORCE or power of acting without thinking or feeling. But such a being is not man. We may add to force intelligence, and conceive of a being capable of acting and knowing, and yet incapable of feeling. Such a being is very conceivable; there may be, for aught we know, many such beings; but man is not one of them. He is capable of feeling. The sentiments, love, joy, grief, hope, pleasure, pain, are among those phenomena which nobody questions, for they are facts of every one's experience. Man, then, is not only a substance, but an intelligent and *sentient* substance,—a being that ACTS, KNOWS, and FEELS.

From this it follows that man has three faculties, which may be named,

1. Activity,
2. Intelligence,
3. Sensibility.

Activity is the power of acting; intelligence the power of knowing; sensibility the power of feeling. There may, for aught we know, be beings endowed with more than these three faculties; but these are all that we have found ourselves to possess, and all that we can conceive it possible for us or for any other being to possess.

But the me has already been shown to be a UNITY,—one and indivisible. This distinction of faculties, then, implies no division in its essence. There is not one part of it that

acts, another part that knows, and still another part that feels. It is all and entire in each one of its faculties,—a simple substance, with the threefold power of acting, knowing, and feeling. It must then act in knowing and feeling; know in feeling and acting; feel in acting and knowing. This follows inevitably from the fact that I am in myself a cause. I find myself always as a cause, and never under any other character. I find myself in all my phenomena, in those of intelligence and sensibility, no less than in those of activity. Then I find myself in them all as a cause. Then I am active in them. Since I am a unity, and therefore must act ever as a whole, in all my integrity, I must act in them all with my threefold power of acting, knowing, and feeling.

According to the Formula now obtained, man is a being that acts, knows, and feels, and ALL THESE IN THE SAME PHENOMENON, AND IN ALL HIS PHENOMENA. He is then a TRINITY, a living type of that sublime doctrine which lies at the bottom of all Christian theology, and not only the type, but in some sort the origin and basis.

Two facts here must never be lost sight of, the UNITY and TRIPLICITY of the me. Man acts always as a unity, but with a threefold power of activity, or rather with a capacity of giving to his activity a threefold direction. We can discover in his nature the distinction of faculties, but no division of essence. There is a broad distinction between an action and a cognition, between a cognition and a feeling, and between a feeling and an action; but in actual life there is no separation. The faculties designated are essentially the ME, and the activity displayed in them is the activity of the one invariable and indivisible subject. We cannot say that activity acts, intelligence knows, and sensibility feels; for this would be to separate the faculties from the me, and to give them in some sort an independent existence. The intellectual phenomenon is always the product of the ME displaying itself in its unity and triplicity; therefore of the simultaneous and joint action—so to speak—of all the faculties.

This fact is important. Neglect of it has generated much confusion, and no little false philosophy. Psychologists have mistaken the facts of MEMORY for the facts of CONSCIOUSNESS. The facts of memory may be dissected, decomposed, and distributed into separate classes. As the soul has three faculties, and each of these faculties performs an office in

generating the phenomena, we may detect the part of each, and distribute the phenomena into classes corresponding to the distinction of faculties. In the analysis of these facts, activity will be found to give us *actions*, intelligence *cognitions*, and sensibility *sentiments* or feelings. We may distribute them, then, into actions or volitions, cognitions or ideas, and sentiments or feelings. But this distribution, however true it may be to me as studied in the products of my past life, will not be true to the me of actual life. In actual life all go together. There is no action which is not at the same time a cognition and a sentiment; no cognition not at the same time a sentiment and an action; no sentiment not at the same time an action and a cognition.

But, losing sight of this fact, psychologists not unfrequently transfer to actual life the classifications they obtain by studying our past life, and therefore destroy the *me*, by resolving it into its attributes. In the facts of memory there is no living unity. That living unity has left them behind, has passed on, and is now merely looking back upon them. That living unity is the ME itself, and being no longer in them, but merely contemplating them, as it were, at a distance, cannot, of course, find itself in them. They are to it what the dead body is to the living. There being, in fact, no unity in them, reflection cannot find it, any more than anatomy finds in dissecting the dead body the one vital principle which controlled all the functions and gave a common direction to all the activities of the living body. The me obtained by studying these facts exclusively is necessarily multiple and not simple. Taken, then, for the ME of actual life, it gives to the me of actual life no unity, separates it into parts, into independent being, and, instead of a me that at once, by virtue of its own nature, acts, knows, and feels, gives us three separate, and in some sort independent mes,—a me that acts, another me that knows, and still another that feels, displaying themselves sometimes in concert, sometimes one after another, and sometimes, as it were, one in opposition to another. But the faculties do not exist independent of the me. There is not a me and by its side a power to act, a power to know, or a power to feel. The threefold power is the me, and the me is it. Activity does not act, I act because I am in my essence active; intelligence does not know, I know because I am by my nature intelligent; sensibility does not feel, I feel because I am in myself sentient.

In consequence of transferring to the living subject the classifications we have obtained by studying the dead subject, or facts of memory, we have supposed that we could perform actions or generate phenomena which should not necessarily imply all our faculties. Thought, which expresses the highest activity of the soul, has been regarded as a purely intellectual act, and intellect has been defined to be the thinking faculty, as distinct from activity or sensibility. Thought is looked upon as something dry and cold; and a "man of thought" would designate a man without soul, without heart, destitute of love or sentiment, living only in abstractions. But there are no abstractions in actual life. A purely intellectual being may, as has been said, be conceived of, but such a being man is not. Such a being might indeed think, that is, know, but thinking and knowing in such a being could not and would not be what they are in us. Man is in his essence sentient. He cannot divest himself of his sensibility, for he cannot divest himself of himself. Always and everywhere, then, must he feel. When he acts, act where or to what end he will, he must feel. He can perform no dry, cold, intellectual act. Even the metaphysician, poring over his abstractions, withered and dry as he may seem, is still a man, and has a heart; and when, after days, weeks, months, and years of painful watching and laborious study, truth at last dawns on his soul, and he grasps the solution of the problem which had tortured his heart, he too is moved, and in a sort of rapture exclaims, "I have found it, I have found it!"

The me never acts as naked cause, as pure intelligence, nor as pure feeling. It acts as it is, and for what it is. Thought, then, since it implies the activity of the me, implies the me with all its essential attributes. It implies sentiment as well as cognition. The me, it has been shown, enters into every thought as subject. It enters then as a whole, for it cannot leave one half of itself behind, and go forth and act with the other half. Thought then covers the whole phenomenon of actual life, and instead of being the product of pure intelligence, it is simultaneously and vitally action-cognition-sentiment.

The various distinctions introduced into the phenomena of actual life by psychologists, or rather psycho-anatomists, of facts of activity, facts of intelligence, facts of sensibility, facts of reason, facts of understanding, of a higher nature and a lower, of a moral nature and a religious, however con-

venient they may be for certain purposes, are really inadmissible, and while they recognize the multiplicity of the me, tend to make us lose sight of its unity. It is always the self-same me that acts, whatever the sphere of its activity, or tendency of its action. It has but one nature, and it is always by virtue of that one nature it does whatever it does. If a man be base and grovelling in his propensities, worthless or vicious in his life, it is not a *lower* nature that is at work within him, that is at fault, but the man himself misdirecting his activity; if he aspire to the generous and the heroic, to the pure and upright, it is not a higher nature, nor a nobler faculty of his nature displaying itself, but the man himself conducting with greater propriety and in stricter conformity to the will of his Maker.

All these distinctions go to destroy the unity of the soul, to perplex and mislead our judgments. The distinction which has latterly been contended for between the *moral* nature and the *religious* is unfounded. Man is not moral by virtue of one set of faculties, and religious by virtue of another set of faculties. The same faculties are active in both cases, and the only difference there is or can be between religion and morality is in the direction man gives to his activity. Nor is there any distinction between the faculty by which man knows what some call the truths of the *reason*, and what are termed truths of the *understanding*. There is not a reason taking cognizance of one class of objects, and an understanding taking cognizance of another. To know may indeed have various conditions, but it is always one and the same phenomenon, and by virtue of one and the same intellectual power. The whole me acts in knowing, let it know wherever it will. In knowing material objects it uses material organs, but the faculty by virtue of which I know through these organs is, as will hereafter be shown, the same as that by virtue of which I know in the bosom of consciousness itself. The pretence that sensibility is the faculty by which we know material objects, and reason the faculty by virtue of which we know spiritual objects, is arbitrary and without any just foundation in actual life. Without reason, our senses would be as the telescope without a seeing eye to look through it; without sensibility, we never do, if we ever could know, even spiritual truths. To raise men to a perception of what are called the higher truths, it is always necessary to purify and exalt sentiment. Beethoven carries us nearer to God, than Kant or

Hegel. Without love man cannot soar; and without thet exaltation, that enthusiasm which goes by the name of Inspiration, there are few truths of an elevated nature that are discoverable. Man acts ever with all his faculties, in tha least as well as in the greatest of his actions.

V.

OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.

Psychologists, in addition to Activity, Intelligence, and Sensibility,—the three faculties of the subject already enumerated,—distinguish in the mind certain Powers which they divide into Moral Powers and Intellectual Powers. These powers are Perceiving, Remembering, Imagining, Reflecting, Comparing, Compounding, Distinguishing, Abstracting, Desiring, Willing, and Reasoning; all of which may be arranged, and treated, under the three general heads of

1. Perception,
2. Willing,
3. Reasoning.

But as these are facts of life, mere modes of the activity of the subject, not principles, or elements of human nature, they are more properly termed, as Locke terms them, Operations of the Mind, than *powers* or faculties of the mind, as they are termed by Reid and Stewart.

§ *1. Perception.*

Perception is the official name, in the Scottish school, for the recognition by the external senses of material objects, and answers to the *Sensation* of the old French school of Condillac. But the restriction of the term to this class of our cognitions is purely arbitrary. The fact designated by it is common to all our mental operations. We perceive in sensation, in sentiment, in desire, in volition, in reasoning, in consciousness. This is implied in the fact, which lies at the basis of all science of Life, that the subject never manifests itself, in any degree, nor in any direction, or under any aspect, save in conjunction with the object.

It is not easy to define Perception. It is the simplest

operation of the subject, and therefore incapable of being resolved into a simpler operation, or explained by being shown to have some analogy to another operation more easily apprehended. Reference to the etymology of the word, here as well as elsewhere, may help us to seize the psychological fact designated by it. The word comes to us from the Latin *per-capio*, and means *to seize, to take hold of, to possess, or invade.* Its radical meaning is *to seize*, and implies that the subject establishes between itself and the object the relation of possession. Every being capable of establishing or sustaining any relation between itself and another, must be percipient. Hence Leibnitz endows his monads, or elements of things, with perception. In perception the percipient subject contrives in some way to *invade* and *possess* the object. Hence with the French the word *perception* is applied to the collection of taxes and imposts.

Locke says that "in bare naked perception the mind is for the most part passive;" but according to the view just given of the meaning of the term, the subject must be not passive but active. Even Locke himself implies as much, notwithstanding what he says to the contrary; for he reckons perception among the *operations* of the mind, and assures us that there can be no perception, though all the requisite external conditions be present, unless there be also a *noting* of the mind from within. This noting from within must needs be an active operation. The subject, in point of fact, never is passive at all. According to the Formula of the Me already established, the subject is inherently, essentially a cause, or productive force. We cannot then be passive, for our passivity would negative our activity. Perception must always be taken, then, as an *active* operation. Analyzed, it gives us: 1. The subject perceiving: 2. The *conatus*, or effort of the subject to perceive: and 3. The presence of the object, the seizure or apprehension of which, is the perception.

The doctrine of passivity, that we are passive in the reception of external impressions, has no solid foundation. It is unquestionably true that there can be no mental phenomenon save by the concurrence of an active force from without; but it is also equally true that there can be no mental phenomenon but from the concurrence of an active force from within. Even in the reception of an external impression we are not passive but active. If we did not

exist, we could not *receive* an impression; if we were totally inactive, that is, literally dead, we should be precisely as if we were not, and therefore as incapable of receiving an impression as of giving one. No phenomenon, whether we speak of man, animals, plants, or inorganic matter, can be generated save by the concurrence of TWO FORCES, both of which must act, and act too from opposite directions. Every phenomenon of every *dependent* being, is necessarily THE RESULTANT OF TWO FACTORS. In life, no more than in arithmetic, can we obtain a product with only a single factor. All nature is created according to one and the same original Type or Idea. Through the whole runs a never failing duality; all is bifold, or separated, as it were, into two sexes, without whose conjunction there is never a generation. But more of this when we come to speak of the FORMULA OF THE OBJECT, or what some philosophers call Ontology, or the Science of Being, in opposition to Psychology, or the Science of the SUBJECT; though very improperly, for being is as predicable of me or Subject, as of not me or Object.

Though in perception the subject is always active, yet in simple perception it is not sufficiently so, to be as Locke contends, able to *note* the object. In simple perception nothing is noted, distinguished; and therefore, strictly speaking, nothing cognized or known. Clear, vivid perceptions, in which the subject marks or distinguishes the object, are APPERCEPTIONS. These, however, do no differ at bottom from simple perceptions. Simple perceptions are so feeble, so dim, confused, and short-lived, their objects are so numerous, run one so into another, come and go in such rapid succession, that the subject is unable to distinguish them one from another. In the apperceptions we distinguish; in the perceptions we do not. In the former we *think* our existence; in the latter we have only an obscure and confused *sense* of it. Any seizure of the object is an act of intelligence, if the subject seizing be only conscious. That which enables one to be conscious, to include ones-self, is sentiment, or sensibility. A being destitute of sentiment, would be capable of perception; but might be incapable of cognition. But, since man is sensible in his essence, he must always act whenever he acts, in some degree, as sensibility. Consequently, a certain degree of sentiment must enter into each one, even the feeblest and most obscure, of his perceptions. The perception then does not, as we might

at first sight suppose, become apperception by the addition of sentiment, but by becoming more marked and distinct. Perception, then, *in man*, is of the same nature with cognition, and always is cognition when there is not such a multitude of perceptions rushing as it were upon us at once, and with such rapidity that nothing can be distinguished; as when we witness the rapid revolutions of a wheel, the points follow one another in such quick succession, that there appears to us to be no succession at all; as a top when it spins with the greatest rapidity does not appear even to move.

§ 2. *Memory.*

Under the head of Remembering, or Memory, may be considered more at large, certain objections to the doctrine, that the subject never does and never can know itself save in the phenomenon in conjunction with the object, and that the object is alway veritably not me; that is, is always really and truly existing out of the subject and independent of it.

In opposition to the first of these assertions, it is alleged that the subject can know itself in itself; for there is an order of facts open to our inspection, when once we retire within ourselves, in which we may study the subject by direct, immediate consciousness. In opposition to the second assertion, it is urged, that though it is unquestionably true that the subject must needs have in every fact of life an object, yet since we can, as in reflection and imagination, think on the facts which we have ourselves created, the object may, in certain cases at least, be of our own creating, and therefore not necessarily not me, in the strict sense contended for.

1. Our life, as we look upon it, consists entirely in efforts to explore and find out ourselves. The soul, restless and uneasy at home, goes out into the not me, to find what is necessary to fill up its view of itself. Since it finds itself only in finding the object, and only so far forth as it finds the object; and since it finds the object only in finding itself, and only so far forth as it finds itself, all our inquiries may be summed up in the two questions, WHAT IS THE SUBJECT? WHAT IS THE OBJECT? The answer to the one of these questions, will always be the answer to the other. At

bottom they are not two questions, but one question, and those old sages who summed up all in the injunction, "KNOW THYSELF," were not so far out of the way. According to the doctrine, thus far contended for, man knows himself only so far as he comes to know God and nature, and God and nature only so far as he comes to know himself. The knowledge of the one is always by the knowledge of the other, and the knowledge of both is but one and the same knowledge; or at least, only the reciprocal knowledge of two correlative terms, as will hereafter be shown at full length.

The question, what is the subject? it follows from this, can never be fully answered, save by one who knows all that there is to be known. Before we can answer it, we must know both God and nature, and know them completely. The whole of our life, individual and social, temporal and eternal, cannot suffice for a knowledge so extensive; for in order to be able to suffice for it, we should need to be capable of an infinite knowledge. The subject unquestionably represents in life the infinite, but represents it only in a finite manner; in order to represent it in an infinite manner, it must itself be infinite, which it is not and never can be. The complete and final answer to the question, what is the subject? must then forever transcend our powers. The only question we can answer, is what has the subject found itself to be? The answer to this question would be an inventory of the present intellectual wealth of the race, and a sort of *novum Organon* of science, and a means of advancing the sciences.

This question, what has the subject found itself to be? though by no means easily answered, *can* be answered by a profound study of the monuments of the individual and the race; that is, the facts of Memory, and the facts of History. But a class of modern psychologists smile at our modesty, when we talk of the difficulty of answering this question, and of limiting our inquiries to this relative knowledge of the subject and the object. They tell us, that the soul may know itself as it were absolutely; for it can study, if not itself in itself, yet itself in its facts, and these facts in itself. The facts which reveal the soul, are in the soul; we carry them always about with us, and may find them whenever we look steadily within. We can study them as easily and as certainly, as we can the facts of physical science. We observe the facts of external nature by the external senses,

and proceed by induction to the construction of a science of the universe; we may, in like manner, observe the facts of the soul by immediate consciousness, and proceed by induction to the construction of a complete Psychology, or science of the soul. If this were so, nothing would be more simple and easy than to know ourselves; for nothing is or can be more certain than the facts of consciousness.

But even admitting that there is the order of facts, of which these psychologists speak, and that we can study them by immediate consciousness, the study of the soul in them would not be the study of the soul in itself, for they are the phenomena of the soul; and the study of the soul in them would still be the study of the soul in its phenomena, according to the principle laid down, that being must always be studied in the phenomenon; that the category of substance can be seized and studied only in the category of cause.

Moreover, the knowledge of the subject obtained from these facts, even admitting that we can know them in the manner and to the extent alleged, would not be a complete and final answer to the question, what is the subject? unless it be assumed that the subject has already completely realized itself. If it be conceded that man has not as yet attained to the utmost limits of his possibility, that he has yet an Ideal, and therefore a Future, the knowledge contended for would not be an absolute knowledge of the subject; but merely a knowledge of what it has thus far found itself to be; that is to say, the same relative knowledge to which we contend all our knowledge is necessarily restricted.

But these psychologists misapprehend the character of the order of facts of which they speak; the world which contains them when they are observed; and the light or psychical faculty by means of which they are studied. The distinction they contend for, between what they call external senses and an internal sense or consciousness, does not really exist, and has been made in consequence of too strong a desire to establish, as it were, a parallelism between physical science and psychological science. This parallelism no doubt in some sort exists; but not in the sense contended. There is in fact no purely physical science; and no purely psychological science. Our physics depend always on our metaphysics; because the subject always includes itself as one of the elements of all its thoughts. It therefore necessarily constitutes one of the elements of physical science, as much

as it does of psychological science; and the worth of its physical science always depends on the view which it takes of itself. As it knows itself only as the correlative of object, in all its science of itself, it must include as one of the elements of that science, the object or not me. Each science therefore contains the other, and the two are, as has just been intimated, not two sciences, but one science. As the science of nature is always *by* the science of the subject, and as the science of the subject is *by* the science of nature, the method of studying one or the other is doubtless the same. But we have not two sets of senses, one for the external, and one for the internal, one for nature, and the other for the subject. The observer is always the subject, the me, the whole me and nothing but the me. I always observe, whatever the field of my observation, by virtue of my own inherent intelligence, or rather power of intelligencing. This power is one and indivisible, as is necessarily implied in the unity of the subject, which we found affirmed by its substantiality. This is always one and the same light, whether it shine out through those windows of the soul called the external senses, or whether it blazes out in the brilliant but brief light of consciousness. What this illumines I observe; what it leaves in the shade I cannot observe. In external sense, and in consciousness, the observer is always the same,—always the one invariable, persisting subject, which I call me, myself.

The light, or power, by which I observe, or by which I am rendered capable of observing, is not only one and indivisible, but is always myself, and in no sense whatever distinguishable from me. It is me, inherently, essentially, not something separable from me, and capable of being distributed among different organs. The brain is called an organ of the mind, but the *power* to think is not the brain, is not secreted by it, does not reside in it. *It* does not think, *I* think; *It* is not the intelligent subject or force; *I* am that intelligent subject or force. The material, or physical organs, improperly termed senses, since they are not senses, but organs of sense, do not observe; *I* observe. The body does not feel; *I* feel. The pain which I say is in my foot, is not a pain which my foot feels, but a pain which I feel; and I may even continue to feel it for a time, after my foot has been amputated and removed far from me. Consciousness does not know, for it is not an agent, nor even the faculty of an agent. I am the agent and I, not the con-

sciousness—know. It is not correct to speak of the senses as observing the external world, and consciousness the internal world, as if I, the real and only subject, were standing idly by, with no conceivable employment, but that of merely listening to the reports which consciousness and the senses are so obliging as to make to me. It is always I myself, that sees, hears, feels, knows, although by means of appropriate organs, according to the conditions of my being and modes of activity. Consciousness, it cannot be repeated too often, is not a sense, a faculty, a power, nor even a fact of a peculiar sort; but simply the subject becoming able to recognize itself in the phenomenon, and to say, *I* am, *I* think, *I* will, *I* know, *I* love. All activity, whether voluntary or involuntary intelligent, or sentient, is in the subject,—is in fact the subject itself. Whatever is done, the me or subject does it; that is, when we contemplate the fact from the subjective side. It observes, because it is an *active* intelligence; knows, because it is an intelligent force. It is itself both the intelligence and the force in their indissoluble unity. There can be, then, no *external* intelligence, unless we can conceive the subject being external to itself; that is, out of itself. All intelligence is and needs must be internal, in the subject itself; and therefore must be internal also all our powers of observation, whatever they be, and whatever, or wherever, their organs.

Nor is this all. There not only are not the two sets of faculties for observing, supposed, but there are not even the *two fields* of observation contended for. There is not an external field of observation, and an internal field. It is admitted, that the subject may study itself in its facts, and learn itself, so far as it has entered into them; but it cannot and does not study these facts in itself. It is the observer; and all on the side of the observer. It cannot double itself over, as it were, and be at once the observer and the observed; nor can it divide itself into two halves, and observe one half of itself with the other. Now, nothing can be in the subject, or on the side of the subject, but the subject itself. If then these facts are in the soul, they are subject, and not object; and therefore cannot be studied. Nothing which is in the subject, till projected in the phenomenon, can, for this reason, be observed. All observation, since the subject is the observer, must therefore needs be external. All objects of contemplation, reflection, observation, study, or even imagination, must therefore be

exterior to the subject. The very term *object*, implies that the facts concerned are out of the subject, standing over against it. It is because they are thus out of the subject, standing over against it, that they are called *objects*, instead of subject. which they would be, were they *in* the me. The light, power, or faculty of observing is internal, subjective; but the observation itself is made always from within outwards,—made in the external, and just as much, and as inevitably so, in the case of the facts of consciousness, as in the facts of the material world. What is so often said, about "introspection," "looking within," "studying the soul by immediate consciousness," must not then be too strictly construed. The facts which philosophers and divines have in view, when they exhort us to look within, are no doubt very real, and very necessary to be studied, in order to become acquainted with ourselves. They are facts, nay, facts open to our inspection; but they must be regarded as existing out and independent of the subject, not in it, and therefore, as not me.

Moreover, these facts, which are called facts of consciousness, and which constitute what is called the *internal* world, are not, when objects of study, facts of *consciousness*, nor are they observed by immediate consciousness. A fact of consciousness, or a fact in which I am conscious, is always a present intellectual act, in which I recognize myself as the subject acting. The thought I am *thinking*, whatever it be, not the one I *have* thought, is the fact of consciousness. Consciousness concerns always the present, and, like the subject itself, has no past, and no future. The moment I arrest myself thinking, and attempt to seize the thought, and to make it an object of reflection, it ceases to be the thought I *am* thinking, and becomes the though I *was* thinking, and on which I am now reflecting. The fact of consciousness, is now myself reflecting on the thought I was thinking, or rather the thought I am thinking on that thought. The fact of consciousness, then, dies the moment we attempt to seize it, and to make it the object of our observation, and a new fact is born. Observation of psychological facts by means of immediate consciousness, is then out of the question.

That there is the order of facts we are considering, and that they must be studied as the indispensable condition of being able to answer the question, what is the subject? there is and can be no doubt. They are the products of

our past living; they are the *facts* of the subject, what it has done, or rather, the facts in which it has realized itself, so far as realized itself it has; and they must therefore, if known, reveal the subject to itself, as a picture reveals the artist, or a book its author. There has been no error in directing our attention to this order of facts, as a means of learning ourselves; nor in the importance which has been ascribed to them; but in calling them, when studied, facts of consciousness; in alleging that it is by immediate consciousness that we study them; in pretending that it is *in* the subject that they are studied; and in calling the study of the subject in these, a study of the soul by itself in itself, and not the study of itself in its phenomena. They are facts,—no doubt facts having a peculiar relation to the subject, but still facts, and in the condition of all facts which fall under our observation,—exterior to the subject, and therefore really and truly not me.

So much I have thought it not improper to say in answer to the first objection urged, an objection which can hardly have failed to suggest itself to the most careless reader. No one pretends that the subject cannot study itself; but simply, that it cannot study itself directly, immediately; but indirectly, mediately, in its phenomena.

The facts which are sometimes called facts of consciousness, are, properly speaking, FACTS OF MEMORY. They are, as I have said, products of our past life; but not on this account facts of consciousness, any more than is the book I have written, or the machine I have constructed, a fact of my consciousness. When remembered, I no doubt am conscious that, *when present*, I found myself in them as their subject. It is this fact which connects them in a peculiar manner with myself, and which has led some able psychologists to call them facts of consciousness. But they are not facts of consciousness, even when remembered; for the difference between a pain which we are now experiencing, and one which we merely remember to have experienced, is very obvious, and escapes no one's attention.

2. But these facts are unquestionably products of our past life. They can be remembered, as we say, *recalled* by memory; and when so recalled, they are *objects* of study—objects of thought—and, therefore, according to the principles laid down, not only *object*, but veritably NOT ME. But, if they are products of our past life, the creations of the subject, even admitting that the subject can manifest itself

only in conjunction with the object, does it not follow that the object may be its own creation, and therefore after all really, and, so to speak, vitally subjective? If the subject can create its own object, as in reflecting on its own products, what evidence does the fact that it cannot manifest itself without an object, furnish that the object is really not me, existing out of the subject and independent of it?

That the facts of Memory are products of our past life, is conceded; that when remembered they are *objects* of thought, is not only conceded but contended; and therefore that in certain cases, and under certain restrictions, the object is a product of the subject, will not be denied. But, in calling these facts, *products of our past life*, we necessarily assume that our life began *prior* to their production. They could not have been produced before we began to live, that is, to manifest ourselves. We must have acted prior to them. If then we can never act, as is certainly the case, save in conjunction with the object, we must have had, prior to them, an object, which could have been in no sense whatever the creation of the subject. Moreover, let it be borne in mind, that these facts are not created by that act of the subject in which they are the object. They were the product not of that act, but of a prior act, and therefore had a sort of independent existence of the subject, before they became the object of his life.

But, although the Facts of Memory are products of our past life, they are not products of the subject acting alone. The past life of which they were the products, consisted, like all dependent life, in the reciprocal action and reaction of subject and object. They were never then, even when facts of consciousness, purely subjective facts. Nothing is purely subjective but the me itself, or that which is all on the side of the subject; but all on the side of the subject, these facts never were. They are indeed the products of our past *thinking*; but like all thought, the resultant of TWO FACTORS, the *joint* product of the simultaneous action and reaction of both subject and object. They are, then, even considered in their origin, no more subjective facts, than they are objective facts. They are neither one nor the other, but partake of the nature of both.

Moreover, MEMORY itself, or the power by which we remember them, and are able to make them objects of reflection, is, *in its manifestation*, no more purely subjective than is the manifestation of the power to think or to

perceive. Memory, properly speaking, is not a faculty of the subject, but an act, and therefore, according to the condition of all acting, the subject displaying itself in conjunction with the object. The subject by itself alone can no more remember than it can think. It needs physical and external conditions as much as seeing or hearing. In some states of the body we can no more remember than in some states of the visual organs we can see. In some states we remember with ease, in some with difficulty, in others not at all. · Sometimes it is impossible to remember in one state what has been experienced in another, as is witnessed by the phenomena of sleep and natural or artificial somnambulism. Moreover, some outward circumstance, some external occasion, some motive or reason more or less urgent for remembering, is essential to induce us to remember, and even then, will we never so energetically, if the objective conditions of remembering are not favorable, we cannot remember. There must always be some fact of our present life, some present occasion, which demands the past, to cause us to resort to the past, and to consult its records. Since, then, we can remember only in concurrence with the objective, Memory itself must not be regarded as purely subjective the facts of memory. The fact, then, that the facts of memory may be objects of reflection, therefore of thought, makes nothing against the fundamental position, that THE OBJECT IS ALWAYS NOT ME.

3. But what after all is Memory? Where are these facts of our past life when we cannot, or do not, remember them? They are not in the subject, for if they were, and the subject had the power of looking into itself, they would be always present in fact both to the subject and to its view, and therefore there would, and could be no memory. They could never fall into the past, never be lost sight of,—forgotten;—but would be always present facts; for the subject being always itself present, of course whatever it contains would also be present. If they were always present in the soul, and the soul could always look into itself, it could also always see them, and be immediately conscious of their presence. But neither is by any means the case. These facts do fall into the past, and not unfrequently escape wholly from our sight. We do not carry our whole past always, as it were, under our eyes. We can remember but a very little of our past life, only here and there a thought, a sentiment, or an event, that stood out in bold relief,—only

here and there one flower that bloomed amid the millions that faded, and wasted their fragrance and beauty unnoted. The rich trains of thought, the pure and eloquent feelings awakened in us by the beauty, the grandeur, the agitation or the repose of nature, by the sweet and thrilling melodies of the harp, the conversation of the great and the wise, the venerable and the good, the true, the lovely, and the loved, have passed away and become to us as the receding echo of a pleasant dream, which we remember to have had, but which we can no longer recall. Could this be so, if the products of our past life were still in us, and we had the power of looking into ourselves, and reviewing them at our leisure?

But, if these facts do fall into the past, and, to some extent, fade away from our sight, they do not vanish entirely. Some of them we remember, and the fact that we can remember them is a proof that they in some sense do still continue to exist. What I remember is never a new creation, but always an old friend or acquaintance, revisiting me, with or without invitation. If these products of our past life, when not remembered, had ceased to exist, they would have become precisely as if they had never been, and it would be no more possible to remember them, than to remember, if the expression will be permitted, what had never occurred. The past, then, since, to some extent at least, it is open to memory, cannot be dead, but must be still something. It has not ceased to be. Forgotten it may be; we may not hear its eloquent voices, nor be charmed by its melodies, but it has not gone wholly out. One day, one happy moment, it shall return to our view in all, and even in more than all its original freshness and beauty. As we grow old, the veriest trifles of our childhood and youth come back to us, and we find again thoughts, sentiments, events, which move us, and even more powerfully than they did when they were actually present. We still find the friend of our youth so early and so suddenly taken from us; the beloved of my heart, from whom I have been separated by death, for long years, returns to me again, and my heart swells and my eyes overflow, as I look upon the sweet face that won me, and listen to the silver tones of that voice which charmed me. Could that which had ceased to be, which had become as if it had never been, come back to my heart with such vividness, and have such power to move me? No, no. The facts of my past life then still are, but WHERE ARE THEY?

It may be answered that they are in the Memory, but this answer cannot be accepted, for it is merely a repetition of the fact that prompts the question. It is merely saying that we remember, that under certain circumstances, we seem to ourselves to find again, though not as present, the facts of our past life. Memory is not something distinct from me. There is not the subject, and by its side, but distinct from it, a memory. Memory is the subject itself, the subject remembering. Nothing can be said to exist in the memory which may not be said to exist in the subject. These facts, we have seen, do not exist in the subject; they do not exist in what is called the world of space, for they are not corporeal; where, then, do they or can they exist? There is but one answer to be given to this question; it is that they EXIST IN TIME as bodies do in space. Memory, though involving much which is, in the present state of our knowledge, wholly inexplicable, may be defined, THE SUBJECT PERCEIVING IN TIME.

This view of Memory, which, I believe, is not a very common one, though not altogether original with me, is of very great importance, and may help us to explain some phenomena which have hitherto been inexplicable. It recognizes a world of Time as well as a world of space, and in man the power of perceiving in the one world as well as in the other. On any other view of memory, time would have no meaning, would have no contents. The future we should say is not yet, and the past has ceased to be. There would, then, remain only the present, which is a mere point, and the type, if I may so speak, not of time, but of Eternity, that is, of NO-time. Space marks the relations which bodies hold to each other, not merely as they exist in our mind, as Kant maintains, but as they exist in the Divine Mind, that is, as they really exist. Time marks the order in which events succeed, and not only the order of the events which have been, but also of the events which are to be. Events bear, then, the same relation to time, that bodies do to space, and perception of the events is properly perception in time, as perception of bodies is perception in space.

But time has two divisions, the Past and the Future. Memory is the subject PERCEIVING IN THE PAST; but may we not also perceive in the future? Cannot man look before as well as after? Does not the prophetic element, then, bear the same relation to the soul that the historical does? and is not PROPHECY found to be a fact as well attested in man's

history as memory itself? It may, or it may not exist in as great a degree; man may not have the same power of foresight that he has of after-sight; yet the power to foresee is as unquestionable and as universal as the power to remember. Every man presages to a greater or less extent, has always a more or less vivid presentiment of what is to fall out. Most people can relate some remarkable instances of foresight or presentiment which have occurred in the course of their experience.

This FORESIGHT is not always clear and distinct, but in general feeble and confused; and so is it with our perception of bodies in space. It is only here and there one that is distinctly marked; the greater portion coming within the range of our vision are perceived only confusedly, as are the small particles of water which compose the wave I see rolling in upon the beach, or the hum of each separate insect which goes to make up the total hum of the swarm to which I listen. In Memory, too, our perceptions are for the most part of the same confused character. We often foresee with as much distinctness as we remember; and the objects of which we have a presentiment, not unfrequently stand out before us in as clear and as brilliant a light as the objects we perceive in space, and are capable of being discerned with equal ease and exactness.

Leibnitz contends that we not only have a *reminiscence* of all our past thoughts, but a PRESENTIMENT of all our thoughts, though in a confused manner, without distinguishing them. The fact that we perceive only in a confused manner without distinguishing one perception from another, makes nothing against the fact that we do perceive. We must not suppose that our actual perceptions are confined to the few distinct perceptions in which we not only perceive but apperceive. The me, or subject, is essentially active and percipient; the object, all nature, is always before it, around it, and streaming into it with ten thousand influences, each of which must, from the nature of the case, be perceived; for, unperceived, they would not and could not be *influences;* they would be as if they were not. In deep sleep, in fainting, in stupor, there is perception, but no apperception; or how otherwise could we awaken, or return, or be recalled, to consciousness? We close the eyelids unconsciously, when any foreign body approaches the eyes. We are at times swayed to and fro, are powerfully affected, we know not how, and cannot tell wherefore. We experience the most

pleasurable, or the most painful sensations, without a clear or distinct perception of any external cause. When we walk for our pleasure, we not seldom take one direction rather than another, without any reason of which we are conscious; and when we walk, lost in revery, or rapt in our own meditations, we turn aside, and with perfect unconsciousness carefully avoid the obstructions to our progress, which may be lying in our pathway. We must needs perceive what comes within the range of our organs of perception; and yet we seldom mark the roar of the Ocean near which we live, breaking on the distant beach; the hum of the city through which we daily pass; the rich and varied beauty of the landscape which has been lying spread out before us in warm sunlight from our childhood; and yet these influence our characters, and nice observers can easily tell, on seeing and conversing for a short time with a stranger, the general description of the natural scenery amidst which he has been brought up. Objects are constantly before us which we do not note; sounds are perpetually ringing in our ears of which we are unconscious; and yet remove those objects, silence those sounds, and we should instantly miss them; a sense of loneliness or desertion would come over us, and we should look around to find that of which, when present, we took no notice. These considerations, and many more of the same kind, warrant the induction, that we may perceive without apperceiving, and that we are never to assume that we do not perceive, when all the conditions of perception are present, merely because we do not distinguish our perceptions one from another, or because they are too numerous and too rapid in their transit across the plane of our vision, to allow us to clothe them with form, and thus convert them into thoughts. While, then, we may say with Locke, that the soul does not always *think*, we must still contend with Leibnitz, that it always *perceives*, and everywhere.

These feeble, confused, undistinguished perceptions, play a very important part in the conduct of life. It is by them that we must explain what are called *involuntary* actions. By them we are also able to account for a great variety of phenomena, which without them would be wholly inexplicable. Assuming that we may perceive without apperceiving, and in the world of time as well as in the world of space, we can readily account for the fact that we are so seldom surprised when we become conscious of perceiving, and

for the fact long ago noted by Plato, and by him made the basis of his argument for the immortality of the soul, that all knowledge comes to us ever as a *reminiscence*, as something which we have previously known, and now suddenly remember. When a man utters a new and striking thought in my hearing, I seem to myself to have had that thought before. In all my observations on nature, in all my reflections on science, art, and morals, I seem to myself, for the most part, to be reviewing what I had before seen, though hastily and imperfectly. The authors who take hold of the popular heart, and enter into the life of their race as its restorers, rarely surprise us; they seem to us to be saying what we all had always thought or felt, but had never been able to express, and had never before heard expressed. This is precisely the effect we should look for in case we had, as Leibnitz says, "a presentiment of all our thoughts." The soul had had a presentiment, a dim and confused perception, before the clear and distinct view which converts the perception into a thought. What is subsequently thought had, as it were, in some degree, been foreseen and predicted. Hence we find that prophecy never surprises us; and the bulk of mankind, they who are not prejudiced by systems and theories, find no difficulty *a priori* in crediting to the fullest extent, those individuals who from time to time stand out from their race as the providential representatives of the prophetic power of our nature. Our power of clear and distinct perception in time as well as in space, varies with the state of our mind and body. We know by experience, that in our own case the power to foresee in certain states of nervous excitement or exaltation of sentiment, in trance, or what the Alexandrian philosophers called *ecstasy*, is altogether greater and more certain than in our ordinary state. Hence the Pythoness who gave forth her oracles in her moments of almost convulsive excitement, natural or artificial, may readily have perceived what she predicted. The belief in oracles among the heathen, then, as well as in the prophets and seers among the Hebrews, may have had something solid at bottom.

To the same power of perceiving without apperceiving, and of perceiving in time, as well as in space, must be attributed our faith in the order and stability of nature. On this faith is founded the whole conduct of life; and yet it is no induction from experience, and no logical inference from the immutability of the Creator. It is never obtained by a

logical process. Because the sun rose to-day, or because I have seen it rise for a thousand days, I cannot say that it will rise to-morrow. Men, too, have this faith, who never think of inferring it from the experience of the past. It is not inferred from the immutability of the Creator; for it may be found where there is no belief in the Creator, and where men have not asked themselves, if the immutability of the Creator involves the immutability of the creation. Nor is it inferable from the immutability of the Creator. We all admit that God is immutable, but none of us admit the immutability of creation. If we have a right to infer the order and stability of nature from the fact that God is immutable, it is only because this fact implies that there can be no change in his works. If no change in his works, then, no progress, no deterioration; all is fixed, immovable. And yet in the case of man, we know this is not true. Humanity is capable both of improvement and of deterioration. There are no data from which this faith can be inferred, and, as a matter of fact, it never is an inference. Yet all men have it, and in every act of their lives, in the least and the greatest, pre-suppose it. Whence comes it? The soul perceives in time, and in time future, as well as in time past. It has always a presentiment of the continuance of this order and stability, which must survive, whatever the changes nature may undergo.

To this same power we must attribute our faith in our own personal identity, a faith which we retain, notwithstanding the perpetual interruptions of consciousness, as in deep sleep when we do not dream, in fainting, and stupor. These interruptions never shake our faith in our own identity. We are always the same, invariable, persisting subject. The subject finds itself, recognizes its own existence only in its acts. It is not always conscious, does not always think; and therefore, if it acted only when it thought, it would at times lose all sense of itself, which in point of fact never happens. It perceives, always; and in all perception it acts; and in all acting, however feeble or confused, it must have a feeble and obscure sense of its own being;—too feeble and obscure, it may be, to give it a clear and distinct consciousness, yet always sufficient to keep alive a faith in its own identity and persistence.

The fact here touched upon, might perhaps carry us further yet, and account, in some manner, for our faith in Immortality, and, at the same time, show us that the sub-

stance of that faith rests on as high a degree of certainty as that which we have of our present existence. The faith in Immortality, which in some form is, and always has been the universal faith of mankind, is after all nothing but the faith which we have in our own identity and persistence, and requires no other conditions. It is a presentiment of the soul, an actual perception in time, shading off as all time does into eternity.

How the soul can perceive in time, past or future, is no doubt inexplicable; so is it, how it can perceive in space. There is no more mystery in the one case than in the other. All we can do, is to determine what it perceives; *how* it perceives, we shall never be in a condition to explain. All we can do, all we shall ever be able to do, is to say that it perceives because it is essentially a percipient activity, which after all is only saying simply that it perceives.

§ 3. *Imagination.*

Imagining or Imagination, is commonly reckoned among the original faculties of the soul; but it is more properly a fact of human life, implying the presence and activity of all the faculties. As an operation of the mind, taken in a broad and perhaps loose sense, it is hardly a simple operation, but partakes in some degree of reasoning as well as of perceiving, and of perceiving in time as well as in space; yet taken strictly, it is in the main, if not entirely, a mere mode or degree of perceiving, and therefore appropriately enough treated under the general head of PERCEPTION.

The name of this operation is borrowed, not from what may be regarded as its essence, but from one of its incidents, or frequent, though not unfailing, accompaniments. Taken literally, the word implies the act of *representing* by images, and perhaps, the act of so representing *actual* existences; but the operation itself is chiefly concerned with *ideal* existences; and its essence consists rather in the degree of intenseness and energy with which those existences are perceived, than in the mode in which they are expressed or represented.

In Imagination, as in perception, as in apperception, there are both subject and object; but the object is for the most part ideal, and therefore commonly supposed to be a mode, affection, or creation of the subject; and therefore

again as wholly subjective and without objective validity. Hence, *imaginary* would say *fictitious*, unreal, without any solid foundation. But the object in Imagination, as in thought, according to the doctrine already laid down, must be really not me, and therefore really existing out and independent of the subject. The subject in imagining, is as far from being or creating its own object as in apperceiving or remembering. Imagination in its elements differs not at all from apperception, nor indeed from simple perception. The difference is a difference in quantity, not in quality. It is distinguished from apperception, as apperception is distinguished from perception, that is, by being a higher degree of the same activity. We may reckon FOUR degrees of activity, which may be named,

1. Perception.
2. Apperception.
3. Imagination.
4. Ecstasy or Trance.

Heighten perception to a given degree, and it is apperception; heighten apperception to a given degree, and it is Imagination; heighten Imagination to a given degree, and it is Ecstasy or Trance. The reality of the phenomena included by the ancient Alexandrian school under the head of Ecstasy, and which the modern believers in mesmerism ascribe to the mesmeric state, cannot be altogether denied; but as they are still wrapt in great obscurity, and as we are unable to affirm any thing with much positiveness, concerning them, they are best classed under the head of Imagination, with which they are certainly allied, and from which in the present state of our knowledge they are by no means easily distinguished. Including then the ecstasy of the ancients, and the mesmeric state of the moderns, under the head of Imagination, we must reduce the degrees of activity to THREE, Perception, Apperception, and Imagination; of which Imagination will be the *highest*, and differing from the other two only in being a more intense and energetic degree of the same activity.

In Imagination we apperceive, but with greater intenseness and energy than in ordinary thought. Hence, the NOTION or Form with which the subject clothes the naked elements of the thought, is more real, living, substantial, than in ordinary thinking. A man imagining is a greater, a more vigorous and exalted being, than a man merely

thinking. Herein is the true distinction between the ordinary thinker and the poet, and between the artisan and the artist. Intensify ordinary thought, and it is poetry; as is evinced by the fact that all real thinkers, all men of sincere and earnest minds, in their more felicitous moments, when acting with the whole force and energy of their being, become more or less imaginative, and rise into strains of genuine poetry. Intensify the power of the artisan, and the miserable sign he is painting for some obscure village inn, becomes a Madonna, in which shall be inshrined "the beauty of holiness." The rough, jarring tones of the rude peasant, grating harsh discord on the ear, become sweet, musical, tender, and touching, the moment his heart warms up with a generous passion, or melts with love and devotion.

The fact here insisted on deserves the attention of all who are concerned with Æsthetics, or the science of the Fine Arts. Every one has felt that poetry depends on the imagination, but wherein imagination differs from other mental operations, no one seems to have been able to determine. It is evidently not in the *expression*, otherwise all figurative or symbolical expressions would be poetical; and the huge, ill-shapen beasts of Hindoo and Egyptian mythology, would be truer specimens of art, than the symmetrical, graceful, and finished productions of Grecian genius. "White as snow," "swift as the wind," "quick as lightning," and similar expressions, are figurative in a high degree; but, whatever they may once have been, are now far from being poetical, or indicating the presence of imagination. They may be used poetically, but they are ordinarily nothing more than extravagant prose. Those who have agreed that Imagination is not in the expression, have usually considered it a special faculty of human nature, and have considered poetry to be the result of a special power of the soul not called into exercise in ordinary prose. Yet analysis of the finest passages of poetry taken from Homer, Dante, Milton, or Shakspeare, will by no means sustain this view. These passages indicate the presence of no original element of human nature, not essential to the driest and dullest prose. Art contains no elements not requisite to the most ordinary productions of the artisan. Every stone-cutter is an incipient Phidias; and the richest and sublimest of Beethoven's Symphonies, contain no elements not contained in the usual tones of the human voice, and brought into play in ordinary speech. Few men are artists; yet all men

are able in a degree to relish Art. The germs of the poet are in all hearts; hence, the true poet fetches from all hearts an echo to his song. All men love the poet, for he is to them what they are aspiring to be,—is themselves enlarged. All men love Art, and are moved by it. The rude Indian paints the prow of his canoe, polishes his war-club and his bow; and the Indian maiden strings her beads of wampum, and decks her hair with shells, to win his admiration or his love. The artist, whether painter, poet, sculptor, architect, or musician, is no doubt above the mass of men, and very distinguishable from them; but not by having aught of which they have not the elements. In this respect, all men are brothers, and equals.

The simple truth is, there is not the radical distinction between poetry and prose, between imagination and ordinary thinking, commonly contended for. Poetry and prose differ not in kind, but are merely different degrees of what at the bottom is the same. All prose writers, of the least genius, when warmed up, are poetical in thought and expression; and our truest poets, for the most part of the time, give us merely measured prose. Prose rises imperceptibly into poetry; and poetry sinks imperceptibly into prose. No man can define the exact boundary line between them; and it is only when at a considerable distance from the line, that we can tell whether we are in the territory of the one or of the other. On each side of the line, there is and always must be a disputed territory, which will be enlarged or contracted according to the intensity and energy of the life of him who undertakes to adjust the dispute.

Imagination has at times been called the *creative* faculty of the soul, and therefore looked upon as the highest faculty of our nature. But all activity is creative. To act is to do, to effect, or produce something; that is, to create. Man is active by nature, and therefore must act in all his phenomena. He must then be creative in them all. He is then creative, not because he is imaginative, but because he is active. Including, as we have said, under the head of Imagination, the phenomena which the ancients ascribed to ecstasy, and the moderns to the mesmeric state, man is *more* active in imagination than in any other of his operations, because imagination is the highest degree of activity of which he is capable.

In regard to this higher degree of activity, men differ one from another, and the same man differs from himself, at

different epochs of his life. The susceptibility of this degree of activity, that is, of imagination, depends on the relative proportion in which the faculty we have called Sensibility, enters into our original constitution, or the special degree of excitement it may at the moment be undergoing. The Sensibility, by which must be understood, not merely the power of being placed in relation with the external world, the RECEPTIVITY of the Kantian philosophy, is, if I may so speak, the central element of the me or subject. It is this which is more especially at the bottom of all those of our phenomena which indicate the highest and intensest degree of life, as emotion, passion, affection, love, joy, grief. This faculty is not possessed by all men in the same relative proportion. In some men it is scarcely discernible. These are cold, dry, hard, and though not unfrequently passing for men of thought, are usually regarded as unamiable, dull, uninteresting, drudges, mere plodders, who doubtless are not without their use in the world, but who are never among the chiefs of their race, the lights of their age. In others again this faculty seems to predominate; and these are those of our race who have, if one may so speak, the largest, the richest, and the loftiest nature; and life, that is, action, that is, again, manifestation of our being, must needs be with these more intense and energetic than with those of a narrower and less richly endowed nature. Just in proportion, then, as this element predominates in the original constitution of the individual, or just in proportion as it is for the time being, naturally or artificially, rendered the predominating element in the life of the individual, will be that individual's susceptibility of imagination.

Life being in this individual more intense and energetic than in ordinary men, or at least than in their ordinary state of inward excitement, he must necessarily clothe his thoughts with richer, more vivid, and substantial forms; which again will require a more vivid and expressive language for their utterance. Hence the peculiar language of imagination; hence poetry; hence all the various forms of Art. All are but the various language the soul adopts in its states of highest and best sustained activity, as the means of giving utterance to its own intense, energetic, and, therefore, creative life. But after all, the difference is not a difference in kind. In the simplest act we perform we are creative, in a degree; and the simplest and most prosaic forms of expression we ever adopt, are constructed on the same prin-

ciple, after the same laws, and are in fact at bottom the same with those of the sublimest and richest Art.

The Greeks, it is true, seem to have regarded the Imagination as a specially creative faculty. We see this in the fact of their calling the poet a *maker*. They must have supposed that imagination, on which poetry depends, deals only with the Ideal, and that the Ideal is the mere creature of the subject. Hence, they make the essence of poetry consist in *fiction*. Fiction is that which is *made up* by the poet out of himself, his own fancies and conceits, and needs, and has no objective basis. All the truth or reality there is in poetry, and therefore in imagination, on this hypothesis, is simply and exclusively of the subject's own creating. But this is by no means true.

Imagination, unquestionably, deals much with the Ideal, but not exclusively; nor is all dealing with the Ideal, Imagination. Metaphysics, ethics, transcendental mathematics and geometry, nay, all reasoning, as will hereafter be seen, the most abstract, the dryest, the dullest even, deals with the Ideal not less than does Imagination. We may perceive the Ideal feebly, listlessly, as well as intensely and energetically; and it is only in the last case that perception of the Ideal is Imagination. We may also perceive the Actual with intensity and energy, with the highest degree of activity we can experience. If so, Imagination may deal with the actual world as well as with the ideal world. The essence of Imagination does not consist either in the object with which it deals, nor in the mode or manner in which the subject *represents* the object; but solely, as we have seen, in the intensity and energy with which the object is seized. The actual world is often seized with great intensity and energy, as we may learn by reading historical, descriptive, and didactic poetry. In the "Hind and Panther" of Dryden, even political and theological speculation and reasoning become imaginative and poetical. It must be a very defective definition that excludes from the domain of poetry, Pope's Essay on Man and his Moral Essays, the Satires of Horace and Juvenal, the "Rerum Natura" of Lucretius, the sixth Book of the Æneid, or even Wordsworth's Excursion, with the exception of some of the details and descriptions.

Nevertheless the object with which Imagination deals, unquestionably, for the most part, belongs to the Ideal world, and it may be maintained, with great plausibility at least, that in what may, for distinction's sake, be termed the poetry

of the Actual, the poesy consists in the detection and representation of the Ideal. This is evidently the thought of those who place the essence of poetry not in fiction, nor in imitation, but in what is called INVENTION, that is to say, in *finding*. In our ordinary state, or at least the bulk of mankind in their ordinary state, stop with the Actual. A primrose by the river's bank is a primrose and nothing but a primrose; man is merely a two-legged animal without feathers; all nature appears, and is what, and only what, it appears. There are individuals who never get beyond this state; individuals to whom there is never the mighty and dread Unknown before which they stand in awe, or shrink into insignificance. Even whole nations, with the exception of a cultivated class, little numerous, rarely if ever get through the Actual. In proof of this, might be cited the much boasted Anglo-Saxon race. The genuine Englishman of the lower class, is perhaps the least imaginative human being conceivable. English Literature surpasses that of all modern nations in genuine works of imagination; and yet there is, strictly speaking, for the Anglo-Saxon race, no genuine national poetry. The English have no national songs, no national airs, as have their neighbors the Scotch and the Irish, or the Italians, and the people of Northern and Eastern Europe. The peasant Burns could hardly have been born south of the Tweed. Similar remarks may be made on the Anglo-Americans. We are by no means an imaginative people. We import our songs and music, as we do our silks and broadcloths. And yet, however it may be with the mass of the uncultivated English and Americans, however it may be with some individuals through their whole lives, and with all men during their ordinary state of inward excitement, there are to most men moments when the actual becomes transparent, and reveals to their view the rich and magnificent world of the Ideal lying beyond, its basis and its possibility. To all intense and energetic action the Actual becomes merely a symbol of the Ideal. All men, when wrought up to a high degree of well sustained activity, are imaginative, and do perceive more than has as yet been realized. Perhaps, were we to change our point of view somewhat, even the English and American branches of the Saxon race, would themselves be found to be not altogether without imagination. They are a practical people, but they often display in the direction of mere practical life, an intense and energetic activity, that approaches

very nearly to the poetical. They have, after all, a national song in the steam-engine and the deep-laden ship, and national music in the ringing of the ever-busy hammer of industry.

Let it be admitted, then, if it be insisted on, that poetry consists in the intense and energetic detection and representation of the Ideal in the Actual, and therefore that Imagination, according to the common faith of mankind, deals altogether with the Ideal; it will not follow that the object is merely a modification, affection, or creation of the subject. The Ideal is always *found* by the poet, not *made*, and is as truly objective as the Actual in which he finds it. The Ideal exists out of us, and independent of us; only it exists as the Ideal, not as the Actual. It is as truly perceived, and in the most fervid imagination is as truly an object of perception, as is a man, a horse, a plant, or an animal. When I see an individual man, I call him at once a *man;* but by what authority do I so call him? Unquestionably because I recognize in him the *genus*, or race, by virtue of which he is a man, and not a horse, or a dog. This *genus* or race is not actual, but ideal, and it has no *actual* existence save in individual men and women. Yet it is not itself individual, is not all in one individual, nor all in all individuals; for it is at once in all individuals, is the basis of each individual, and the infinite possibility of each to be more than he is. Whatever force, or substance, or power, we recognize in a particular man, it belongs to him not as a pure individual, but as a representative of humanity. To deny, then, in the case of man the objectivity and independence of the Ideal, would be to deny the objectivity and independence of the Actual, which never is but by virtue of the Ideal. Imagination, then, by dealing with the Ideal, no more deals with the unsubstantial, the fictitious, the supposititious, the chimerical, or the subjective, than though it dealt solely with the Actual.

This is not the common opinion. Men have made poetry consist in fiction, not in truth; and the severest remark is to accuse one of "drawing on his imagination for his facts." Even Shakspeare, whom one may dare cite for his philosophy, as well as for his poetry, seems to have adopted the common notion, that in Imagination the subject creates its own object:

"*Hip.* 'Tis strange, my Theseus, that these lovers speak of.
"*The.* More strange than true; I never may believe

These antique fables, nor these fairy toys,
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover, and the poet,
Are of imagination all compact:
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold:
That is the madman; the lover, all as frantic,
Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt;
The poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to *airy nothing*
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination."

And yet according to the Formula of Thought, already established, which makes it a phenomenon with three indestructible and inseparable elements, namely, SUBJECT, OBJECT, and FORM, these *airy nothings* are not nothing, but something; for the subject is always me, and the object always not-me.

But must we then take all the creations of the poet, the chimeras, hydras, monsters, and demons of popular superstition, the fairies, genii, heroes, demigods, gods, and goddesses, bodied forth by the various national mythologies of ancient and modern times;—all the heroes and heroines of novels, fables, and what we term fictitious history,—must we take all these as so many real personages, as actually existing, out and independent of the subject, as Peter, James, or John? To us who contemplate them, reflect on them, they are unquestionably not-me, that is, really objective existences, but existing as facts of memory, and belonging therefore to the world of time. To the subject who created them, they were the NOTIONS, or the FORMS with which he clothed real thoughts or actual apperceptions. The Form of the Thought or Apperception is always, as has already been shown, the creation of the intelligence of the subject; but *it is never created save when that intelligence acts in conjunction with a real object*, belonging to the world of immediate perception; to the world of memory; or to the world of foresight. These creations differ only in degree from our ordinary *notions*, or the commonest forms which we give to our apperceptions. They

are created by the subject, not by the subject acting without an object, but acting in conjunction with the object; and therefore they conceal under them an *objective* reality, no less than a subjective reality.

This will be evident, if we but analyze any one of these "airy nothings" of the poet. The elements out of which they are constructed are always real apperceptions, never pure fictions. We may imagine a mountain of gold, when no mountain of gold shall actually exist; but what is this mountain of gold but the combination of two facts of memory, namely, the conception of gold obtained from the memory, or, what here is the same thing, *experience* of gold, and the conception of mountain obtained from the same source? Had we never had any experience of gold and mountain, we should have been wholly unable to imagine a mountain of gold. Take the dainty, delicate spirit Ariel of Shakspeare, or the devil-begotten Caliban, and it may be seen by even a slight analysis, that Shakspeare has created nothing but the form with which he has clothed the actual facts of his own experience. The same remark may be made of Oberon, Titania, Robin Goodfellow, and the whole race of little people, as well as the giants of Teutonic Mythology. The pattern men and women of our novel-writers are nothing but combinations, more or less felicitous, of what they have really experienced. All the conceptions out of which these pattern men and women are constructed, are furnished by actual experience. They may surpass the men and women one actually meets in society, but they do not surpass the Ideal suggested or revealed by them. In chiselling a Venus or an Apollo, the artist has unquestionably embodied a beauty which surpasses all actual beauty, but not all the beauty actually present to his view. There hovered before him as he worked, a beauty, which perpetually baffled his efforts to seize and fix in his glowing marble. He has created nothing. The beauty I worship in a Madonna is not supposititious; it is not the creation of a mortal. The mortal has but found and revealed the Immortal. He has but imperfectly embodied what his actual experience has enabled him to perceive. Find an artist who, having never looked on the delicate features and graceful form of woman, can yet give us a Venus, or who, having never marked the masculine form and vigor of man, can yet give us an Apollo, and you will find one who can create out of himself, without needing

to draw on experience for the materials with which to work.

All the creations of the poet, or the beings of imagination, whether lovely or unlovely, chaste or unchaste, are nothing but the forms with which men attempt to clothe their apperceptions, all of which include necessarily subject and object, though in some cases the object may be the product of our past life, or what we have termed a fact of memory. Out of these apperceptions they are all constructed. They differ, then, at bottom not at all from what we have already termed the NOTION or Form of the Thought. Intensify the Notion in ordinary thinking, and you have one of these poetical creations,—a Venus or an Apollo, an Ariel or a Caliban, a Miranda or a Lady Macbeth.

The object in Imagination is, then, really not-me. There is always truth, and even a high order of truth, under the wildest and most extravagant fancies and conceits of the lover, the madman, and the poet. Not all unreal is the bright world of Romance into which we rise from the dull Actual in all our moments of higher and intenser life. The "land of dreams," in which the lover and the poet, in their intensest frenzy, rise free and delighted, is, if we did but know it, more substantial than this cold, dry, work-day world, in which for the most part of the time we merely vegetate, and call it living. In these moments the soul penetrates beyond the Actual to the Ideal, which is the basis of all reality, that in which we are all, without seeming to know it, immersed as in a vast ocean of being.

But every *notion*, we have seen, has its face of error, because it is the creature of the subject, and the subject is finite. So also must all the forms of Imagination have their face of error. None of these express, or can express, the *whole* truth, or nothing but the truth. Nevertheless, as man in the Imaginative state is in his highest state of activity, acting with his greatest force and energy, both as sentiment and as intelligence, it follows that the forms of Imagination are the truest and the least inadequate of any of the forms with which he clothes his thoughts. They are the highest and most expressive forms he ever adopts; and contain the highest and most comprehensive truth to which he ever naturally attains. There is profounder truth in the Parthenon or Saint Peter's, than in the *Novum Organon;* and a Head of Jupiter by Phidias, or a Madonna by Raphael, is worth more than the Critique of Pure Reason. Homer, Dante, Shakspeare, and Milton, contain more philosophy than Aristotle,

Saint Thomas, or Leibnitz, can comprehend, and the Thousand and One Nights more than the Essay on the Human Understanding. The only real instructor of the human race is the artist, and it is as artists, as men wrought up to the intensest life, and therefore acting from the full force of their being, that Socrates, Plato, Descartes, the great and universally admitted philosophers, have been able to quicken the race, and set it forward to higher and more comprehensive life. No man is really a philosopher till warmed up into the artist. Here is the sacredness of Art, and the explanation of the fact, that the highest truths are always uttered by men when under the influence of the loftiest and most genuine Imagination.

§ 4. *Willing.*

The second general operation of the Mind, or Subject, is WILLING, or, as it is sometimes denominated, the *Will*. There is, however, an obvious distinction between Will and Willing. The term Will means, 1. The power or faculty of Willing; 2. The interior result, effect, or product of the exertion of this power or faculty. It should be confined in its use to this last meaning, in which sense it is the synonym of VOLITION. Willing is neither the power regarded as a faculty, nor its effect, that is, the power regarded as having acted; but the power regarded as *in action*, that is, as operating. It is, then, strictly, not a faculty, that is, a *principle* of human nature, but an OPERATION, and therefore a *fact* of human nature.

Will is often treated by psychologists, ancient as well as modern, as a special power or faculty of human nature. Thus Saint Augustine, who with Moses, Pythagoras, and Plato, recognizes the Triad or Trinity of human nature, which we have affirmed in our Formula of the Me or Subject, terms one of the elements of this Triad Will,—his Trinity being, *Am*, *Know*, WILL, To Be, To Know, and To Will. Swedenborg, Edwards, Kant, Reid, and others, also make the Will a faculty of human nature. That there is a power or faculty of Willing of course must be true, or else there could be no such operation as willing, and no such phenomena as volitions; but this power or faculty is in nowise distinguished, nor distinguishable, from the general power or faculty of acting, which we have called the ACTIVITY.

WILLING, according to this view of Will, can be only a specific mode of acting in general, without any generic difference from any other species of acting. But wherein is it specially distinguished from acting in general? This is no easy question to answer. Locke makes it consist in the "mind, thinking upon its own actions, and *preferring* their doing or their omission;" Edwards makes it consist in preferring or choosing; Swedenborg, Kant, and Reid reckon under it all those phenomena in which we are *active*, as distinguished from *passive;* Cousin and his school identify it with Liberty, make it both spontaneous and reflective, and define it to be the RESOLUTION of the Subject, on the presentation of a case, to act or not to act. All these definitions are more or less defective. Choice and preference are judgments; and, then,—if we distinguish, as Locke and others do,—between the Will and the Understanding,—acts of the understanding, intellections, the *νοήματα* of the Greeks, not volitions. M. Cousin avoids this objection, but only by giving a definition which defines nothing, and which fails to distinguish Willing from any other species of acting. All these psychologists have erred in consequence of their asserting a passivity in man, as well as an activity, and assuming that we are passive, not active in a portion of our phenomena. But we have already seen that there is no passivity in man or in nature. What we call our passivity, is not in us, but out of us, not-me, and is no more passive than the me itself. All our powers are active powers, and we are active in all our phenomena. To resolve to act or not to act, is itself to act; so also is to prefer or to choose; so also, again, is to perceive, to reason, to understand.

If the Subject, or Me, were not a unity, if faculties were little beings or agents in us, as Locke says he suspects some are in the habit of considering them, we should find it comparatively easy to define what we mean by Willing; but as the case stands, a definition is all but out of the question. Willing is not a peculiar, nor an isolated phenomenon; it is an operation which enters as an integral, an essential element, in some degree, into every one of our phenomena. There are no phenomena of human life, which are pure, unmixed volitions. The volition is never alone, never the *whole* phenomenon, but always an inseparable part or portion of it. The only distinction which it seems to us possible to make between Willing and Acting in general, is analogous to the distinction we have already made between

Apperceiving and Perceiving. It is the Subject exerting its general power to act in a special degree, or under special conditions, with a distinct consciousness of acting, and of the end to which, or in view of which, it acts.

But the distinction which we have sought to mark, amounts to very little, and all but escapes us when we examine it closely. The Me, or Subject, is essentially intelligent, and therefore never acts, never can act without intelligence, without, to some extent, perceiving that it is acting and the grounds of its acting. The whole *Me*, since it is a unity as well as a multiplicity, acts and must act together. In all its phenomena it must be always active, always sentient, and always intelligent. Then it never does, and never can, as we say, act *blindly*. If, then, we were to define a volition, an act done with intelligence, we should fail to distinguish it from any other act we may perform. If we go a step farther, and assume that the intelligence with which it acts, rises to distinct consciousness, we still distinguish volition from any other act, only in the degree or energy of intelligence with which it is performed.

According to Guizot, in his very able view of the Pelagian Controversy, Willing takes place only after the case has been investigated, and the decision of the mind made up. We have decided what it is we ought or ought not to do, and the act of the Will is the resolution we now take to do or not to do, what we have already decided we ought or we ought not to do. This would seem to define a voluntary act, to be an act done after deliberation. But deliberation itself involves volition. We do not deliberate without willing to deliberate, nor without being conscious of some motive for deliberating. Moreover, we deliberate only where there is doubt, obscurity, or uncertainty. Where our knowledge is complete and immediate, there is no occasion for deliberating. The highest intelligences deliberate the least. They comprehend at a glance what ought to be done, and take their resolutions instantly. Are these less voluntary in their actions than are those feebler intelligences who deliberate, adduce the pro and the con, doubt, hesitate, for a long time, and after vacillating between acting and not acting till the time for acting has passed away, are finally resolved, and conclude to act? Have they less of what we call *Will?*

Nor is this all. There are few persons who always act with a clear and distinct consciousness of the fact that they

are acting. There are very few of us who always clearly and distinctly understand what we are doing, or why we are doing what we are. Ask any man at a venture, to give you the reasons which induced him to act as you see him acting, and in nine cases out of ten, if he attempt to assign any reasons at all, he shall assign those which are not the true reasons, reasons which have come to him as after-thoughts, and which were not present to his mind as his motives for acting. We are rarely able to assign the true motives of our actions even to ourselves. Nothing is more frequent, or morally more disastrous, than self-deception. But shall we deny all volition where the motive is not clear and distinct? Shall we say that the bulk of mankind are involuntary in their whole conduct, and that even the choice few are also involuntary in by far the greater part of their lives.

The truth after all, we apprehend, is, that all actions are in some sense voluntary; and under the point of view of voluntary or involuntary, one action will be found to differ from another only in its energy and the degree of intelligence with which it is performed. No man is responsible in a moral point of view for what he does involuntarily; but who would not revolt at the moral doctrine, which should hold us responsible for only those actions which we perform with clear and distinct consciousness of the act and its motives? Responsibility is unquestionably proportioned to the degree of the intelligence of the agent, enlarging or contracting as that intelligence is more or less. But as man is intelligent in his nature, in his very essence, and therefore must always act with some degree of intelligence, it follows that he must begin to be responsible as soon as he begins to act. Infants, in this view of the case, have a moral character, and do incur, in a degree proportioned to their intelligence, moral responsibility. The question between the responsibility of the infant and the full grown man, can be only one of degree. The infant perceives as well as the man, and therefore acts with intelligence. It perceives doubtless to an altogether feebler extent, and thus far acts with an altogether feebler degree of intelligence and of moral obligation. The clearer, further reaching, more distinct and certain, one's knowledge, the greater his responsibility, and the more culpable he becomes if he acts improperly. This is the universal sense of mankind, and the rule as laid down by our religion.

Moral responsibleness begins with life, and continues

through it; and since man acts always and everywhere, in all his phenomena, it must needs attach to him as Intelligence and Sensibility, no less than as Activity. A man's thoughts, feelings, desires, passions, emotions, affections, are in some sort his acts, are in the strictest sense his acts. He must then be as responsible for them as for any other of his deeds. The desires of a man's heart are to a great extent the test of his character, and the Gospel teaches us that we must be brought into judgment for every one of our thoughts, words, and deeds. The notion which sometimes obtains among us, that a man is not accountable for his desires, his feelings, in case he restrains their outward expression, is exceedingly low and mischievous. Jesus assures us that he who looks upon a woman to lust after her in his heart, hath committed adultery with her, and he who is angry with his brother is a murderer. The desires, feelings, inward affections as they are called, are the all-important matters. They prove what the man is. They cannot, and will not be impure, unchaste, ungodly, unless the man be himself inwardly corrupt. Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. Therefore are we commanded to keep our hearts with all diligence, for out of them are the issues of life. No man is truly moral who is not purified in his very essence, so that no impure, no unchaste, no ungodly desire can spring up within him. He must not only refrain from possessing himself of what is another's, but he must not even covet; he must not only refrain from committing murder, but he must not even feel the slightest desire to injure his brother; not only withhold the expression of anger, but he must be "slow to anger," and "rule his own spirit."

Thoughts and opinions, according to this view of the case, have a moral character, for they are in some degree voluntary. A man acts in thinking, acts in forming his opinion, and it is not a matter of moral indifference what thoughts a man thinks, or what opinions he forms. Error of opinion is never harmless, even to the man himself, much less to society. Opinions, doctrines, are deeds which live after the man is dead, and, if false, may corrupt the minds and the hearts of multitudes. He who steals, robs, or murders, on the largest scale possible to a private man, is harmless in comparison with him who successfully propagates a false doctrine on morals, politics, or religion. A man has, then, nothing of that unrestrained license of

opinion we sometimes claim for him. No man is or can be at liberty to think as he pleases, to reject or embrace any doctrine or any opinion he chooses. He has no more right to embrace a false doctrine than he has to commit a crime, or to be guilty of a vice. A heavy responsibility rests upon every man, and every man is as much bound to seek for truth in his opinions as he is for formal rectitude in his ordinary actions.

This rule reaches to those who cling to old opinions, to old theories, to old established doctrines, no less than to the advocates of new views. A man who upholds a popular error is no less, and often even more, in fault than he who propagates a new one; for he often upholds it, not because he really believes it, but because it is popular, and he is too indolent to expose it, or because he is too indifferent to truth, too little in love with his race, too little in earnest, to be willing to submit to the inconvenience, and perhaps personal danger there may be in ranging himself on the side opposed to it. Such a man is guilty on all sides of his character, and most of all for his moral indolence, selfishness, cowardice, and want of fidelity to God and humanity. The truly moral man is always energetic, disinterested, and heroic.

Nor does this rule concern merely the *utterance* of opinions. A man must not aim merely to be blameless before the public, but before his conscience and his God. He must be right in his private thoughts. His whole life is nothing but a succession of thoughts, and therefore can be a true normal life no further than he thinks truth. Nay, furthermore, a man can think truth only in proportion to his inward purity and moral conformity to the law of God. Every man thinks with his whole nature, and therefore thinks as he is. If inwardly corrupt, his thoughts will be corrupt and false. They are the pure in heart who see God. He who would be able to form correct views of God, man, or nature, must cleanse his heart from all iniquity, must wash his hands in innocency, and be clean before his Maker. The man who propagates a doctrine on morals, politics, or religion, nay, a man who *believes* on these great subjects, a doctrine radically false, does by that fact show forth that his heart is radically depraved. The world has not been always in the wrong in judging a man's morals by his doctrine, and in maintaining that there is a necessary connection between soundness of doctrine and purity of life.

In morals, then, we must hold that a man is just as responsible for his opinions as he is for any other of his deeds. If he do his best to obtain the truth, no doubt God will pardon him the errors into which he may fall; for God is merciful, and never exacts impossibilities. Whether a man should be held socially, or rather civilly, accountable for the doctrine he may propagate or entertain, is a question of social ethics, which will be considered in a subsequent part of this work. All we say now is, that while we utterly deny the maxim, not unfrequently put forth, and on high authority too, that "Error is harmless if Truth be free to combat her," for Error will have travelled half over the globe, before Truth has pulled on her boots for the pursuit; yet it does not follow from this that society ought to seek forcibly to prevent the utterance of such doctrines as may be judged unsound; nor because society may not by the application of force hinder the utterance of error, that a man is not responsible *in foro conscientiæ* to society for the doctrines he entertains, upholds, or promulgates.

The difference between Will and Activity, and between Willing and Acting, is, it would therefore seem, not only difficult to define, but, in a moral point of view, of no great practical importance; for it is impossible to define with any tolerable exactness the line where the one loses itself in the other. Here, as in the case of Perception and Apperception, of Apperception and Imagination, of Imagination and Trance, there is a disputed territory, and till we have advanced a considerable distance into the interior, we can never say whether we are in the territory of the one or of the other; everywhere the one shades off into the other without any abruptness of outline, and is, even when most obviously distinct, so only in degree and not by any real difference at bottom.

The debates which we carry on in ourselves, and which are generally explained as debates between inclination and judgment, passion and reason, may seem at first view to make against the doctrine of the Unity of the Subject for which we contend, and also against the general identity we have asserted of acting in desire, passion, and affection, and of acting in willing, or, in what are commonly termed *volitions;* but these debates are, in point of fact, not carried on in ourselves, between one branch of our being, so to speak, and another, and it must not be pretended that the Subject acts with a greater degree of purity or exclusiveness in volition than in desire.

This apparent duality of the Subject is one of the mysteries of our nature, which has been taken notice of in all ages, and is unquestionably of difficult solution. St. Paul has stated it as clearly, and with as much distinctness as can be desired, in his Epistle to the Romans,—"For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that I do not; but what I hate that do I." So again, Ovid, in a passage often quoted:

> "Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque cupido,
> Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora, proboque;
> Deteriora sequor."

That there is this apparent duality, and, so to speak, internal antagonism, suggesting, if not justifying, the old hypothesis of two souls, or two principles, one good and the other evil, one from Ormuzd, the other from Ahriman, must needs be admitted; for, I presume, every man's experience bears witness to it; but we must not thence infer that the me, or Subject, is not a unity, that it is essentially a duality; for, after all, the *I*, active in desire, in passion, affection, or inclination, is identically the *I* that is active in volition, in reason and judgment. A little psychological analysis suffices to identify the two. But what is the explanation of the apparent contradiction? The explanation is not in the hypothesis of two souls, nor yet in what is termed the antagonism of soul and body, spirit and matter. In point of fact, this alleged antagonism between spirit and matter, soul and body, has no existence. The secret nature of the relation between soul and body is no doubt a mystery to the wisest; but whatever it be, this much we may affirm of it, that it is a relation of perfect harmony, making of the two not two but one in the unity of life. Man, as we shall hereafter see, is neither soul nor body, but the union of the two, or more properly, soul in and through body. The body is as essential to the full conception of a man as is the soul. Desire, passion, appetite, inclination, do not originate in the body, regarded as a force or activity distinct from the spiritual man; they are not physiological phenomena as distinguished from psychical phenomena; but are as interior, and come out as much from the spiritual centre of the man, as do volition, perception, reason, judgment. Lust is love, but love profaned; evil passions are nothing but the perversion, inversion, or profanation of good passions. When I sin it

is I and not my body that sins; and I sin with precisely the same faculties and by the exercise of precisely the same powers wherewith I do good; as St. James affirms, when speaking of the tongue, he says, "therewith bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we men who are made after the similitude of God. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing." The dissolution of the body does not free the soul from the condemnation of sin, nor cleanse it of its moral pollutions.

The true explanation of the problem will be found in distinguishing, so to speak, between the Fact of Consciousness and the Fact of Memory. I desire to do what I see to be evil, and instantly this is opposed by my desire to do good, or to receive good. Conscience, the rule of right which a man's own experience establishes for him, and which, therefore, belongs to the world of Memory, condemns the evil desire. That is, I see by comparing the desire with the rule, that it is wrong, and therefore condemned. But this condemnation does not extinguish it. I see it is opposed to what I have decided to be good, which I also desire. There are now two desires, between which I am torn and tormented. But these two desires are not at the same instant facts of consciousness. The desire to do evil, when combated by the desire to do good, is not a fact of consciousness, but a fact of memory; so the desire to do good, when combated by the desire to do evil, is not a fact of consciousness but also a fact of memory. Again; the desire, passion, or inclination, when I am judging it, when I am comparing it with the rule of right which I have obtained by my experience, is, since it is obviously the object concerning which I am thinking, not a fact of present consciousness, but of past consciousness. The duality, then, is not in the subject, but is composed of the me present, living, the Subject, and the me that was, that is to say, the me of memory, whether the me actualized, or the me disclosed by the Ideal, and which we feel should be actualized.

The question, whether the Will be free or not, that is to say, whether man be a free agent, or a mere machine acting only as propelled, or necessitated by a force foreign to himself, is easily disposed of. The power to act is the only possible definition of freedom. A being that has the power to act is free to act; and the being that is free to act, has the power to act. A being that is necessitated, has no power to act. The actor is that which necessitates, not that which

is necessitated. If man has the power to act, he is free to act, and free to the full extent of his power. The question, then, whether Will be free or not, whether man be a free agent or not, resolves itself into the question, whether he be or not an *active* being; and finally into the question, whether he does or does not act. That he does act, he knows as certainly, as positively, as he knows that he exists; for, as we began by showing, it is only in acting—thinking—that he finds his existence, and it is only under the relation of *actor* that he finds himself at all. I know myself free, then, with all the certainty with which I know that I am; and indeed the measure of my freedom is the exact measure of I *am*. I AM is found only in *I am* FREE. I know myself only as actor, that is, as a cause. But I do find myself in every fact of consciousness to be a cause, as has been shown by the fact that I find myself always as the subject of the act. If a cause, I must be free, and free to the full extent to which I am a cause, for a cause that is necessitated is no cause at all. The real cause is that which necessitates. In finding himself an actor, that is to say, a cause, man finds himself free. The phrases *free* will and *free* agency are absurd. Will is not will any further than it is free, and an agency which is not free is no agency at all.

But in affirming that man is a cause, we do not affirm that he is a universal, unlimited cause. His freedom is not an unlimited freedom, but is co-extensive with his power to cause. How far this goes must be learned by experience. It is not determinable *a priori*. No man knows, or can know, what he can do before he has tried; and much which was once pronounced impossible for man to do, we now find he can do with great ease. The power varies with different individuals, and with different epochs in the life of the same individual. It is feeble in the child, but grows with his growth; it grows also with the progress of the race. The progress of freedom in society is but the expression of the progress of freedom in humanity in its individual manifestations. It may be advanced by moral and intellectual culture. Practical wisdom, the purification and exaltation of sentiment, whatever tends to give energy and intensity to man's activity, enlarges his power, and therefore his freedom.

Under the head of Willing, according to the relation we have established between it and acting in general, may be arranged the acts of *attending* and *reflecting*, and also the

several appetites, inclinations, propensities, desires, passions, emotions, affections, however they may be designated, all those in which Sensibility predominates, as well as those in which the intellect predominates, those which are normal and good in their tendency, as well as those which are anormal, perverse, and evil; but as their special treatment belongs to the special departments of science termed Ethics and Æsthetics, we pass them over till we come, in the progress of our work, to those special departments; which we must do both for the sake of systematic harmony, and because we cannot treat them properly till after we have discussed the *third* general Operation of the mind, which we have termed Reasoning, and which we proceed in the following section to consider at length.

§ *6. Reasoning.*

In order to understand the precise operation of the Mind, termed REASONING, it is necessary to have a clear and exact notion of the proper meaning of the word REASON. Reason is sometimes reckoned among the powers or faculties of human nature, but upon no sufficient authority. When taken for one of our powers or faculties, it must be identical with what we have called the Intelligence, or power of knowing. The power to know is always the same, whatever the field or the objects of knowledge. Reason is the *object* of the faculty of knowing, rather than the faculty itself; and man is a *reasonable* being, not because Reason is one of his faculties, but because he is created in relation with Reason, and made capable of perceiving its truths, and following its dictates.

Reason, properly defined, is the world of necessary relations, abstract and universal truths, or the world of absolute and necessary IDEAS, using the word *Idea* in its original Platonic sense. According to this view of the case, Reason answers to the Logos of the Greeks, and, as we shall see hereafter, to the Logos, or Divine Speech, of the Evangelist, the WORD that was in the beginning, which was with God, and which was God, and which may perhaps be properly termed the MIND of God, using the word Mind to designate the mental operation, rather than the substantive power that operates. But more of this when we come to consider CHRISTIAN THEODICY. The objects of human knowledge are

divisible into two classes, the IDEAL and the ACTUAL. The Ideal includes the abstract, the universal, the necessary, the permanent, the immutable, the absolute, the infinite; the Actual includes the concrete, the particular, the contingent, the transient, the variable, the relative, the finite. The first class is the world of Ideas, and the constituent elements of what we understand by the Reason.

This may be easily explained. A—A, is a proposition which contains two concrete, particular, contingent objects, between which there is the abstract, necessary, and universal relation of equality. But this relation of equality by no means depends on the presence or absence of these two particular, contingent, concrete objects; for, B—B, is another proposition with other concretes, between which there is precisely this same identical relation of equality. The whole is greater than a part. Here is asserted a truth which is the same identical truth, whether asserted of one contingent whole or of another. The same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, is just as true when asserted of one particular thing, as when asserted of another particular thing. That which is not, cannot act; no phenomenon can begin to exist without a cause; every quality supposes a subject; men should govern their passions; they should love one another as each loves himself; are all propositions which express universal and necessary truths, for the truths are the same whatever be the particular thing, phenomenon, quality, or men in question.

We are here far from attempting to draw up a complete list of the Ideas of Reason. That work has been done, and so done as not to need revision, by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Those which we have enumerated, we have enumerated merely by way of example, for the purpose of explanation, of making apparent the order of objects in question. These Ideas, indeed, all Ideas, though they are sometimes termed *entia rationis*, beings of Reason, and therefore regarded as having no existence as not-me, are really objective and independent of us, as is evinced by the simple fact, that they are *objects* of thought; for it has already been demonstrated that the object of thought is *always* not-me. If they were, as some philosophers pretend, mere modes or affections of the subject, they would be all on the side of *Subject*, and therefore could never be found in the mental phenomenon as *object*. They would, also, not only be subjective, but would needs vary with each Subject.

But they do not so vary. The three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, is equally a truth whether perceived or not,—a truth which may be perceived at the same instant by a million of differently constituted minds; and these millions of differently constituted minds are not perceiving a million of different truths, but one and the same invariable truth. It must then be independent of them all, and instead of a mode or affection of the Subject, an object of its intelligence.

Ideas, absolute, necessary and universal truths, are perceived *by* the Subject, but not *in* itself. This is the fact which modern psychologists have overlooked, and the overlooking of which has occasioned their principal errors. Locke makes the Idea objective to the mind, it is true, for he defines it to be that about which the mind is immediately conversant; but he still seems to regard it as *in* the Subject, a sort of intermediary between the percipient agent and the external reality which is the real object of the mental perception. Hence, Locke's difficulty is to establish the agreement or disagreement between the *Idea* in the mind, the immediate *object* of its perception, and the external reality, of which the Idea was the image or representation,—a thing which he never succeeds, and never can succeed, in doing. Locke confounds *Idea* with *Notion*, and tries to make, if one may so say, a distinction between the *seeing* and the *seen*, as if the object of sight could be conceived of, and in some degree ascertained outside and independent of the sight or seeing of it; as if there was an object for us outside of the object of perception. There may be, and we shall hereafter show that there is, a higher than the Idea, but this higher is the Absolute God, in his own infinite and incomprehensible, because *unuttered* Essence. Nevertheless, the Idea is the real object with which Locke is concerned, and the agreement or disagreement he was seeking, instead of being the agreement or disagreement of the Ideal with the infinite Real, or God, shining out through it, was merely the agreement or disagreement of the Notion, which is unquestionably subjective, with the object, whether that object belonged to the Actual or to the Ideal.

Even Cudworth, who has treated the Ideal, or Ideas, in his *Immutable Morality*, with more depth and justice than any other writer in our language, and who asserts, and for ample reasons, its objectivity, fails to establish, scientifically, that objectivity, in consequence of regarding Ideas as the

property, or rather as the creation of the Subject, existing in the mind as its original garniture, or produced by it, "vitally protended" from itself by its own energy. But, if existing *in* the Subject, if they are, as Kant contends, laws or categories of a *subjective* reason, that is, of reason as a faculty of human nature, they are subjective, and of no authority outside of us. If these Ideas are *in* the Subject, the Subject can find its object, and be able to display itself, without going out of itself. It would then be under no necessity of going out of itself in order to find itself, and consequently would be sufficient for itself. If sufficient for itself, that is, if the assumption of itself be sufficient to account for all its phenomena, then there is no occasion for the assumption of aught beside itself; nay, not only no occasion for the assumption of an object, but actually no possibility of even conceiving of an object, for whatever we should agree to call *object*, would be *subject*.

Nevertheless, we should be wrong to suppose that either Locke or Cudworth, ever for one moment, doubted the objective reality of what is, in regard to Ideas, really the objective element of the mental phenomenon. This reality both affirmed, and both labored to maintain, and both failed to maintain it, only because both placed the Idea *in* the Subject, instead of *out* of the Subject. Cudworth also seems to have failed, because affected by a belief in innate ideas, and because, like some of his successors, he was preoccupied with what we regard as a useless, if not even an unaskable question. He contended that in certain cases our knowledge is intuitive, that is to say, we know by looking on, or as I should say, by simply perceiving the object. A man makes a certain affirmation, there is a God, for instance, or two things respectively equal to a third, must be equal to one another. Now, one does not need to have these and like propositions proved, demonstrated; we see their truth at once, *intuitively*, as it is said. But how is it that the mind is able to perceive and recognize these truths intuitively? that is to say, what is the *medium* through which we know that which we know *immediately?* The question is absurd, and yet it has been asking and attempting to answer this question, that has caused no small part of our metaphysical aberrations. How is it that I am able to call an object beautiful? That is, how do I know that beauty is beauty, when I see it? By virtue of the fact that I have in myself, it is said, the *Idea* of the Beautiful, which Idea becomes the

touchstone by which I try the object and determine whether it is beautiful or not. But what is the real purport of this answer? It is that there is a distinction to be made in the Subject, between the Subject and the power or agency by which it knows the object. According to this doctrine, the *Idea* is *subjective*, but *intermediate* between the subject and the object, as the condition on the part of the Subject of knowing the object. Be this so, it only resolves the *Idea* into the power or faculty by which we know what we know. To say simply that we know the Beautiful, by virtue of the fact that we are intelligent agents, is saying all that we say, when we say that we know the Beautiful by virtue of an original pattern or Idea of the Beautiful instamped on our natures.

Nor is this all. The question, what are the subjective conditions of knowledge? is very different from the question we are considering in regard to the objectivity of Ideas; but they have really been confounded, and are so confounded by Cudworth himself. He really confounds Idea in the sense of intermediary between the subject and object, or rather as the power or faculty of the subject to know the Ideal, the abstract, necessary, universal, the absolute, with the Ideal, with the absolute Ideas themselves. This, too, is the precise error into which M. Cousin, who can rarely be detected in an error, has fallen, as may be seen in the fact, that after defining the Reason precisely as we have done, he declares it a faculty of the Subject, the power by which the Subject knows all that it knows. This error is avoided only by distinguishing between Reason as the faculty of intelligence, and Reason as the object of intelligence, between Idea as an inward property or power, a subjective picture or pattern of the objective, and Idea in the old Platonic sense, answering very nearly to the *genus* or *kind*. Idea, in the Platonic sense, and in the only sense in which it concerns us, is transcendental. It transcends the Actual, but is the transcendental *in* us? This is what say our modern Transcendentalists, and this is their error. Assuming that Ideas are the medium of knowledge, that is to say, that we know because the Idea of what we are to know is innate, instamped by the hand of God on the retina of the human soul, and then identifying Idea in this sense with Idea in the Platonic or true transcendental sense, they have fallen into the gross absurdity of asserting that the Transcendental is in the Subject, and therefore, the Eternal

Logos, nay, the infinite and absolute God himself. But greater is the container than the contained; and, therefore, said the author of the Orphic Sayings, to us one day in conversation: "I am *greater* than God, for I contain him." It is this confounding of Idea in one sense with Idea in a different sense, that has originated the systems of philosophy and religion among us, founded on the alleged infinity of the soul, on the alleged fact that it is absolute, and therefore sufficient for itself, and for all things, being in itself, as the old Sophist contended, "the measure of all things." Hence comes the profane nonsense, so common among a portion of our young men and maidens, about "the great Soul," "the Soul," "the Divine Soul," "the Infinite Soul," and "the Divinity of Man." Hence the presumption of our professors and lecturers in setting up Natural Religion as the *measure* of Revealed Religion, and in undertaking to show to popular assemblies what is, and what is not, fit and proper for God to do or not to do.

Locke and Cudworth, no doubt, believed in the objectivity of transcendental Ideas, when they considered them apart from the subjective power of knowing of them; but in consequence of conceiving it to be *in* the subject that the subject perceives them, they were unable to demonstrate their objectivity; for, in point of fact, nothing can be objective that is *in* the subject. If these Ideas were in the subject, they would be the subject perceiving, not the object perceived; for we have already demonstrated, that whatever the subject perceives is out of itself, as it were standing over against it, opposing, resisting it. The Subject does not even perceive itself in itself, but only as projected in the act or phenomenon, and reflected from the phenomenon as from a glass. The objectivity of the Ideas which constitute the Reason, and therefore of the Reason itself, is established the moment we find them to be *objects* of thought, and their objectivity establishes not only that they are not-me, but out and independent of me.

The reluctance of many philosophers to admit the *externity*, so to speak, of Ideas, comes, in part, from their conceiving that *out* of the Me, must needs imply out in *space*. In their view there are only two worlds, the world *without*, and the world *within*. The world within, is the world within the Subject, and therefore necessarily subjective, though they seem never to have so believed; and the world without is the world of space, the material world, the world

of senses, with which we become acquainted through the medium of the senses. All knowledge, say they, consists in knowing the world without, and the world within. The facts of memory, the products of our past living, since they are not outward material facts, must subsist *in* the soul; and God himself, since he has no extension, and therefore cannot occupy space, must also exist in the world within; therefore must be subjective, must be me; and therefore I must be the infinite God, at the same time that I am poor, miserable, and sinful! But, after all, these philosophers are the victims of their own vicious terminology. What they really mean to assert is merely the transcendental character of Ideas, and they have really intended by their IN-*World*, not the world within the Subject, that is, when they understand themselves; but the world which stands opposed to the worlds of Time and Space. Their *In-World* is really as much out of the Subject as their external world itself; and it is properly not an In-World, but the World of Eternity and Immensity; that is to say, the world which transcends time and space, or more strictly still, which transcends the Actual, and is, therefore, in the old Platonic sense, Ideal.

Man, in some sort, stands in relation with three worlds,—the world of Space, the world of Time, and that of Eternity. The world of time and that of space are identified and declared to be one world under the name of the Actual. But beyond the Actual there is for man always the Ideal. The actual world, the moment we examine it, is seen to be insufficient for itself. There is obviously something back of it, realizing itself in and through it. I take up a fact of memory, that is to say, an act which I have performed. I see at once that it could not have performed itself. It may have been, for aught I know, a cause, an actor in relation to certain effects or consequences which have followed it; but it could itself have never been without an actor. I take a tree, an oak or a pine, for instance. Now this pine, or this oak, I see is obeying a law which it is not. This acorn will never produce a pine. There is something back of this individual oak, a principle, pushing itself out and actualizing itself, which transcends this actual oak, and can survive it. So when I see a man I immediately recognize in him that which makes him a man, to wit, humanity. This individual man I see is but a deed, an act of some power back of him, actualizing itself in and through him, and this, which I call the kind, I find to be the same in all men. The Actual,

moreover, never suffices for us. The actual beauty I behold never quite satisfies me, and always reveals to me a beauty transcending it. The goodness I see actualized is always a little defective, and I see beyond it a goodness that is purer and more perfect. Now, this which transcends the Actual, which is revealed by the Actual, on which the Actual depends, and which is realizing itself in the Actual, is the Transcendental world, the world of Ideas, or, in one word, Reason. The objects of this world are not *facts* nor *events*, not what has been done, nor what has happened, that is, from our point of view, and therefore do not belong to the world of Space nor of Time, but to the world of Eternity and Immensity, that is to say, of No-*Time* and No-*Where*. Yet their reality, or substantiality, can no more be questioned than can be the actual existences in time and space. For, abstract the transcendental Idea, humanity, and who could conceive of an actual *man*? or who, seeing an individual man, could say he is a man? Who could know individuals without knowing genera? or, if there were no genera, how could there be individuals? Man is so constituted that he can and does recognize this transcendental world, which I call the Ideal; but he does not recognize it in himself any more than he does the actual; nor is he it, any more than he is the world of time and space. He is a reasonable being because he is able to recognize it, and the power of recognizing it is, no doubt, to a very considerable extent, that which separates him from the animal world, and gives him his character of personality, that makes him a person, and therefore morally accountable. Still this power differs only in degree, not in kind, from that which perceives in the feeblest and obscurest perception, and probably not from the power of perceiving common to all percipient beings, the lowest as well as the highest. Man, if he rises to an intuition of the Ideal, and through that to a recognition of the Absolute, is still kindred to all nature, and may call the worm his brother.

How man can perceive the Ideal, in our out of the Actual, is no doubt an inexplicable mystery; nor is it less a mystery how he perceives in time, or in space, that is, how he perceives at all. How does the Subject establish the relation we express by the word *perception*, between itself and the object? What is the perception, the knowing power, regarded solely in itself? strictly on its subjective side? Who knows? Who can answer? The speculations of phi-

losophers, their various hypotheses of ideas, phantasms, species, images, vibrations, nervous fluids, electric or magnetic influences, throw no light on the subject, but leave us as much in the dark as ever. How we can see external objects, by means of the picture painted on the retina of the eye by the refraction of the rays of light from the object, any better than without the intervention of such picture, it is impossible to conceive. How do we perceive the picture? Philosophers have imagined an analagous picture, which they call innate Idea, intervening, if we may so say, between the percipient subject and the transcendental object of perception; but how the mind can grasp the transcendantal object any easier through the intervention of this innate Idea than without it, is still an inexplicable mystery. All their efforts to explain the How, are worse than useless. The *How* does and for ever must transcend the reach of our powers, because, answer as we will, the question will perpetually renew itself, however far back we may drive it, till we come to the Infinite itself. There is no instance, save in a loose and superficial sense, that we ever do or can answer the question of the *How*. The most that we can do is, within given limits, but within limits always extending, to tell what is, and what are the usually accompanying phenomena. The mystery of perceiving is always the same, and no greater in one world, or by means of one kind of apparatus, than another. Man himself is a mystery unto himself, and always will be. Ever sits the Sphinx by the way-side with her riddle of the man-child, and ever is a new Œdipus demanded to solve it. All we can say is, that we perceive because we have the power to perceive; we know we have the power to perceive because we are conscious of exercising it. The extent of this power we know only by experience, and when we have experienced it with regard to the world of Reason, we know its competency there as well as anywhere else.

But, from the fact that man perceives the Ideal, necessary relations, abstract and universal truths, absolute IDEAS, we must not suppose that he perceives them independent of the Actual, and in an absolute manner. Man is finite, and so are and must be all his perceptions. He perceives the world of Reason, but does not comprehend it; that which *transcends* time and space, but only *in* time and space. He perceives the necessary, but his view of it is contingent; the permanent, but his view of the permanent is transient;

the Infinite, but not with an infinite perception; the universal, but always in a relative and particular manner.

The Ideal is seen and known, but only in the Actual. The objects of the higher Mathematics and transcendental Geometry, belong to the world of Reason; but they are revealed to us only in the concrete, that is, through concrete, finite, particular, and contingent objects, belonging to the actual world of Time and Space. Magnitudes, quantities, dimensions, relations, what mathematician could talk of these, seek to determine or measure them, if he had not found them concreted? That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract, universal, necessary, and therefore absolute truth; but would it be possible for us to conceive of it, to have any notion of it, if we had before us, either as a present fact or as a fact of memory, no actual triangle and right angle? A — A. This relation of equality is not dependent on the given concretes A and A; but without concretes, we could no more conceive of it than we could of whiteness, independent of that which is white, or roundness without our having seen something which is round. For this reason, in the mathematical sciences, we are obliged to make use of signs. But they are not sciences of signs, but of realities. They deal with real relations, and make use of artificial signs as representatives of the natural concretes, because without concretes the relations cannot be conceived of.

This fact, that we know the Ideal only in the Actual, is still more obvious when we leave the region of mathematics. It is here the old question concerning Universals and Particulars: Whether know we the particular in the universal, or the universal in the particular? The last is the true answer. It is the prerogative of God to know the particular in the universal, but finite intelligence can know the universal only in the particular, the *kind* only as revealed by the *individual*. Whence know I humanity? In individuals, and in individuals only, and only so far as I know individuals. Abstract all actual men and women, and what would be humanity to me? Humanity is inconceivable save in individual men and women. So of all genera. God himself is known only in his works, that is to say, his works of nature, providence, or grace. Hence it is that no man sees God, or can see him, save through a mediator, as manifested in the face of his Son; and hence, too, the reason why we cannot even see the Son, through whom the Father

is revealed, till incarnated, and only so far as made flesh and dwelling among us. Here is the philosophy of the Christian Fathers, and which some modern theorisers have seemed to themselves to find exceedingly absurd, and probably for the sole reason that they were unable to comprehend it. This is the doctrine of Aristotle, the doctrine in reality of Locke and the English School, and what the old Nominalists had in their doctrine that was true, and worthy of being set forth and preserved.

But, if we perceive the Ideal only in the Actual, we must not fall into the opposite error, of asserting that we perceive *only* the Actual. We have seen that we attain to genera only in individuals, but then we do attain to them; and if we did not, we could not even know the individuals. This is the truth so insisted on by Plato and the Platonists, by the Realists among the Scholastics, and by the modern Transcendentalists and Eclectics of Germany, France, and America. The genera are what Plato calls Ideas. Humanity is an Idea, which is actualizing itself in individual men and women. Now, if I had no power, on seeing a man or a woman, to detect the Idea, that is, humanity which is transcendental, I could not say whether the individual in question belonged to the human race or to some other race, or to any race at all. I could not say of this woman, this picture, this statue, how beautiful! if I had no perception of the Idea, of the kind, namely Beauty, or the Beautiful, of which I speak, and of which the woman, picture, statue, is a representation. The conception of the individual, then, always involves that of the kind, race, or Idea, which has led some to suppose that the knowledge of the Idea, the race, the kind, that is, of the Universal in the language of the schoolmen, precedes as a matter of fact the knowledge of the actual, the individual, the particular. It does, as M. Cousin shows in his examination of Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, *logically* precede, but not *chronologically*. The simple fact is, that the knowledge of the one is always by and through the knowledge of the other, and therefore both are to be regarded as simultaneous, and as ONE SIMPLE KNOWLEDGE, rather than as two distinct kinds of knowledge. The Actual reveals the Ideal, but knowledge of the Actual is knowledge of the Actual only so far as it is knowledge of the Ideal, which is the basis and possibility of the Actual.

We are now in a condition to answer the question, What is Reasoning? Reason is the Transcendental World, the

world of Ideas, kinds, genera, Universals, what I call the Ideal.—Only let it be kept in mind that the Ideal, if not Actual, is still real, and exists not in the Subject, but out of it, and is truly objective, and therefore *not-me*. It is as much and as truly an object of perception as a tree, a house, or a man. If it be asked how we know that we perceive it? the answer is, the perception *is* the *knowing* that it is perceived. The perception is not the *medium* of knowing, but the *knowing itself*. Reasoning is simply detecting and bringing forth in a clear and distinct light, in the various concrete objects of the Actual world, the Ideal. It is to *generalize*.

But what is it to *generalize*? Merely to classify, to aggregate, to arrange under distinct heads, or in separate groups? This answer may suffice for our naturalists, but can by no means suffice for the philosopher. For if this were all, why not arrange the oak under the head of the pine, and place the sheep in the same class with the wolf? Some rule or principle must be adopted according to which our classifications of the individual objects shall be made. What is this rule or principle? Is it arbitrary, or natural? Should not our classifications be those which really are in the nature of things? Should not individuals and particulars be arranged according to their nature, like with like? Then, to generalize is to detect the *genus*, and to bring back all individuals to their respective *genera*.

According to the doctrine we have laid down, the genera, or Ideas, are not fictions, are not mere abstract nouns, invented for the convenience of scientific classifications, but realities, living powers, as much superior to the individuals, as we are to our individual actions. We know individuals, particulars, only so far forth as we detect in them the Idea they are actualizing, or rather which actualizes itself in them. In every act of *reasoning*, we are always seeking this transcendental Idea. When we abstract, what is it we do, but eliminate the transient, the particular, the concrete, that is to say, the Actual, in order to get at the Ideal? In decomposing a phenomenon, are we not always doing the same? In comparing, are we not merely endeavoring to find out whether this particular belongs to *that* kind, or to *this*. In proving, demonstrating, assigning *reasons*, what are we but seeking to exhibit the reason, that is, to point out the kind to which the particular in question belongs, the Idea of which it is a more or less perfect actualization?

To reason, again, is to define. All logic consists in definition. But we define only, as say the schoolmen, *per genus*, and *per differentiam*: that is, by detecting what is common to all the individuals concerned, and discovering whence they differ one from another. But the definition *per differentiam*, must necessarily depend on the definition *per genus*, of which it is only the development. Reasoning therefore, after all, resolves itself into the detection in the individuals of the *genus* or kind. We detect the kind, the genus, the Idea, and consider it apart from the particular. This is erecting it into a science. Man considered in this way gives us the science of humanity. Man, nature, all classes of particulars considered in this way, considered solely in what is common to them all, in relation to the Idea of Ideas, of which all their genera and sub-genera are but so many individual manifestations, give us Philosophy, the science of sciences, which some go so far as to term not only the science of the Absolute, but absolute science.

It is this science of the Sciences, this science of Ideas, that is, of kinds, genera, in their unity, or one Divine Original, which M. Cousin and his school term ONTOLOGY, and which in their view is the Science of the Absolute. They with us, or we rather with them, call Ideas objective; and as all Ideas are universal, necessary, and immutable, and as they are all united or made one in the Reason, or Logos, in the language of Plato, the Speech of God, which therefore must be one, universal, necessary, and absolute, they must in the last analysis be identical with the Absolute God, as says Saint John,—"And the Word was God." Hence, as we know Ideas, and know nothing but Ideas, for individuals are nothing, abstracted from the genus or kind, we may be said to know God. Hence, M. Cousin denies the incomprehensibleness of the Deity, and asserts that he is intelligible. This, however, is too strongly expressed. On the wings of Ideas we can unquestionably soar to God; for God reveals himself in Ideas, as Ideas reveal themselves in deeds, or genera in individuals; and as the act carries us back to the actor, the individual to the genus, the genus to the Original, or Universal Generator, the GENUS of Genera, we have a direct and sufficient medium through which, from the simple recognition of ourselves as actors, we can rise to God himself. But we must remember that we know God only in Ideas, and Ideas only in individual actualizations of

them. We can, therefore, know of God no more than these individual actualizations reveal of him.

Our knowledge of these individual actualizations is very imperfect. Moreover, even if it were perfect, it would not be a complete knowledge of God, for God has not put himself all forth in his creations. Supposing we had a perfect acquaintance with all the individual men and women that now are, and all that have been, we should have only an imperfect knowledge of humanity, because humanity has not been all manifested, and has, as we learn from the fact that new individuals are continually pushed out, possibilities which are as yet unrealized by any or all of the individuals which have been and are. Then, again, were we even to know all the actualities and possibilities of humanity, we should still be defective in our knowledge of God, unless we were in like manner to know the actualities and possibilities of all actual and all possible races of beings in his actual and possible universe. So it is in vain to pretend that we have a full knowledge of God the Absolute. Our knowledge of God after all, if we consider him as the Infinite Reality of which the Ideal is the Revelation, and the Actual the Actualization, is little more than knowledge of him as the Infinite UNKNOWN. Science must not pretend to absolute knowledge, for the human mind cannot grasp all things, and if it could, that would not suffice; for all things remain never the same for two successive moments. Always will there be the Infinite Unknown before us, and therefore, never for us any resting-place in the pursuit after knowledge. Eternally must we aspire to know, and eternally may we rise higher and higher, in the scale of our knowledge, and still see the Infinite Unknown, rising dark, and dread, and frowning above us. Yet let us hope, and toil on, never weary or disheartened.

KANT'S CRITIC OF PURE REASON.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1844.]

ARTICLE I.

In order to comprehend and appreciate Kant's Critical Philosophy,* or indeed any particular system of philosophy, we must begin by determining the class to which it belongs, and its appropriate place in the general history of philosophy. But all classification, if it is to be of the least scientific value, must rest on a necessary principle of classification, be founded, not in the caprice or convenience of the critic or the historian, but in the very nature and reason of science itself. There is, then, always, a preliminary question, concerning the principle of classification, which we must not pass over, if we mean our ulterior labors shall contribute at all to the better understanding of the particular system we propose to discuss, or to the advancement of science in general. Our readers must, therefore, suffer us to pause, and linger awhile on this preliminary question.

I. CLASSIFICATION OF SYSTEMS.

Modern historians of philosophy, for the most part, contend, that we should classify the several systems of philosophy, which are put forth from time to time, according to the assumed principles of their psychological origin. This is especially the case with M. Cousin, whose brilliant courses of lectures in 1828 and 1829 must, doubtless, be familiar to all those of our readers who interest themselves in the study of philosophy. M. Cousin assumes, that all philosophy has its origin in psychology, and is, in fact, nothing but a method, or doctrine of science, and its application. There can be in philosophy nothing, the principle of which is not in human nature. One system of philosophy can differ from another, only in the different degree of importance attached by its author, in constructing it, to one or another of the original elements of human nature. Ascertain, by a rigid analysis and classification of all the facts of con-

* *Critik der reinen Vernunft;* von IMMANUEL KANT. Siebente Auflage. Leipzig. 1828.

sciousness, according to their psychological origin, the number and characteristics of all the fundamental elements of human nature, and you have determined the number and characteristics of all possible systems of philosophy.

The number of original elements of human nature, under the present point of view, according to M. Cousin, is four; 1. SENSIBILITY; 2. INTELLIGENCE; 3. SPONTANEITY; 4. GOOD SENSE. There are, then, four psychological principles of philosophy; and every possible system must be referred to the predominance of one or another of these as its principle.

If, in philosophizing, we take the point of view of the senses, that is of sensibility, we shall recognize no objects as really existing, except such as do, or such as may, affect the external organs of sense. We shall then assume as valid only those cognitions which have their origin in sensation alone, and attempt to explain the world, man, and God, by means of mere sensations. Hence SENSISM. If we fix our attention, exclusively, on the intelligence, or reason, taken as the principle of pure thought, we shall attempt to explain the universe, geometrically, from the point of view of mere conceptions *a priori*, and shall find ourselves unable to recognize any ontological existence, which is not contained in these pure thoughts, or conceptions. The only ontological existence contained in these is the thinking subject. Hence, IDEALISM, or, as we prefer to term it, EGOISM. If we pursue our psychological investigations, to which we are driven by the absolute necessity we are under of believing something, and by the unsatisfactory termination of both Sensism and Idealism, we shall find, that, in the fact of cognition, we are often involuntary, that the cognitive power—the *vis cognitrix*—acts spontaneously, without any intervention of the *me* proper, and reveals to us, as it were, immediately, the sublime principles of the universe, and carries us up into immediate relation with its Original and Cause. By being quiet, by simply opening the mind, and then remaining all passive, the light from its Source will stream into the soul, and we shall know God and nature by immediate intuition. If we fix our attention, exclusively, on the order of facts thus introduced into the consciousness, we shall attempt to explain the universe solely from the point of view of Spontaneity. The philosophy that does this is MYSTICISM.

But all these systems contradict one another; each leaves

a portion of the facts of consciousness unexplained; disputes, quarrels follow, and disgust men of plain, practical *good sense*, who, struck with the inconclusiveness of the reasoning of each, conclude that certainty with regard to human knowledge is out of the question. Doubt and uncertainty hang over all human science. They who fix their attention solely on this fact, and erect doubt into a principle, generate a fourth system, which we may call SCEPTICISM. Thus Sensism, Idealism, Mysticism, and Scepticism constitute all the possible systems of philosophy. Every philosopher must, by virtue of the absolute necessity imposed upon him by the nature of the human soul itself, be either a Sensist or an Idealist, a Mystic or a Sceptic,—or all four together, and neither exclusively, that is to say, an ECLECTIC.

Having settled all this, we are prepared to run over the History of Philosophy. When we come to a particular system of philosophy, our first question is, Where does it belong? Is the author a Sensist? an Idealist? a Mystic? a Sceptic? or, in fine, an Eclectic? For instance, we propose to study Plato; then, What was Plato? With which of the five systems* shall we class him? Having determined that he is an Idealist, we know then that he is one who attempts with mere conception *a priori* to explain the universe. This determined, we have comprehended Platonism, and may proceed to Aristotle, and go through the same process. Nothing more simple. After having settled the principle of classification, you have nothing to do, but to determine the method of any given philosopher, and, lo, you are instantly master of his whole system!

Now, in our judgment this is making the matter quite too easy; and, moreover, is amusing us with mere barren classifications, as barren as are the classifications of a modern botanist, which, when learned, leave us as ignorant of the actual plant as we were before. It has the air of being very scientific, but it really tells us nothing of the individual system we would study. It proceeds on a false assumption. All philosophy is not of an exclusively psychological origin; and there are systems not explicable from the psychological point of view. How, on mere psychological principles, explain the difference between Plato and Aristotle, between Roscellin and Guillaume de Champeaux, or between Abelard

* We say *five*, for M. Cousin, though officially admitting only four, really contends for five, in that his own system is not one of the *four*.

and his great opponent, St. Bernard? Psychologically explained, Plato, Proclus, Erigena, St. Anselm of Canterbury, Roscellin, St. Bernard, St. Thomas, Giordano Bruno, Peter Ramus, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, to mention no more, must all be ranged in the same category. Are there between these no generic differences? Assuredly, Plato was not a Nominalist, and yet his method is that of Roscellin, at least so far as it is possible now to ascertain. Assuredly, Saint Bernard was not a Conceptualist, and yet there is no difference as to method between him and Abelard. Assuredly, never men differed more, one from another, than many of the Scholastics, and yet they all adopt one and the same method; namely, the dialectic method, which rests on the principle of contradiction, the principle of the syllogism. How, then, explain their differences from the point of view of psychology?

The psychological principle of classification is admissible, only when the question concerns a doctrine of science; that is, when the system to be classed is not a system of philosophy, but a doctrine concerning the origin, conditions, and validity of human knowledge. Now, ancient philosophy concerns itself very little with doctrines of science, in this sense, and the scholastic philosophy, never. Plato, indeed, takes up the question of science, but it is in relation to the object of science, not, primarily, in relation to the cognitive subject. In his mind, the question, What is Science? has no reference to the origin, conditions, or validity of human knowledge, psychologically considered, but refers to that in the object, or phenomenon, present to the mind, which must be known in order really to know the object. The refutation of Sensism, in his Theætetus, is not a refutation of it from the point of view of psychology, but of ontology. In this dialogue Socrates labors to show, not that we have another psychological principle of knowledge than the senses, as M. Cousin, in his argument placed at the head of his translation of this dialogue, teaches, but that what the senses give us is no real science; that we must look deeper into the object, to its essence or *idea*, before we have attained to any knowledge of it which may properly be denominated science. Plato is a philosopher, not a psychologist; and, if he touches the psychological question, it is always from the point of view of ontology.

Aristotle, again, though he differs from Plato as to his ter-

minology and mode of exposition, adopts, on this point the same doctrine. He, no doubt, undertakes to construct a doctrine of science; but it is always science objectively considered. The inquiry relates always to what is necessary to know, in order to have science properly so called. His *wisdom*, which answers to Plato's *science*, is never in the knowledge of the mere sensible appearances, nor in that of particulars, but in the knowledge of causes, principles, which is very nearly what Plato means by a knowledge of *ideas*. His categories, or predicaments, are all ontologically derived and reduced, and are the forms, or the laws, of the object, not, as the categories of Kant, the forms, or laws, of the subject. He, doubtless, has a psychology; he is the father of logic; but his logic is an *organon*, or instrument, of science,—a logic that determines the *use* of the human mind in advancing science, not the *value* of the human mind as a cognitive subject, as is the case with Kantian logic. The Fathers of the Church, especially the Scholastics, no doubt, concern themselves with science, with psychology, with logic, and treat at large of the powers and capacities of the human mind, and often with a sagacity, precision, and depth, which we in vain attempt to equal; but it is always from the point of view of ontology, in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense. How, then, explain their labors, from the point of view of psychology, in the modern sense of the term?

Since the time of Descartes, down to Fichte, if we except Spinoza, Leibnitz, and some doctors of the Church, as Cudworth and Henry More, the question of science has been, primarily, a psychological question. It has been before all a question of the human mind itself, not as to the mode or manner of its use in the advancement of science, but as to its value or capacity, as the subject of science. Can I know? Can I know that I know? What is it, psychologically considered, to know? What is it to know that I know? How do I know? How do I know that I know? These are the problems, and problems very nearly peculiar to modern times. The great philosophers of antiquity, of the early days of the Church, of the Middle Ages, troubled not themselves, at all, with these problems. We do not mean, of course, to say, that similar questions were not asked in antiquity, for there were then, as well as now, sophists and sceptics; but, that the great men, the men who had doctrines, and whom humanity owns as philosophers, and reveres as having contributed to her growth, ask no such vain questions. In their

estimation, to know is to know, and he who says, I know, says all that he does who says, I know that I know. Now, between the systems left us by these great men, and our modern systems, which take their point of departure in psychology, and assume that the first problem relates to the psychological origin, conditions, and validity, of our cognitions, there is, in our judgment, not merely a specific, but a *generic* difference. The last seek to explain the origin, conditions, and validity of our cognitions; they then seek a doctrine of science, the *Wissenschaftslehre* of Fichte; the others seek to explain the origin, principle, and genesis of things, and, therefore, seek a doctrine of life. We have, then, two distinct classes of systems, which we may denominate,

1. Doctrines of Science,
2. Doctrines of Life.

These last are the only doctrines which should be included under the term PHILOSOPHY; the others may be termed, if the reader pleases, PSYCHOLOGY.

This division, it may be thought, rests on the distinction between psychology and ontology. Doubtless, M. Cousin and others, whom we must class among the psychologists, admit this distinction, for they, as well as we, speak of ontology; but with them this distinction means only the distinction between the method and its application. With them, ontology is nothing but the psychological method in its development. Such your method, such your ontology. Given a philosopher's psychological doctrine on the origin, conditions, and validity of human cognitions, and his whole doctrine concerning the cause, principle, and genesis of things is given. Hence the reason and necessity of Eclecticism, which recognizes all the psychological principles of cognition. If you mutilate the subject in forming your psychology, you will mutilate the object in your ontology. You must, then, include the whole subject in your method, if in its application no portion of the object is to be excluded. But this proceeds on the principle, that there can be nothing in the development not in the method. Ontology, given as the development of the psychological method, can, then, contain nothing, not already contained in the psychological principles themselves. It can, then, be only the logical,—the *ontological* generalization, as we shall hereafter see, is quite another affair,—only the *logical* generalization of psychology, and, therefore, can never carry us out of psychology,

that is to say, out of the sphere of the subject. Their ontology is, then, no genuine ontology at all; it is nothing but a logical abstraction, and altogether worthless. It is therefore, that the Absolute, God, the Trinity, about which M. Cousin says so much, considered in the light of his own system, are but the veriest abstractions, and as to substantive existence have no being at all out of the mind itself.

Notwithstanding appearances, then, M. Cousin and the modern psychologists do not make the distinction we recognize, and on which we found our division of all systems into the two classes named. The distinction we contend for is not the distinction between method and its application, for this is common to every possible system, whether of the one division or of the other; nor is it precisely the distinction between ontology and psychology, when this last is taken in its legitimate sense, that is, as the investigation and classification of the faculties of the soul with a view to serve as the organon of advancing science. No philosopher ever failed to have a psychology, for no philosopher was ever yet able to philosophize without serving himself with the human mind as his organon; on the other hand, no psychologist ever sought a doctrine of Science, save to apply it afterwards to the explanation of the universe, and, through it to attain to a doctrine of Life. The real principle of our classification must be sought, not in the respective aims or results of the several systems to be classed, but in their respective points of departure. All alike aim at a doctrine of Life, and all arrive at some doctrine which is, or is taken to be, a doctrine of Life. Those systems, only, we class under the head of Doctrines of Science, which take their point of departure in psychology, and seek to solve the problem of Life, by first solving, from the psychological point of view, the problem of Science; all those systems which take their point of departure in ontology, and proceed directly to the solution of the problem of Life, we call Doctrines of Life. We call the first, Doctrines of Science, because it is the predominance of the problem of Science in the minds of their respective authors, that induces them to take the psychological point of departure; and the others we call Doctrines of Life, because it is the predominance, in the minds of their respective authors, of the problem of Life that induces them to take their point of departure in ontology. If the problem of Science predominate, the author of the system will concern himself mainly with the principle, the genesis, and the

validity of our cognitions, that is, of *ideas* in the sense of Locke; if the problem of Life predominate, he will concern himself with the cause, principle, and genesis of things, that is, with *ideas* in the sense of Plato.

Now, each of these two grand divisions admits several subdivisions. The determination of the number of classes into which we may subdivide the doctrines of Life is no easy matter, and demands a full acquaintance with all the great principles of philosophy; and whether a given system belongs to one class or to another, can be determined only by a profound study of the system itself. The prevailing doctrine, in our times, subdivides the doctrines of Life into two classes,

1. Materialism;
2. Spiritualism.

The objection to this division is, that it is not fundamental, and has no well established principle. What is matter? What is spirit? These are questions which admit no *positive* answer. We can answer them only by negations, by saying what they are not; never by saying what they are. This classification has no ontological basis; and, in point of fact, not even a psychological basis. When we come to clear up our notions of substance, and to investigate anew the cognitive power of the soul, we shall see that this boasted distinction of spirit and matter never concerns either the essences of things, or even the notions which we form of those essences.

We contend for another classification of the doctrines of Life, more philosophical, and less inadequate to the explanation of the historical facts in the case, founded, not in psychology taken in the modern sense, but in the several points of view under which the subject-matter—the object—of science may be contemplated; therefore, in ontology. We may contemplate the object under the several points of view of Plurality, Unity, and Synthesis. If we contemplate Life, with the old Ionians, under the point of view of Plurality, our doctrine of Life will be POLYTHEISM, or ATHEISM; if under the point of view of Unity, with the old Eleatics, our doctrine of Life will be UNITYISM, or PANTHEISM; if, in fine, with Moses, Pythagoras, Plato, the Christian Fathers, the Scholastics, in a word, with all great theologians of all ages, and nations, under the point of view of Synthesis, our doctrine of Life will be TRINITYISM, or THEISM; or, as M.

Leroux calls it, not inaptly, CHRISTIAN IDEALISM. God, in the view of Chistian theology, is not Unity, nor Plurality, but their synthesis, or rather, the one in the other,—the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father, in indissoluble union. The ONE God of the Hebrews is, indeed, one God; but, in the ineffable mystery of his single being, is the indissoluble union of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity, as shadowed forth in the very first verse of Genesis, where the Hebrew name for God is a singular noun with a plural termination. The objections of the Unitarians to this sublime theology proceed from their assuming that it implies a *division* in the Godhead, which, of course, is inadmissible. But the Trinity, so to speak, is more ultimate than their conceptions reach, and concerns a theology which lies back of the conception of God as one. God, with the Trinitarian and the Unitarian, is alike one and indivisible. The Unitarian stops with this proposition. When he has said, God is ONE, he has said all that seems to him important, perhaps all that he believes can be said. But it is precisely here, where this proposition ends, that the Trinitarian solution of the mystery of Being begins. God, regarded as simple Unity, is not the *living* God, and therefore is incapable of being the Source of Life. The Unitarian, no doubt, believes that God is the *living* God; but he enters into no inquiry as to what, touching the ineffable mystery of the Divine Being, is implied in this assertion, that God is the *living* God. He, therefore, stops short of a real doctrine of Life. It is into the mystery of the Divine Unity itself, that the Trinitarian attempts to penetrate. He seeks, by decomposing, so to speak, without destroying, this Divine Unity, to get at the ultimate principle of Life itself. A sublime audacity, to which God himself, by his revelations of himself, invites him! It will be seen, at once, that the Trinitarian theology, which we in our classification term Theism, or Idealism, by no means excludes the Unitarian's faith in one God, but accepts it, and explains it by carrying it up to the principle of Life; by showing, that, in order to be the *living* God, this One God of the Unitarian must be the Triune God of the Trinitarian. The Trinitarian doctrine belongs to a much higher order of thought than the Unitarian, and proceeds boldly in the solution of problems which lie far out of the Unitarian's reach. But more of this, when we come to the direct consideration of the doctrines of Life, in our future numbers.

According to the principle of classification here contended for, that is, the ontological principle of their origin, we subdivide the doctrines of Life into three classes; namely,

1. Atheism;
2. Pantheism;
3. Theism.

It is not our purpose, at present, to enter into any discussion concerning these doctrines, as to which is true, or which is false, nor as to the question, whether the human mind, by its own spontaneous development, could, or could not, have attained to the true doctrine of Life. We shall enter fully into these questions, after we have disposed of the doctrines of Science; we will now only add, in passing, what our readers must suspect, that, for ourselves, we accept Theism, or, if they will, Trinityism, as the true doctrine of Life, and hold and teach that the human mind could never have attained to it without Divine Revelation, in the old-fashioned sense of the term, though possibly it is *now* able, by reflection on the reason and nature of things, to demonstrate its truth. We add, also, to take away all occasion for misapprehension, that we do not, in our view of the economy of salvation, hold, with Protestant divines, that it is belief in this doctrine of Life, though true, that saves us, but the influx into the soul of the Truth, or ontological principle, of which it is a true account. It is never the efficacy of the *doctrine* that redeems and sanctifies, but the efficacy, the real presence, of God himself. The doctrine is efficacious only so far as it brings us within the sphere of the influence of the Divine Reality, or, in theological language, of the Holy Ghost. Not man's *view* of God, but God himself, as manifested and communicated to us, in the way and manner, and through the Mediator and disciplines, he himself has instituted, is our Redeemer and Sanctifier. But this by the way..

The classification of the doctrines of Life, which we have here given, may seem, at first view, to be borrowed from M. Cousin, and to be sustained by his reduction of all our ontological Ideas to three; namely,

1. The Idea of the Finite;
2. The Idea of the Infinite;
3. The Idea of the Relation of the Two.

M. Cousin would contend that the idea of the Finite corresponds to that of Plurality; the idea of the Infinite to

that of Unity; and, in fine, the idea of Relation to that of Synthesis; and we are by no means disposed to deny this apparent correspondence; and we have most likely been indebted to our knowledge of M. Cousin's reduction for the principle of our classification. But the correspondence is more in appearance than in reality. M. Cousin's terms are a little too abstract and vague for our purpose; moreover, the terms Finite and Infinite are not the exact equivalents of the terms Plurality and Unity. Unity may be predicated of the finite as well as of the infinite, and the conception of the infinite is very different from that of unity. Our conception of the infinite is a negative conception, merely the conception of the *not*-bounded or undefined; but our conception of unity is one of our most positive conceptions. The attempt to explain the universe from the point of view of the infinite would not result in Pantheism, but in Nihilism; for the infinite, taken, not as a predicate, but as the subject of the predicate, would be equivalent to infinite nothing; and from the conception of infinite nothing, how obtain the conception of infinite something?

Nor is this all. This reduction of absolute ideas, which plays so conspicuous a part in M. Cousin's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, is not part and parcel of his own system; it is one of his loans from the Hegelian philosophy, confessedly a doctrine of Life,—though in our judgment by no means the true doctrine of Life. The principle of this reduction of the categories—not Kant's, but Aristotle's, not the psychological, but the ontological predicaments—to the three ideas enumerated is not by any means a psychological principle. It is impossible to refer the idea of the Finite to the Senses, that of the Infinite to the Intelligence, and their Relation to the union of sensation and intellection. The senses, M. Cousin tells us, can give us no conception of unity; and yet, who dare deny that unity may be predicated of the finite? Moreover, we shall hereafter see, that the senses are, in themselves, no independent medium of communication between the subject and the object. The intelligence can no more be dispensed with in the fact of sensation, than it can in the fact of cognition. M. Cousin himself, in point of fact, carried away by his admiration for Hegel out of his own poor psychology, virtually admits that the reduction in question is not psychologically obtained. He even makes this reduction the basis of his psychological classification, and attempts from it, after the example of his

master, as from the point of view of ontology, to explain the history of philosophy, which, as he had elsewhere laid it down, was to be explained psychologically. Thus the predominance, in an epoch, of the idea of the Finite is given as the *cause* of the prevalence, in that epoch, of Sensism; the predominance of the idea of the Infinite, as the cause of the prevalence of what he calls Idealism; the predominance of the idea of Relation, of Synthesis, as the cause of the prevalence of Eclecticism. Surely, this is to abandon the field of psychology altogether, and to enter into quite another region.

We do not forget that M. Cousin contends, that he begins in psychology, and from that attains to ontology; and that, after having through psychology arrived at ontology, he has a perfect right to use it for the explanation of his psychology. But his psychology must have been perfectly explicable, and perfectly explained, without ontology, if his ontology was obtained from it; wherefore, then, seek, by means of ontology, to explain it anew? But M. Cousin is deceived; for the ontology, he obtains by generalizing psychology, is only a logical abstraction; it never carries him out of the subject; and is, therefore, as we have seen, no genuine ontology at all. It is quite another sort of ontology from that which he borrows from his friend Hegel, and which he uses to explain his psychology, and is by no means reconcilable with it.

The doctrines of Science may also be subdivided into several classes. Here, since it concerns purely psychological doctrines, the psychological principle of classification is not only admissible, but necessary; yet even here we cannot accept M. Cousin's classification, without some important modifications. He reckons four classes, which he names,

1. Sensism;
2. Idealism;
3. Mysticism;
4. Scepticism.

This classification rests for its principle on an inaccurate psychology. M. Cousin makes the basis of Idealism the reflective reason, and that of Mysticism the spontaneous reason. This presupposes a distinction, or, rather, a division, of reason into the reflective and the spontaneous, which we hold to be inadmissible. Scepticism is, indeed, a fact in history; but, as it is the negation of all science, and

concerns not our powers of science, but their absence, we are hardly willing to call it a doctrine of Science. It has, moreover, no psychological principle. Even M. Cousin does not hold GOOD SENSE, which, according to him, is its principle, to be a fundamental faculty of the *me*. It is the name given, not to one of its original powers, but to a certain practical exercise of all its faculties in mutual support and limitation. We strike from the list of doctrines, therefore, what is termed Scepticism. Of his four systems we retain, then, but three.

Of the three we retain, only the first is rightly named. All these doctrines take their rise in the Subject, and should, therefore, all be called by the general name of EGOISM. The principle of each respectively is, the predominance of a given faculty of the subject. The subject has three original faculties, which, so far as concerns doctrines purely psychological, and because all psychological doctrines so regard them, may be named Sensation, Sentiment, Intellect. Hence, three systems, which may be denominated,

1. Sensism:
2. Sentimentalism;
3. Intellectualism.

If we undertake to explain the phenomena of the subject by sensation, our doctrine of Science will be Sensism; if by sentiment, it will be Sentimentalism; if by intellect, that is, pure conception (*Begriff*), it will be Intellectualism. All doctrines of Science must be referred to one or another of these three classes;

Our classification of all possible systems is, then, first, into two orders; and, second, each order into three classes.

I. DOCTRINES OF L[illegible]E—

1. Atheism;
2. Pantheism;
3. Theism.

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE—

1. Sensism;
2. Sentimentalism;
3. Intellectualism.

Our present purpose confines us to the second order; namely,

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE.

It is the common opinion among those who in our times pass for philosophers, that there was no philosophy, properly so called, in the Church, from its origin down nearly to the sixteenth century. M. Cousin is hardly willing to allow that the Scholastics were really philosophers; he sees with them only philosophy in germ, prevented by the prevailing theology from attaining to any thing like a fair or full development. Ancient philosophy was born with Socrates, and expired with the closing of the Greek schools at Athens, by order of Justinian, in the sixth century; and modern philosophy was born only with René Descartes, in the sixteenth. But we cannot accept this view. The last three centuries, in our judgment, have been by no means eminently philosophical centuries; and were we to characterize them in a word, we should do so by denominating them unphilosophical, but scientific.

To say that there was no philosophy in the Church prior to what we call the Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century, is to take a very false view either of the Church or of philosophy itself. What were all the great questions debated by the theologians of the Church, against the Gentiles, the Gnostics, the Manicheans, the Sabellians, the Monophysites, the Arians, the Donatists, the Pelagians, the Predestinarians, represented in the ninth century by the monk Gotteschalk, the Berengarians, concerning the Real Presence, which last provoked the whole scholastic philosophy, but so many profound ontological questions? Was the question between the Arians and Athanasians nothing but a question of a mere dogma enjoined by authority? Was it for a single diphthong that men disputed and cut one another's throats for some three hundred years? Do not so libel humanity. The difference expressed by that diphthong was all the difference between Paganism and Christianity, between Atheism and Theism. In asserting that the Son was made of a *like* substance with the Father, what did the Homoiousian attempt, but to introduce two kindred substances as the basis of his theory of the universe, and thus to explain Life from the point of view of plurality, which is Polytheism or Atheism? What was, at bottom, the Pelagian controversy? Pelagius asserts the power of

the human soul to place itself in a salvable state. Press this assertion, push it to its last consequences, and it annihilates God, and proclaims the supremacy of man. It transfers the creative power to the creature, and makes the universe live by its own inherent life, independent of a supermundane Creator. What, again, was the real doctrine involved in the controversy provoked in the ninth century by Gotteschalk? Gotteschalk is the antipodes of Pelagius. He is the precursor of Calvin. He asserts the Divine sovereignty in a sense which leaves man no freedom. Just so far as you deny man's freedom, you deny man himself. To deny man, to deny the active force of the creature, is to deny the reality of the creature, to make him merely a mode or affection of the Creator,—is, in fact, to deny creation, and to fall into Pantheism. Was here no philosophical question? Does it not become so in the hands of John Erigena, who has been wrongly accused of being himself a Pantheist? Was there no profound ontological question raised up by Berengarius, in the eleventh century, touching the Eucharist, and which engaged in its discussion such men as Lanfranc, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and involved the whole dispute of the Schoolmen about *genera* and *species*? Understand the matter better, and you will find that it is always in the Church a question of ontology.

The reason why men of no mean capacity fall into this mistake concerning the theologians of the Church is, that they separate in their own minds, fundamentally, philosophy and theology. Philosophy they regard as the work of the human mind, as resting for its authority on human reason alone. They will allow nothing to be philosophy, therefore, which is not entirely emancipated from all theological envelope, and which does not assert the absolute independence and sufficiency of the human reason. If human reason is independent, if it is fully competent, of itself, to attain to the true doctrine of Life, then Revelation, then Divine Communication through the agency of prophets and apostles, is superfluous; and hence nothing is properly philosophy, that does not proclaim the whole teachings of the Church as to the origin and grounds of our religious faith, either false or superfluous. Philosophy, with the moderns, is profoundly infidel; and hence whatever finds its support in the Christian Revelation is denied to be philosophy at all. What with them passes for philosophy, or rather the principle of what passes with them for philos-

ophy, is profoundly hostile to the Church. This both they and the Church have always felt and asserted; hence the condemnation of the one by the other.

We insist on this point. The modern philosopher begins by putting Christianity on trial, and claims for the human reason the right to sit in judgment on Revelation. At one period, its aim is to overthrow the Church; at another, it is to *reconcile*, as it is called, reason and faith. How often in these very days of ours, have we heard it said, that the problem of philosophy is to reconcile faith and reason! Have not we ourselves begun our philosophical course by so affirming? Do not those who were associates and fellow-laborers with us in the outset continue still so to affirm? Faith is questioned; men doubt; and they seek to *prove* faith,—to get rid of doubt. Reason appears to teach one thing, faith another; and they seek, by mutual explanations and refinings, to make the teachings of the one coincide with those of the other. Is not this the thought of our "Charles Elwood," of our "New Views," of Ripley's "Miscellanies," of Walker's "Lectures," of Cousin's labors? Taking this view, we necessarily imply, that philosophy is of purely human origin, and that the human reason, in which it originates, is competent to sit in judgment on all questions which do or may come up.

We proclaim its independence and sufficiency. If we believe, it is because reason has demonstrated our right to believe; if we disbelieve, it is because reason declares it to be unreasonable to believe. If we reject the Trinity, it is because we find it irrational; endless punishment, it is because it does not comport with our notions of justice, &c. Now, this being our state of mind, we necessarily transport it into the study of the Fathers and theologians of the Church; and because we do not find them asserting the independence and sufficiency of reason, in our sense, because we do not find them studying to *prove* religion, to get rid of doubt, and to harmonize the independent teachings of reason with the independent teachings of faith, we conclude, forthwith, that they were no philosophers; or that, if they were so in their secret thought, they dared not be so in public. Poor men, they were bound by their actual belief in authority, or by their fear of it, to maintain certain prescribed dogmas, and so could not give free scope to independent thought, or free development to their own reason! Here is wherefore our modern philosophers can find no phi-

losophy, properly so called, in the Church, prior to the Revival of Letters. Prior to that epoch, men believed, and when men believe, they do not philosophize. Does not this imply that philosophy is held to be of purely infidel origin?

Now, that philosophy has been, since the Revival of Letters, what this implies, we do not deny; and, if this character, which it has since borne, be really the essential character of philosophy, we admit, most cheerfully, that there was very little, if any, philosophy in the Church prior to the epoch named. But it is precisely this fact we controvert. We maintain, with Saint Augustine and John Erigena, the identity of religion and philosophy. Philosophy is nothing but the practical teachings of religion, referred to their ontological principles, and reduced to doctrinal forms. Philosophy is the offspring, not of Doubt, but of Faith, and is impossible in unbelieving epochs. If the moderns could learn this fact, they would form a very different estimate of the Fathers of the Church, and of the Scholastics, from that which now very generally obtains. Without a knowledge of this fact, without rising to the *identity* of religion and philosophy, instead of their *harmony*, it is impossible to comprehend the Schoolmen, or the great Fathers of the Church.

In contradiction to the commonly received opinion, we regard the thought of the Church, from its birth down to the Revival of Letters, as profoundly philosophical. All the great question debated were, at bottom, great ontological questions. Men believed; they had a doctrine of Life, and this doctrine they labored to comprehend and explain. The Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century marks a decline in religious faith, and the sixteenth century is itself a period of transition from philosophy to science, from religion to doubt.

M. Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, adopts the common opinion, that the Scholastic Philosophy was provoked by the celebrated passage of Porphyry, concerning *genera* and *species*, translated by Boetius; and tries to connect, through Boetius and Porphyry, the Scholastic Philosophy with the Neoplatonists, and, through them, with the ancient philosophy of Greece. We admit the connexion, but we do not believe this is the precise medium through which it actually took place. He adopts this hypothesis, because he always separates philosophy from theology, and must, therefore, seek its continuity through a medium

comparatively independent of theology. But, in point of fact, the celebrated passage of Porphyry had very little to do with the generation of the Scholastic Philosophy. That philosophy was provoked by the theological controversy raised up concerning the mode, or manner, in which Christ is really present in the Eucharist. That controversy necessarily involved discussions as to the nature of substance, and discussions as to the nature of substance open, of themselves, to philosophical minds, the whole question of *genera* and *species*. The Scholastic Philosophy originated, really and truly, in the theology of the Church, and was connected with the ancient philosophy chiefly by means of that portion of the ancient philosophy which the Church had received and assimilated through the early Fathers.

But, in the progress of the discussions Berengarius had provoked by his doctrine of *impanation*, the disputants began to study more and more attentively the ancient masters, especially Aristotle. They also made themselves more or less familiar with the contemporary Jewish and Arabic schools. Aristotle, the Jews, and the Arabs, all became to them sources of wisdom extraneous to the Church, and, of course, must have more or less weakened the hold the Church had on their minds, if not on their hearts. None of these extraneous sources contained the true Christian doctrine of Life, the unadulterated Word of God. Study of them, naturally and almost inevitably, carried the Scholastics away from the truth, and involved them in the mazes of error. They must necessarily lose more and more the deep sense of the Church; and, in proportion as they lose the sense of the Church, they must cease to love and reverence its authority. In this way was effected the moral and intellectual state which admitted the revival and triumph of heathen literature in the fifteenth century. The Scholastic Philosophy, in its progress, necessarily involved this revival. Ancient heathen literature once revived, and everywhere studied as an authority, faith in the Church could hardly be maintained, and must continue to become every day more and more difficult; for this literature did not contain, or at least but very imperfectly, the Christian ontology, and, therefore, in proportion as it took possession of the mind of the scholar, must it obscure his perception of the real sense of the Church. The Schoolmen were carried away, by their discussions, into the society of the Peripatetics, Jews,

and Arabs, and these carried them away from the deep meaning of the Church.

The Church, to all who had lost the sense of its profound significance, could appear to be only an arbitrary authority, and its dogmas only empty formulas and unmeaning rites and ceremonies. As an arbitrary authority, it could have no right to command; and for it to assume to command, to continue to enjoin its dogmas and discipline, could be regarded only as intolerable tyranny, demanding to be resisted. To this point matters were brought at the close of the fifteenth century. The sixteenth century opens with the dominant character of revolt against the whole moral, intellectual, social, political, religious, and ecclesiastical order founded and developed by the Church. This revolt, embodied and directed by Luther against the ecclesiastical phase of this order, becomes PROTESTANTISM; embodied and rendered victorious by the monarchs of the time, under its political phase, it becomes the SUPREMACY OF THE STATE, to be subsequently transformed into the Supremacy of the People, and the subjection of both Church and State to the will of the multitude; embodied, and directed especially against the Schools, by Descartes, it becomes what by courtesy we call MODERN PHILOSOPHY, the last word of which is Kant's "Critic of Pure Reason."

Now, if we regard the origin of Modern Philosophy, if we pay attention to the circumstances of its birth, we see at once, that it could have been only a doctrine of Science. It was the offspring of Doubt and Rebellion. It must vindicate its own right to be, and its own right to rebel. It must needs find, or erect, some tribunal before which it could summon the Schools, and compel them to appear and give an account of their right to command,—to show by what authority they pretended to reign. This, evidently, demanded preliminary inquiries as to the origin, the conditions, the extent, and limitations of human knowledge, the evidence and grounds of certainty. It must find the law by which it could justify itself, and condemn the Schools.

Where could this law be found? The first rebels had sought it in antiquity. But antiquity was divided. Men began to study Plato, and, if some quoted Aristotle, others could quote Plato against them, and one ancient school could be overthrown by another. The sixteenth century exhausted itself in the vain effort to get some solid ground, by means of the ancients, on which it could stand. There

were great men, and great victims, but nothing solid was obtained. It became evident that the law could not be taken from antiquity; it could not be taken from the Church, because the Church was precisely that which was to be tried; nothing remained, then, but to leave antiquity and the Church, and to fall back on human reason itself, and, starting from that, proceed to the construction of a general doctrine of Life. This was attempted by Telesius and his disciple Campanella in Italy, Bacon in England, and Descartes in France.

Of the Italian school, our knowledge is too limited to speak at much length. We will only add, in passing, that Campanella, the contemporary of Bacon, deserves not less than the Englishman the honorable mention of the historian of philosophy. He is equally admirable under the point of view of method, and much profounder, more comprehensive, more systematic, and complete in his views. As a philosopher, as well as a man, we should place him far above Lord Bacon. Of Lord Bacon we shall soon proceed to speak; we stop now for a few moments with René Descartes, who is, after all, the real father of modern science. Peter Ramus, or Pierre Rameau, one of the greatest of the Platonists of the sixteenth century, had successfully combated the Peripatetics, and greatly weakened their authority in the French schools, but without being able to found a doctrine of Life generally acceptable. Descartes, a native of Bretagne, of the old Celtic race, a layman, a soldier, and a geometrician, undertook to settle the question once for all, and to reconstruct philosophy on a solid and imperishable basis. The age was, as we have seen, an age of Doubt and Rebellion. The fifteenth century doubted the doctrines of the Church, and rebelled against its authority, in favor of Pagan antiquity; the sixteenth century shook and pretty much overthrew the authority of antiquity. The seventeenth century opens with this double doubt and two-fold revolt. It will accept neither the Church nor antiquity. All authority is thrown off; doubt is universal and complete. This entire independence of authority, and this universal and complete doubt, is the point of departure for Descartes. It is so, because it is the point of departure for his age, and more so still for himself. He really felt the doubt; he really felt himself independent of authority.

Here, then, is Descartes, without tradition, without experience, reduced, as it were, to the state of primitive destitu-

tion; all is before him; nothing is behind him. He has no ancestors, no recollections; or, if some, in point of fact, none but are to be theoretically repulsed and disowned. What, then, must first of all be the question? Certainly it must be the question of Science. All is to be constructed. In his view there is nothing standing. He has made of the universe a *tabula rasa*,—a universal blank. All is to be re-created. Does any thing exist? As yet, he assumes that he has no right to assert a single existence, not even his own. How know I that I myself exist? What right have I to affirm that even *I* am?

Here is his first problem, and a problem to be solved only by a doctrine of Science. Hence, his first work is entitled METHOD. But we must not be unjust to Descartes. He never confounded method with philosophy. Nor did he propose doubt as the universally necessary point of departure of philosophy. M. Cousin has on this point misinterpreted him. Descartes proposes the method of Doubt, only because doubt was the fact of his age, and of his own mind. But he proposed it only as preliminary to faith. No man ever felt more strongly, than Descartes, the need of believing, the absolute necessity of a doctrine of Life. Yet, as he takes his point of departure in the question of Science, we must class his system with the Doctrines of Science, not with the philosophical doctrines.

Descartes solves the problem of Science by his famous *Cogito, ergo sum;* I think, therefore I am. But is this a solution of the scientific problem? Descartes was to find his point of departure in absolute Doubt. Doubt can be removed only by Science. Hence we say, his preliminary problem was the problem of Science—Can I know? For, evidently, taking his starting-point, the possibility of knowledge must precede the determination of existence; that is, I must be able to say, I know, before I can legitimately say, I *am*. He himself accordingly affirms *cogito* as the condition of affirming *sum*. But the very question was in this *cogito*. By what right do I affirm that I think? I am conscious. True; but not that I *think*, but that I *am*. I may, perhaps, very legitimately affirm I am, on the authority of consciousness; but on what authority do I affirm consciousness? Who says, "I am conscious," says, "I know," for Science is already in consciousness. Descartes's problem, then, required him to go behind consciousness, and to establish the validity of consciousness itself; for

he has no more right to take Science in the fact of consciousness for granted, than he has anywhere else. Yet he never goes behind consciousness. He trenches the question of Science, and proceeds at once to the question of Life, existence,—Cogito, ergo *sum*. I *think*, which is already to know, is assumed as evident of itself, and the point to be made out is merely I *am*.

This sudden abandonment of the scientific problem for the ontological problem has vitiated the whole Cartesian doctrine, as a doctrine of Science, and has left the original problem of Descartes to be renewed by each of his successors. Malebranche struggles manfully with it; but, taking his point of departure in the human mind, he cannot, to save his soul, get behind I *know*, or I am conscious, and is obliged to resort to *vision in God*, in order to establish the validity of consciousness.

But this is not our only objection to the Cartesian solution. We make no account of the objections brought against the Cartesian enthymeme, *Cogito, ergo sum*. We readily admit that it is defective as an argument, for *I am* is already in *I think;* but Descartes never meant it for an argument. He was too good a reasoner to conclude from *I think* to *I am*. He refers to *cogito*, not as the *datum* from which *sum* is inferred, but as the fact in which it is found, or recognized. In the fact of thinking, I recognize myself not only as thinker, but as persisting subject. Since, then, I think, am conscious, I am able to affirm myself ontologically; or, rather, in the fact of thinking, I *do* so affirm myself, do affirm I am. This now becomes his point of departure. I affirm my existence, because, in thinking, I recognize, or rather conceive it. Transfer, now, to the object the kind of evidence on which I affirm my own existence, and for *cogito, ergo sum*, I must say, I conceive the object, therefore it is. The possibility of being conceived is, therefore, made the criterion of the reality of the object. This determined, nothing is more easy than to construct his theory of the universe. All rests on the original conceptions of the subject, given in the affirmation, *I am*. Proceed with these as in the construction of the science of geometry, and you arrive, with mathematical certainty, to a doctrine of Life.

But, unhappily for the truth and value of his doctrine of Life, his point of departure was in the subject alone; and the only ontological existence, contained in the conceptions, was simply what he expresses by the phrase, *I am*. Hence,

his system was, after all, pure Egoism; and, since constructed with pure conceptions, as distinguished from sensation and sentiment, a pure *Intellectualism*. This is evident from his assertion of INNATE ideas. Doubtless, Plato asserts innate ideas, but in altogether another sense. The Inneity for which Descartes contends is, we believe, original with him. Obliged to deduce all from the subject, he must needs give up all external existence, God, and all objects of religious faith, or else found them on something innate in the subject. Man believes in God, because the idea of God is innate, born with the human soul; that is to say, because he is born with the inherent *faculty* to think God, to conceive his existence. But by what right conclude from the conception to the reality of the object? The belief, in this case, could have only a subjective value, because conception (*cogito*), on the Cartesian hypothesis, as we have seen, involves no ontological existence but that of the subject. So that, however numerous the innate ideas, they could never carry us out of the sphere of the subject; a fact which Locke does not appear, in his attack on Cartesianism, to have ever suspected; for, if he had, he could have made much shorter work with innate ideas.

This doctrine of innate ideas has been recently revived in our own country, and we find men of no mean ability undertaking to conclude from the innateness of the idea, or rather sentiment, in their terminology, to the reality of the object; not perceiving that what is really subjective in its principle must needs be equally subjective in its application. No conclusion from the subject to the object ever yet was valid. The cause of the self-deception of our friends, on this point, is in their making, or trying to make, a distinction between the subject and the inneity of the subject; as if what is innate, inherent in the subject, is not subject! What is in the subject, inherent in its nature, born with it, and without which it would not, and could not, be what it is, is essential to the subject, in the fullest sense of the words, *is* the subject.

Descartes, nevertheless, was on the verge of the truth. If he had analyzed the fact of consciousness in relation to the object as carefully as he did in relation to the subject, he would have escaped his fatal error. He was right when he said, *Cogito, ergo sum;* but he did not discover the whole truth. It is true, I find "I am" in "I think"; but it is equally true that I always, in the same act, in the same

cogito, find another existence, which is not myself, but distinguished from me. *Cogito, ergo sum*, is true; and *Cogito, ergo est*, is equally true; for both are contained simultaneously and indissolubly in *cogito*. Here is the fact that Descartes overlooked. He attempted to deduce *id est* from *ego sum*, which was impossible; but both were given him primitively in the fact of consciousness, and he had no occasion to attempt to infer one from the other. But it needed the psychological labors of nearly two centuries to place this fact in the clear light of day; and, what is a little discouraging, very able psychologists even yet not only do not perceive it, but cannot be made to understand it, when it is stated to them in the plainest and least ambiguous terms possible.

Descartes had two eminent disciples, Spinoza and Malebranche. But Spinoza, at an early age, abandoned him, and passed from the schools of science to the schools of philosophy. We shall meet him again, when we come to the consideration of doctrines of Life, and, therefore, pass him over for the present. His Pantheism has borrowed little from the Intellectualism of Descartes, except the definition of Substance. Malebranche is the true continuator of Descartes. He, as we have seen, starting with the problem of Science, was obliged to take refuge in Vision in God; that is, that we in ourselves are incapable of Science, and can know, at all, only by virtue of the special intervention of God himself in each and every act of knowing. We cannot linger on this theory, although we agree with M. Leroux, that it is a very remarkable theory, and, at bottom, worthy of altogether more respect than it has received; although M. Leroux's explanation of it makes it really identical with M. Cousin's doctrine of Spontaneity.* Malebranche, if he had known it, was on the point of touching the truth, and making an end of psychology. If he had been understood,

* M. Leroux is the uncompromising enemy of M. Cousin, whom he seeks, in season and out of season, to turn into ridicule; and yet, on almost all important points, his philosophy and Cousin's are the same, or come to the same results. In his *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*, he showers down his ridicule most unmercifully upon M. Cousin's doctrine, that we see all by virtue of the Impersonal Reason, which, in the last analysis, is identical with God himself; and yet this is precisely the doctrine of his own article on God in the third volume of the *Revue Indépendante*. What is this Universal Life (*Vie Universelle*) of which he speaks, and by union with which all particular beings subsist and

he would have been seen to have demonstrated the impossibility of solving the problem of Science from the point of view of psychology alone; that the *inneity* of the subject, however great or various it may be, can generate no fact of science, save as it acts in conjunction with the object; that, indeed, the fact of science can be explained only by rising to ontology, and taking our point of sight in the infinite and eternal Reason of God,—the doctrine of Plato, of the Fathers, and of all who have thought a little profoundly on the subject,—"*In Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.*"

Malebranche closes the direct line of the Cartesians, and ends in demonstrating the impossibility of explaining Science by means of pure Intellectualism. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, a little prior to Descartes, flourished Francis Bacon. Bacon, in our judgment, is hardly to be regarded as an original genius. He had been preceded, in nearly all that is valuable in his views, by the Italian school, and was, in more respects than one, surpassed by his contemporary, Campanella, as we have already intimated. Nevertheless, Bacon was a man of great depth and reach of thought, extensive erudition, lofty and comprehensive views. He also undertook to settle the question of Method, but more in the sense of Aristotle than in that of the moderns. His aim was not so much the solution of the problem of Science, to determine the origin, conditions, and validity of knowledge, as to construct a *novum organum* for augmenting or advancing knowledge. Bacon was not a psychologist, nor yet, though endowed with a fine philosophic spirit, was he a philosopher. His views were vast, often profound, oftener wise and just; but his mind was very little systematic, and his labors ended in exerting an influence, rather than in the construction of a doctrine, whether of Science or of Life. To talk of Baconian Philosophy, save in deference to common usage, is to betray our ignorance. There is not, and never was, any such thing

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live, but the Impersonal Reason of "le grand éclectique"? In the same volume of the *Revue*, we have a very able and elaborate article on the Hegelian Philosophy, which we believe in the main just; but will M. Leroux tell us the difference between the Hegelian doctrine he here so warmly and successfully combats, and his own doctrine as brought out in the fifth book of his *Humanité*? His infinite Virtuality, his invisible *Ciel*, answering, by his own confession, to the *Void* of the Boudhists, what is this, but the God of Hegel manifesting himself through all gradations of being, and coming to self-consciousness in man?

as a Baconian Philosophy,—meaning thereby a philosophy founded by Bacon himself.

But we shall be told, that he has given us a method, that there is a real Baconian Method. Not at all. Nothing seems to us more vague, inconclusive, less scientific, than what Bacon says about *Induction*, unless it be what Englishmen and Americans say after him, and professedly in his spirit. The Inductive Method of philosophizing was no new discovery of Bacon's, but, so far as sound, is the method of the human mind itself, and has been practised by every philosopher in every age. Nor has Bacon thrown any new light upon it, or demonstrated its legitimacy. He does not seem himself to have ever comprehended the great ontological fact on which it depends. If we understand it, the Inductive Method is, from the examination of a certain number of particulars, to obtain a law which shall be applicable to particulars even beyond the sphere of observation. It is to go from the known to the unknown. Now, every tyro in logic knows, that a law thus obtained, which in fact is no law, but a classification, cannot be logically valid beyond the particulars examined. The generalization, which Bacon and his followers attain to, is no genuine generalization, but a mere classification of particulars. The process is not by examination of particulars to attain to the generic, to what Plato would call the idea, and Aristotle, the principle or cause; but merely to a class, and the generic it obtains is nothing but a general statement of the particulars ascertained. It has, therefore, no scientific value.

Bacon was a lawyer, and he transported into philosophy the method adopted, and very properly adopted, in his own profession, in which a high degree of probability, rather than absolute certainty, is that which is sought. In the profession of the law, this method is not without its validity, because the question there concerns human actions, the generic principle of which may be assumed to be known in our knowledge of human nature, on which they depend. Here the generic principle, that which generates the actions, is human nature. In our reasoning on these particulars, the general is always assumed to be known, and up to a certain extent always is known. From observation of the mode of its manifestation in certain given particulars, we may very legitimately conclude to the mode of its manifestation in certain other particulars of a like character. So, having ascertained, from observation of a certain number of partic-

ulars, their generic principle, we may conclude that a certain number of other particular actions not embraced in the number of these, having a like character, have the same generic principle. But, in all this, there is no advance of knowledge beyond the sum of our actual knowledge of the principles and the particulars concerned. Moreover, the whole validity of the induction rests on our knowledge of the general, not as a rule, or a classification, but as the cause generating the particulars. Taken out of the sphere of the law, transported to a region where the generic is unknown, the inductive method, which proceeds from the particular to the general, involves a *petitio principii*, inasmuch as it assumes the knowledge of the cause, the principle of generalization, the validity of which knowledge was the very point to be made out.

Nevertheless, the application, it is said, of this method to the study of nature has given us the exact sciences. *Exact sciences!* what are they, and where are they? We hear of them; our friends boast of them; but we have never discovered them. So far from its having given us the exact sciences, its warmest partisans deny, with one voice, the possibility of science. What pass with us for sciences are nothing but classifications of phenomena, constantly varying as new phenomena are discovered. What is your doctrine of physics, your famous Newtonian attraction, but the mere classification of observed phenomena? You tell us bodies attract one another so and so, and under such and such conditions. What does this mean? Simply, under such and such conditions, such and such phenomena take place. Call you this science? What is the principle of attraction? You talk of electricity and magnetism; but what do you tell us, but, simply, that you have observed such and such phenomena? Chemistry is one of your exact sciences; yet you are unable to settle your dispute about the primitive *state* of bodies, much less to determine their primitive elements. What is the principle of chemical affinity? Why are new chemical compounds always formed in certain definite proportions, which cannot be varied? Theories in abundance we find, but none of them seem to be settled. We take up Liebig's "Organic Chemistry;" surely, we say, here we shall find exact science, if anywhere; and yet, so far from science, we do not even find facts. We pass to his "Animal Chemistry," and here we do find, indeed, theory, theory to our heart's content, but hardly a recognition of

the principle of Life. A certain portion of the phenomena are attempted to be explained on chemical principles, as they were formerly attempted to be explained on mechanical principles; but we find no explanation of that subtle principle in the animal economy, which never fails, during life, to resist your chemical action. One may as well explain the circulation of the blood by capillary attraction, or by the principle of the forcing pump worked by the lungs serving as the arms and sails of a windmill, as explain, with Liebig, animal heat by means of internal combustion, making the animal a huge furnace for the consumption of carbon. Go into your mathematics, and tell us what is the principle of number? What is the ground of certainty in mathematical reasoning? What is the ground of your mathematical axioms? What is the real science of mathematics? Does it really advance knowledge beyond the few empirical propositions with which it starts? Is it productive, or merely composed of identical propositions piled upon identical propositions? Is it really a science, or only an organon of science? Is it knowledge, or, as the ancients held, and as the name implies, merely a discipline? We could run through the whole list of the so-called exact sciences, and propose similar questions, but it is unnecessary.

We shall be told that these and similar questions are unanswerable; that our knowledge is necessarily limited to phenomena; that to aspire to a knowledge of principles, causes, essences, is to aspire to the unattainable; and that the progress of modern science is owing precisely to the fact that we do not now so aspire. This may or may not be so; for our part, we believe quite the contrary, and are prepared to question, to a very considerable extent, this modern progress, even in departments where it is most loudly boasted. We doubt whether modern science in any department has as yet come up to the ancient. The more we penetrate into the concealed sense of this old world, the more convinced are we that science was not born with Francis Bacon, the more and more do we feel that the world has forgotten more than it knows. But let this pass, which is not stated as a belief, but as a doubt; let it all be as the partisans of the exact sciences allege, that we can only attain to a knowledge and classification of phenomena; still we must beg them to pardon us, if we find it impossible to stretch our courtesy so far as to call this knowledge and classification of phenomena, science.

There is really nothing in these boasts about the exact sciences. We have no such sciences, and every scientific man knows that there is not a single department of science, so called, the principles of which are ascertained and fixed. The most that can be said is, that we have investigated some few departments of nature, and ascertained a few facts,—which are indeed facts, and such as we are able to apply to practical purposes. The Inductive Method has, then, by no means wrought such mighty wonders even in physical science; while its application to metaphysics and theology has made confusion worse confounded, as Bacon himself told us would be the effect, if so applied. He denied its applicability save to physical science; and, if he had denied its applicability even to this, and contended for its legitimacy only in the practice of the law, he would have been nearer yet to the truth. Yet we deny not the Inductive Method, when enlightened by a profound philosophy. It contains a truth, but a truth not to be perceived and comprehended on the threshold of the temple of science, but only after we have entered and sacrificed in the innermost sanctuary.

Bacon, we repeat, has left an influence, but no system. Some have charged him with being the father of modern Sensism; but he has contributed to Sensism only indirectly. He does not discuss the question of method from the psychological point of view, and he was himself a believer in an order of facts not reducible to sensation. Yet, by recommending the Inductive Method, and denying its validity when applied to any other phenomena than those of the sensible world, his influence has been exerted almost wholly in the direction of Sensism. So far as we can class him at all, then, we must class him with the Sensist school. This is his place, so far as he has a place in the history of modern science. Yet, in point of fact, though it is the fashion to attribute almost every thing to him that is good in the modern intellectual world, we do not believe his influence has been great, and we are sure that it has been almost wholly overrated. He has left no school; he has had no disciples.

Hobbes followed Bacon in the order of time, and has been called his disciple; for what reason we cannot discover. No two men were ever more unlike. Hobbes is, in our judgment, much the superior man of the two, considered either morally or intellectually. He in part appertains to Philoso-

phy, though we class his system with the doctrines of Science, for the reason, that he takes his point of departure in psychology, and with Sensism; for he recognizes in the soul no cognitive faculty but that which he terms *sense*. His genius, however, is mathematical; and, if he had started with *Cogito, ergo sum*, instead of *Sentio, ergo sum*, he would have stood on the same line with Descartes, but have surpassed him in the reach of his thought, and the firmness of his logic. At bottom, he has a much more philosophic mind than Descartes, and, paradoxical as some will hold it, a much more generous love for mankind. Hobbes is a true Englishman; and, therefore, must needs profess one doctrine, and practice another. If he loves mankind, he must in doctrine atone for his philanthropy, by maintaining the duty to hate them; if he hates them, he must be eloquent in praise of universal benevolence. Confide with your whole heart in an Englishman or an American,—unless he preaches philanthropy. When he once mounts that for his hobby, look well to your locks and keys. Nevertheless, the obloquy showered upon Hobbes, for his moral and political doctrines, has deprived him of his true place as the representative of the Anglo-Saxon mind, and made it unnecessary to dwell upon his doctrines.

Hobbes was succeeded by John Locke, who, as every body knows, is regarded as *the* English Philosopher. We regard Locke as inferior in almost every point of view to Hobbes; but, as it is through him that Hobbes lives, and speaks, and acts on the Anglo-Saxon race, it is in him Hobbism is to be studied and appreciated. Locke is veritably a disciple of Hobbes, and the "Essay on the Human Understanding" is little more than Hobbes diluted, or a sort of Hobbes "made easy"; or, as we may say, Hobbes made palatable, and fit to be served up to respectable people.

Locke, absorbing, as he does, his master, is the greatest name we meet among the English psychologists. We say *psychologists*, for Locke is never a philosopher. As a philosopher, England has a whole army of great names which must take precedence of his. He can sustain no comparison with such men as Cudworth, Henry More, Stillingfleet, Butler, and hardly any with such men as Clarke, Wollaston, and, in a later age, Dr. Richard Price. In genuine Philosophy, Cudworth is the greatest name we are acquainted with among Englishmen. But Philosophy is not now our subject; we are concerned only with doctrines of Science.

Locke's system is nothing but a doctrine of Science. His problem is purely the scientific problem. He would, first of all, study the understanding, investigate and determine the powers of the human soul, to know to what objects they are, or are not, applicable. What he proposed, first of all, was what Kant afterwards called a *Critic of the Pure Reason.* But, bred to the profession of medicine, he approaches his subject as a physiologist, and restricts himself to dissection and the investigation of functions.

He asks, like Descartes, Can I know? How can I know that I know? He undertakes to answer this question by a direct investigation of the functions of the understanding. His point of departure, then, is in the subject; and his system, whatever it be, must therefore come under the general head of Egoism. His real answer is the answer of the Sensists. It is true that he does not, officially, like his successor, Condillac, annihilate the *me*, and reduce the subject to mere sensation; but he makes all our knowledge begin in sensation, and sensation is with him the simple capacity of receiving impressions of external objects. The root of all science is in sensation. His formula is really, *Sentio, ergo sum*, I feel, therefore I am; and, when transferred to the object, it is, *Sentio, ergo est*,—I feel it, therefore it is.

Unquestionably, Locke does not confine, officially, the objects of science to objects which are perceptible by external sense. He admits and contends for quite another world, but he recognizes in the soul no innate capacity to seize intuitively this other world, nor a capacity to detect it in the sensible phenomena; he attains to it solely by reflection; that is, dialetically. He concludes from the sensible world to the non-sensible. Thus, God is *inferred* from the phenomena of nature, immortality from the phenomena of the soul, and the promises to be read in the Bible. So that all in his system which transcends pure sensation, and the consciousness thereof, is merely logic, and not science. Certainly it is not we who condemn dialectics, or affirm that what is logically true can ever be without scientific validity; but from pure sensation we cannot logically conclude to any thing, either in the direction of the subject or in that of the object, beyond sensation. Now, in Locke's premises, unquestionably, as a matter of fact, there is, besides sensation, both subject and object; but officially, under the point of view of his system, there is nothing but the sensation

itself. Sensation is nothing but a mode or affection of the subject,—is the subject, in fact. Now, from this it is impossible to conclude to any existence but that of the sensation itself. Hence, all our knowledge is necessarily restricted to what Hume would call momentary "Impressions." And this is what Berkeley and Hume, coming after Locke, and adopting his premises, but with superior sagacity, and greater logical acumen, have easily demonstrated.

Berkeley and Hume have thus done for Locke what Malebranche had done for Descartes. They demonstrate the utter inadequacy of Sensism as a doctrine of Science, as he had demonstrated the utter inadequacy of Intellectualism. We can arrive at knowledge, by starting from *I feel*, no better than we can by starting from *I think*. This is precisely where the question of Science stood, when Kant came with his *Critic of Pure Reason*. Intellectualism had been convicted of impotence in Malebranche, who, as we have seen, sought refuge in his theory of Vision in God; Sensism having been convicted of impotence in Berkeley, who took refuge in an analogous theory, and in Hume, who took refuge *nowhere*, but remained floating as a mere bubble on the ocean of universal doubt and nescience,—what was to be done? Was all to end here? Is science impossible? Is it possible? If so, on what conditions? Kant's problem, we see, then, was precisely the problem with which Descartes commenced, and which he trenched, rather than solved, by his famous enthymeme, *Cogito, ergo sum;* and precisely the problem with which Locke also commenced, and which he had undertaken, but failed, to solve by sensation and reflection. There is, then, nothing new or original in Kant's undertaking. He undertook to solve the problem all psychologists had been trying to solve since the revolt against the Schoolmen. His originality is not in his problem, but in his mode of handling it. He has always before his eyes, on the one hand, the sad result of Intellectualism; on the other, the equally sad result of Sensualism; and, without affirming or denying either, he enters into a criticism of both, in order to determine whether we have a right either to affirm or to deny.

We see, now, the problem of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*. What is Kant's solution of this problem? What is the method by which he obtains his solution? What is its positive value? What contribution has it made to our doctrines of Science? These questions will open up the whole

subject of the Critical Philosophy, and will enable us, if answered, to comprehend and appreciate it. But we have detained our readers so long with these preliminary remarks, designed to prepare the way for the exposition and appreciation of Kant's *Critik*, that we must reserve the direct consideration of the work itself to our next number.

ARTICLE II.

We have classed the several modern doctrines of Science, sketched their history from Descartes down to Kant, and determined Kant's position and problem. His problem is, as we have seen, the purely scientific problem; that is, Is science possible? Yet it is not precisely in this form that he himself proposes it. To even a tolerably attentive reader of the *Critic of Pure Reason*, the real problem will appear to concern the conditions, extent, and bounds of human science, rather than the possibility of human science itself.

By a rigid analysis of the intellectual phenomenon, Kant discovers that every fact of knowledge involves a synthetic judgment, and hence he proceeds to inquire, How are synthetic judgments formed? What is their reach? What their validity? In asking and answering these questions, he disguises, both from himself and his readers, the real problem with which he is concerned. The science, that is, the *knowing*, properly so called, is all and entirely in this very synthetic judgment. If this judgment be impossible, if it be invalid, then is science impossible, and human knowledge a mere delusion. So, after all, Kant is inquiring into the possibility, as well as into the conditions, validity, extent, and bounds of science.

Assuming this, we may say, in the outset, that the whole inquiry into which Kant enters is founded in a capital blunder, and can end in no solid or useful result. To ask if the human mind be capable of science is absurd; for we have only the human mind with which to answer the question. And it needs science to answer this question, as much as it does to answer any other question. Suppose we should undertake to answer this question, and should demonstrate by an invincible logic, as Kant himself professes to have done, that science is impossible, our demonstration would be a complete demonstration of its own unsoundness; for the demonstration must itself be scientific, or be no demon-

stration at all. If the demonstration be scientific, it establishes the fact of science in demonstrating to the contrary; if it be not scientific, then it is of no value, and decides nothing, as to our scientific capacity, one way or the other.

Kant professes to start at a point equally distant from both dogmatism and scepticism. He neither affirms, nor denies; he merely criticises, that is, investigates. But is the critic blind? To criticise, to investigate,—what is this but to discriminate, to distinguish, to judge? Can there be an act of discrimination, of judgment, without science? If you assume, then, your capacity to enter into a critical investigation of the power of the human mind to know, you necessarily begin by assuming the possibility of science, and therefore by what logicians term a *petitio principii*. Kant attempts the investigation, and in so doing assumes his capacity to make it; and, therefore, contrary to his profession, begins in pure dogmatism. He begins by assuming the possibility of science, as the condition of demonstrating its impossibility,—for the impossibility of science is what he professes to have demonstrated, as the result of all his labors.

We might hesitate a moment before bringing this charge of absurdity against a man of Kant's unquestionable superiority, did we not seem to ourselves not only to perceive the absurdity, but also its cause. Kant's fundamental error, and the source of all his other errors, is in attempting, like most psychologists, to distinguish between the subject and its own inneity, and to find the object in the subject,—the *not-me* in the *me*. We believe his much wronged and misapprehended disciple, Fichte, was the first to detect and expose this error. If Kant had comprehended, in the outset, the simple fact subsequently stated by Fichte in the postulate, the *me* is *me*, he never would, he never could, have written the *Critic of Pure Reason;* for he would have seen that if the *me* is *me*, the *not-me* is *not me*, and therefore that the object, or whatever is objective, since distinguished from the subject, is not and cannot be *me*, nor the inneity of the *me*. This simple truism, which is nothing but saying, what is, is, completely refutes the whole Critical Philosophy. We would therefore commend to the admirers of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* of the master, the careful study of the *Wissenschaftslehre* of the disciple.

Kant's great and leading doctrine is, that, in the fact of knowledge, the form, under which the object is cognized, is determined not by what it is in itself, but by the laws of

the subject cognizing. He complains that hitherto metaphysicians have supposed, that the form of the cognition depended on the object, and that our cognitions must conform to the intrinsic character of the objects cognized. He himself reverses all this, and contends, that, instead of our knowing being obliged to conform to the manner in which objects exist in themselves, the objects themselves must conform to our manner of knowing. We do not see objects so and so, because such and such is their mode of existence, regarded as existing independent of our cognition of them; but because such and such are the laws of our own understanding, that is to say, such and such is our own inneity. The external world, for instance, is not necessarily in itself what it appears to us, but it appears to us as it does because our inneity, or intuitive power, compels it so to appear. So of every other actual or possible object of cognition. In themselves considered, there is necessarily no difference between fish and flesh; and the difference, we note, is not determined by them as objects, but by ourselves as subjects, and exists not in them, but in our taste. Change our inneity, and you change all objects of knowledge. This is the great, the leading Kantian doctrine; and the reason why metaphysical science has made no more advance is, because metaphysicians have overlooked this doctrine, and obstinately persisted in believing that there is really some difference between fish and flesh, wine and water, besides what is inherent in the taste of the eater or drinker!

But if the form of the object is determined by the forms of the subject, then, instead of going into an investigation of the innumerable and diversified objects of knowledge, in order to determine the foundations and conditions of science, we should go into an investigation of the subject itself, of this very inneity which the subject imposes upon all its cognitions. The grounds, conditions, and laws of science, are then to be obtained from the study of the subject instead of the object. We must know ourselves, as the condition of knowing all else. The object of the *Critic* is, therefore, to investigate the subject, and determine its part in the fact of experience.

In order to place the matter as clearly before our readers as possible, and to enable them to seize, as distinctly and as firmly as the nature of the case admits, the precise problems which Kant undertakes to solve, we extract liberally from his Introduction.

"That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt; for how else should the understanding be brought into exercise, if not through objects which affect the senses, and partly of themselves furnish representations, and partly excite our intellectual activity to compare, to connect, and to separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is called experience? In respect of time, there is no knowledge prior to experience, with which all begins.

"But if all begins *with* experience, it does not follow that all springs up *out of* experience; for it may happen that even our empirical knowledge is composed of what is received from sensible impressions, and of what our own understanding, merely excited to action by the sensible impressions, *supplies from itself;* though we may not, indeed, till long practice has made us attentive to it, and skilful in separating it, be able to distinguish the latter element from the former.

"It is therefore, to say the least, a question demanding a closer investigation than it has heretofore received, and also a question not to be answered at a single glance, whether we really have any cognitions which are independent of all experience, and even of all sensible impressions. We may call these cognitions *a priori*, and distinguish them from the empirical cognitions, which have their origin *a posteriori*, that is, in experience.

"This expression, cognition *a pirori*, is not sufficiently definite, to designate the complete sense of the proposed inquiry. For we are accustomed to say of many empirical cognitions, that they are possible *a priori*, because we do not derive them immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which rule, however, is itself borrowed from experience. Thus, we say of a man, who undermines the foundation of his house, that he may know *a priori* that it will fall, and that he has no occasion, in order to know that it will fall, to wait for actual experience of its falling. But he cannot know this wholly *a priori;* for it is only from experience that he can know that bodies are heavy, and therefore must needs fall, if that which upholds them be taken away.

"In our inquiry, we shall understand by cognitions *a priori*, not such as may be independent of this or that particular fact of experience, but such as are absolutely independent of all experience. To these are opposed empirical cognitions, or such as are possible only through experience. Our cognitions *a priori* are either *pure* or *mixed*. Only those are pure which have no empirical mixture. For example. Every change has a cause. This is a proposition *a priori*, but not pure; for the conception of change, which it contains, is derivable only from experience."—pp. 1, 2.

From this, Kant proceeds to show that we are, even in our ordinary condition, in possession of cognitions *a priori*.

"It is necessary here to find a sure mark, or criterion, by which a pure cognition may be distinguished from an empirical cognition. Experi-

ence may, indeed, teach us that something may be made in this or that way, but not that it could have been made in no other way. If, then, in the first place, we find a proposition, which, at the same time that it is conceived, is also conceived as *necessary*, it is a judgment *a priori;* and if, moreover, it is underivable from any other proposition, which is also conceived as necessary, it is absolutely *a priori*. In the second place, empirical judgments are never truly and strictly universal, but have, at most, only an assumed and a comparative universality, (through induction,) so that we can only say from experience, So far as we have hitherto observed we have discovered no exception to this or that rule. A judgment, then, which is conceived as strictly universal, that is, as admitting no exception to be possible, cannot be derived from experience, but must be absolutely *a priori*. Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of validity, is merely a conclusion from what is true in most cases to what is true in all, as in this proposition,—All bodies are heavy. On the contrary, when strict universality belongs to a judgment, that universality shows that the judgment has a peculiar origin, namely, in the power of cognition *a priori*. Necessity and strict universality are, then, the certain marks of a cognition *a priori*, and they belong inseparably to each other. But since it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation than the contingency of the judgment, or since the absolute universality which we attribute to a judgment if frequently more obvious than its necessity, it will be well to use these two criteria separately, of which either is sufficient by itself alone.

"That there are necessary, and, in the strictest sense, universal, and therefore *pure*, human cognitions *a priori*, it is not difficult to show. If we wish for an example from science, we may take the mathematical axioms; if an example from the common use of the understanding, we may take the proposition, Every change has a cause. In this last example, in point of fact, the conception of cause so obviously involves the conception of its necessary connection with the effect, and of the strict universality of the rule, that the conception of cause would be wholly lost, if we should undertake, as Hume does, to derive it from the frequent association of that which follows with that which precedes, and from the habit which we thus acquire (therefore possessing merely a subjective necessity), of connecting our representations. Moreover, without recurrence to similar examples for proof, we might demonstrate that our cognitions really contain *a priori* principles, by demonstrating the absolute indispensableness of such principles to the possibility of experience. For whence could experience deduce its own certainty, if all the rules according to which it proceeds were themselves empirical, and therefore contingent? We could in such case hardly receive them as first principles. But it suffices for our present purpose, to have indicated the pure use of the understanding as a fact, together with its criteria.

"But it is not merely in the judgments, but also in the conceptions,

that a certain cognition *a priori* is evident. Abstract from your empirical conception of body, one by one, color, hardness, softness, weight, impenetrability, all that is empirical in the conception, and there still remains the *space* which this body, that has now disappeared, occupied, and the absence of which it is not possible to conceive. In like manner, abstract from your empirical conception of some object, corporeal or incorporeal, all the properties which you have learned from experience, you must still leave it the quality by which you conceive of it as substance, or as pertaining to substance (though this conception of substance is more definite than that of object in general). The necessity, therefore, with which this conception forces itself upon you, obliges you to confess that it has its seat in the understanding *a priori*."—pp. 3–5.

All actual knowledge begins with experience, and prior to experience there is no actual knowledge; but every actual cognition, or fact of experience, if we understand Kant, is composed of two parts, one *empirical*, obtained from the sensible impression, the other *a priori*, furnished by the understanding itself from its own resources. The marks or criteria of the cognition *a priori* are universality and necessity. Whatever is conceived of as absolutely universal and necessary is *a priori*. The cognition *a priori* makes up one part of every actual cognition. Into every actual cognition or fact of experience, as the absolutely indispensable grounds and conditions of its possibility, enter, then, the conceptions of the universal and the necessary. This means, if we comprehend it, all simply, that we never do, and never can, conceive of the particular and contingent, save through conception of the universal and the necessary. This fact we are not disposed to question; but the further statement which Kant makes is not quite so evident, namely, that the conceptions of the universal and necessary are underivable from experience, and must, therefore, be cognitions *a priori*. Whence his proof, that, in apprehending the particular and contingent, we do not also apprehend, as real objects, the universal and necessary, instead of supplying them from our own inneity?

But we must let Kant speak yet longer for himself. Having assumed that there are cognitions *a priori*, he proceeds to show that philosophy needs a science which determines their possibility, principles, and extent.

"What is still more important than what precedes is, that there are certain cognitions which leave entirely the field of even possible experience, and, through conceptions to which no objects in experience correspond, seem to extend the boundaries of science itself beyond the limits

of experience. And it is precisely in these cognitions which transcend the sensible world, and in reference to which experience can neither guide us nor correct our judgments, that lie the most important investigations of our reason, investigations in our view altogether preferable to any thing the understanding can collect in the field of experience, and much sublimer in their aims, and which, therefore, we must needs prosecute at all hazards, even at the risk of error. No considerations of doubt, disregard, or indifference can induce us to abandon them. These unavoidable problems of the Pure Reason itself are, GOD, FREEDOM, IMMORTALITY. But the science whose aims and preparations are directed solely to the solution of these problems, and which is called metaphysics, begins its process in dogmatism, and undertakes the solution with full confidence in itself, without having made any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason to obtain it.

"It would, however, seem to be very natural, that, after having left the territory of experience, we should not proceed forthwith to construct a system with cognitions which we have obtained we know not whence, and on the strength of principles with whose origin we are unacquainted, or without having, by previous examination, fully assured ourselves of the solidity of the foundation; that we should rather ask the question, which should have been asked long ago, namely, How is the understanding able to attain to cognitions *a priori*, and what are their reach, their legitimacy, and their worth? Nothing, in fact, were more natural, if by *natural* we understand what is proper to be done; but if we understand by *natural* what usually happens, then nothing can be more natural, or easy to comprehend, than that this inquiry should have remained hitherto unattempted. For a part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has from early times been in possession of certainty, and by that fact created a favorable expectation of a like certainty in regard to the rest, notwithstanding the rest is of quite a different nature. Moreover, when once out beyond the circle of experience, we are sure of never being contradicted by experience. The charm of extending our cognitions is so great, that we will not, unless stumbling upon an evident contradiction, be restrained in our progress. But with proper care we can avoid contradiction in framing our fictions, and without their ceasing on that account to be fictions. The science of mathematics affords us a striking example of how far we may go in cognition *a priori*, without the aid of experience. This science, indeed, concerns itself with objects and cognitions, only so far as they may be intuitively represented; but this difficulty can be easily surmounted, for the intuition itself may be given *a priori*, and therefore be little else than mere conception. Captivated by this proof of the power of reason, the impulse to extension perceives no limits. The light dove, in her free flight in the air whose resistance she feels, may fancy that she would succeed all the better in airless space. So Plato left the sensible world because it set too narrow bounds to the understanding, and ventured forth on the wings of Ideas into the

empty space of the pure understanding. He did not remark that he made no progress by his efforts, since he had no resisting medium to serve for his support, on which he could rest, and to which he could apply his strength to propel the understanding forward. But it is the usual fate of human speculation to prepare its edifice as soon as possible, and then, for the first time, to inquire whether its foundation has been well laid. Then are sought all kinds of excuses to console us for its want of fitness, or to put off so late and so dangerous an investigation. During the construction of the edifice, we are freed from care and suspicion, and flattered with an apparent solidity, by the fact, that a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysis of conceptions of objects which we already possess. We are thus supplied with a multitude of cognitions, which, though nothing but elucidations and explanations of what had been already conceived, but in a confused manner, are nevertheless esteemed, at least as to the form, to be new views, notwithstanding they do not extend the matter, or contents, of our conceptions, but merely disentangle it. Now, since this analytic process furnishes us with a real cognition *a priori*, which has a sure and useful progression, the reason, as it were unconsciously, smuggles in along with it assertions of quite a different nature, and adds to given conceptions others, which, though *a priori*, are wholly foreign to them, without our knowing how it is done, or its even occuring to us to ask. It will be well, then, to begin by pointing out the difference between these two kinds of cognitions, that is to say, the difference between *analytic* judgments and *synthetic* judgments.

"In every judgment in which is conceived the relation of the subject to the predicate. (I notice here only *affirmative* judgments, for, after these, the application to negative judgments can present no difficulty), this relation may be of two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something contained in it, though in a manner concealed; or B lies wholly outside of A, with which, however, it stands closely connected. In the first case the judgment is ANALYTIC; in the second, it is SYNTHETIC. Analytic judgments (affirmative) are those, therefore, in which the union of the subject and predicate is that of identity; whilst those in which this unity is conceived without identity are to be named synthetic. The first may also be called *explicative* judgments, and the second *extending* judgments; because the former by means of the predicate add nothing to the conception of the subject, but merely resolve this conception, by analysis, into the several partial conceptions already contained, though confusedly, within it; but the latter add to the conception of the subject a predicate not contained within it, nor by any possible means deducible from it. For instance, when I say, All bodies are extended, I express an analytic judgment, for I have no occasion to go out of the conception of body to find that of extension, which I connect with it. The predicate is contained in the conception of body, is always thought with it, and I have only to analyze the conception of body in

order to find it. But when I say, All bodies are heavy, the predicate, heaviness, is by no means included in my conception of the subject, that is, of body in general. It is a conception added to the conception of body. The addition, in this way, of the predicate to the subject is a synthetic judgment.

"All empirical judgments, as such, are synthetic. For it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience, since I am not obliged to go out of the conception itself in order to form the judgment, and therefore can have no need of the testimony of experience. That a body is extended, is a proposition which stands firm *a priori*. It is no empirical judgment. For, prior to experience, I have all the conditions of forming it in the conception of body, from which I deduce the predicate, extension, according to the principle of contradiction, by which I at once become conscious of its necessity, which I could not learn from experience. But, on the other hand, I do not include, in the primitive conception of body in general, the predicate, heaviness; yet this conception of body in general indicates, through experience of a part of it, an object of experience, to which I may add from experience other parts which also belong to it. I can attain to the conception of body beforehand, analytically, through its characteristics, extension, impenetrability, form, &c., all of which are included in the primary conception of body. But I now *extend* my cognition, and, as I recur to experience, from which I have obtained the conception of body in general, I find along with these characteristics the conception of heaviness. I therefore add this, as a predicate, to the conception of body. The possibility of this synthesis rests, therefore, on experience; for both conceptions, though one contains not the other, yet belong as parts to a whole, that is to say, to experience, which is itself a union of synthetic, though contingent, intuitions.

"But in the case of synthetic judgments *a priori*, we have not this assistance. Here we have not the advantage of returning and supporting ourselves on experience. If I must go out of the conception A in order to find another conception B, which is to be joined to it, on what am I to rely, and by what means does the synthesis become possible? Take, for an example, the proposition, All that which happens has a cause. In the conception, Something happens, I conceive, indeed, an existence which is preceded by a time, and from which analytic judgments may be deduced; but the conception of cause is absolutely foreign to that conception, and indicates something altogether different from that which happens, and is therefore not contained in the conception of it. How, then, from that which happens in general, do I attain to something entirely different from it, and come to know that the conception of cause, though not contained in the conception of that which happens, is yet connected, and *necessarily* connected, with it? What is in this case the unknown — X on which the understanding relies, when it fancies that outside of the conception A it discovers the predicate B wholly foreign to it, and

which nevertheless it believes joined to it? It cannot be experience, for the principle in question unites the conception of effect with that of cause, not only with a great degree of generality, but with the expression of absolute necessity, and therefore wholly *a priori*, and by means of mere conception. Now it is on such synthetic, that is *extension*, principles, that rests all our speculative cognition *a priori*; for, though the analytic are of the greatest importance, and even indispensable, yet only for the sake of obtaining that clearness and distinctness in our conceptions demanded as a sure ground of an extending synthesis, which alone is to be accounted as a new acquisition."—pp. 5–11.

These extracts are sufficient to show us that Kant holds, 1. That we are in possession of cognitions *a priori*; 2. That these cognitions are the indispensable ground and conditions of all actual cognition; 3. That they stretch away beyond the field of even possible experience; 4. That among these which extend beyond even possible experience, are those cognitions which lie at the foundation of our loftiest faith and sublimest hopes concerning God, Freedom, and Immortality; 5. That it is precisely of these that philosophy needs a science which shall determine their possibility, principles, and extent; and 6. Till we have such a science, we have no solid foundation for any religious or ethical faith, indeed for any branch of knowledge whatever.

The inquiry into which Kant enters concerns precisely these cognitions *a priori*, and his aim is to construct the science of their possibility, principles, and extent. His aim is high, and his inquiry one of no mean importance,—if the case stands as he assumes. Are these cognitions *a priori*, which extend beyond all actual, beyond all possible experience, able to sustain our religious, ethical, and scientific superstructures? Here is the question Kant raises, and which he says should have been raised, and answered, long ago, but which, unhappily, has remained hitherto neglected, and consequently hitherto *no progress* has been made in metaphysical science.

The assumption of Kant, that thus far no progress has been made in metaphysical science, is in the outset a strong presumptive proof that he himself is in the wrong. A man who comes forward with a pretended discovery in any branch of human science, requiring him to consider all who have hitherto cultivated that branch to have been wholly in the wrong, proves by that fact alone that his discovery is to be looked upon with no little doubt and distrust. It is reserved for no man, in our day and generation, to take the

initiative in any branch of human thought; and he who can discover no merit in his predecessors gives very good evidence that he has no merit of his own. Kant's unqualified condemnation of all the metaphysical labors of humanity, prior to himself, is, for us, a sufficient proof that his own system has no solid foundation, and that his labors have no permanent value.

But we must examine these cognitions *a priori* a little closer. What are they? They are a constituent part of every actual cognition, and, in addition, its ground and condition. *It is only by virtue of these that experience is possible.* We pray our readers to remember this. Deny these, you deny the possibility of experience: deny, then, the validity of these, and you deny the validity of experience. And yet, these cognitions are supplied by the subject, and have no objective validity! The cognition (*Erkenntniss*), which stretches beyond even possible experience, has, according to Kant, no objective validity, that is to say, has no value in relation to any reality exterior to the subject. The moment we venture forth with Plato, on the wings of Ideas, beyond the world of the senses, we are in the empty space of the pure reason, and as unable to succeed as would be the light dove, which cleaves the air, to fly in mere airless space. A cognition, extending beyond the sensible world, is a pure conception, and a pure conception is an *empty* conception, a conception in which nothing is conceived. Of this class are all our judgments *a priori*, which are again the ground of all our judgments *a posteriori!*

Our cognitions *a priori* are of two kinds, analytic and synthetic. The analytic judgments do not extend our knowledge; they only clear up and place distinctly before the mind what was previously conceived, though confusedly; only the synthetic judgments add to the sum of our knowledge. In these there is, at least, a *seeming* extension of knowledge. Take the proposition, All that which happens has a cause. Now the conception of cause is different from the conception of something happening. In this proposition, then, I add the conception of cause to the conception, Something happens. Now, how am I able to do this? And what is the real value of this synthesis, or addition? I cannot obtain this synthesis from experience, for experience can give me only the conception, Something happens; never, the conception, All that which happens *has a cause.* This last conception, namely, of causality, without which there

would, and could, be no extension of knowledge, must be supplied, Kant tells us, by the understanding itself, in which it lies *a priori*, ready to be applied to experience of an actual case of causation. Then what is its value? It is—and this is the great doctrine of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft—it is a mere conception, an empty conception in which nothing is conceived.* Here, then, we are. The whole fabric of human science rests on cognitions *a priori*, and these cognitions are but mere empty conceptions. Here, then, we are, following this great modern philosopher, *in dem leeren Raum des reinen Verstandes.* If there be meaning in language, this is nothing but the Hindoo doctrine of Maya, namely, that all science is a mere illusion. It is hardly worth one's while to master the crabbed style and barbarous terminology of Kant, to be taught this, which after all, like all other teaching, must needs be a delusion.

The full discussion of the facts which Kant has had in view, when asserting cognitions *a priori*, we reserve, till in a subsequent article, we come to consider the categories of the pure understanding. Here we can only remark, that, while we admit what Kant calls cognition *a priori*, we deny it to be a cognition *a priori*. We deny both the reality and the possibility of cognitions *a priori*. Cognition *a priori* is a contradiction in terms. Cognition is the act of cognizing. If nothing be cognized, it is not cognition. Conception in which nothing is conceived is an impossibility. Can there be *seeing* where there is not somewhat that is *seen*? If the cognition be cognition, it must be *a posteriori;* for it must needs be preceded both by that which cognizes and by that which is cognized. Only two terms, in the nature of things, can be *a priori*, namely, the subject cognizing, and the object cognized. If you identify the cognition with the subject, you deny it to be cognition, by defining it to be that which cognizes; if you identify it with the object, you also deny it to be cognition, by affirming it to be that which is cognized. If you make it a product of the subject or of the object, or of both acting conjointly, you admit it to be cognition indeed, but deny it to be *a priori;* for it must needs be preceded by the subject or the object, or by both, and therefore *a posteriori* and empirical. Take which position you will, you must abandon the notion of *cognitions a priori.*

Cognition, again, is the act of cognizing. To contend that it is *a priori* were to contend that cognition precedes

cognizing; that is to say, precedes itself! This were as if one should say, We know before knowing. To assert that we need a science which determines the possibility, the principles, and the extent of our cognitions *a priori*, then, is simply to assert that we need a science which determines the possibility, the principles, and extent of that portion of our experience which is prior to all experience, and is the indispensable ground and condition of the possibility of experience! Into such absurdities, if we speak of *cognitions a priori*, we necessarily fall.

But we must not dismiss such a man as Kant in this summary way. We ask, therefore, again, What does he really understand by cognition *a priori*? Does he mean the cognition of objects in what the Greeks called the intelligible world (*νοήματα*) as distinguished from the world of sense and imagination (*αἰσθήματα* and *φαντάσματα*)? Not at all; because cognition of these intelligible objects would be as much matter of experience, as the cognition of objects perceptible by the senses. To make the matter as plain as we can, we say, here are two particular and contingent objects, A and B, between which subsists the relation of cause and effect. A causes B. A and B, according to Kant, are two sensible representations (*Vorstellungen*) or intuitions (*Anschauungen*). The relation of cause and effect is, possibly, an empirical conception. But the intuitions of A and B were possible only on condition of intuition *a priori* of space and time; that is to say, of the place *where*, and the time *when*; and these again are possible only on condition of intuition *a priori* of space and time in general. In the second place, this particular and contingent conception of cause is possible only on condition of conception *a priori* of cause in general, and of necessary cause. The conception of cause in general and of necessary cause, in the case supposed, is the cognition *a priori*; and the cognition of the possibility of the application of this cognition *a priori* to the particular and contingent fact of causation assumed is the *transcendental* cognition.

Now, the question we raise concerning the cognition *a priori*, that is, the *pure* cognition, and the transcendental cognition, is, whether they are really intelligible objects, *νοήματα*, or whether they are not. Kant decides, at once, that they are not; for, if they were, they would not be *a priori*. What, then, are they? Remember, they precede all actual cognition, and are the grounds and conditions of

the possibility of actual cognition. They are not on the side of the object, are not derived from the object, but exist prior to the apprehension of the object, in the understanding, from which they are supplied. What are they, or what can they be, but the power of the subject to cognize?

We must bear in mind that our inquiry lies wholly within the region of the subjective faculty of intelligence. It does not concern the *knowing*, but the *power* or ability to know; not experience, but the possibility and conditions of experience. This possibility and these conditions are not the object, nor derivable from the object, but, according to Kant, lie already *a priori* in the understanding; that is to say, they lie already in the understanding, prior to any actual fact of experience. These pure and transcendental cognitions are not, then, if we understand Kant, produced by the understanding, nor are they the understanding in operation, that is to say, operating on occasion of a fact of experience; they are not the actual thinking of non-empirical elements, on occasion of the empirical fact; but they are the *power* or *ability* of the subject, in a fact of experience, to think and apply to that fact what is not contained in it, nor derived or derivable from it, and yet without thinking which, the fact of experience itself could not have occurred. They are not the *thinking* of that which transcends experience, but the *ability* to think it. This, in simple terms, is all that we can understand by the pure and transcendental cognitions. If we are right in this, and we are confident we are, then these cognitions are nothing more or less than the constituent elements of the cognitive faculty, of the understanding, without which it would not be the power to understand. They are, then, the understanding itself; that is, the power of the subject to understand; that is, again, all simply, as we say, the inneity of the subject.

Kant calls his work a *critic*, and of course designedly; he call it a critic of the *pure* reason; that is, of reason, when abstraction is made of all experience, of all exercise of reason, and of all that results from its exercise. In other words, pure reason is the faculty itself, as we may say, "*in potentia, non in actu*"; that is, reason as the *vis cognitrix*, the force that knows, taken entirely independent of the *act* of knowing, or cognition. Now, it is reason in this sense, reason as the power of reason, that Kant undertakes to criticise. He assumes in this, that the pure reason may be subjected to analysis. He then assumes the pure reason itself,

that is, the subjective faculty of reason, of intelligence, to be complex, and therefore susceptible of decomposition. The decomposition of this faculty gives, as its original, fundamental elements, the cognitions in question; which shows us that these cognitions, in Kant's view, are not products of reason, nor reason operating, but its constituent elements, therefore it itself.

This last conclusion, however, is ours, not Kant's. Kant's labor is that of analysis; his aim is, to decompose the power of thought. He is not, with Condillac and others, decomposing thought as a fact, but the power, of the exercise of which, thought is the product. He is decomposing, not the act, but the principle of the act; not the thinking, but, properly speaking, the force that thinks. But here is the precise point where his error commences. The understanding, taken substantively, is the cognitive force; but Kant does, and does not, so take it. He fancies a distinction between the force cognizing, and that by virtue of which it is able to cognize. Reason, therefore, is reason by virtue of a somewhat that is distinguishable from it as intelligent force. In other words, the power to know is the power to know, by virtue of containing in itself elements which we may distinguish from itself. Hence, while he would make the pure and transcendental cognitions constituent elements, so to speak, of the cognitive power, he would still make them rather the instruments it uses, than it itself. In his view, they are a somewhat medial between the cognitive force as substance, and cognition, or the knowing, taken phenomenally. They are neither the *vis* nor the *actus*, but the endowments, attributes, or properties of the force cognizing. This is Kant's actual doctrine as exactly seized and stated as it is possible for us to seize and state it.

But here is a grand error, the very error we have so frequently pointed out as the source of all the errors of our modern psychologists, the assumption of a distinction between the subject and the inneity of the subject. Kant, through his whole *Critic*, assumes that the faculty is distinguishable, though not separable, from the subject. But there is no ground for this assumption. The distinction of faculties in man, as of properties in animals and inanimate beings, we of course admit; but this distinction of faculties, or of properties, is a distinction *in* not *from* the subject. This is the great and essential fact, which Kant either overlooks or denies. Thus, he defines the conception of sub-

stance to be the conception of the *substratum* that underlies and upholds the properties or faculties. Thus, we may abstract from an object, corporeal or incorporeal, all the qualities revealed to us by experience, and still the conception of substance will remain, and the object still be considered as existing. Now, this we deny *in toto*. Abstract from a given object, corporeal or incorporeal, or, to make the statement as strong as possible in Kant's favor, abstract from your conception of object in general, all conception of qualities and properties, and there will remain the conception of—NOTHING. Substance defined, as Kant defines it, to be a mere substratum, is nothing but the veriest logical abstraction. Even the definition in the schools, of substance (*sub-stans*, standing under), as that which supports accidents, is inadmissible, unless we are careful to distinguish between essential properties, qualities, or faculties, and *accidents*. The property, or quality, is not an accident, and therefore distinguishable from the substance in which it inheres, or upon which it may be supposed to be superinduced. The quality, or property, is not distinguishable *from* the substance. We may conceive of substances in which we may distinguish qualities, or properties, different from those we distinguish in other substances; but we cannot conceive of one and the same substance with different properties, much less, a substance with no properties.*

The distinction is not between the property and the subject, nor between the quality and the substance; but a dis-

*Realism and Nominalism are, after all, more nearly related than is sometimes supposed, and if they could only come to a mutual understanding, they would be, not two, but one. The error of the old Realists was in not distinguishing between logical abstractions and *genera* and *species*, properly so called. Man in general is not the notion of man that remains, after all notion of what is peculiar to each individual is abstracted, but the *generic* power, of which individuals are the products. It is only in the individual that the generic is to be studied; and it can be learned only so far as we learn what in each individual pertains to him as a substantive existence. In each individual we must distinguish both being and phenomenon. The individual, as being, is the force that acts; as phenomenon, the product of the acting. It is the distinction between activity, or the power that acts, and the acting. The first is *essential*, the other *phenomenal*. The phenomenal reveals the essential; and the essential in the individual is the medium of attaining to a knowledge of man in general, or the generic man. Instead, then, of abstracting all individuals in order to arrive at the general, we must learn what is essential in each and every individual; for the general is richer than any one individual, indeed than all individuals; for all individuals, taken together, do not exhaust it, since its power to produce new and diverse individuals remains.

tinction in the subject, of which the property, or quality, is predicated. So, the distinction of faculties in man is a distinction *in* man, not between man and his faculties. I cannot say I *and* my faculties. The faculties do not stand below me, or by my side, a somewhat which I make use of in acting, feeling, or knowing; nor are they agencies distinct from that agency which I call *me*, and acting, as it were, on their own account. It is not my activity that acts, my sensibility that feels, my understanding that knows, but I myself. It is always *I* that is the active, sentient, and intelligent force. When I say *I*, I necessarily affirm all that the personal pronoun *I* can be used to cover. We must remember here Fichte's postulate. The I is I, and therefore, I — I. If I am always the equivalent of myself, then must I be equal in volition to what I am in feeling, in feeling to what I am in cognition, and in cognition to what I am in either volition or feeling; and, if always the I is I, then must I be identical in each and in all three. Not my activity acts, nor do I act because I *have* activity, or the power to act, but because I *am* it; not my sensibility feels, but I feel; yet I do not feel because I *have* sensibility, or the power to feel, but because I *am* it; not my reason knows, but I know; and I know, not because I *have* reason, or the power to know, but because I *am* it. I being always and everywhere equal to myself, that is to say, being always and everywhere myself, and not another, I must needs act, feel, and know in all and every one of my phenomena. The distinction of faculties is not, then, a distinction between me and my faculties. In this sense there are no faculties.*

The error has originated in a false and vicious notion of substance. If Kant had meditated profoundly the little tract of Leibnitz, entitled "*De primæ Philosophiæ Emendatione et de Notione Substantiæ*," † he would have saved himself and his readers no little trouble. Kant, as we have

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* If any one would see the absurdity of distinguishing between the me and the faculties, he need only study Gall, Spurzheim, and George Combe, or any of our phrenological, neurological, or pathetist professors. None of these miserable quackeries, these burlesques on all science, could ever for one moment have been entertained by even such men as George Combe and our brave *Doctor* Buchanan, after whom a silly multitude runs gaping, if it had only been generally taught that the faculties are powers distinguishable, or rather distinctions, *in* the *me*, not *from* it.

† Leibni. Opp. ed. Erdmann, P. I., p. 121. See also Système Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, &c., § 8; p. 124.

seen, held that the primitive conception of substance is that of substratum, or that which underlies and upholds the attributes, qualities, properties, or faculties. In this view of the case, all the diversity admissible in the universe would be merely a diversity of accidents. Substance, so far forth as substance, would be always and everywhere the same. There might be *accidental* differences among beings, but no *substantial* differences. As substantive, all beings would be one and identical; and multiple and diverse only in relation to their accidents. Thus, as substance, man and animal are one, and man differs from the animal only in the superinduction of a peculiarly human quality upon a substance common to him and the animal world. Thus, it has been contended that there is an ascending scale from the lowest animal up to man, and the ascent consists in adding, in the case of each degree, a quality to those possessed by the degree just below. The superior retains all that belongs to the inferior, and adds a new quality. Thus, man is the *résumé* of the whole animal world, combining in himself all the qualities of all the various orders of existence below him, and adding to them certain qualities which none of them have. Thus man may be defined, for instance, a monkey—*with additions*.

It was this same erroneous notion of substance, that misled Spinoza and involved him in his pantheistic fatalism. Defining substance to be that which stands under (*sub-stans*) or supports accidents, he must needs reject all existences as substantive, which were dependent on any thing out of themselves for support. Only that which needs nothing beyond itself to sustain it is, in the true and proper sense of the word, substance. In this sense, only the infinite and self-existent Being can be substance. Then God is the only substance, and the only substance is God. Then nothing exists but God and his accidents, that is, his attributes, that is, again, his modes. The mode, or attribute, is simply God under a given aspect, or phase, of his being. Consequently, all is God, and God is all, and there is no creator or creation, no providence, no freedom, no duty, no morality, no rewards, no punishments, but an infinite, eternal, and invincible Necessity.

Leibnitz, who studied all systems profoundly, and had a mind of equal acuteness and comprehensiveness, saw the rock on which Spinoza and so many others had split, and avoided it by correcting the prevailing notion of substance.

We may, indeed, define substance, with the Schoolmen, to be that which supports accidents, but only on condition that we keep distinctly in view the difference between *accident* and *attribute*, quality and phenomenon. The true definition of substance, as Leibnitz states, and as we shall have occasion to demonstrate when we come to consider specially the category of substance, in connexion with M. Cousin's reduction of Kant's fifteen categories to the two categories of substance and cause, or, more properly, *being* and *phenomenon*, is that of active or acting force (*vis activa*, what the Germans call *Kraft*). Substance is always, in the language of Aristotle, ἐντελέχεια, and involves, as Leibnitz says, effort (*conatum involvit*), that is, an acting from within outwards. Active force (*vis activa*) is not the attribute of substance, a something subsidiary to our notion of substance, but *is* substance, and the being ceases to be, in ceasing to be active force. Analyze your conception of substance, that is to say, of something which is, and abstract all not essential to the conception itself, and there will remain, as the fundamental, simple, indecomposable, ultimate conception of substance, that of simple active or acting force.

Whatever can be conceived of as existing at all, or in any sense be a subject of human investigation, must be included, as M. Cousin has demonstrated, either in the category of substance or in that of cause; or, more accurately, in the category of the *doer* or in that of the *doing;* or again, as we ourselves say, either in the category of *being*, or in that of *phenomenon*. The phenomena of any given being may be manifold and diverse, but the being itself must be a monad, a unity; for, if the conception of being be that of active force, the introduction of more than one active force into the bosom of a given being would be to dissolve its unity, and to declare it to be, not one being, but as many distinct beings as you assume distinct forces. Every being is, therefore, necessarily a monad, whether we choose to accept the monadology of Leibnitz or not.

Now, man must exist either as being or as phenomenon. Condillac, in resolving the *me* into sensation, allowed him only a phenomenal existence; Leroux, in defining the individual man to be "*sensation-sentiment-connaissance*," indivisibly united, makes the individual purely phenomenal, and allows him an *essential* or ontological existence only in the race. I, as an individual man, am the sensation-sentiment-cognition of humanity; and the me, *le moi*, is not *me* as an

individual existence, but is humanity. Humanity is the activity, the sensibility, the reason, of which I am the action, the feeling, and the knowing. Humanity is the *doer*, I am the *doing*, and my life is the *done*. But humanity, again, is to God what I am to humanity. God is the activity, the sensibility, the reason, of which humanity is the respective phenomena. Thus, the force that acts, feels, and knows in humanity is God; and the force that acts, feels, and knows in me is humanity, the identical force that acts, feels, and knows in all men. But, as the force which acts, feels, and knows in me is that of humanity, and as that of humanity is God, it follows that the force which acts, feels, and knows in me is God, which is a reversal of the doctrine of St. Paul, *Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμεν. In Deo vivimus et movemur et sumus.* That is to say, God lives, moves, and has his being in us, instead of our living, moving, and having our being in him!

Rejecting this view, and assuming man to exist as a being, to have a substantial existence, then he exists as a simple acting force, and must be in his primitive essence a monad, or a unity. Now, bearing this in mind, we may easily perceive that the faculties must needs be distinctions in the bosom of this monad or simple force which I call I myself; not qualities, properties, attributes, or accidents, to be distinguished from it. There are but three possible views which we can take, for instance, of the faculty of intelligence, the faculty which is commonly termed understanding, or reason. 1. It is the force that knows; 2. It is the instrument, or means, by which another force knows; or 3. It is the product of the exercise of a cognitive force. This last it cannot be, because it would still leave the whole question open as to the force that knows. If it is the second, that is to say, a somewhat distinguished from me, but which I use, and by virtue of which I am able to know, then, it is in itself separate and distinct from me, and I in myself am unintelligent, that is to say, incapable of intelligence, which involves a contradiction; for my power to know is affirmed, in the affirmation of my ability to use this somewhat which you denominate the faculty of intelligence; which again involves another contradiction, that of affirming the faculty of intelligence to be at once *me* and *not me*, contrary to our postulate, What is, is,—the *me* is *me*, and therefore is not and cannot be *not me*.

Nothing remains now but the first view, namely, that

understanding, or reason, that is to say, the cognitive faculty, is the force that knows, or cognizes. In cognition, there must needs be an agent that cognizes. Now, this agent is the understanding, taken ontologically, as force, not as the product or the instrument of force. The understanding, then, is force knowing, or intelligencing. This force must be identically and integrally me; or it must be distinct from me. If distinct from me, it is a separate, and, so far as I am concerned an independent being, and is not *me*, but another *me*, and, therefore, in no sense a predicate of me. But here is still another difficulty. The moment you affirm the faculty of intelligence to be a cognitive force, and distinct from me, you declare intelligence cannot be a predicate of me. I am, then, in myself, incapable of intelligence. Now, how am I, essentially, that is to say, in my essence (*esse*), unintelligent, incapable of intelligence, ever to know? The *knower* would not be *me*, but a faculty of intelligence proved to be *not me*. How am I, essentially unintelligent, to be placed in such a relation with intelligence as to believe, and to have the right to affirm, that its acts, which are cognitions, are not its, but mine?

In activity there is a force that acts, which makes the effort; in sensibility there is a force that acts, for it demands an effort on the part of the subject to receive a sensation, as as much as it does to perform an act in any other sense. Assume a being wholly passive, incapable of the least motion on its part, that is to say, a being absolutely dead, could it feel? could it receive an impression? could it experience a sentiment? Of course not. Then in sensibility there is a force that feels. In understanding there is a force that knows. Now, is the force that acts, *me* or *not me*? the force that feels, *me* or *not me*? the force that knows, *me* or *not me*? Of course it is in each case *me*, I, myself. Then activity is simply myself acting; sensibility myself feeling; understanding myself knowing. I am myself each and all three, for each is only myself under a given aspect.

This granted, the distinction *between* the subject and the faculty, that is, between the subject and its inneity, must be abandoned. The faculty *is* the subject, that is, the subject under a given aspect. Now, since we have already identified the pure and transcendental cognitions with the faculty of intelligence, it follows that they *are* the subject, and nothing else. They are the understanding, and the understanding is the subject as cognitive. We can now easily grasp the essential features of Kant's doctrine of science.

The actual cognition, we have seen, consists of two parts, the cognition *a priori*, and the cognition *a posteriori*,—the portion derived from experience, and the portion supplied by the subject experiencing. The empirical portion is merely the sensation, consequently, the actual cognition is sensation *plus* the subject,—the old doctrine attributed to Aristotle, with the famous reserve suggested by Leibnitz: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*,—NISI IPSE INTELLECTUS: Nothing can be in the mind but what is first in the senses,—except the mind itself. Here is the germ of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, and all that Kant has done has been to develope and systematize the doctrine contained in this celebrated maxim.

We commend this fact to those zealous Kantians among us who are loud in condemning Locke for his alleged sensism. The charge of sensism against Locke comes with an ill grace from a follower of Kant; for, so far as it concerns the *objects* of knowledge, the Englishman is much less liable to it than the German. Locke, indeed, recognized only sensation as a source of primary ideas, yet he held, that logic, or what he calls Reflection, is capable of extending our knowledge, and of attaining, by way of deduction, of inference, from sensible *data*, to realities transcending the limits of sensation itself,—which Kant denies, and labors at length to refute, in his "Transcendental Dialectics."

The great and important fact, which Kant seems to us to have recognized, is that contained in the reserve of Leibnitz already quoted,—*nisi ipse intellectus*;—namely, that, in every fact of experience, the subject enters for a part, and must count for something; and that, prior to experience, the understanding is not, as Locke alleged, a mere blank sheet void of all characters and of all ideas. It is the assertion of this fact, that has deceived so many in regard to the true character and worth of the Critical Philosophy, and made them look upon the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* as a successful refutation of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Yet even here the difference between the two is more apparent than real, and, so far as real at all, is to the advantage of Locke.

Kant's doctrine concerning cognition *a priori*, pure cognition, and transcendental cognition, translated into the language of mortals, is, all simply, that a being, in order to know, must, prior to knowing, be able to know,—a doctrine which, so far as we recollect, Locke does not call in question.

Locke, it is true, represents the mind, that is to say, the intelligent subject, prior to experience, to be a mere blank sheet, or piece of white paper, but obviously only in reference to actual objective knowledge, and he really means no more than Kant himself means by his assertion, that all our knowledge begins with experience. Kant asserts nothing as being prior to experience, but the subject inherently capable of experience; for this is the sum and substance of his whole doctrine concerning the pure and transcendental cognitions; but Locke asserts all this, for he does not resolve, as his pretended disciple, Condillac, does, the *me* into sensation, but asserts it as a substantive existence, and as an active and intelligent force, which he treats under the twofold aspect of sensation and reflection. He distinctly and expressly recognizes the *me* as a force capable of receiving sensations, and of working these sensations up "into that knowledge of objects which is called experience." If Kant asserts any thing more, we have not discovered it.

The simple truth is, that, touching objective knowledge, the only matter which Locke termed knowledge, Kant has made no advance on Locke, but virtually adopts Locke's general doctrine. He leaves, in the beginning, Locke where he is, and attempts to get behind experience, and make a critic of the experience-power; not the cognition, but the cognitive power (*Erkenntnissvermögen*); that is to say, to determine whether the sensation and reflection of Locke, or the knowledge, so called, obtained by them, or rather through them, could claim any validity, or be worthy of any reliance. At best, he would only have left us the power of communicating with what lies outside of us, which Locke asserted; but, in reality, he has not left us even so much. For he has attempted to show that no experience is or can be valid without both synthetic judgments and synthetic conceptions, *a priori*, and that these judgments and conceptions are of no value, being nothing but pure, that is, empty conceptions. So that, with him we are worse off than we were with Locke; for if Locke was defective in not recognizing the subject in its completeness, Kant is still more defective, in that he, with Hume, recognizes in man no power of intelligence at all. Kant himself believed, many have since believed, that his *Critic* is a refutation of Hume; *we* regard it as the most masterly defence of Hume that man may be expected to produce. If Kant is right, man is incapable of demonstrating the reality of any existence outside of the

subject, and the subject, for the want of a resisting medium, finally loses all apperception of itself, for Kant contends that the *me* can have intuition of itself only in the intuition of the diverse, that is, of the *not me;* and so all science vanishes, all certainty disappears, the sun goes out, the bright stars are extinguished, and we are afloat in the darkness, on the wild and tempest-roused ocean of universal Doubt and Nescience. Alas! we do not misrepresent the philosopher of Königsberg, for he himself, in the preface to his second edition, tells us, that the result of his whole investigation is, to rebuke dogmatism, "to demolish science to make way for faith."

The *Critic of Pure Reason*, we all know, is confessedly atheistic; it leaves no space for faith in God, and Kant was obliged to write his *Critic of the Practical Reason* in order to restore the faith it had overthrown. That is to say, the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* destroys all evidence of the existence of God, leaving us only a dim and flickering faith in our own *me;* but the reason always aspires to unity, to completeness, to the *whole*, which aspiration can be satisfied only by admitting the notion of a God. In other words, the soul is conscious of a *want;* only God can meet this want; *ergo*, God is! The reasoning, by which Kant gets from the atheism of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* to the *quasi* theism of the *Critik der practischen Vernunft*, is admirably hit off by the following passage from that able, but not over and above saintly, Heinrich Heine, in his *De l'Allemagne*, with which we conclude the present article.

"After the tragedy comes the farce. Kant had hitherto taken the terrible tone of an inexorable philosopher, carried heaven by assault, and put the whole garrison to the sword. You saw, extended lifeless on the ground, the old ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological body-guards of God, and God himself, deprived of demonstration, lay swimming in his own blood; henceforth no more divine mercy, no more paternal goodness, no more future rewards for present sufferings: immortality of the soul is *in agony*. . . . . Nothing is heard but the death-rattle and lamentations. . . . . And Old Lampe, an afflicted spectator of this catastrophe, drops his umbrella; and agonizing sweat and great tears flow down his cheeks. Then Immanuel Kant is touched, and shows that he is not merely a great philosopher, but a brave man. He reflects, and, with a half gracious, half malicious air, says:

"'Yes, Old Lampe must have a God, without which no happiness for the poor man. Now, man ought to be happy in this world,—this is what the *Practical Reason* says. . . . . I mean, yes. I myself mean,—that the practical reason, therefore, guaranties the existence of God.'

In consequence of this reasoning, Kant distinguishes between *theoretic* reason and *practical* reason. And by the aid of this, as with a magic wand, he resuscitates the God which the theoretic reason had slain.

"Perhaps Kant undertook this resurrection not merely through friendship for poor Old Lampe, but through fear of the police. Did he act from conviction? Has he, in destroying all the proofs of the existence of God, wished to show us how deplorable it is to know nothing of God? He in this appears to do very much like my Westphalian friend, *who broke all the lamps* of the Rue Grohnd of Göttingen, *and in the darkness made a long oration on the practical necessity of lamps*, which he had stoned in a *theoretic* manner in order to show what we should be without their beneficent light."*

ARTICLE III.

Kant's investigation, as we have several times repeated, lies wholly within the sphere of the cognitive subject. He is investigating, not knowledge, but our means of knowing. His design is, by a thorough analysis of the faculty of intelligence, to ascertain the conditions of knowing, and to obtain a canon of science, by which we may always be able to distinguish genuine knowledge from its counterfeit. This design he does not profess to have fully executed, and his *Critic*, he tells us, is, therefore, a cathartic for purging the understanding of errors hitherto imbibed, rather than a canon universally applicable.

The first great positive doctrine, which Kant teaches, is, so far as we can comprehend it, that we never attain to a knowledge of things as they may be assumed to exist independently of our cognition of them, that is, as things in themselves; but merely as objects mentally apprehended. *Subject* and *object* are correlatives, and one, therefore, cannot be without the other. A tree, for instance, is a certain determinate object which exists in our intuition as the correlative of the subject of the intuition. But does not the tree exist independently of the intuition? Is it not there before my window all the same when I see it and when I see it not? On the Kantian philosophy, this question is absurd; for it presupposes that I may conceive of somewhat of which I have no intuition. But conceptions without intuitions are void. Then I cannot ask whether the tree does or does not exist independently of my beholding it;

* De l'Allemagne, Tome I., pp. 170–172.

for, independently of my beholding it, that is, of my intuition of it, it is to me no object of conception.

But what! has the universe no existence, save as the object of my intuition? So, in very deed, it would seem, if, as Kant alleges, we can apprehend it only as the correlative of the subject apprehending. Yet Kant does not *deny* the existence of the object as a thing existing apart from the subject; for, apart from the subject, it can be no object of conception, and therefore can neither be denied nor affirmed. It may, for aught we know, exist *really* independently of us, but not *formally;* for it exists formally only in the intuition. Hence his second great positive doctrine, that on which he founds his claims to originality, namely, that the *form* of the thought (intuition and conception), or the form under which the object is cognized, is derived from the subject; never, as metaphysicians had hitherto fancied, from the object. The formal existence of the tree is, therefore, purely subjective. But the tree is cognized only as object, never as thing in itself; consequently, its real existence, practically, if not absolutely, is also purely subjective.

That the *formal* existence of some objects of knowledge may be said to be subjective, we are not disposed to deny; but then the formal conceptions, to be of any validity, must have a virtual, if not an actual, objective foundation *in re.* This is the case with the attributes of God, such as wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. In our conceptions, these attributes are *formally* distinct, but in God they are identical; for the divine essence is simple, and admits of no distinction. The attribute is identical with the subject regarded as pure essence, and pure essence is identical with pure act. God is not Creator *in potentia,*—for that which exists only *in potentia* is imperfect, and needs for its perfection to be realized in act,—but Creator *in actu.* He is not wise, just, and good, when we speak strictly, but wisdom, justice, goodness; and wisdom, justice and goodness are in him not distinct attributes, but *essentially* one and the same. Yet, by reason of his infinity, is there a real foundation in him for what, in our conception of him, are distinct attributes. Consequently, our conceptions of distinct attributes are formally subjective, yet *virtually* objective; for they have their foundation in reality; that is to say, in the infinity of God, which answers to what, owing to our limited faculties, are in us distinct conceptions. There is, then, no objection to admitting that the form of *some* objects of knowledge is imposed

by the subject, in case the object is conceded to exist really, and the forms of the intuition to have a *virtual* foundation in reality. But Kant assumes that the forms, under which all objects are mentally apprehended, are without any foundation, actual or virtual, in the thing apprehended; both the forms and the object are then reduced to mere empty conceptions, or mere modes of the subject, from which, if *formally*, they are nevertheless *really* indistinguishable.

But Kant goes still further, and demonstrates very conclusively that we can have intuition of ourselves only in the intuition of the diverse; that is, that the synthetic judgment *I think* is possible only on condition of the synthetic judgment I think *somewhat* (*aliquid*), and somewhat diverse from myself. But this *somewhat* is merely a mode or affection of myself, and is only formally, not really, actually or virtually, distinguishable from me. Consequently, I can have only a formal, not a real, intuition of myself. Consequently, again, with the knowledge of the *not me* falls the knowledge of the *me* itself; I cease to be able to know any thing, and all science is an illusion. To this conclusion, as we have heretofore proved, we are inevitably driven, if we adopt Kant's premises.

But these premises are false, and the doctrines of the old metaphysicians, which Kant denies and labors to overthrow, are substantially true and worthy of all acceptation. In departing from them, and seeking the foundation of the form of the thought in the subject, instead of the object, Kant has placed science on the wrong track, and caused it to retrograde instead of advancing. This is what we hope to make good in the course of what follows.

Kant, we repeat once more, is investigating the subjective faculty of intelligence. This faculty he regards as complex, and capable of being resolved into,—

1. Sensibility, or the Receptivity;
2. Understanding, or the power of conceiving;
3. Reason, or the faculty of Ideas.

Sensibility furnishes us with sensations, and sensations furnish us with *intuitions* (*Anschauungen*) and *representations* (*Vorstellungen*) of objects; Understanding is that power by which an object represented or presented by sensibility is *thought*, and it furnishes us with *conceptions* (*Begriffen*); Reason is the power by which we give unity and ideal completeness to our conceptions, and by it we are

furnished with *ideas*, which are to conceptions, in some respects, what conceptions are to intuitions.

In accordance with this threefold division of the faculty of intelligence, Kant divides his work into three general divisions: 1. Transcendental Æsthetics, in which he treats of the Intuitions; 2. Transcendental Logic, or Elementary Science, in which he discusses the Conceptions, or the Categories of the pure Understanding; 3. Transcendental Dialectics, in which he discusses the Ideas, and makes the especial Critic of the pure Reason, as distinguished from Sensibility and Understanding. We shall be obliged to confine our remarks almost exclusively to the first two of these three general divisions.

The great problem which Kant undertakes to solve, we have seen, is, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* formed? This question he attempts to answer by a rigid and subtile analysis of the faculty of intelligence. He begins by analyzing the fact of experience. This fact he makes consist of two parts,—the one empirical and *a posteriori*, the other *a priori*, and supplied from the understanding itself. He then eliminates the empirical portion, and proceeds to his analysis of the *a priori* portion, which he terms cognition *a priori*. This cognition *a priori* is assumed to lie already in the understanding prior to any fact of actual cognition, as the ground and condition of the possibility of actual cognition, or, what is the same thing, experience. If we consider this cognition *a priori* in its application to some particular fact of experience, it is simply cognition *a priori;* but if generally, as abstracted from all particular facts of experience, and as the simple possibility of the application of the cognition *a priori* to the empirical fact, it is *Transcendental Cognition*, because it can be brought into none of the categories or predicaments, but transcends them all. A complete system of all our cognitions would be a TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY; but Kant here does not attempt a complete system, but merely a critic of pure reason, and therefore, gives us only a TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIC.

Assuming the threefold division of the faculty of intelligence stated, Kant arranges all our mental phenomena under three heads: 1. Intuitions; 2. Conceptions; 3. Ideas.

The intellectual phenomenon, or actual cognition, in its complete sense, is a complex fact, composed of intuition, conception, and idea. Without these three, no valid cogni-

tion. Intuitions without conceptions are blind; conceptions without intuitions are void, and without ideas are incomplete and incoherent; ideas without intuitions and conceptions are merely *entia rationis*, utterly invalid and worthless.

Ideas are always by their very nature transcendental, corresponding, if we do not blunder in regard to them, in part with the *universals* of the Schoolmen. But intuitions and conceptions may be both *a priori* and empirical. Empirical intuition, that is, actual intuition of some determinate object, is possible only on condition of *a priori* intuition of object in general. This *a priori* intuition, considered without application to object at all, but as the simple possibility of intuition of object in general, is the Transcendental Intuition; and the science of our transcendental intuitions is TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICS. The conceptions are also susceptible of the same analysis. The conception *a priori*, that is, of object in general, considered without reference to any intuition in particular, or intuition in general, but as the possibility of its application to intuition in general, is the Transcendental Conception; and the science of our transcendental conceptions is TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC, or elementary science. Having made these explanations, and definitions, we proceed to consider,

I. TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICS.

We remark, in the outset, that we are far from accepting Kant's analysis of the faculty of intelligence. We do not admit his distinction between intuition and conception, nor that which he contends for between conception and idea. The fact of knowing is *sui generis;* but considered psychologically, it is a simple, indecomposable fact. The human soul, the human *me*, taken as that which it eminently is, is, as Leibnitz contends, a monad, or simple substance, and, as we proved in our former article on Kant, admits of no division into separate faculties. The distinction of faculties is a distinction merely, not a division, or a separation; and proceeds not from any defect of strict unity and simplicity of substance or essence, but from limitation of nature, in consequence of which, the soul is not pure act, but in part power, seeking to realize itself in act. In God, who is perfect essence, substance, or being, save so far as concerns our conceptions of him, there is no distinction of attributes; for he is not the power to do, but the doing,—not a merely

possible Creator, but an actual Creator. There is in him no distinction, no interval, so to speak, between the power and its realization. We are created in the image of God, and therefore must needs be essentially active force (*vis activa*); but we are imperfect forces, because imperfect beings, that is, we are not being in its completeness; for, if we were, we should be God, and not merely created in his image. We exist in part potentially, rather than actually, and are less pure act itself, than the perpetual aspiration to it. If it were not for this fact, the distinction of faculties in human nature would be as inadmissible as the distinction of faculties in the divine nature itself.

The soul is not mere power (*potentia nuda*), otherwise it would have no substantial existence, and therefore could not be said to be at all; for being (*esse*) is not the power to act, but force acting (*vis activa*). So far forth as the soul is, as it is a real entity, it is force acting, or active force, which is the radical conception of entity or substantial being. But as it is a limited being, it is in relation to its limitations only virtual being, or mere potential being. Hence the soul may be defined to be both actual being and virtual being, both active and potential force. Hence it is, and aspires to be more than it is, or to *be* more completely.

The distinction between the *me* and its faculties, so far as such distinction is conceivable, is the distinction between actual being and potential being, between *vis activa* and the *potentia nuda* of the Schoolmen. But as the power (*potentia*) is a defect, an imperfection, a negation of being, not something positive superadded to the soul as essence, the distinction between the *me* and its faculties is, as we have before shown, *really* inadmissible. Then again, if we shift our point of view, and consider the faculty, not as the negation of being merely, but as the positive ability of the soul to remove its limitations by realizing its essence, as the virtuality of the soul, then it becomes virtually the soul itself, and therefore virtually indistinguishable from it, as we contended in our former article. The soul and its faculty are the soul in its actuality and its virtuality, in its actual essence and its virtual essence. The faculty is not actually the soul, because it is not actual being; it is virtually the soul, and becomes it really and identically just so far as it becomes real. Essentially, then, the faculty and the soul are one and the same.

But as the realization of the possibility of our nature, to

which we tend, is effected by distinct and separate moments, a classification becomes possible. The soul, considered as the power tending to realize itself in one class, is what we term one of its faculties; considered as tending to realize itself in another class, it is what we term another of its faculties. Psychologists have arranged all the phenomena resulting from the several moments in three classes; namely, Volitions, Sentiments, and Cognitions. Man may therefore be defined, psychologically, a being that acts, feels, and knows. But he is so far forth as real being a monad, or simple substance, and therefore must enter into each class as actor with the simplicity and entireness of his nature. Consequently, he is *essentially* present in each and all three of the classes, as identically volitive, sensitive, and cognitive. Essentially considered, therefore, the distinction of classes would be inadmissible. But as the soul in no one, nor in all, realizes its entire virtuality, and as this virtuality is realized under distinct phases, a *virtual* distinction, corresponding to the one named, is unquestionably admissible. But, as the distinction of attributes is virtual, not real, it follows that the distinction between volitions, sentiments, and cognitions is virtual, not real.

At most, then, only a virtual distinction in the soul, of the three faculties of willing, feeling, and knowing, can be admitted. How, then, shall we admit a further distinction, not virtual merely, but real also, in the faculty of intelligence itself? Is to know made up of distinct and separate moments? Is it not one simple fact, whatever its sphere, degree, or conditions? What is the evidence on which Kant grounds his division of the virtuality of the soul to know, into sensibility, understanding, and reason? He speaks of blind intuitions and of void conceptions, and presupposes that the *me* may act as sensibility, without at the same moment acting as understanding, and that it may act as understanding without acting as sensibility. But this is impossible; for the soul is one and simple, and admits of no plurality or complexity. In intuition the soul is active, for intuition is the active beholding of the object, not the mere passive reception of the representation. Assume the soul to be purely passive, and the representation would be impossible. Kant himself nowhere regards the receptivity as pure passivity, for it is that by which the object is actively placed before the mind. Then in the intuition the *me* is active. If active, it is active with what it is essentially. It

is essentially volitive, sensitive, and cognitive, and therefore must needs be all three in each and every intuition. Consequently, a blind intuition, or an intuition in which the soul is not actively cognoscent, is impossible.

We are aware, that what Kant calls sensibility is supposed to be in some way dependent on the body, and to be in consequence of this distinguishable from understanding, which is held to be purely psychical. Man is unquestionably, as Bossuet says, a being made to live in a body, and is in all his operations served by bodily organs. But man is himself always the operator. In vision the eye does not see, in hearing the ear does not hear, but the soul. The force that sees or hears is not physical, but psychical, or rather spiritual. So in every fact of knowledge, whether of material objects or spiritual, the *knower* is always the same identical spiritual subject, knowing always, because spiritual, but through bodily organs of knowledge. In this mode of being, independently of the body, man never acts, he performs no function at all. But as he himself is not body, but spirit living in body and served by bodily organs, whatever he wills, feels, or knows, must be willed, felt, or known by spirit.

The union of soul and body is unquestionably a mystery which exceeds our ability to explain; yet of the fact of such union we can be as well assured as of any other fact whatever. How the soul can use the body and be itself affected by whatever affects the body is also a mystery, an impenetrable mystery. All we know is, that it does use the body, and is affected by all its accidents. What we call affections of the body are in reality affections of the soul, at least in great part. In pain, it is not my body that suffers the pain, but I myself. So in disease, and the innumerable ills that flesh is heir to. The agent and patient are the psychical man, not the physical man. In sensibility, I use what are called the senses. But in strictness what are called the *senses* are not senses, but the *organs* of sense. That which *senses* is the spiritual force which I call I, myself.

Assuming this, we are unable to perceive any thing in the alleged fact of the dependence of sensibility on material organs, that militates against the simplicity of the cognitive faculty. The dependence on bodily organs is no greater nor otherwise in intuition than in conception, sentiment, or volition. We repeat, therefore, that blind intuitions are impossible. The *me* is *me;* the *me* — *me*, essentially con-

sidered. It is essentially intelligent force; wherever present, it must be cognoscent. It is present in intuition. Then the intuition cannot be blind.

Nor are empty conceptions possible. In conception, I am present as the subject of the conception. But no finite being can perform a single act by himself alone. The subject can act only on condition of an object that acts in conjunction with the subject. A void conception is a conception in which nothing is conceived, a conception which has no object, that is to say, an act performed by the subject alone, without the concurrence of any object; an act impossible to any finite and dependent being, and possible only to the Infinite Being himself. Nor is this all. In every conception, as a matter of fact, I do conceive of somewhat. This somewhat, which stands in the conception as object, must be either *me* or not *me*. But the *me* is not and cannot be its own object, for it cannot redouble and fold itself over so as to look into its own eyes; and moreover, because in every conception the *me* recognizes itself as the subject of the conception, and Kant himself shows that the *me* can have intuition of itself only in intuition of the diverse, that is, in intuition of somewhat indistinguishable and diverse from itself. But in every conception I have intuition of myself. Then in every conception I have intuition of some object which is not myself. A conception in which there is intuition of object is not a void conception. Consequently, void conceptions are impossible.

It follows from what we have said, that a real division of the cognitive faculty, a division which implies that one part of the faculty can operate, and another part be at rest, is inadmissible; that there are no intuitions without conceptions, and no conceptions without intuitions; and furthermore, that intuitions and conceptions are not distinct phenomena, but both are given simultaneously and as one simple, indecomposable fact. All intuition is cognition, and all cognition is intuition, for all knowing is by beholding the object known.

But waiving this, and leaving the analysis in question to stand for what it is worth, we proceed at once to the more direct consideration of the science of the principles of sensibility, which, as we have said, Kant denominates *Transcendental Æsthetics*. Our readers must be careful not to confound sensibility as understood by Kant with sensibility as the psychological principle of that class of our mental

phenomena termed the sentiments, such as love, joy, grief, hope, fear, &c. This class of our phenomena we do not find recognized by our psychologist. He agrees with Locke in recognizing in the *me* only two general faculties; namely, WILL and UNDERSTANDING. Both he and Locke deny to the sentiments a special psychological principle, and hence the dry, hard, rationalistic character of their respective systems, which repulses whatever is generous, noble, heroic, or devotional, and tempts us perpetually, while studying them, to exclaim of either, as St. Theresa did of Satan, "Alas! unhappy being, he does not love."

By sensibility, as we have already said, Kant understands a subdivision of the general faculty of intelligence, that subdivision by which the object is represented, or presented, placed before the mind, or by which we are furnished with intuition of it. The affection of the senses furnishes us with sensations; sensations with intuitions. But intuitions referred to objects are empirical, and empirical intuitions are not possible without intuitions *a priori*. Of intuitions *a priori*, there are two; namely, SPACE and TIME.

We remark here, that Kant makes the affection of the senses necessary to actual intuition, and he teaches that conceptions without intuitions are void. Therefore there can be valid conceptions only on condition of actual intuition, and actual intuition only on condition of some affection of sensibility. Hence it follows, that our actual cognition, in case cognition be admitted, must be confined to cognition of sensible objects *plus* ourselves, which proves what we before asserted, that his system, assuming it to admit science at all, is a system of pure sensism, and as far removed from a true spiritual philosophy as that of Condillac himself; for he nowhere teaches or implies, that any but material objects are capable of affecting the senses. But this by the way.

We cannot have intuition of object without intuition of its *locus*, that is, of its space, and this intuition requires in turn intuition of space in general. Intuition of space in general requires the transcendental intuition, or intuition of the possibility of the application of the intuition of space in general to intuition of some determinate portion of space, or space in particular. But whence this transcendental intuition? and what is it? It is not derivable from experience, for all experience presupposes it; nor from object, because it is not intuition of any object in particular, or some determinate portion of space; but is the necessary *a priori* con-

dition of possible determinate intuition. It must, then, lie *a priori* in the sensibility, and be the form which the sensibility imposes upon all empirical intuitions.

All empirical intuitions are accompanied by intuitions of simultaneousness or succession, that is to say, of TIME. The intuitions of change, of succession, cannot give me the intuition of time, for they all presuppose it. Change, succession, mark or measure time, and are therefore distinguishable from it. The intuition of time must, then, necessarily precede them. An event occurs. We can have intuition of it only by having intuition of a determinate portion of time. This implies intuition *a priori* of time in general, and this last the *transcendental* intuition of time, that is, of the possibility of the application of the intuition of time in general to a possible empirical intuition. This transcendental intuition of time, like that of space, lies originally in the sensibility, as the form it necessarily imposes on all its empirical intuitions.

The simple fact, that all our empirical intuitions, taken as they are in Kant's statement, imply or presuppose the intuitions of space and time, we are not disposed to question. But, in the first place, the restriction of the fact of intuition to intuition of mere sensible objects, as they are called, can be justified only by assuming the subdivision of the cognitive power of the subject, which we have denied. In point of fact all thinking is intuition, and one class of our mental phenomena are no more or less so than another. In all cases there is intuition, that is, according to the etymology of the word, an actual beholding, looking upon, or apprehension by the mind, of the object of which there is intuition. Even in memory it is the same. In remembering there is always actual intuition of the fact remembered, for the fact of memory is not a creation of the subject at the moment remembered, nor a non-existent fact, when unremembered. We are capable of intuition of bodies, which is called perceiving in space; of events, which is perceiving in time; of ideas, which is perceiving in eternity, though ideas are never perceived as pure ideas, but always in the bodies or the events in which they realize and reveal themselves.

In the second place, we deny that space and time are mere forms of our sensibility, which it imposes upon the objects beheld. We readily admit that they are not things, entities, in the language of the Schoolmen. We also admit

that they are the forms of all our intuitions, under which we perceive all the objects we do perceive; but they are forms imposed by the objective world on our perception, not the forms which the perception imposes on the object perceived. Brilliant discoveries often turn out to be brilliant errors, and this will prove to be the case with this famous discovery of Kant, that time and space are nothing but the subjective forms of our sensibility.

Kant himself, in admitting as he very properly does, that all knowledge begins with experience, has deprived himself of the right to insist on his own doctrine. It is obviously true, chronologically considered, that there is no actual intuition of time and space prior to experience of bodies and events. Prior to this, there lies in the sensibility merely the capacity to perceive bodies and events, that is to say, the possibility of the empirical intuitions of space and time. Now admit that the empirical intuition demands, as its condition, the *a priori* intuitions, that is, the intuitions of space and time in general, it by no means follows that these last may not be perceived along with the first. Kant establishes three things: 1. That in every empirical intuition of determinate space or time, there is always and necessarily the intuition of space or time in general; 2. That this intuition of space or time in general is not logically obtainable from empirical intuition *in the sense he defines empirical intuition;* 3. Which is only a corollary from the first, that, in order to be able to have intuition of determinate space and time, we must be able to have intuition of space and time in general. But in all this he merely proves, that, in order to be able to perceive the determinate, the particular, we must be able to perceive the general, because the particular always presupposes the general. Yet this does not prove his doctrine. In order to prove that, it is not enough to prove that in the intuition of the particular there is always and necessarily intuition of the general, but that the general lies *a priori* in the sensibility, and is supplied from it. But this, so far as we have been able to discover, he does not prove. For, from the fact that the particular is never, or even can never, be perceived without the general, we have no right to conclude that the general is supplied from the sensibility, any more than we have, that the particular itself is supplied from the same source.

Furthermore, space and time are pure relations. They mark the order in which bodies and events stand in our

intuitions, it is agreed; but who dare say that they mark *only* this? Of course, if we accept Kant's doctrine, that the form under which the object is perceived is derived from the subject, we must say so, but this is the very point in question. Kant asserts it, makes it the foundation on which his whole edifice rests, but he nowhere demonstrates it. To assert a doctrine, and then to assume it, as the basis of particular demonstrations, while it is itself undemonstrated, is not, we believe, the general practice of good logicians, and though it may be authorized by the Kantian logic, is repugned by the Aristotelian. Moreover, his general doctrine is not susceptible of demonstration. It is in fact suicidal. If we cannot attain to cognition of things themselves, if we can cognize them only as objects, and as objects only under the forms imposed by the understanding, we can know nothing at all. We do always seem to ourselves to perceive the forms of the object as objective, and if in this our understanding deceives us, it forfeits our confidence, cannot be trusted at all. And no more, when by the Kantian processes, it demonstrates the forms to be subjective, than when, in the apprehension of common sense, it affirms them to be objective.

Then again, Kant assumes, that whatever is necessary, permanent, universal, in the fact of experience, is merely the subject vitally protended. Whence his proof of this? What more limited, mutable, and transitory than this very human *me?* When we come to treat, in the next division, of the Categories, we trust we shall establish the reverse of Kant's doctrine; namely, that the forms of the thought, inasmuch as they are objectively conceived, must needs be objectively derived, and therefore that space and time mark the *real* order and relations of things themselves, and not merely the order in which they stand in our intuitions. Space, properly speaking, is the order in which bodies stand, the relation they bear to one another in the world of reality, and is the order in which we behold them, because we perceive things themselves, and as they exist *a parte rei.* Time is not merely the order in which events *appear* to us to succeed one another, but the order in which they do actually succeed one another. Does the clock keep time for us only when we are awake? Do events stand still when we are unconscious? Does the darkness which conceals bodies from our vision affect their mutual relations? Are there not even animals whose intuitions of space and time coin-

cide with ours? No. When we perceive bodies in space, we perceive them, saving the imperfections of our vision, in their real order and relation; when we perceive events in time, whether in time present, in time past, or in time to come, making the same reserve, we perceive them in the real order of their succession, not as they succeed in our intuitions merely, but as they succeed independently of our intuitions. Any other view than this were fatal to science, by striking at the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculty.

Nor can we accept, without some important qualifications, what Kant and even Cousin say concerning intuitions of space and time, after abstraction is made of their respective contents. They would have us believe that it is possible to conceive of space, even after we have conceived of the absence of all the contents of space, and of time, after having conceived of the absence of all the contents of time Take away in thought the entire universe, and we may still conceive of space as remaining; take away the whole order of succession, and time is left. But this we deny. For space and time are neither forms of the sensibility, as Kant maintains, nor are they entities, as Cousin would seem to teach. They are pure relations, and therefore must needs be inconceivable, where there is nothing related. Space is very conceivable *within* the universe, but not out of it; for it marks the order in which its several parts stand to each other; but without the universe it is inconceivable. What is called *imaginary* space is *imaginary*, or rather a mere word, to which there is no conception to respond. We may always ask of some particular thing, *Where* is it? for that merely asks its relation of coexistence to something else more or less clearly apprehended. But to ask of the universe, as embracing the totality of things, *Where* is it? is absurd; for that asks, What is the relation? where there is nothing related. So of time, we may ask of some particular event, *When* did it occur? for that merely asks its relation, in the order of succession, to some other event, to which we more or less distinctly refer. But to ask of the universe itself, *When* did it begin to exist? or, When will it cease to exist? is absurd; for, besides the universe itself, there is nothing between which and it there is the relation we express by the term *when*, or by the term *where*. Besides the universe, there is no existence but God; and the relation of the universe to him is not that of time or space, but of the effect to its cause.

The speculations about infinite time and infinite space, which play so conspicuous a part in some metaphysical systems, are without any foundation in reality. Neither is or can be infinite. They are not real existences, nor are they purely ideal. Our conceptions of them have their foundation in reality. They are not ideal, for they are real relations; they are not entities, because no relation is an entity. Being relations, they are necessarily bounded by the objects between which they are the relations. Leap the bounds of the universe, and you are not out in illimitable space, but out of space, in IMMENSITY, which is the negation of space; or, to speak more strictly, you are in God, whose being and presence are the bounds of the universe. Pass beyond the limits of all change, of all succession of events, and you are not in time endlessly continued, but in ETERNITY, where time is not,—in God, who is the negation of time, as of space. It is no exalted conception of God to say, that he fills all space, and lives through all time.* He fills immensity, he inhabiteth eternity, and, as we approach him in our thoughts and affections, we rise above time and space, to the Immense and the Eternal. Doubtless, God is virtually present, present by his efficacy, in all space, and through all time; but our true way of regarding him is to regard him as bounding all time and space, as embosoming, so to speak, in his own divine consciousness, all worlds and events, as we embosom in our consciousness our own thoughts and volitions.

But we must pass from the consideration of Transcendental Æsthetics to the second general division, namely,—

II. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

According to Kant, our cognitions spring from two sources, two distinct fundamental faculties; the first of which, sensibility, as we have seen, furnishes us with intuitions; the second, the understanding (*Verstand*), with conceptions. By sensibility the object is *presented*; by understanding it is *thought* or conceived. The first supplies us with the two transcendental intuitions of space and time, the necessary forms of all our intuitions; for, in relation to every object we behold, we may ask, *Where?* and *When?*

* Vide St. Anselm. *Monologium*, c. 22 and 23.

Of these we have already treated, denying that space and time are mere forms of the sensibility, without a foundation objectively in reality (*in re*).

The conceptions, or apprehensions (*Begriffn*), are to the understanding, as we have said, very much what the intuitions are to the sensibility. They are, 1. Empirical, 2. *A priori*, 3. Pure, 4. Transcendental. They may be defined, the seizing, grasping, apprehending, or taking hold by the mind, of the object presented by intuition. But they seize the object only under certain fixed and definite forms. In other words, in like manner as all our empirical intuitions are subjected to the two forms of space and time, so are all our conceptions subjected to certain invariable laws. No object can be beheld, but under the relations of *where* and *when*. So, none can be conceived, save under certain relations, which are denominated the *forms* of the conceptions. For example, if we conceive of some particular thing, we must conceive of it either as subject or as predicate, as substance or as phenomenon, as a whole or as a part, as one or as many, as simple or as composite, as cause or as effect, &c. These necessary and invarible forms of all our thoughts or conceptions are what Kant, after Aristotle, terms the Categories of the Pure Understanding. They are reducible to four orders, namely,—

1. Quantity;
2. Quality;
3. Relation;
4. Modality.

Each of these orders contains three categories,—in all, twelve. QUANTITY contains, 1. Unity, 2. Multiplicity, 3. Totality; QUALITY contains, 1. Reality, 2. Negation, 3. Limitation; RELATION contains, 1. Substance and Accident, 2. Cause and Effect, 3. Community, or reciprocal action of cause and effect; MODALITY, finally, contains, 1. Possibility and Impossibility, 2. Real and Unreal, 3. Necessary and Contingent.

We cannot go into any particular exposition of the Categories. Their exactness we are not disposed to question; but it may be asked, if their number cannot be reduced. From the point of view of logic, it strikes us that they may be reduced to two, namely, subject and predicate; and from the point of view of ontology, to ideal and actual, general and particular, necessary and contingent, being and phe-

nomenon, or, as M. Cousin contends, substance and cause.*

But leaving this question,—by the way, a question which has only a remote connection with our present purpose,—we proceed at once to the principle of the Categories. Whence are they derived? Aristotle had given us the categories of

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* M. Cousin's critics seem to have misapprehended his reduction of the Kantian categories, in consequence of having taken the reduction given in his Course of 1828, instead of that given in his Course of 1818. In the Course of 1828, after his acquaintance with Schlegel, he reduces all our fundamental ideas to three, the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and that of the relation of infinite and finite. But in the Course of 1818, reported by one of his disciples, and published with his authority in 1836, he reduces the Kantian categories to two, namely, substance and cause, using the term cause not to designate the force that causes, but the simple action of causing, a use of the word to which we find it difficult to reconcile ourselves. "Cause," he says, "is distinguished from being; being is not action, but resides at the bottom of all actions. Action [according to him, synonymous with cause] is the phenomenon, the quality, the accident, the manifold, the particular, the individual, the relative, the possible, the probable, the contingent, the diverse, the finite; these are all reducible to the single category of cause. Being, as Kant says, the *noumenon*, is the subject, the unity, the absolute, the necessary, the universal, the eternal, the identical, the infinite. We may, then, reduce all the subdivisions to the two fundamental ideas of SUBSTANCE and CAUSE. If it be objected, that under the category of cause there are the two ideas of cause and effect, and under that of substance the two ideas of being and accident; we reply, that the effect always reacts on the cause, and becomes in turn itself a cause, and causality displaying itself on the theatre of phenomena absorbs the accident in the cause. Besides causality, then, there is only substance."—*Cours de Philosophie*, 1818, publié par Adolphe Garnier. Paris: 1836, p. 34.

The assertion, that the effect always reacts on the cause, is not correct. The universe does not react on its Creator, for creation introduces no change in God, who is immutable. The effect, taken strictly, is never a cause in relation to *its* cause, but effect merely; but each effect, however, becomes in turn a cause in relation to its own effects. My acts unquestionably react upon me, but never so far forth as they are purely my acts. But what I call my acts are only partially mine. Other causes besides myself have been engaged in producing them; and it is as effects of those other causes, which give them a certain independence of me, that they react on me. Moreover, nothing seems to us more certain than that cause and effect are irreducible to one and the same category. In our view, the category of cause is identically the category of substance; for our radical conception of substance is, not that it is that which has the power to cause, but that which *is* cause, and it is substance only so far forth as it is cause. Cause is the causer. But that which is not cannot cause; and again, that which does not cause really or virtually is not. Cause, then, is the substance, the being. M. Cousin, then, would have been more correct, and he must pardon us for saying, more faithful to his own philosophy, if, instead of saying the subdivisions of Kant are reducible to the two ideas of substance and cause, he had said they are reducible to the two ideas of cause and effect, or, as we ourselves prefer to say, *being* and *phenomenon*.

reason, or the necessary forms of every logical proposition. These are the ten predicaments; namely, *Substance*, *Quantity*, *Quality*, *Relation*, *Where*, *When*, *Situation*, *Habit*, *Action*, *Passion*. But Aristotle derives his categories, ontologically, from the object. He holds philosophy to be the science of life, or of things; and his purpose is, to determine what are the forms under which any real being does or can become an object of thought. He therefore derives the categories from the thing, or at least holds them to be founded objectively *in re*, and makes them the necessary forms of the conception, because they are the necessary forms of the thing conceived. Kant, on the contrary, denying the capacity of the human mind to cognize the *noumenon*, and conceding only its capacity to cognize the phenomenon, and, therefore, the object only so far forth as object, not as thing, contends that the categories are derived from the subject, and are the *a priori* forms of the pure understanding, which it imposes on the object conceived. They are the forms under which the object is cognized, not because they are the necessary forms of the object considered as thing existing objectively *in re*, but because they are the necessary forms of the human understanding itself. The principle of the Kantian categories is, therefore, directly the reverse of that of the Aristotelian. Aristotle held that the human mind can attain to a knowledge of things, and therefore to the knowledge of the forms of things. This Kant positively denies.

That we do cognize all objects under the categories which Kant enumerates, or the two to which, after M. Cousin, we may reduce them, is undeniable. That these are the invariable and necessary forms of every cognition, we contend as earnestly as the stanchest Kantian; but this is not the question. The question we raise is, Do we always cognize under the categories, because they are the *a priori* forms of the understanding, or because they are the forms of things themselves? This is the question, and a question that goes to the truth or falsity, as a system, of the whole Kantian philosophy.

In answer to this question, we begin by remarking that Kant deceives himself, when he supposes that he is really investigating the faculty of intelligence; for that faculty is not only simple, and therefore not susceptible of analysis, but it is, so far as it is any thing positive, the subject itself, indistinguishable, as we have shown in our former article,

from the *me*. The investigation of this faculty, then, must needs be the investigation of the subject investigating, and therefore not of the object investigated. What is that which investigates? The intelligent *me*. What is that which is investigated? The intelligent *me*. The *me* is *me*, and always equal to itself. The subject and the object are the same, and absolutely indistinguishable. But if so, the *me* investigating — the *me* investigated, and hence to investigate — to be investigated. That is to say, it is all the same thing to strike, or to be struck! But certainly the object investigated is distinguishable from the subject investigating, by this fact, at least, that it is investigated, while the subject investigates. But the *me* — *me*, according to our postulate, and therefore can in no sense whatever be distinguished from itself. Consequently, the *me* can never be its own object. Consequently, again, it is not the living subjective faculty of intelligence, that Kant is really analyzing.

We are aware that this doctrine is controverted. In these days of wonderful discoveries, it has been discovered, if we may believe our modern psychologists, that we may by the interior light called consciousness observe ourselves, all the same as the external world by our senses; and hence the late Professor Jouffroy wrote an elaborate essay, which one of our friends has translated, to establish a parallel between physical science and psychology, and to prove that the principle and method of each are the same. We ourselves gave into the same notion for a time, and talked largely, if not wisely, about the interior light of consciousness. But M. Leroux, notwithstanding his many and fatal errors, and the radical unsoundness of his leading doctrines, has triumphantly refuted M. Jouffroy, in his *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme;* and we think we have ourselves done the same over and over again, and especially in our Essays on *Synthetic Philosophy*.

The *me*, doubtless, can study itself; but only in its phenomena, not in itself. Consciousness is not a special faculty, as one would gather from the Scottish school; nor is it an interior light, distinguishable from the light of the senses, as M. Jouffroy teaches, and, we are sorry to say, as M. Cousin himself, though not without some misgivings, also teaches. There is in consciousness no *direct* intuition of the *me*. The *me* finds itself in every conscious act, but only as the subject acting. Thus, I must do somewhat in

order to know that I am, and then I know only that I am the doer of that somewhat. Hence, Descartes is obliged to affirm *cogito*, before he can affirm *sum*. *Cogito, ergo sum;* not because he infers *sum* from *cogito*, but because, save in the act *I think*, he could not find the fact *I am*. If I could have direct, immediate intuition of myself, that is, if I could be my own object, I should not be obliged to have recourse to the phenomenon of thinking in order to affirm myself, for I could affirm myself immediately, without the intervention of the phenomenon. But this is not possible.

Kant says, *I am, I think, I judge*, accompanies every synthetic judgment, and in this he is right; but as subject, not as object; for, in order to complete the sense, I must add, I am something (*aliquid*), for instance, actor, doer, lover, thinker, &c., and that I think, I judge something. The *me* can affirm itself only as subject, and therefore can never affirm itself by the pronoun without the verb. Thus, *I am, I think, I judge, is* the subject, the form under which it recognizes itself in the fact of consciousness. Consequently, the object, as the correlative of subject, must be distinguished from it, and therefore be *not me*. The doctrine we are here insisting upon is by no means so new, so recondite, or so contrary to the general belief, as may at first sight be supposed. Every body, in fact, admits it, though every body may not comprehend it in all its bearings; for every body believes, that, in order to ascertain what are our powers, we must exercise them. I learn that I can think by thinking, that I am capable of love by loving, and of devotion by worshipping. There is not a single faculty or property of my nature that I can know, till it is brought into exercise. All will admit this. Then all do really, whether they know it or not, admit that the *me* can study itself only in the phenomenon. Consequently, it is not, and cannot be, the direct object of its own intuition; and hence Kant very properly teaches that it can have intuition of itself only in the diverse, that is, in the *not me*.

Assuming this, the categories are not, and cannot be, derived from the subject, for they are confessedly forms of the object, and in the fact of perception are objectively perceived. If they are the *a priori* forms of the understanding, they are the *a priori* forms of the subject; for we have before proved that the understanding, as cognitive force, is indistinguishable from the subject itself. If they are the forms of the subject, they are identically the subject; for

we have also proved that there is no distinction admissible between the subject and its inneity. In every fact of perception the subject always distinguishes itself from the object. If, then, they are the subject, they must, in every perception, be distinguished from the object, and be recognized, not as pertaining to the object, but as pertaining to the subject. They could not be perceived as forms of the object, but would be perceived as forms of the subject. They would be included in *I am, I think, I judge.* But they are objectively perceived, or, if the term be preferred, objectively *conceived;* for they are the invariable forms under which the object we conceive, whatever it be, is conceived. Therefore they are object, and not subject. For, again, if the *me*, as Kant himself agrees, cannot observe itself as object, but only indirectly as subject, it follows necessarily, that it cannot observe its forms as object, for its forms are indistinguishable from itself. Just so certain, therefore, as we see objects at all, just so certain is it that the forms under which we see them are object, and not subject.

This is conclusive. But nevertheless some may object to our conclusion what we have already conceded; namely, that the *formal* existence of some objects of knowledge is subjective; for this concedes that the forms of the object may be imposed by the subject. But we must distinguish between *negative* forms and *positive* forms. In the cases we alleged, the conceptions all had their foundation in reality, and were *formally* subjective, but virtually objective. The conception differs as to form from the object, not through the addition of something to the object as existing *in re*, but through inadequacy, owing to the limited nature of our faculties, which is insufficient to take in the whole reality. Thus, we are compelled to regard the divine wisdom and goodness as separate attributes, because our faculties are too limited to grasp them in their identity. In this case, we add nothing to the thing conceived, but fail to conceive all that is in it. This affects the adequacy of our conceptions, but not their validity. This same inadequacy, in a degree, probably, attends all our conceptions of all objects whatever; for the reality is always greater than we conceive. Negatively, then, all conceptions may be formally subjective.

But in regard to the categories, the case is different. They are not the negation of our faculties, nor the limitation of our intellectual activity. They are not the *terminus* of

our conceptions of objects, but are assumed to be something positively added by the subject to the object, without which the object could not be conceive l. They make up an integral part of the conception, and are conceived, in conceiving the object, as objectively as the object itself. Now the difference between a conception objectively valid, that is, a conception of something which exists objectively *in re*, but formally limited by the inadequacy of our power to take in the whole thing, and a conception formally *augmented* by the addition of a positive element from the resources of the subject, it strikes us is very great and very obvious. Because a negative form is subjective, that is to say, a form which is merely privative, we are not at liberty to say a positive form, in which there is that not in the object, is also subjective. Consequently, the concession as to negative forms, or inadequate conceptions, does not invalidate the argument.

We resume; the *me* being always itself, and always equal to itself, and being also always the subject thinking, it can never be the object thought. This establishes at once, saving the inadequacy of the conceptions, the reality of every object of conception, and proves that the object must be, as thing, at least, all that it is as the correlative of subject. Here is the complete refutation of Idealism, or of what we, in our classification of doctrines of science, have termed Intellectualism.—a refutation of both Kant and Berkeley.

Moreover, Kant's proofs of his own doctrine make against him, rather than for him. What is it, in fact, that he establishes? Simply, that every cognition of the particular involves cognition of the general, that every cognition of the phenomenon involves cognition of the *noumenon*, that every cognition of effect involves cognition of cause. But he himself admits that all cognition begins with experience. Whence, then, his proof, or whence, then, any possible proof, that the general, the *noumenon*, the cause, is not itself as much empirically given as the particular, the phenomenon, the effect? By what principle of logic are we to infer, from the fact that in every cognition of the particular there is also cognition of the general, that the general is not empirically given, but furnished *a priori* by the subject?

Kant sustains this inference, apparently so illogical, and really so in our estimation, by an arbitrary and incomplete definition of experience. He restricts experience to the effect, the phenomenon, the particular, the contingent; and then, because the cause, the *noumenon*, the general, the

necessary, is found in every empirical synthetic judgment, concludes that it is not derived or derivable from experience, but must necessarily lie *a priori* in the understanding. But by what right is experience so restricted? My sole knowledge of my ability, and of the extent of my ability, to know, is derived from knowing; so is my sole knowledge of the reach of experience derived from experience. I can measure my ability to experience only by what I find in experience. If, on analyzing experience, I find it to contain universally certain given elements, the legitimate induction is, that these elements are given by experience, and that any definition of experience which excludes them is *primâ facie* defective.

Kant, we have already proved, is, as to doctrines of science, a SENSIST; and as to doctrines of life, so far as he is any thing, he must, therefore, be a MATERIALIST. He restricts all our knowledge to sensible intuitions, and sensible intuition to objects which do or may affect the senses. We are aware that this is not the common opinion. His admirers would have us believe that he has triumphantly refuted the sensism of Locke and Condillac, and that he is a stanch spiritualist; but we are unable to conceive how any man can read his *Critic* with the least understanding, and not perceive that he restricts all experience, *minus* the subject experiencing, to objects of sensible intuition; that is, to such objects as are capable of furnishing us with sensations, which is all that Locke or even Condillac does. If this does not make a man a sensist and a materialist, in case he admit the objective reality of the intuitions, words have lost their meaning, and the sooner we get a new dictionary the better. Taking experience in this restricted sense, Kant's conclusion is of course undeniable; but he has no right to take it in this restricted sense, because in this sense, as he himself shows, it does not contain all that we find in experience.

Kant's great problem, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* formed? becomes important, nay, a problem at all, only in consequence of this arbitrary and unwarrantable definition of experience, and the false view which it compels him to take of reality. In every synthetic judgment *a priori*, he contends, there is an element added not contained in the objects of experience. In any given fact of experience, the *noumenon* is joined to the phenomenon, the general to the particular, the cause to the effect. But

experience attains only to the effect. How, then, do I, in my judgment, become able to add to it the conception of cause, and especially of necessary cause? Experience attains only to the phenomenon; but, in my judgment, I add to phenomenon the conception of the *noumenon*. How is this done? Whence do I obtain this *noumenon*, which lies wholly out of the range of all possible experience, and become able to join to the empirical subject a predicate not contained in it? This is the problem. But in all this it is assumed that experience attains only to the effect, the phenomenon, and the element joined in the synthesis to the empirical object is not contained in the object; that is, that the cause is not in the effect, the *noumenon* in the phenomenon, the general in the particular.

This assumption is also made by Hume, for Kant and Hume both agree as to the nature and reach of experience. With both, empiricism and sensism are synonymous. Neither admits the capacity of the soul to have experience of intelligible objects (*νοήματα*), but both confine it strictly to sensible objects (*αἰσθήματα* and *φαντάσματα*). And why? Because they make a prior assumption, that, ontologically considered, the intelligible world lies wholly out of the region of the sensible world, that the *noumenon*, as Kant terms it, that is, the being (*esse*), is not in the phenomenon, the cause is disjoined from the effect. For, if the *noumenon*, ontologically considered, were in the phenomenon, the cause in the effect, inseparably united, there would be no more difficulty in conceiving that the former should be really experienced than there is that the latter should be. The two being ontologically inseparable, we ought, in case we have intuition of things as they exist in reality, to perceive them, and to conceive them, always as inseparably united, precisely as we do.

But Hume, assuming the two categories, the category of cause and that of effect, to be disjoined objectively, was extremely puzzled to ascertain how it happens that they are always strictly united in the conception, that is, subjectively. He finally resolved the problem by recourse to habit or association, contracted from having frequently observed that certain things uniformly accompany certain other things, in the order of antecedence and consequence. Kant detects and shows the inadequacy of this solution, and attempts a new one; namely, that the conception of the category of cause is purely subjective, lying *a priori* in the understand-

ing, and is by it added in the synthetic judgment to the category of effect. But this removes no real difficulty; for the real difficulty was not so much how this synthesis is formed, as what is its validity when formed. On Kant's hypothesis, it has no validity, because there is nothing in reality to correspond to it; it is a conception without an object, and therefore void. Hence, as to the reality of science, it leaves us precisely where we were left by Hume. It refutes Hume's solution of the problem, but it confirms Hume's scepticism.

Assuming Kant's hypothesis, it does not advance our science at all. For to say, that in synthetic judgments we add the category of cause, is only saying, in other words, that in every cognition we always couple the conception of cause with that of effect, which was the fact to be explained. All admit the fact. The question is, The reason of the fact, and its value? The truth is, the fact itself is inexplicable from the purely psychological point of view, and nothing better proves it than the abortive attempts of Hume and Kant, both men of the highest order of metaphysical genius, and either of whom would have explained it, had it been explicable by the method adopted. We have said more than once, that science, or knowing, is inexplicable psychologically. Every psychologist inevitably, if he push his principles to their last conclusions, ends in scepticism. This lies in the nature of things, because *science is not a purely psychological fact.* There is no seeing where nothing is *seen*, no knowing where nothing is *known*. To explain the fact of science, what Kant calls a synthetic judgment *a priori*, we must have a doctrine of life; for we see things so and so, because they exist so and so *a parte rei*. Thus the two categories are connected in the thought, because they are so connected ontologically, and because we see things, so far as we see them at all, as they really exist.

A true doctrine of life, or ontology, will show us that the *noumenon* is in the phenomenon, the cause in the effect, the general in the particular, the necessary in the contingent; and therefore we see or detect, more or less obscurely, no doubt, the first category in the second. God is the Creator, the Cause, of the world; but is present with it, for he is declared to be present with all his works, for it is only in him that they are, and are sustained. And hence it is that we may *find* him in his works, as says St. Paul, "*Invisi-*

bilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas."—Rom. i. 20. Were it not so, the argument *a posteriori* could in no case be valid, and the cause would in no sense be revealed by the effect. Nay, the cause would never be worth seeking for, for it would be to us nothing but an empty name.

We must, however, in asserting that each category is an object of experience, that is to say, objectively and empirically derived, beware of the error of the mystics and exclusive spiritualists, who will have it that we can attain to the intelligible world immediately, that we can rise to cognition of cause without the medium of the effect. Humanity, in relation to individuals, belongs to the first of the two categories to which we have reduced the subdivisions of Kant. But humanity, abstracted from individual men and women, who participate of it and reveal it, is incognizable, is no object of knowledge. God is cognoscible, but, in the present life, only as revealed in his works, that is, his works of creation, providence and grace. The beatified will see God face to face as he is, as says St. Paul, "*Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate; tunc autem facie ad faciem;*" for "we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we shall see him as he is," as says St. John. But, at present, it is only darkly we see him, only in part that we know him, through the medium of the effect; not till we are glorified, shall we be able to have the beatific vision of cause in itself, and then only by a supernatural light.

The doctrine of the reality of ideas, of the true, the beautiful, and the good, is a true doctrine; and that we have real experience of ideas, objectively, as much so as of sensible objects, is, we hold, an unquestionable fact; but it is only in the category of the phenomenon, of the effect, the particular, the contingent, that we cognize them. But as the ideal is always in the actual, so in the intuition of the actual we have intuition of the ideal. Hence it is, that, in the cognition of effect, I have always the conception of cause. Consequently, the element which Kant assumes to lie out of the fact of experience, and to be added *a priori* in the synthesis, does not lie out of the fact of experience, and is, in fact, not a synthetic judgment, but an analytic judgment, or, if synthetic, it is synthetic *a posteriori*. Consequently, there are no synthetic judgments *a priori;* and Kant's problem, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* formed? ceases to be a problem. The question he raises,

he raises in consequence of a misapprehension; and he never could have asked it, if he had had a doctrine of life, for it has no foundation in ontology.

We have said, that, admitting Kant's doctrine, no progress is made in explaining the fact of science. What, after all, is disclosed by his labors, that gives us either a more or a less solid ground of certainty? We know by the representation of objects *plus* what we ourselves add to it. We add the forms of the intuition, the forms of the conception, and the synthetic judgment *a priori*, by which we unite the intuition and conception into a cognition, and this cognition to *I am*, so that it is not only cognition, but *my* cognition. What says all this beyond simply saying, *I know*? And when it is said, I am capable, by means of sensibility and understanding, of intuitions and conceptions *a priori* and transcendental, and, by means of these, of cognition *a posteriori*, what is said beyond the simple fact, that I am intelligent? Who says, *I know*, says, to say the least, all that Kant has said; and who says, *I am intelligent*, says all that can be said in explanation of the fact of intelligence from the point of view of psychology. No analysis can reduce *I know* to a lower denomination, or resolve it into separate elements. They, who explain or undertake to explain vision by talking of the rays of light falling on the retina and painting thereon the image or picture of the object, add nothing to our knowledge of the visual faculty itself, and aid us not at all in solving the real mystery of vision. They merely explain, granting them all they allege, —much of which we hold to be very questionable,—some of the external conditions under which the fact of vision usually takes place. No anatomizing of the eye brings us in the least nearer to the visual force. It is just as difficult to explain how the mind sees the image reflected on the retina, as it would be to explain how it could see the object itself without the intervention of the image. The insertion of the *species*, or the *representation*, between the object and the understanding explains nothing. How is the representation itself cognized? If the intuition be not cognition, how will you make it cognition? In all our investigations we assume that we know. This, to say the least, is an inevitable necessity. The only questions for us, then, are, What do we know? and, How can we know more than we do?

If we go further, and ask, How do we know? or, Why do we know under this or that form? we must go to ontol-

ogy, to things themselves. I see things because they are; and under this or that form, because they so exist objectively *in re*. If I perceive the particular only in the general, and the general only in the particular, it is because, though distinct, they are inseparable, in the constitution of things. Rise to the comprehension of the Platonic ontology, especially to Christian theology, and the whole matter becomes plain enough. Below that elevation it is necessarily inexplicable.

More we intended to add, more we shall add, when we come to treat of the doctrines of life or philosophy properly so called; but we have reached our limits, and are tired of the task of laboring to refute an author who is always able, always profound, but always wrong in his fundamental principles. We have labored in review of Kant till we are tired of him, and we have no doubt that our readers will readily allow us to dismiss him. We have aimed to comprehend his doctrine, aimed to set it forth correctly, and to meet it fairly. If we have done him any injustice, it has been unintentional. We took up his work with a profound reverence for it. We had been accustomed, by those whose opinions we most valued, to look upon Kant as the great metaphysician of modern times; we expected much; we have found—nothing. There may be depths in the *Critic* we have not sounded, diamonds that we have not discovered; but we have sounded to the depth of our line, and we have searched diligently for the gems which might be concealed at the bottom; but, alas! we have found nothing but bald atheism, and cold and heartless scepticism, erected into a system bearing all the imposing forms of science. We have labored to refute its fundamental principles, because we believe them adopted by large numbers who have never read Kant himself, and because we would do what we can to atone for our own former philosophical and theological errors, and aid as we can in recalling the age to a religious philosophy, in consonance with the profound mysteries of the Christian faith. We hope we have not labored in vain.

AN A PRIORI AUTOBIOGRAPHY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1850.]

This work appears without the author's name; but we presume we betray no confidence in saying that it is by a Unitarian minister, in whom, while he was pursuing his preparatory studies, we took a deep personal interest, and who was one of our most intimate and highly esteemed young friends. If we submit, in the course of the following remarks, some of its reasonings and speculations to a severe, this fact may assure the author that it is to no unfriendly, criticism.

The author inscribes his work to "Citoyen Pierre Leroux, Republican and Philosopher," and tells us that the materials requisite for its construction are to be found in the works of Jacob Boehme, Fabre d'Olivet, and P. J. B. Buchez; but this, though creditable to his independence and frankness, can hardly be regarded as a recommendation of his work itself. We have, it is true, never studied the writings of Jacob Boehme, but we have looked into them far enough to see that their author was a wild enthusiast, who mistook his own heated fancies for the illuminations of the Holy Ghost. Fabre d'Olivet we know only as cited by Leroux in his *L'Humanité*; but we hazard nothing in classing him with those profound scholars who draw their erudition from their theories, and then support their theories by it. Buchez, best known to our public as the first President of the French National Assembly, appears to be a man of moderate abilities and respectable attainments, a half disciple of La Mennais, and a visionary, who would conform the Church to the spirit of the age, and make her on earth the Church Triumphant, by effecting an impossible amalgamation between Catholicity and modern pantheistic Socialism. All three are men with whom we have little sympathy, and the last from whose works we should expect materials suitable for a work to be composed and published by a professedly Christian minister.

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*Remarks on the Science of History; followed by an *a priori* Autobiography. Boston. 1849.

Leroux is, unquestionably, a man of ability, endowed with no small portion of the philosophical spirit, and possessed of various and extensive, though ill-digested, erudition. He has been well characterized by M. Lerminier, in one of the French periodicals,—we cannot now recollect which,—as an author with "numerous notions on a variety of subjects, but acquired in a manner somewhat confused," as having "more fervor of spirit than strength of mind, more impetuosity in the pursuit of ideas than power to master and translate them, and more boldness of imagination than solidity of judgment." The present writer, as editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, had, we believe, the very questionable honor of being the first to introduce him to the American public; and we cannot deny that there was a brief period when he exerted a very great influence over our own philosophical speculations. Indeed, the study of his writings formed an epoch in our mental history, and we drew largely upon him in constructing our *Synthetic Philosophy*, some chapters of which were published in *The Democratic Review* for 1842 and 1843; and we are indebted to him for much that is sound, and nearly all that is unsound, chimerical, extravagant, and pantheistic, in the various philosophical essays which we published during the period beginning with January, 1842, and ending with July, 1844, and which we hope no one will regard as indicative of the philosophical doctrines we have since held or now hold.

We learned, it is true, much from Leroux, which we have seen no reason to reject, but still more which we now regard as false and absurd. We learned from him to substitute, intentionally at least, the ontological method of philosophizing for the psychological, which we had hitherto professed, and this was much; but, unhappily, we learned from him, at the same time, a vicious ontology, conducting, though we saw it not then, necessarily to pantheism or nihilism. We learned from him, though for false and insufficient reasons, to respect scientific tradition, the continuity of science through the ages, and that every system which breaks it is to be rejected,—a great and important truth; but we learned from him to confound scientific and theological tradition, and to subject both to a psychological instead of an ontological test. We learned from him to assert the direct intuition of ideas, or the intelligible, as Reid has taught us to assert the direct perception of bodies,—a fact, the neglect or denial of which has ruined modern philosophy; but

we were, at the same time, led by him to disregard all distinction between intuition and reflection, and therefore to contend that reflection, as well as intuition, reproduces the order of being; which involves the absurdity of supposing that, in the order of being, the abstract precedes the concrete, the possible the real, and that the creator is fulfilled or completed in the creature. In fine, we learned from him to assert an ontological basis for Christianity, and to regard the Christian mysteries as great ontological truths or facts; but were led by him to assert natural ontology, or the ontological truths and facts of the natural order, in the place of those of the supernatural order, the peculiarly Christian ontology. These errors vitiated the truths we borrowed from Leroux, and which we might better have learned from far purer sources, if we had had any thing like that acquaintance with philosophical literature which every one should have who assumes the attitude of a teacher of philosophy.

The author of the small, but ambitious and not insignificant volume before us, appears to have adopted from Leroux, substantially, these same truths, coupled with these same errors, however widely he may differ from his master in his development of them. He is not a plagiarist, he is not a mere compiler, but he fails to give his own fine metaphysical genius fair play. He thinks and writes too much under the influence of masters, and relies with too generous a confidence on the acuteness, depth, and erudition of the school to which he finds himself accidentally attached. In consequence of this, though possessing the capacity for original thought, and no ordinary aptitude for free and independent philosophical speculation, he does not work freely, and gives us, after all, little else than what we may find in the authors he has studied. He will, we trust, emancipate himself, one of these days, and justify the expectation we long ago indulged, that he would prove a valuable contributor to American philosophical science.

The author has bestowed much thought and labor on his work, and yet it bears the marks of haste. It is not equally elaborated throughout, and it wants artistic conception and finish. Its several parts do not seem to us to cohere, or to have originated in the same design. We feel, in reading it, that it lacks unity and regular scientific development. It is not easy to discover the connection between the author's Remarks on the Science of History, and his *A priori* Autobiography, which follows, avowedly for the purpose of illus-

trating and verifying them. The Autobiography is said to be constructed according to the *a priori* methods; that is, as we understand it, deduced, geometrically, from necessary and eternal principles. No such principles appear to be enunciated, and there is nothing in the Autobiography itself to lead one to regard it as any thing else than an autobiographical sketch of the religious experience of a serious young man, of a speculative turn, exhibiting with spirit and fidelity the various doubts he encountered, and the methods and reasonings by which he solved or attempted to solve them. But as the author really has a philosophical genius, we must presume that he connects the several parts of his work in his own mind, and has, underlying them, a philosophy which he regards as moulding them all into a uniform and systematic whole. This philosophy, which he presupposes rather than states, we must seize in the best way we can, and appreciate, as the condition of understanding and appreciating what he has written.

It is evident from the Remarks on the Science of History, with which the author prefaces his *A priori* Autobiography, that he holds,—1st, that the human race is progressive, and that the history of its progress is universal history; 2d, that universal history may be written in the form of the biography of any given individual; and 3d, that biography, and therefore universal history, may be constructed *a priori*. The following extract will clearly prove this much:

"Desire, according to Buchez, the first President of the present French National Assembly, is a movement of the will, an outbreak, and energetic operation, of the active principle, toward something we have not as yet.

"When we do not understand our desire, we are conscious of uneasiness, doubt, and trouble: as soon, however, as the intelligence begins to comprehend the blind appetency, a formula for it rises to the mind, and it becomes transformed at once into acceptation, hope, determinate volition, aspiration in view of an ideal, a conviction, a form of faith, a belief, &c.;—*it becomes, moreover, a thesis proposed for reasoning.* Thus the movement for the comprehension of a desire may be considered as containing the progress and completion of a distinct event, viz. the acquisition of a clearly defined sentiment; and, for this reason, that movement may be subdivided as follows: (1.) The appetency, or longing tendency, toward something we do not possess, and of whose nature we have no clear apprehension; (2.) The reasoning we institute within ourselves to discover the origin of our uneasiness,—to discover also the object which is necessary for the satisfaction of our desires; (3.) The

full and conscious act of desire, which is the operation of instinctive tendencies, with an open knowledge of the object desired.

"The progress of any event, in which men are actors, takes place always in three stages: the first is the great epoch of DESIRE, which is subdivided, as we have seen, into three sub-epochs; the second is the great epoch of REASONING, wherein are discovered the ways and means by which the object necessary in order to the gratification of desire may be obtained; and the last is the great epoch of EXECUTION or REALIZATION. The epochs of Reasoning and Execution are, like that of Desire, each of them subdivided into three sub-epochs,—as shall be fully exemplified in the sequel.

"These three Grand Epochs, each of which is composed of three sub-epochs, form, when taken together, the great Logical Series by Nines, the series of Buchez.*

"No example, in illustration of the movement of this series, would carry so much conviction to the mind of the reader, as one that could be verified by each individual from his own private experience: such an example is possible for us, for the ordinary process of a religious experience lends itself very readily for the purposes of scientific investigation, and, moreover, fulfils the requisite conditions. To test, therefore, the correctness of the serial order and movement, we will proceed to construct, by the *a priori* methods, a sort of imaginary spiritual Autobiography. And we shall take the liberty, for the sake of securing facility of composition, and avoiding circumlocution, to commence at once by speaking in the first person.

"The method of writing universal history under the form of a biography, and of writing biography under the forms of universal history, is philosophically correct.

"As it was necessary for the race to go through the Mosaic dispensation, in order to become prepared for the reception of Christianity, so it was necessary for it to go through the Patriarchal dispensation, in order to become prepared for the religion revealed through Moses. In like manner, in the experience of the private Christian, the understanding of the Old Testament must pave the way for the understanding of the New. Every thing moves forward in regular progressions. He who *thoroughly* understands the present epoch must have reproduced, and lived through, in his private experience, all the religions, dispensations, and civilizations that preceded it."—pp. v. viii.

1. That mankind are progressive, though not in the sense the modern progressists, or humanists, pretend, we do not dispute, and could not, without denying the propriety of all efforts for their moral, physical, intellectual, and religious improvement, and of all exhortations, admonitions, instruc-

* *Introduction to the Science of History*, by P. J. B. Buchez.

tions, schools, colleges, seminaries, and churches. But it is no less certain that they are also retrogressive, and that, if in one time or place they advance, they in another decline and suffer deterioration. Their history, or what the author terms universal history, must take note of this fact, and record the decline and fall of individuals, of nations, states, and empires, as well as their rise and progress. The author's conception of history, then, omits a very real and a very important class of facts, and is therefore inadequate.

2. The history of mankind can be written in the form of biography only on condition that there is no difference between individual and individual, and none between the individual and the species, which, since the species is identical in all individuals, is to deny all individual existence, and therefore all existences,—for existence is, and must be, individual. *Genera* and *species* are, no doubt, very real; but, considered apart from individuals, in which they are concreted, their reality is God, and distinct or distinguishable from him they *are* not. As God, they are the possibility of actual existences, but are themselves only possible, not actual, existences. But history is always of the actual, and existence resolved into its possibility has no history. If, then, the author admits no difference between individual and *species*, he cannot write history at all; for there is then no history conceivable. If he admits a difference between individual and species, he cannot write universal history in the form of biography, or biography in the form of universal history; for biography must note what is peculiar to one individual, and history must record, not only what is common to all individuals, but also that wherein different ages and nations differ from one another. The biography of Theodore Parker will not be the biography of Plato; nor the biography of Aristotle, or even that of our author, the history of all men. It is true, the author cites Ralph Waldo Emerson in proof of his doctrine, but the passage he cites is not precisely to his purpose; besides, Mr. Emerson is not conclusive philosophical authority.

3. But passing over this, neither history nor biography can be written *a priori*, because the supposition denies free creation, that is to say all creation, and then all contingent existence, and therefore all existences, as distinguishable from necessary Being, or God. To write or construct *a priori* is to deduce from necessary principles their eternal and necessary consequences. *A priori* reasoning is simply

analysis, and gives only what is already contained in the matter analyzed; for nothing can be in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If the premises are necessary and eternal, the consequences must be necessary and eternal; and if the premises are not necessary and eternal, the reasoning is not, strictly speaking, *a priori*. To assert that history can be constructed *a priori* is, then, either to assert that history takes note only of the essences or forms of things, or that all men, nay, all existences, are necessary and eternal. The author can assert neither; not the latter, because if he makes all existences necessary and eternal, he identifies them with God, and denies them as existences, and of course what is not can have no history; not the former, because the essences or forms of things are necessary and eternal, as he himself strenuously maintains; and the necessary and eternal has no history, for it is immutable and immovable, neither progressive nor retrogressive. History is predicable only of the contingent, subjected to the accidents of space and time; and if the author denies space and time, he cannot assert his theory of the progress of the race by the "great logical series by nines," which, though logical, he evidently holds to be also chronological. Evidently, then, the author is mistaken in saying that history or biography can be constructed *a priori;* for the only condition on which he can suppose it would deny its possibility, by asserting that existences are necessary and eternal, therefore only necessary and eternal modes or affections of the Divine Being, who, as not subjected to the accidents of space and time, has and can have no history.

But waiving this, the author's theory of history is inconsistent with itself. He is, like Buchez and Leroux, a devout believer in progress. He holds, as may be seen from the passage cited, that mankind commence their career in space and time at the lowest conceivable point, in the epoch of Desire, and in the lowest sub-epoch of this grand epoch, namely, in that of mere "blind appetency," and that they gradually work their way up through the several epochs and sub-epochs to the grand epoch of Execution or of Realization, both logically and chronologically. But from the connection he asserts between history and biography, it is evident that he holds that every individual of every successive generation must commence at the same point, and traverse the same number of epochs, and in the same order. Where, then, is the progress of mankind? Their progress would

seem to be in a circle, that is, a progress in which there is no advance. The ages accumulate nothing; every new-born individual has to begin where the first began, and no one can derive any advantage from his predecessors.

Assuming that the starting-point for the race and for the individual is in mere blind appetency, the author takes, as the point of departure for his Autobiography, the mere blind *religious* appetency, and conducts himself, step by step, through his several epochs and sub-epochs, to the grand epoch of Realization, that is, the realization of the appetency in full scientific belief in God and the Christian revelation,—at least such is his pretension. But in reading his work, we cannot help feeling that he very effectually refutes himself; for his reasoning powers appear to have been as fully developed in the first epoch as in the last, and the reasons by which he sustains his doubts to be every whit as conclusive as those by which he sustains his belief. He, moreover, does not adhere rigidly to his plan of proceeding, by geometrical reasoning, from blind appetency to its final realization. His chain of deduction, here and there, lacks a link, and he is obliged to *toggle* it with frequent sudden revelations. These sudden revelations are of great assistance to him, and appear as accommodating as were the gods to Homer, when the blind old bard wished to excuse or cover the retreat of a favorite hero, or enable him to elude a blow which might send him prematurely to the land of shadows. We trust this is the only likeness between them and the Homeric gods, and far be it from us to intimate that they proceed from the author's imagination.

We cannot follow the author, step by step, through his Autobiography, of which we are to presume that he is himself no more the subject than is every other man. All we can do is to seize upon a few prominent points, which will serve best to bring out his philosophy, and enable us to set forth what we regard as his more fundamental errors. It is clear to the philosophical reader, that his theory is based, on the one hand, on the Cartesian enthymem, *cogito, ergo sum*, and on a false Platonism, on the other. The pretension of Cartesianism is to demonstrate, after the manner of the geometricians, from the simple sentiment or conception of our personal existence, or rather entity, the being of God and the existence of the universe,—an absurd pretension, which vitiates all modern philosophy, and leads, as Gioberti has unanswerably proved, necessarily to the sensism of

Locke and Condillac, and the scepticism and atheism of the French school, on the one side, and on the other, to the pantheism of Spinoza and of the recent German philosophers. Nothing can be deduced from the conception of our personal existence, regarded as entity, but that existence itself; for deduction is analysis, and analysis adds nothing to the intuition, as Kant has forever settled in his masterly *Critik der reinen Vernunft*. Hence it is that the syllogism, which is nothing but the instrument of analysis, as Mill in his *Logic* has sufficiently proved, never advances knowledge beyond direct intuition. It serves to clear up and render distinct the reality already intuitively revealed, but not to extend the perception of that reality. If the great men among the Scholastics have sometimes the air of teaching the contrary, it is because they are accustomed to speak of knowledge only as reduced to the form of science, that is, of knowledge in the order of reflection, not in the order of intuition. In the order of reflection, the syllogism may be said, inasmuch as it is its province to clear up and distinguish, to advance science, for knowledge is termed science only by reason of its being clear and distinct; but in the order of intuition it does not, as is evident from the fact universally conceded, that nothing can be in the conclusion which is not affirmed in the premises. There is no logic by which we can go from the known to the strictly unknown.

The conception of ourselves, as obtained by Descartes, must be considered either as psychological or as ontological,—in modern language, either as subjective or objective. As the former, that is, reflection taking as its direct object, not the reality intuitively revealed, but the intuition itself, as a psychological fact, it is a mere sensitive affection, external or internal, and necessarily leads, if regarded as external, to the sensism of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Volney, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, and Broussais; if as internal, the sentimentalism of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Bernardin Saint-Pierre, Madame de Staël, the Schlegels, Benjamin Constant, Jacobi and a host of Germans, men and women, too numerous to be mentioned. As the latter, which is reflection taking as its object, not the mere intuition, but the substance or being revealed in it, it must take substance or being either as concrete or as abstract. If as concrete, it leads necessarily to the autotheism of Fichte, Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, and our author. The substance or being asserted is *I* or *Ego;* as analysis adds nothing to the intu-

itive assertion, from this it can obtain only *I* or *Ego*. Then *I* or *Ego* is all that is or exists, which is autotheism. If as abstract, as the *ens in genere* of the Abbate Rosmini, it leads necessarily to the pantheism of Spinoza, who pretends to construct all, geometrically, from the single conception of substance or being. But substance or being *in genere* is a pure abstraction, an empty word, therefore a mere nullity. From nothing, nothing can be obtained. Hence the nullism or nihilism of Hegel and his followers, and also of our author,—the last result of Cartesianism, as was already implied in its making universal doubt its point of departure.

That our author virtually reaches this sad result is evident enough from the following paragraphs:—

"I had, indeed, become really ill. But in the midst of the excitement of my physical system, this great formula seemed to be continually repeating itself:—*Life is the activity of an Efficient Cause*, LIFE IS THE ACTIVITY OF AN EFFICIENT CAUSE. I saw that I had unconsciously built up all my speculations upon the premise that I myself was *dead:* and now when the evidence to my mind was irresistible that I was ALIVE, an *efficient cause*, that is, A FREE AGENT, no one can tell how I loathed the practical conclusions of all my preceding theories.

"I expected a great deal from this formula, which thus revealed itself to me in the midst of a tumult of thought; and, verily, I was not disappointed: for, first of all, it utterly annihilated my Pantheism. I reasoned as follows:—

"I am revealed to myself, *by observation* in *consciousness*, as TRANSCENDING TIME: for I perceive the facts of my memory, and say of them, They are facts of memory, and I contradistinguish myself from them in consciousness,—therefore they are *not me*. I am not a fact of memory, but a living, perceiving subject. I see also the relation between these facts of memory, and call it *time;* but say, it is a relation between things which are *not me*, and, therefore, it also is *not me*. *I* perceive *it*,—*it* is *time*. Time is the relation in which the facts of memory stand to each other, and not the relation in which they stand to me. The events and their relation stand before me in the relation of *objects perceived;* but to each other they stand in the relation of *time*. To me, a transaction of ten years' date is as present as an affair of yesterday; for if it were not thus present, I should not be able to see its relation to the affair of yesterday, affirming that it took place exactly ten years ago, all but one day. I contradistinguish myself from time, and am independent of it: nevertheless, all my acts fall in time. When I perceive, think, will, the perception, thought, volition, is an act which is an event, following some events, and preceding others; but *I*, who originate these events, remain still transcending time; for only the acts, and not the *I*, find a place in time. The *I*, therefore, is in ETERNITY, but *exists* in *time*.

"If we abstract from the soul its active existence, there will remain its essential *Being*, which is rooted in eternity,—not an eternity which is time indefinitely extended, but an eternity altogether independent of time, having nothing in common with time, for it *altogether transcends* it. It is a matter of no importance to me, if some men see fit not to understand all this; for they are unable to understand it, because they are incapable of that observation in consciousness wherein the soul perceives itself as subject;—wherein the soul perceives itself, not as thought, feeling, volition, but as the *I* which thinks, feels, and wills. I perceive myself in consciousness, not as an activity, but as the *efficient cause* which exerts an activity. I know that I shall not be annihilated when my activity ceases, but that I shall merely hold my activity *in potentia*, ready to deploy it again when the moment comes. This *I*, this *efficient cause*, this essential being of the soul, could not have been created at any former time, neither can it be annihilated at any future time, because it *is* in *eternity*, in an eternal NOW; and, if it is once, that once is eternity: there is no before or after for it.

"I perceive myself in consciousness as an efficient cause. By *efficient cause* I mean a cause which operates by virtue of efficiency *inhering in itself*,— I mean a cause which is itself the ground, origin, and reason of its own activity. Without doubt, I have a notion of *efficiency*, which notion I could have obtained from no source whatever other than the observation of the activity of my own soul. In the outward world I perceive only effects;—will any man pretend that he ever perceived an *efficient cause* in the external world? He may indeed have perceived the *operation* of such a cause, but he surely never perceived the cause itself. If I perceive the Divine activity, I perceive only the activity, and never the Efficient Cause, which is the Divine Substance. Will any one pretend that he has seen God directly? Does not the very fact of our possessing a *notion* of efficiency prove the existence of the efficiency which inheres in our own souls? But what is all this reasoning to me? After prolonged meditation, I have attained to be able to carry on investigations in my own consciousness: I am able, on rare occasions, to perceive myself directly, as an efficient cause,—as subject: and, by more extended observation, I find that nowhere else can I *directly* observe any *efficiency*."—pp. 76–80.

The author defines pantheism to be the assertion of God as the only efficient cause, and contends that he refutes it by asserting another efficient cause, namely, himself. If he does really assert another efficient cause, he certainly does refute it; but this he does not do. It is true, he asserts himself as efficient cause, but as uncreated, independent, and eternal efficient cause; therefore, if words have meaning, he asserts that he is himself God, which, if he recognizes other efficient causes, is polytheism; if no other, is autotheism.

But he recognizes no other efficient cause, for he says expressly, "I find that nowhere else can I directly observe any efficiency"; that is, he has direct intuition of no efficiency but his own. Then he can obtain no other by reflection or analysis. From the fact that I am an efficient cause, I cannot conclude something else, which is not myself and of which I have no intuition, is an efficient cause. Then he must take himself as the only efficient cause. Then, since he asserts himself as uncreated, eternal, independent, and indestructible efficient cause, he asserts himself as God, and the only God,—all that is or exists. He may call this pantheism or autotheism as he will; it makes no difference, for at bottom both are one and the same thing.

But the uncreated, eternal, and indestructible *I* or *Ego* he asserts as efficient cause is, after all, a mere abstraction, and must be so; for, as actual, we are, in fact, subject to the accidents of space and time,—too evidently contingent for any man to assert seriously the contrary. Hence says the author, "If we abstract from the soul its active existence, there remains its essential being, which is rooted in eternity." "*This I*, this efficient cause, this *essential* being of the soul, could not have been created, neither can it be annihilated." Undeniably, then, the soul he asserts as efficient cause is not the soul as concrete existence, but the soul as abstract being. But abstract being is a nullity, and therefore the author's philosophy, which rests on it as its foundation, is, in the last analysis, nullism or nihilism.

This is where the author finds, or rather loses, himself in following Descartes, as must every man of tolerable reasoning powers who follows that psychologue, whether he takes one or the other of the two routes we have indicated; for that sensism leads to nullism has long since been amply established. Our author, consciously or unconsciously, seeks to save himself by means of a bastard Platonism. Descartes makes ideas mere abstractions, formed by reflection operating on intuition as a psychological fact; according to Plato, ideas are real objects of intuition, necessary and eternal, anterior to all actual existences, the necessary and eternal forms or essences of things. The author attempts to combine both doctrines, and therefore asserts ideas as abstractions, and abstractions as real, necessary, and eternal,—the very absurdity, justly or unjustly, charged to the account of the old realists. It is neither more nor less than setting forth abstractions as real entities, and clothing the possible

with the attributes of the real. This will appear if we examine the author's note H, in his Appendix.

"The affirmation that GOD CREATED THE WORLDS OUT OF NOTHING annihilates itself:

"For, if God created them out of nothing, their creation was evidently *possible* to him. This possibility existed as a necessary condition of the creation, *before the worlds were created;* for, had the creation not been possible, it is evident that it would never have taken place. The possibility existed, therefore, in the logical order (for we have nothing to do here with chronology) prior to the creation.—This possibility was not created, but existed prior to the very first act of creation; for, if it was created, its creation was possible, and this new possibility preceded the creation of the created possibility, else that creation could not have taken place. This possibility of a possibility, if it was created, must have been preceded by still another possibility, and thus, by continuing the hypothesis, we fall upon an infinite series,—an evident sign of the absurdity of the supposition.

"Therefore the creation of the worlds was preceded by the POSSIBILITY of that creation, and this possibility was itself uncreated.

"The very first act of the Divine Will must have been preceded by the possibility of that act, else it could not have taken place. This possibility is independent of the Divine Will, for it is anterior to the very first act of that Will, and is, indeed, that upon which the operation of the Divine Will depends.

"It is evident, therefore, that two Powers concurred in the creation of the Worlds, (1.) The Divine Will, and (2.) That which made the creation of the Worlds, and the operation of the Divine Will, *possible.*

"God, therefore, is not only the voluntary cause of the existence of the universe, he is also the eminent cause; and he knows the things which are made, partly by perceiving them in the operations of his Will, and partly by perceiving them in Himself as eminent cause.

"The soul of man has its root of being, not in the Divine Will, but in God as eminent cause; for the Soul, as is made evident in the text, transcends all time so far as its essence is concerned, and therefore never began to be, and never can cease to be,—that is, it is uncreated. The *possibility* of the soul's existence is indeed that root of substance, hid in God as eminent cause, which is the essential being of the soul.

"The Divine Will depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very Being of God, and the Will of Man depends also, for *its* ability to operate, upon *its* possibility, inhering in the same Being of God: the Will of Man, therefore, having its ground and root in the soul's substance, is dependent upon the Being, but not upon the Will, of God. God sees all our actions in himself; he sees our subjective movements in himself as eminent cause, and he sees the operation of the circumstances which act upon us in his Will: and thus he sees us as free

agents, beings capable of acting in opposition to his Will,—beings whose actions he cannot control by his Will, because those actions have their origin in regions of Divine Essence as ancient and as remote as is the source of the Divine Will itself: beings whose act ons he cannnot control by his Will, because the Will of God is subsequent in the order of nature to the sublime ground which is the spring of the activity of the human soul.

"Thus the doctrine of a creation out of nothing defeats itself; for it is equivalent to the doctrine, that all creation is effected by the leading forth of visible things, through the energy of the Divine Will, from POTENTIALITY into ACUALITY. God brings forth, according to his Will, from potentiality into actuality, just what he pleases; but when any human soul *is* brought into actual relations, it acts from itself, independently of God's Will, for it acts from an origin transcending God's Will.—God may drive any human soul back into potentiality, that is, may destroy its life, but while he suffers it to live, he cannot alter its will by any direct exertion of power. If he wishes to alter its will, he must change the circumstances which surround it, or change its bodily conditions. In short, he cannot change the subjective action of the soul, and, if he wish to change its life, he must do it by changing the objective element with which it concurs, or by changing the instrument by which the concurrence is effected.

"Is this Pantheism? Nay, is it not the doctrine which truly and especially avoids all Pantheism? Atheism sinks the Will of God and the Will of Man in the movement of Destiny: Pantheism sinks Man and Nature in the Will of God: and New England Transcendentalism sinks God and Nature in Man. The true doctrine must be sought in a Synthesis of the operation of the three great Powers."—pp. 148–152.

Here the author with admirable gravity assures us, that "the affirmation that God created the worlds out of nothing annihilates itself." The creation of the worlds out of nothing, he reasons, if we understand him, either was possible to God or it was not. If it was not, he could not have so created them, and the affirmation is false. If it was possible, the affirmation is still false, for their creation was then preceded by its possibility, and could have been only the bringing forth of that possibility into actuality. But, conceding the latter supposition, the conclusion does not follow. If the creation of the worlds out of nothing was not possible to God, the affirmation is false, we concede, for God cannot do what he cannot. If it was possible,—then it was not possible? Not at all. Then, by the very terms of the supposition, it was possible; therefore the affirmation may be true, and does not annihilate itself.

The author asserts the contrary, because he conceives the possibility of creation is *something*, is *res* or reality, which, since it does and must precede creation, cannot but be something uncreated, necessary, and eternal. Therefore, since creation is nothing but the reduction of possibility to actuality, creation could not have been out of nothing, but, if at all, must have been out of this very something called possibility. We grant that creation must have been possible, or it could not have been created. We grant that the possibility of creation was itself uncreated, necessary, and eternal, and yet not therefore does it follow that God could not have created the worlds out of nothing; *because this very possibility is an abstraction, and therefore in itself nothing.* Grant, then, that God creates only by reducing potentiality to actuality, nothing is granted against the affirmation; for since abstract possibility is nothing, to "bring forth from it into actuality" is precisely to create out of nothing; as the author himself not only concedes, but even asserts, when he says, as he does, that the doctrine of a creation out of nothing "is equivalent to the doctrine, that all creation is effected by the leading forth of visible things, [why not of *invisible* things also?] through the energy of the Divine Will, from potentiality into actuality." Then the leading forth from potentiality into actuality must be equivalent to creation out of nothing.

The assertion of creation out of nothing does not mean that nothing creates, or that the Creator creates his own ability to create; that is, creates himself. It is intended, on the one hand, to deny that God creates out of preëxisting matter, or that creation is merely impressing matter with form, as the Platonists maintained, and, on the other, to assert that God creates by himself alone, from his own omnipotent energy or inherent ability to create. Creation certainly implies, or rather connotes, the uncreated possibility of creation, and we readily concede that the possibility of the creation of the worlds was not created, but eternal. Thus far we have no quarrel with the author. But *the* POSSIBILITY *of creation is the* ABILITY *of the Creator, and the possibility of the creation of the worlds is the eternal, underived, inherent ability of the Creator to create them*, as the author himself, apparently without being fully aware of the import of his language, asserts, when he tells us it "inheres in the very being of God." The possibility of creation inhering in the Divine Essence itself is precisely what all

theologians and philosophers generally understand by the Divine ability to create. Understood in this sense, the author's reasoning amounts simply to this: The worlds could not have been created if God could not have created them, and God could not have created them if he had not been able to create them; but God was able to create them; therefore their creation was possible, and he may have created them. No Christian philosopher will find any difficulty in acceding to all this.

But, assuming the reality of abstractions, the author thinks he finds in the assertion, that the possibility of creation is itself uncreated, the assertion of a solid and indestructible basis of free agency, or the freedom and independence of the human will. The human will has the root of its activity in the soul's substance, and the soul's substance, since eternally possible, is itself eternal, uncreated, and therefore independent of the Divine Will, and therefore the human will must be independent of the Divine Will, and not controllable by it. God can neither will nor create a human soul, unless it be possible to him. The possibility, whether of an act of the Divine Will or of the creation of the human soul, is therefore anterior to either, and therefore uncreated. But this uncreated possibility inheres in the very being of God. Therefore "the Divine Will depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very being of God, and the human will depends, for *its* ability to operate, upon *its* possibility, inhering in the same being of God." Therefore the human will depends on the being, but not on the will, of God. Therefore we are free agents, and God cannot control our actions by his will, because they "have their origin in regions of Divine Essence as ancient and as remote as is the source of the Divine Will itself," "and because the Will of God is subsequent in the order of nature to the sublime ground which is the spring of the activity of the human soul."

This discovery, like most new discoveries in the fundamental principles of philosophy, is more specious than solid. The author has evidently thought long and hard to obtain his conclusion, but that conclusion rests on the supposition, that the soul which acts is identically the uncreated, eternal soul,—that is to say, the uncreated and eternal ability of God to create the soul,—which is not true in itself, and is, moreover, contrary to the author's own doctrine. The soul that acts is the soul as "active existence;" but the soul,

which the author asserts as eternal, which "could not have been created, and cannot be annihilated," is the essential soul, the soul "abstracted from its active existence," as we have already seen; that is to say, no soul at all, for abstractions are nothing. There are no abstractions in nature, or the ontological order; that is, in the order of being, of reality. But the soul, as actual or active existence, the author concedes, depends on the will of God; and since, then, it is only in the sense in which we depend on the will of God that we do or can act, it does not follow that our actions are independent of that will, and uncontrollable by it. Nay, on the author's own principles, it follows that they are controllable by it.

The author seems not to have considered, that to assert that the possibility of an existence inheres in the being of God is to assert, in regard to the existence itself, that it cannot exist without the intervention of the Divine creative act. To say that a being depends upon its possibility so inhering, is only saying that it cannot exist without God, and can be only what he has the inherent ability to make it; which is to assert its limitation, not its ability, and God's ability, not his limitation. Grant that the human soul depends upon its possibility inhering in the very being of God, what follows? Therefore the soul is eternal? Not at all; but therefore the soul is not eternal, is created, or else does not exist; because the possible does not exist till rendered actual, and to render the possible actual, the author himself tells us, is equivalent to creation out of nothing. The author has fallen into a slight mistake; he has made the soul's possibility God's inability, and the soul's want of existence its eternal and independent existence. The soul is possible in God, therefore God is unable to create it; therefore the soul is, and is eternal, capable of acting freely and independently of the Divine will. As much as to say, if the creation of the soul is possible, it is impossible. We can hardly believe that this logic has been borrowed from Aristotle.

The author protests against pantheism, and, we doubt not, with sincerity. He wishes, we presume, to distinguish, and fully believes that he does distinguish, between the human will and the Divine. Yet his doctrine, if he excludes the Divine creative act, makes the human will, physically as well as morally, the Divine will. "The Will of Man," he says expressly, "depends, for its ability to operate, upon its

possibility inhering in the very being of God." The possibility of a will inhering in the Divine Being must mean, either the ability of God to will, or his ability to create a will. If the author understands it in the latter sense, he loses his argument for the freedom of the will founded on the supposition that it is not created; if in the former sense, he makes it identically the Divine will itself, for the inherent ability to will is the will, and all that is ever meant by the will, ontologically considered. But to make the human will identically the Divine will, and on that ground to assert its freedom, is to assert its freedom by making it physically the will of God, and annihilating it as human,—pure pantheism. Divest us of the substantive force that wills, and restore it to God, and what remains to be called *we?* It is not a little surprising that the author did not see this, for he is very careful to tell us that the Divine will and the human will are alike dependent, and in the same sense dependent, upon their respective possibilities inhering in the very being of God; and it is on the ground that they are so dependent, and that the activity of each is the inherent activity of the same Divine Essence, that he asserts one is independent of the other. But if so dependent, either both are the will of God, and then identical, or neither is. The author's mathematics should have taught him, that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another.

It is not difficult to seize the truth the author has in his mind, and which, interpreted by his doctrine that abstractions are real, may well seem to support his conclusion. "God," he says, "brings forth, according to his Will, from potentiality into actuality, just what he pleases; but when any human soul *is* brought into actual relations, it acts from itself, independently of God's Will, for it acts from an origin transcending God's Will.—God may drive any human soul back into potentiality, that is, may destroy its life, but while he suffers it to live, he cannot alter its will by any direct [how any more by *indirect?*] exertion of power." It is easy to see what the author is driving at, though he does not appear to have very distinctly apprehended it, and he is far from expressing it correctly. What he wishes to say appears to us very briefly and very accurately expressed by Vasquez:*—*Essentiæ rerum ordine rationis sunt ante omnem Dei scientiam et voluntatem: quare licet possit cuili-*

* Apud Perrone, *De Deo*, Part. II. Cap. 1, note.

bet rei tribuere, aut non tribuere existentiam, non potest illius naturam intrinsecus immutare. "The essences of things, in the order of reason, are before all science and will of God; and hence, though God may or may not give existence to any thing he pleases, he cannot intrinsically change its nature." Here is evidently what the author has in view. The essences of things are what are also called the possibilities, forms, or ideas of things, and being prior, in the order of reason,—not, by the way, in the order of nature,—to the science and the will of God, are uncreated, therefore necessary and eternal. God may or may not endow them with existence, bring them forth into actuality, actualize them, as he pleases, but if he wills to actualize or render actually existent any one of them, he must conform to its intrinsic nature. Thus, if he choose to actualize the *man-idea*, to clothe it with actual existence, he must do so without altering, or in any respect impairing, the intrinsic nature of that idea,—what our author calls the possibility of a human soul. Hence, by virtue of this necessary and eternal *man-idea*,—our possibility inhering in the very being of God,—we are rendered, as actual existences, free agents, and our actions are independent of the will of God. This is really the process, we suppose, by which the author obtains his startling conclusion. But his conclusion is invalid, because it is obtained only by reasoning *a posse ad esse*, which the logicians tell us is not allowable. We act not as possible, but as actual existences, and we cannot conclude what we actually are from what it was possible for God to make us. Before we can assert *what* we are, we must know, not only that God has actualized *an* idea, but *what* idea he has actualized in creating us. If the idea is that of free agents, or existences capable of free will, then we may say, God must, *ex necessitate suppositionis*, treat us as such, because he cannot both do and not do the same thing at the same time; but not otherwise. The error of the author is not in asserting that we are free agents, and that God cannot, while he suffers us to live, make us any thing else, for that is a fact; but in concluding our free agency, not from *the* idea of the existence which we are, but from the fact that our existence is the actualization of *an* idea. This cannot be done, for, since every existence is the actualization of *some* idea, it would imply that all existences have free will, and that minerals, plants, and animals have free will as well as men; which would destroy the author's notion of Destiny,

compel him to abate one of the three great powers he supposes to concur in the movement and government of things, thus razing the ontological basis of his three grand epochs, and oblige him to a very essential modification of the mysterious figure poised on three forces coalescing in their action, which adorns his title-page, and is, we presume, emblematical of his theory of God, man, and nature. Besides, it would limit the Divine omnipotence, deny to God the power to create different orders of existence, resolve all genera and species into one, and bring us back by another route—the ordinary route of American Transcendentalists—once more to pantheism.

The author obtains his conclusion from the assumption, that ideas, genera, and species, regarded in themselves, abstracted from the existences in which they are concreted, are active, causative, not merely *causæ essentiales*, but *causæ efficientes*. This is a most grave error, and yet it is not peculiar to the author. It is the common error of all who assert the reality of abstractions. We ourselves fell into it in the essays we have referred to, and which we wish to be considered as retracting. Leroux avowedly asserts it, and it is fundamental in nearly all the humanistic theories of the day,—theories which glorify humanity at the expense of individuals, and absorb the individual in the race. Even Cousin, who should have escaped it, expressly teaches it, and makes it the principle of the solution of the problem proposed by Porphyry, and so furiously debated by the Scholastics.* But the idea is the mere possibility of existence, and it is a contradiction in terms to assert that the possible is active. Only the actual is active. All reality is, no doubt, in a certain manner, active; and this fact, since ideas are real, is what misled us, and, we presume, is that which has misled others. Ideas are certainly real, and in some sense active; but their activity is not the activity of the things of which they are the ideas or the necessary and eternal forms, but of the Divine Intelligence or Reason, in which they are real. If the ideas are considered as concreted in existences, the activity is the activity of the existences themselves; if they are considered as not so concreted, yet as real, the activity is the activity of the Divine mind which contains them, and is the power to concrete or actualize them.

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* *Fragments Philosophiques: Philosophie Scholastique*, édit. 2e. Paris. 1840.

The author's errors seem to us to result solely from his attempt, consciously or unconsciously made, to combine Cartesianism and Platonism in a single doctrine, and will vanish of themselves, if he will just bear in mind that ideas, the forms, essences, or possibilities of things, are before the science and will of God only in the order of reflection, not in the order of being, and that they are God himself, infinite in number, indeed, if regarded in relation to the effects which God is able to produce, but regarded in relation to his ability one only, and identically his own real, necessary, and eternal being. It is in regard to these two points that modern philosophy is principally at fault. Let it once be set right as to these, and its other errors, so far as of grave magnitude, will fall of themselves.

The author confounds the order of reflection with the order of being. If he had not been betrayed by the prevailing psychologism of the age, he would hardly have done this, for his own genius is philosophical rather than psychological. His mistake arises from not distinguishing between reflection and intuition. The Scholastics are aware of the distinction, and presuppose it, but we rarely find them treating it *ex professo*. Cousin and the modern Germans have, indeed, distinguished between reflection and spontaneity, which would virtually be the true distinction, if they did not contrive to identify the intellect and its object, the *vis intellectiva*, with the *intelligibile*, sometimes making both human, sometimes both Divine. Cousin comes nearer than most others to the truth, but misses it, in consequence of supposing that method must take precedence of principles; that it is by method we obtain the principles of philosophy, and not that it is the principles that precede and determine the method. He has been misled by Descartes, who makes the consideration of method precede that of principles, whereas method is nothing but the application of principles, and necessarily presupposes them. It does not obtain or discover principles, it merely applies them to the solution of special problems. The principles must precede, and be given *a priori*, or no practical application of method is possible. Cousin has virtually acknowledged this, but he has still supposed that it is our reason, not, indeed, in its reflective, but in its spontaneous movement, that supplies or discovers and affirms them; which is to suppose that reason can operate without them, that the intellect can act without the intelligible! Every act of intellect is an intellection;

and so there can be intellection in which nothing is understood, or known,—a sheer contradiction in terms. Here is his mistake. The principles are necessary to constitute the intellect, intellect *in actu*, and the understanding cannot operate at all without the intelligible object. Consequently, as destitute of the intelligible, it cannot go forth, either spontaneously or at the command of the will, to seek the intelligible, the principles, which method is subsequently to apply. The principles are not and cannot be sought, for the mind without them is incapable of action, and therefore incapable of seeking. Hence it is never *we* who seek or who find them, but *they* who find us, reveal and self-affirm themselves in direct intuition. It is they that affirm themselves, not we who affirm them; and they affirm themselves in affirming their own intelligibility, for what is not is not intelligible, and therefore no object of intuition. Here is what Reid has attempted to state, in his doctrine of the constituent principles of human belief, but which he has failed to state in its true philosophical light, with scientific precision.

The philosopher and the psychologist, or rather psychologue, both depend alike on intuitions for the intelligible, and both do and must work with and on materials supplied by them, and have and can have no materials not so supplied. Thus far, both agree. But the philosopher proceeds to construct his philosophy ontologically, as we say, that is, by *contemplation* of the being, reality, or objects revealed and self-affirmed in the intuitions; while the psychologue proceeds to construct philosophy psychologically, that is, by *reflection* on the intuitions themselves, taken as mere psychological facts or phenomena. As the idea is that which is primarily and immediately intelligible, and that by whose intelligibility all else is intelligible, and as the idea which is obtained by reflection operating upon mere psychological phenomena is and can be only an abstract idea, the psychologue is compelled to place the abstract before the concrete, the possible before the real, which, transferred to theology, asserts the Divine essence before the Divine *esse*, and the Divine *esse* before the Divine attributes. But this, as we have seen, leads necessarily to scepticism and nihilism, because there are no abstractions in the order of reality,—because an abstract idea is a mere nullity. To place the abstract before the concrete, the possible before the real, is to place nullity before the starting point; and he who starts from nothing

will have to travel a long way before he arrives at something. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit.* Either, then, for result, nihilism, or we must start with reality. If we start with reality, God must be conceived primarily as real being, and then we cannot conceive his essence as prior to his *esse*, or his *esse* as prior to his attributes.

If the author had paused a moment to compel modern psychologism to give an account of itself, he could hardly have failed to perceive, that to suppose the possible precedes the real, the abstract the concrete, is as false psychologically as it is ontologically. The conception of essence as prior to being, or being as prior to its attributes, is a mere abstraction, and like all abstractions is the product of reflection operating on conceptions. But if the product of reflection, it cannot be psychologically primary. Certainly, men do not begin with reflection, that is, *re*-think before they think. In the order of knowledge, the abstract must be subsequent to the concrete, precisely because reflection must always be subsequent to intuition; for it is formed by reflection operating on intuition, and only the concrete is revealed in the intuition, since what is not is no object of intuition. Neither ontologically nor psychologically, neither in the order of being nor in the order of knowledge, therefore, is the abstract prior to the concrete, the possible to the real, the essence to the subsisting being, or the being to the attributes of God. Then no potentiality in God; then God is pure act, *actus purissimus*, and then in his nature simple, *simplicissimus*,—a fact our author denies, but which he cannot deny without assuming a principle of reasoning false in itself, and involving absolute and universal negation.*

* Certainly, in asserting that the order of knowledge follows and reproduces the order of being, we do not intend to deny the *distinctio rationis* asserted by our theologians, and which we could not deny without falling into the error or heresy of the old Aëtians and Eunomians. But this distinction—the *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*, for the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* presents no difficulty—does not of itself imply any difference between the order of knowing and the order of being; it merely implies the inadequacy of our knowledge,—not that we know reality in an order not real, but that we do not know all reality, and are not able to embrace even what we do know in a single conception. Owing to the infinity of God and our finiteness, we are obliged to conceive what is revealed to us of God, whether naturally or supernaturally revealed, in separate and successive conceptions; and hence, when we wish to reduce it to the forms of reflective science, we are obliged to treat the essence of God as if it preceded his *esse*, his *esse* as if it preceded his attributes, and his attributes as if distinguished from and following

The author, not fully comprehending this, fails to perceive, though he virtually asserts it, that ideas, the essences, forms, or possibilities of things, are God. He asserts, and very properly, that the possible, that is, the *idea*, in the sense of Plato,—the only sense in which we use the word in this article,—inheres in the very being of God, and therefore, if God is pure act, as we have just proved, both ontologically and psychologically, must be God himself. This is the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and, indeed, of all great philosophers in all ages. Ideas, the necessary and eternal forms of things, genera and species, universals, or *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, as they are sometimes denominated,—possibilities of things, in the terminology of our author,—are not mere words, as Roscelin and the nominalists pretend; are not pure conceptions, as Abelard and Descartes would persuade us; are not mere subjective forms of the understanding, as Kant teaches; are not entities, as the old realists are said to have maintained; are not innate ideas originally inserted in the soul, as Henry Moore, Cudworth, Descartes (!), Leibnitz, and some Catholic theologians, allege; nor are they conceptions *cum fundamento in re*, as we ourselves at one time tried to hold; but they are in the Divine mind, and are the real, necessary, eternal, and indestructible God himself. *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia*, says St. Thomas.† Therefore

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one another. That some of the Schoolmen, especially the Scotists, have introduced distinctions uncalled for, and which have given rise to much unsound theology, and still more unsound philosophy, is very possible, and, in our judgment, very true; but that the distinction in question is allowable and necessary cannot be denied. That our theologians do not understand it as implying any difference between the order of knowledge and the order of being is evident from their efforts to show that it is founded in reality,—that it is *eminently* or virtually contained in God, in the respect that there is in him what is equivalent and more than equivalent to all that we embrace in our separate and successive conceptions. In conceiving God distinctly as Being, Truth, Intelligence, Wisdom, Goodness, &c., we ascribe to him nothing that he is not; and though he is all these at once in their indissoluble unity and indistinguishable simplicity, the distinctions admitted do not falsify our knowledge, for they are privative, not positive, and suppose, not that we add what is not, but that we fail to embrace in our conceptions all that is, in the Divine Being. The distinction asserts a defect in our knowledge,—not that it is not true, as far as it goes, but that it is inadequate; and a similar defect in our knowledge is universal, for always above what is intelligible to us rises that which is superintelligible to us, indicating that reality is infinite, and proving that finite intellects do not and cannot comprehend it.

† *Summa*, I. Q. 15, a. 1 ad. 3.

it is God, for no distinction *secundum rem* is admissible between God and his essence. "Sunt ideæ," says St. Augustine, "principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsæ neque oriantur neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit."* If contained in the Divine mind, if eternal and immutable, neither beginning nor passing away, but the forms of all things which may be or are originated, that may or do perish, they are unquestionably the necessary, eternal, immutable, and immovable God himself, in the infinite plenitude of his being; for certainly God is all that is uncreated, necessary, immutable, and eternal, as all theology and all philosophy never cease to assert. The necessary, immutable, and eternal, abstracted from reality, from real being, who is it, is necessary, immutable, and eternal nothing, and therefore absolutely unintelligible; for we never cease to repeat, that what is not is not intelligible. What is not is a pure negation, and negation is intelligible only in the intelligibleness of the affirmative, and hence God is said to know evil only by knowing its opposite, good. Necessary and eternal possibility is intelligible only as the necessary and eternal ability of God, that is, as his Divine omnipotence. We may consider the idea under the distinct aspect of possibility in the order of production, and then it is simply the power or ability of God; under that of exemplar or archetype, after which the Creator operates or may operate, and then it is the intelligence of God; under that of the end, the *finis propter quem*, of the Divine operations, and then it is the goodness, *bonitas* of God; or, in fine, under that of the essence of things, the *causa essentialis*, the basis, so to speak, or foundation of existence, and then it is the being of God. But as power, intelligence, goodness, being, &c., are identical and undistinguishable in God, the idea, under whatever aspect it is revealed to us, or is contemplated by us, is always and everywhere identically the one God, real, necessary, and eternal.

But if so, is not God all things, the universe itself? *Mediante* the creative act, yes, otherwise no; because, conceived simply as real, necessary, and eternal Being, *Ens*

* *Lib. de Diversis Quæstionibus* LXXXIII. Quæst. 46.

reale, et necessarium, he is not conceived as productive, and no universe is or can be asserted. The difference between philosophy and pantheism lies precisely in this creative act of God. Pantheism asserts, Real being is, *Ens reale est*, and there stops, and in doing so asserts God as real and necessary being, and nothing else. Philosophy goes a step further, and asserts, *Ens reale creator est*, Real being is creator, and in doing so asserts the universe; for existences are nothing but the creative act of God in its terminus, as is asserted in asserting creation out of nothing. The difference between the two formulas, however slight at first view, is all the difference between act and no act, between existences and no existences, universe and no universe. To say that God *non mediante* the creative act is the universe, is not true, for then there is no universe; to say that God *mediante* the creative act is all things, is the universe, is true; for then the universe is not only asserted, but asserted in its true relation to God, as being only from him, by him, and in him, through the creative act bringing it, as our author would say, forth from potentiality into actuality. There is no possible bridge from God as real and necessary being to existences, or from existences to him, but his creative act, and therefore we must either rest in pantheism, or assert creation out of nothing.

But it follows from what we have said, that the formula, Real and necessary being is, *Ens reale est*, which is ontologically and psychologically primary, is not an *adequate* philosophical formula. We cannot attain to the conception of existences from the conception of being, or being is, any more than we can attain to the conception of God and the universe from the single conception of ourselves as simple entity. The simple formula, *Ens reale est*, Real entity is, is and must be unproductive, because from Real entity is, we can conclude only Real entity is. Being is intelligible of itself, and demands nothing in addition to itself to its intelligibility, as Hegel and others prove clearly enough. It does not depend on another to be, for if it did it would not be simple *being*, but an *existence;* it does not need to produce in order to be, for it already *is*. It is being free from the category of relation of every sort, and it is only the category of relation of some sort that demands or connotes something beyond itself. It is what is called *substance*, and needs nothing beyond itself for its complete intelligibility, or, as Spinoza says, to be conceived. Unless,

then, we can add to it the further conception of cause, of creator, it can be no more productive in the order of knowledge than in the order of being itself. Cousin has felt the difficulty, and has sought to escape it by resolving the category of being into that of cause, and the category of cause into that of being, and asserting that God is being only in that he is cause, thus making creation an intrinsic necessity, which, as it denies the free creative act, is pantheism. The Germans, falsely holding, that Being is, is an adequate philosophical formula, fail utterly, as all who are familiar with their theories well know, to attain to the real conception of existences, and revolve unceasingly in dead pantheism or nihilism. The error common to all is that of supposing that all conceptions are generable and generated from a single original conception. This is the grand error of modern philosophy itself, and that which has led it to attempt, first, with Descartes, that prince of psychologism and absurdity, to deduce geometrically all our conceptions from the single conception of our personal entity, and second, with Spinoza, Shelling, and Hegel, to do the same from the conception of what they call the Absolute,—Absolute Being, that is, simple *ens reale*. Some few, like Cousin and our friend Channing, following the neoplatonists, and misapprehending the sacred mystery of the Trinity, introduce plurality and variety into their original conception of God, the first cause; but they obtain no relief, for they lose unity, dissolve the absolute, and assert the generative principle either of polytheism or of atheism.

The remedy is in supplying the defect in our formula, and rendering it productive. The productive formula must embrace the two conceptions entity and existence, connected by the creative act, the copula or medium between the two extremes. That is, the only adequate or productive formula is the synthesis or synthetic judgment, *Ens reale creator est*, or Being creates existences, because it is only *mediante* the creative act that real being is itself pr ductive, and a formula cannot be productive in the order of knowledge unless it includes all the terms necessary to productiveness in the order of being, or ontological order. The error of modern philosophers does not lie in the denial of the necessity of having this synthetic formula, so much as in attempting to obtain it by reflection, as if reflection could add something to intuition, or operate productively before having obtained a productive formula,—in principle nothing less than sup-

posing that the Creator creates his own creativeness, that is, creates himself. The synthesis must precede all our judgments *a posteriori*, because without it no judgment is possible, except the simple judgment Being is, which is not *a posteriori*, but *a priori*, for he who says *Being* says all he says who says Being *is*. It is possible, then, to obtain this synthesis, the adequate philosophical formula, only as it reveals and affirms itself *a priori* in direct and immediate intuition, in which we ourselves are but simple spectators; and that it does so reveal and affirm itself is certain; for after the labors of Reid and the Scottish school, especially as that School has been developed by Sir William Hamilton, we are well permitted to assert, that we have direct intuition, not only of phenomena, but of existences themselves; and existences, as we have seen, are and can be nothing but the Divine creative act, which, as what is called conservation of existences is nothing but the very act, unsuspended, that originally created them out of nothing, is constantly before our eyes in the simple fact of existence itself. As this synthesis reveals and affirms itself *a priori* in immediate intuition, it is and cannot but be certain, both ontologically and psychologically, *secundum rem* and *secundum nos*. Here is the principle of the solution, which, for the want of space, we must leave to our readers to devevelop for themselves.*

Keeping in mind what we have established, that the idea, the ideal, in modern language, whether under the aspect of intelligibility, or of wisdom, goodness, power, immutability, being, is God himself, the apparent limitation of the Divine freedom the author fancies he detects can present no difficulty. Grant that the idea is uncreated, necessary, eternal,—

* Consult on the philosophical formula, or "Idéal Formula," Gioberti, *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, Cap. IV. It is with some hesitation that we refer our readers to this work, because its author is in bad odor, and also because, though we have commenced the examination of it, we have as yet proceeded but a little way, and are far from having mastered it. We certainly do not refer to him as in himself authority, although his ability is unquestionable, nor as to a writer whose works can be safely consulted without great caution; but on the point on which we refer to him, he is more full and satisfactory than any other writer, ancient or modern, of our acquaintance. We cannot say that we have been absolutely indebted to him for any of the views set forth in the text, for we had obtained them, substantially, before we had the least knowledge of his writings or of his doctrines; but it would be folly on our part, and injustice to him and the public, to attempt to dissemble that he has greatly aided us to clear up our previous views, and on several not unimportant points to extend them. In his hostility to the Jesuits, we have

grant that God in producing existences operates, and can operate, so to speak, only after the idea, and must conform to its intrinsic nature,—nothing is granted but that God, in creating, must create according to his *own* intrinsic nature, and can neither in creating nor in dealing with existences do violence to himself. That is, God is what he is, and cannot be any thing else,—is God and cannot cease to be God,—*is*, and cannot annihilate himself. As the only necessity supposed or supposable is his own most perfect nature, he is necessarily free to do whatever is not repugnant to that nature, that is, which would not imply his non-being; for since he is pure act, and most simple, any thing repugnant to his wisdom, intelligence, goodness, or any other attribute, would be repugnant to his very being, and imply his annihilation. But this is no restriction of his freedom, for freedom is in being, not in not being, and is restricted only by some defect in the being of whom it is predicated, never by that being's own perfection or plenitude. To say that God is free to do whatever he pleases, except annihilate himself, since the exception results from the perfection, not from the defect, of his nature, is to assert his absolute freedom; for freedom to do whatever does not imply the non-being of its possessor, *and therefore the annihilation of itself*, is the highest and most perfect freedom conceivable. The *Arbitrium Liberum*, as possessed by us, in the sense that it demands deliberation, is, of course, not predicable of God, for in that sense it implies defect; but in the sense in which it is a positive perfection, it is implied in the freedom we have just asserted, and must be predicable of God as most perfect being. Then since God is pure act, and no distinction *secundum rem* is admissible in the Divine nature,

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no occasion to inform the readers of this journal that we neither do nor are likely to share, and we rejoice to hear that his *Gesuita Moderno* has been placed on the *Index*. In the work to which we refer, we find many things, not immediately connected with philosophy, things affecting him as a man, a statesman, and an Italian patriot, which commend themselves neither to our judgment nor to our taste. We by no means participate in his political passions or his national prejudices; we do not expect with him to see the Church Triumphant on earth, and we wholly dissent from his doctrine that the state, instead of the Church, is the proper schoolmaster. In a word, in those of his writings we have read, we find not a little extraneous matter that we do not like, and much, if not unsound, that is easily misapprehended, and not inapt to lead to dangerous errors; but we have, in what pertains exclusively to philosophy, found much that we most heartily approve, and which, in our age especially, needs to be profoundly meditated.

God must be intrinsically *Arbitrium Liberum*, and therefore whatever he does must, from the very perfection of his nature, be done by free-will. Consequently, the Divine operations are and can be subjected to no necessity but the necessity *ex suppositione*, that is, the necessity which compels you, if you suppose a thing is, to suppose it is, or that compels us to say, What is is, and cannot *not* be without ceasing to be.

But we have dwelt longer than we intended on the author's note. We return to his text. We regret that our limits compel us to leave many things unnoticed which we should be glad to consider. The author goes into a long argument, in which he attempts to deduce from his primary conception of himself as efficient cause another conception of himself as *relative* efficient cause, and then from himself as *relative* efficient cause to conclude God as *absolute* efficient cause. We can only cite his summing up of his argument:—

"I have reproduced this argument as well as I could, for it passed through my mind so rapidly that I was not conscious of the steps. But all this reasoning is to no purpose. The following proposition and conclusion, if rightly considered, are self-evident:—

"If there were no ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE, there could be no RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES: but there are RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES, therefore, the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS.

"The necessary corollary followed at once:—

"But every efficient cause is ALIVE, therefore the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS ALIVE. I believe, therefore, in the LIVING GOD."—pp. 99, 100.

The argument here is, substantially, the ordinary argument *a posteriori* of philosophers and natural theologians. As an explicative or interpretative argument addressed to believers, or even to those who through mental confusion occasioned by false science fancy themselves atheists, it certainly has its value, and a very high value; but as an argument addressed to those supposed *really* to doubt that God is, it does not appear to us to be properly an argument at all, for it contains no genuine illation. "If there were no absolute efficient cause, there could be no relative efficient causes." Nothing in the world more true. So if there were no relative efficient causes, there could be no absolute efficient cause. The argument rests on the supposition, allowable or not, that absolute and relative are correlatives, and that one cannot be without the other. But if the abso-

lute and relative are correlatives, and cannot be, one without the other, how can you know one without knowing the other? Correlatives do not *imply*, they *connote*, one the other. The assertion of one is then the assertion of both, and the doubt of one is the doubt of both. If, then, you place, as you necessarily do in the argument, the absolute in question, you place the relative equally in question, and how then can you obtain your conclusion without begging the question?

"But there are relative efficient causes." We do not doubt it; but how do you know it? You either do know it, or you do not. If you do not, you are not entitled to your conclusion, "the absolute efficient cause is." If you do, you know it either immediately, by intuition, or mediately, by discursion. If the former, you have intuition of *relation*, then of the absolute, for relation without the *related*, the two terms of the comparison, is an abstraction, a nullity, and therefore no object of intuition. If you have intuition of the absolute, you know it immediately, and therefore do not conclude it. If you say the latter, that you know the relative mediately, by discursion, you must then have some *datum* intuitively revealed from which you can conclude it. Whatever is intuitively revealed must be revealed either as simple entity or being, or as entity or being under the category of relation of some sort. The supposition itself excludes the latter; therefore nothing remains but the former, that is to say, pure, unrelated being, simple, naked entity. But pure being, simple entity, is already absolute, and if you assume that you can derive the relative from it, your argument is a *vicious* circle, for you take the absolute to prove the relative, and then the relative to prove the absolute.

But the grand difficulty is, that you cannot conclude the relative from simple entity or being. This is what we have all along insisted upon. Have we not already shown that the simple formula, Entity is, is unproductive, and that, torture it as you will, you can get from it only Entity is? The conception of relation is neither generated nor generable from simple entity. We grant you have the intuition of being, of entity, and that this intuition contains a judgment *a priori*, namely, Entity or being is. But, if this is the whole of the intuition, how without a further intuition are you to get beyond it, or to add to it? Conceptions without intuition, remember, Kant has for ever settled, are

empty, and of no value.* As entity you know it, but, by the very supposition, you do not know it under any relation, positive or negative, of time, place, or position, of quantity or quality, of cause or effect, of habit, action, or passion. All you can say of it is, *It is.* Term it in conception God, and you are a pantheist; term it yourself, and you are an autotheist; term it nature, and you are an atheist.

Here is seen the folly of Descartes, who pretends to deduce God and the universe from *sum*, *I am;* but from the simple intuition *I am*, only *I am* is attainable. The author very properly adds, I am *efficient cause*, but from *I am efficient cause*, nothing follows but I and my effects. From I and my effects, I can conclude only my relation to my effects and theirs to me; not that I am myself an effect, a creature, related to an efficient cause which I am not. Nor can I infer that I am a relative, dependent cause from the external causes which, in point of fact, limit and not unfrequently thwart my causality; for with only the intuition, *I am efficient cause*, these really external causes, as the Idealists amply prove, are to me only sensitive affections, only myself, and therefore warrant no conclusion beyond myself. That I am a relative efficient cause cannot then be concluded from sensible impressions, nor from the intuition of myself as efficient cause. Then either I cannot conceive myself as *relative* efficient cause, or I have direct intuition of myself as *relative* efficient cause. But the relative connotes the absolute. Therefore, to have intuition of myself as relative, as an effect, as a creature, is also to have intuition of the other term of the comparison, that is, of the absolute, the creator, God.

The patrons of the argument *a posteriori* do not deny, they in reality assume, what we maintain,—that we have direct intuition of ourselves and external objects, as relative, as effects, as creatures, or existences; but they assume that, while we know them immediately, we know God only mediately, as implied in them, and logically concluded from them, and therefore that they are more evident to us than he. They are, probably, led to make this assumption from mistaking sensible for intelligible intuition, or, at least, from regarding the sensible object as more evident than the intelligible. Certainly, we have no sensible intuition of

* Thus far Kant was right; his error was in denying intelligible, and admitting only sensible intuition.

God, and if we have sensible intuition of existences, it must be conceded that they are in the sensible order more evident than the Creator; and this, we suppose, is what St. Thomas means, when he says the effect is more evident *quoad nos* than the cause. But it must be borne in mind, that, without the intelligible, the sensible is not, or at least only a sensitive affection, from which nothing is concludable, as we have already shown: and, moreover, the effect in its character of *effect*, the character in which it must be asserted, if any thing is to be concluded from it, is no more a sensible intuition than the cause. The effect as external object strikes the senses, but as effect it does not. The relation of effect belongs as much to the intelligible order as does the relation of cause; for it is only the same relation viewed from its terminus *ad quem*, instead of its terminus *a quo*. The greater or less degree of evidence predicated or predicable of either must be in the same order, and, as the cause is confessedly in the intelligible order, the only evidence of the effect that can be any thing to the purpose must be also in the intelligible order. We therefore deny the assumption, for we deny that we can have immediate intuition of existences as existences without immediate intuition of God. What is not is not intelligible, and what is not intelligible cannot be known. Existences, therefore, cannot be immediately revealed to us in intuition without God, for without him they are unintelligible, and unintelligible because without him they are not existences, that is, do not exist. To suppose a thing intelligible without that by which it exists, is only supposing that it can be intelligible without being. Knowledge, from the very fact that what is not is not intelligible, must follow the order of being. Then, as existences in the order of being are not and cannot be without God, it follows that they cannot be without him in the order of knowledge. Then they cannot be more evident to us than God; for certainly a thing can never be more evident to us than that by which it is evident, and without which it would be totally inevident.

The *a priori* argument, sometimes resorted to, is even less of an argument, if possible, than the argument *a posteriori*, because its pretension is to demonstrate God from necessary and eternal principles, and necessary and eternal principles are God already, as we have shown in showing that the idea is God. Indeed, we are unable to conceive the possibility of constructing an argument to prove that

God is, which does not assume that he is, both as its necessary conditions and principle. From sensibles alone we can conclude nothing, because they have in themselves no *nexus*, as Hume has clearly demonstrated, that binds them to the necessary. The intelligible must supply the *nexus*, before we can begin to frame our argument, and the intelligible is the idea, and the idea is God. In every argument, the major term must be more general in its order than the conclusion, or nothing is concluded. But in no order, not even in that of knowledge, as we have just proved, is there any thing conceivable more general than God. *Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia*, says the inspired Apostle, and it must be so, if God is at all. How, then, frame an argument to conclude him, that does not assume him as its condition and principle? A God that could be concluded by an argument would, it strikes us, by that fact alone, be proved to be not the true God; for if he could be concluded, it would at least follow that something can be known without knowing him, and then that something can *be* without him, and if something can be without him, his very being is denied.

But this inability, in the ordinary sense of the words, to demonstrate that God is, should rather rejoice than alarm us, for it proceeds from the perfection of our evidence that he is, not from its defect. We cannot prove that God is, for we have nothing more evident, *secundum rem* or *secundum nos*, than he with which to prove that he is. He is QUI EST, He who is, and from whom, and by whom, and in whom are all things, and therefore by and in whose intelligibility all things are intelligible. He is the Being of beings, himself intelligible, and the principle of all intelligibleness; himself evident, and the principle of all evidence; himself certain, and the principle of all certitude and of all certainty. What more can be asked? He is light, the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world. Is the light less evident than that which it enlighteneth? Is it the object enlightened that affirms the light, or is it the light that affirms the object, and in affirming it affirms itself? No, we have erred. It is not we who make God, but God who has made us. It is not we nor creation that affirm God, but it is God who affirms himself, in direct intuition, and the heavens and the earth, the sea and the land, all creatures great and small, catch the Divine affirmation, and echo and reëcho it to every intelligence.

It is a great mistake to suppose that God may be placed in question. It is this mistake that has created the embarrassments from which we find it so difficult to extricate ourselves. It is agreed on all hands, that God, if at all, is real and necessary Being,—*Ens reale et necessarium*,—and the characteristic of the necessary is that the contrary cannot be thought. But to place God in question is to concede that the contrary can be thought. To proceed in the face of this concession to prove that God is, can be only proceeding to prove impossible what we concede to be possible. *Ex Deo, et per Deum, et in Deo sunt omnia.* Therefore, to place God in question is to place all things in question, and then nothing that is not conceded to be doubtful remains from which to construct an argument. From doubtful premises we can obtain only a doubtful conclusion. The moment you concede that God is doubtful, you concede universal doubt, and that certainty is unattainable. Here, again, is the condemnation of Descartes, who makes the assumption, that all things are doubtful, or that nothing is certain, or to be accepted as certain, till demonstrated, the necessary point of departure of philosophy. But if we start with the assumption, that nothing is certain, how are we ever to arrive at certainty? If all things can be thought as uncertain, what is there that can be thought as certain? If all things cannot be thought as uncertain, the Cartesian doubt is impracticable, and Cartesianism proposes to arrive at truth by starting with a stupendous falsehood. Yet Descartes had some reputation in his day, and his method is still that of the majority of modern philosophers. For ourselves, we reject the Cartesian method as unphilosophical, absurd, impossible, and impious. The fool, no doubt, has said in his heart, God is not,—*Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus*,—but has only evinced his folly; for it is only by intuition of God that he is able to give a meaning to his words, since negation is intelligible only by virtue of the positive. The words "God is not" are universal negation, but universal negation is absolutely unintelligible, and consequently, if nothing is, nothing can be denied; that is, unless something is, it is impossible to make a denial, and if something is, God is. Well, then, does the Holy Ghost say it is the fool who says in his heart, "God is not."

We deny not that there have been persons who persuaded themselves that they doubted the Divine Being. And we certainly have encountered theories, ancient and modern,

sometimes under the name of philosophy, and sometimes under the name of religion, which are explicitly atheism, or which necessarily, if pushed to their logical consequences, lead to atheism; nevertheless, we maintain that no man ever did, ever will, or ever can really doubt that God is. Atheism, or what passes for atheism, is rarely the vice of the unlettered and simple, but nearly always of the refined, the voluptuous, and the speculative, and is cherished, not because there is no conviction that God is, but because that conviction condemns both the practice and the speculations which atheism favors. It is not that the light does not shine, but those people resolutely refuse to let it illuminate them because their deeds are evil, or, at least, deeds that will not bear the light. Mere practical atheists, that is, those who conduct themselves as if there were no God, present no difficulty; for it is evident that their conduct necessarily implies nothing more than the inactivity, not the total absence, of belief. The so-called intellectual atheists are persons of a speculative turn of mind, and invariably take as the object of reflection, not the reality revealed in their intuitions, but their intuitions themselves, as mere psychological facts. They thus lose sight, *in the reflective order*, of the reality intuitively revealed, and build up a theory which excludes God. God not being included in their theories, they cannot believe in him theoretically, and therefore conclude they ought not to believe, do not, and cannot believe, in him at all. They are thus in will and in reflection really atheists. Nevertheless, the light, though they comprehend it not in their theories, continues to shine in their darkness; their intuitions remain, but they treat them with contempt, will not hear them, because they see clearly, that, were they to do so, their theories would fade away as the shades of night before the rising sun. It is not that they lack conviction, but that, puffed up with the pride of intellect, and confused by false science, they stifle it,—pretending that it is the creation of fear, of habit, or of early education. Their cure is not to be effected by syllogisms, or mere reasoning. Their disease lies in the fact, that they close, instead of opening, their hearts to the truth. Take a man brought up in their school, who has all his life been poring over dry psychological conceptions, and resolutely refusing to admit as true every thing he is unable to comprehend in his contracted and dead formula, and bring him one day to leave his empty conceptions, to turn his

mind to the contemplation of the objects revealed to him in his intuitions, and he is surprised to see how rapidly the mists disperse, the darkness rolls back, his doubts melt away, and the glorious reality appears before him, informing with its light his intellect, and enrapturing his heart with its beauty. He stands amazed at his former blindness, astonished at his doubts of yesterday, so clear is the light to his unclosed eye, so easy is it to open his heart to believe. No doubt the grace of God is operating within him, but, so far as the change depends on human effort, it consists in the fact, that he has turned round with his face towards God in his intuitions, and beholds reality in the light, no longer in the shadow cast by himself. What, humanly speaking, will best serve those who esteem themselves atheists, are such considerations as tend to draw them off from mere reflection on their own psychological phenomena, and set them with free mind and open heart to contemplating the objects revealed to them and to all men in direct and immediate intuition. These are, no doubt, such as are usually presented by the patrons of the argument *a posteriori*, and, if presented in the light of a sound philosophy, for what they really are, and not for what they are not, they are all, the grace of God supposed, that can be required.

If the entire drift of our reasoning be not misapprehended, the question whether God is living God or not will present no difficulty. It has been our endeavor to enter our solemn protest against the dead abstractions of modern psychologism, to prove that there are no abstractions in nature, that abstractions are nullities, and yield only nullity, that ideas are not mere words, are not mental conceptions, are not intellections, are not subjective forms of the understanding, are not *ours*, but are real *intelligibilia*, intelligible objects, objects of our intellect, not our intellect nor the products of our intellect itself, and that they are in the Divine Mind or Eternal Reason, infinite in number considered in relation to the effects God is able to produce, considered in relation to his ability, one, and identical with himself. We have also endeavored to establish that God reveals himself immediately to us in direct intuition as creator, actually creating, according to his own will, out of nothing, therefore as free, voluntary creator, therefore as living, personal, and therefore as proper object of worship, prayer, praise, love, and reverence.

One word more we must add, to prevent misapprehension.

From the fact that we assert direct and immediate intuition of God, it must not be inferred that we assert, or intend to assert, either that we see God intuitively by himself alone, or as he is in himself,—the former of which it would be at least temerity, and the latter undeniably heresy to assert. We assert, indeed, intuition of intelligibles, but we do not assert pure intellections, as does exaggerated spiritualism. Of pure intellections we are not naturally capable; for we are not pure intelligences, but intelligence wedded to body, and therefore can naturally apprehend the intelligible only in union with the sensible. What we have denied and attempted to disprove is, that God is known only as contained implicitly in his works and discursively obtained from them; but we have not asserted, or intended to assert, that he is known as God without his works. *Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur*, (Rom. i. 20,) says St. Paul, and he seems to us to express precisely our meaning. If we see God only discursively, as implicitly contained in his works, we do not see him clearly, for such implicit seeing is not clear seeing. It is not thus we see God; but we clearly see him or the things of God, otherwise unknown or invisible to us, in understanding, or by understanding his works, as we see the light in seeing the visible body which it renders visible. We actually see the light; it is the primary and immediate object of our vision, and the medium by which we see all else that we do see; but we do not see it in itself, nor by itself alone, for our eyes are too weak for that, and it would strike us blind were we to attempt to look directly into it, as any one may satisfy himself by attempting at mid-day to look directly into the sun. So in the intelligible world, we really and truly see God; he is the primary and immediate object of the intellect, and the medium by which we intellectually see all else that we do intellectually see, understand, or know, but not as he is in himself; for if we cannot look into the sun, which is but the shadow of his light, without being struck blind, how much less can we look into him who is light itself; nor do we know him by himself alone, that is, apart from his works, but we know him in knowing objects, which are made intelligible objects only in and by his intelligibility, as they are made existence only by and in his creative act, or omnipotent power.

There are several things in the author's book of considerable importance, which we have passed over; but if he

seizes the real import of what we have advanced, he will have no difficulty in understanding how we view them. We have aimed, not so much to refute his particular views, as to point out what we consider to be the fundamental mistakes into which he, misled by prevailing psychologism, has fallen, and to explain their origin and establish the principles on which they can be and are to be corrected. We take our leave of the book with kind feelings toward its author, and with the confident hope of meeting him hereafter in a work which we can cordially accept.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1858].

We have, as our readers will recollect, frequently asserted that the uncatholic world, Protestants as well as avowed unbelievers, have fallen into such depths of scepticism that they no longer recognize the first principles of science, and have ceased to hold any principles with that firmness which is necessary to bind them by the conclusions which logically follow therefrom. No doubt there are large numbers in the Protestant sects who fully believe themselves to be Christian believers, and who would hold us unpardonable for calling them unbelievers; but even these, with a very few individual exceptions, are prepared to give up the Christian name itself rather than concede the identity of Christianity and Catholicity.

We take no pleasure in stating this fact. It would much abridge our arguments with Protestants, if we could address them as, in some respects, Christian believers, who hold in common with us the great primary principles of religion, and differ from us only on certain specific points of doctrine; but this, if it was ever proper, is now out of the question. Those among them who believe themselves Christian believers, and who are determined to be Christians, for the most part so believe and are so determined only on condition that Christianity does not prove to be Catholicity. They are resolved to be Christians only on condition that they can be Christians without being Catholics. With few exceptions, they hate Catholicity more than they love the Gospel, and sooner than submit to the Church they would reject the whole Christian religion, and deny the very existence of God. Neither we nor they themselves can rely on any concessions in favor of religion they may appear to make, for they make no concessions, however honestly they may make them, which they will not revoke the moment they perceive they cannot adhere to them without furnishing premises from which the Catholic Church is

*The Soul, her Sorrows and her Aspirations: an Essay towards the Natural History of the Soul, as the True Basis of Theology. By William Francis Newman. Second edition. London: 1849.

logically concludable. Were we to take them at their profession, and from their avowed principles conclude the Church, they would not accept her, but would abandon their own professed principles, and seek to escape the conclusion by alleging that we have deduced it from premises that it is necessary to establish. The reason of this is, that they have settled it in their minds, that, let what will be true, the Church is false, and therefore that the fact that any principles imply her truth is a sufficient proof of their falsity.

We are forced, in our argument with Protestants, to proceed on the supposition that they are Protestants, and Protestants before every thing else, and therefore that they will follow out the principle on which they vindicate their protest against Catholicity, if necessary, to its last logical consequences. That principle, as every body knows, is the unrestricted right of private judgment, which is simply the denial of all authority, and the assertion of the absolute moral independence of the individual. This principle, if principle it can be called, we hardly need add, is purely atheistical; for if there is a God he must be supreme, sovereign lord, and man must be morally as well as physically dependent on him, subject to him, and bound to obey him in all things whatsoever,—in thought, word, and deed. The characteristic principle of Protestantism, in that it is Protestantism, is therefore atheistical, and although all Protestants may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact, it is really atheism and nothing else that they oppose to the Church. Nothing is more natural, then, than that they should push their denials to the denial of God, to atheism, in case they find that it is only by so doing that they can maintain their protest against the Church. We cannot, then, construct an argument sufficiently ultimate for the final refutation of Protestantism, unless we make it sufficiently ultimate for the refutation of atheism.

No doubt many of our Protestant readers will object to this statement, and regard it as in a high degree unjust to them. But they must bear in mind that, in our judgment at least, they were never consistent with themselves. They adopt the fundamental principles of two essentially hostile and eternally irreconcilable systems. They are Protestants, and they for the most part profess to be Christians. Understanding by a *Christian*, not merely a baptized person, but one who professes and believes the Christian doctrine, a *Protestant* Christian, or a *Christian* Protestant, is to the

Catholic mind simply a contradiction in terms. The distinctive principles of Protestants, in that they are Protestants, if logically carried out, would render them atheists; the principles they profess, in that they profess to be Christians, if logically carried out, would require them to be Catholics. They do not ordinarily carry out either set of principles to their last logical conclusions, and they are far from perceiving the innate hostility of the one set to the other. They usually take it for granted, that, since they hold both sets of principles, the two must be reconcilable one with the other, and both alike Protestant. They consider them both to be elements, under diverse aspects, of one and the same homogeneous system, and that one may, consistently with the assertion of both, be limited and modified by the other. Hence, when we tell them that the principle of their Protestantism is atheistical, and that to be consistent they must deny God, they deny the charge, and bring forward against it the principles and doctrines which they profess to hold in common with us, and on the strength of which they claim to be Christians; and when we tell them that, if they hold these principles and doctrines, to be logical they must be Catholic, they reply by bringing forward their distinctly Protestant principles and doctrines; thus repelling the charge of atheism by alleging certain Catholic principles and doctrines, and evading Catholicity by alleging atheistical principles and doctrines, apparently unconscious that in so doing they act inconsistently, and imply that of contradictories both may be true. They alternate between atheism and Catholicity, assume atheistical ground to escape Catholic conclusions, and Catholic ground to escape atheistical conclusions. It is in vain that we attempt to bind them by conclusions drawn from either set of principles. They suppose they may reasonably hold both, and will be held to neither, when taken exclusively.

Certain it is that Protestants profess to be Christians only by virtue of what they hold in common with the Catholic Church; for all else in their system is negative, and Christianity, whatever else it be, is something positive, affirmative, resting on its own basis, and intelligible by itself, not merely in that it is the denial of something else. Strip Protestants of what they hold in common with the Church, of what they originally learned and retained from her, and they would have nothing with which to cover their nakedness, or which even they could or would call Christianity.

They are even in their own estimation Christians only in so far as tney agree with the Church, and do not protest against her. Now they cannot be Protestants in the respect in which they agree with the Church, for it is only in dissenting from her and protesting against her that they are Protestants. Hence their Protestantism is not and cannot be in the Christian principles and doctrines they profess, and in treating them as Protestants these are not to be taken into the account. Their Protestantism is to be distinguished from these, and to be judged without reference to the fact that they who hold it do or do not hold these along with it, that is, their Protestantism is to be distinguished from all Christian principles and doctrines, and to be judged unchristian, precisely as it should be judged in case that Protestants did not, inconsistently with it, profess to hold some portions of Christian truth. It is what they deny in opposition to the Church, not what they hold in common with her, that constitutes their Protestantism, as what they hold in common with her, not what they deny in opposition to her, that constitutes their sole claim to be regarded as Christians. It follows, therefore, that we cannot treat Protestantism in any respect as Christian, nor Protestants in that they are Protestants, as Christians. As it is not the Christianity they profess, but the Protestantism which they hold, that it is necessary to refute, and as the principle of this is atheism, we must, in all our arguments intended to be a final refutation of Protestantism in its principle, begin with a refutation of atheism, on which the majority of Protestants will unhesitatingly fall back, if they find it necessary to do so in order to avoid Catholic conclusions.

Undoubtedly Protestants generally recognize the existence of the Supreme Being, but we apprehend that, although many of their ministers have written much to prove that God is, comparatively few of them have that clear conviction or that firm persuasion that he is, which is necessary to warrant us in assuming their belief in his existence as the basis of an argument against them for doctrines repugnant to their passions or their prejudices. There are with most of them things more subjectively certain than that God is, and consequently, if hard pressed, they would sooner deny his existence than surrender them. Hence they need to have the existence of God established anew to their minds, and to be shown that it is absolutely certain, so certain that

there is nothing else that we believe or can believe that it would not be more reasonable to deny than to deny it.

We propose, consequently, to offer a few suggestions in refutation of atheism, but our readers must not suppose that we are about to inflict on them a long chapter of metaphysics. There are popular errors which admit of no popular refutation. The mass of the people can understand, and profit by, the results of the profoundest thought and reasoning, but only a limited number can understand the processes by which those results are obtained. There is no truth above the reach of the common mind, but the arguments which demonstrate the truth, or the reasoning necessary to vindicate it from the errors often mixed up with it in the popular mind, can in general be appreciated only by those who have received a preparatory discipline. Hence the Divine wisdom in all matters of primary importance and essential or useful to our salvation teaches us not through philosophy and metaphysics, but by revelation communicated to us by a living and ever-present authority. But the refutation of atheism is possible without any very long or intricate process of metaphysical reasoning. The question involved is by no means so difficult as it has sometimes been made to appear, and the question needs but to be clearly and distinctly stated to be within the reach of the ordinary understanding.

There are, doubtless, real atheists in the world, both speculative and practical, but no man can be consistently an atheist. Not indeed, as some tell us, because every man in every act of intelligence asserts principles from which that God is can be logically inferred, but because, as a matter of fact, every man in every act of intelligence, in every exercise of understanding, in every thought, apprehends and asserts that which is God, although he may not be distinctly conscious that such is the fact. The refutation of atheism does not lie in demonstrating from principles distinct from God that God is; it lies in showing that the human intellect has in its operations immediate intuition of that which is God, and could not operate or know any thing at all if it had not. The question has been obscured and rendered difficult to ordinary minds by our modern philosophers, who have proceeded on the supposition that, in order to know that God is, we must be able by our natural light to originate the belief in his existence, and to demonstrate it from certain principles or premises more immediately known

to the mind than is God himself. They have supposed it necessary to begin, with Descartes, in doubt, to assume, at least for the purpose of the argument, that man began in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being or his attributes, and then proceed to show how by the operations of his own mind he might attain to the conception of God, and demonstrate his real existence. But this is an error, and one attended with many fatal consequences. The belief that God is, inasmuch as it is a matter of supernatural revelation, pertains to faith, but as the preamble of faith, as St. Thomas calls it, it must be a matter of science. It is necessary, in order that it may be a matter of science, that we should not merely believe, but also know, that God is; and we must know that he is, because faith, though transcending reason, must be reasonable, have some relation to science, which could not be the case if we had no knowledge properly so called of the existence of God. Motives of credibility must have a scientific basis, but unless we know independently of the revelation that God is, and is the Creator of all things, they can have no such basis. But to the reality of science or knowledge as distinguished from faith it is not necessary that its matter or the object known should be originally discoverable by the mind's own operations; all that is necessary is that, when clearly and distinctly presented to the mind, it be intuitively evident. The distinction between faith and knowledge does not necessarily consist in the fact that the objects of the one are supernaturally revealed to the mind, and the objects of the other are discovered by it, but in the fact that in the former the assent is given on the authority of the Revelator, and in the latter by the intuitive apprehension of the truth. In point of fact there is very little of what we know that has been originally discovered by us, or presented to the mind otherwise than by the teacher who originally knew or had already learned it. It is not, therefore, at all necessary to the scientific validity of the belief in God, that it should have been originated by the mind's own operations, or that it should be a belief which the mind without assistance from abroad could have generated. This belief, moreover, is one that the mind not furnished with it could not originate. If we could suppose a people at any time entirely destitute of the belief, in total ignorance of God, with no conception of his being, we should be obliged to suppose them remaining forever without it, unless taught it super-

naturally by God himself, or by teachers from some other people who had already been taught it. The reason of this is, that there is no conceivable process by which the mind can originate it, which does not presuppose that the mind is already in possession of it. "Fear made the Gods," sang old Lucretius, and whole hosts of philosopherlings have labored to prove that the passions have generated the belief in God, and that therefore it has no validity. The passions have, no doubt, obscured the intellect, and influenced the notions which men left to themselves have formed of the attributes of God, and of the worship which he exacts of them, but they could not have originated the belief itself, for the belief is an act of the intellect, which precedes all motion of the passions, and without which neither passion nor its object is conceivable. We must intellectually apprehend an object before we can desire it, fear it, or love it; and we must conceive it to be God before we can tremble or love, be filled with fear or awe, thrill with terror or delight in its presence as in the presence of the Divine. All the passions in themselves are blind, and no one of them is capable of presenting any object to the mind, and they have and can have no object save as presented by the intellect. Men must have had the belief that there is the Divine, that God is, before they could have supposed that what moves their passions is God or Divine, or be led to infer from the fact that their passions are moved that there is a Divinity that moves them; they must also have held his existence before they could have dreamed of saying this or that is God, or of identifying him with wood or stone, heroes or animals, the elements, the mysterious, the terrible, or the beneficent forces of nature, the wind or the rain, the storm or the tempest, the sun, the moon, or the stars of heaven; and consequently the belief that God is must have preceded the rude forms of African fetichism, as well as the poetical and polished mythology of Greece and Rome. The belief must necessarily precede its applications or its corruptions, and consequently all those have grossly erred who have labored in the interests of atheism to prove that man has generated in his own mind the belief in God.

They, again, have erred no less grossly, but from more commendable motives, who have alleged in the interests of the belief that the human mind is able to generate it. This to some extent is the case with the author of the work before us. We say *to some extent*, for he does not precisely

allege that the individual has originated the belief for himself, since he assumes that the well-instructed child has before forming the belief *heard say* from his father that there is a God.

Nevertheless, his whole argument proceeds on the supposition that the individual is able to originate the belief, and he undertakes to show the process by which it may be done. Like all philosophers of his class, he begins with the child, —forgetting that the adult is before the child, and that the human race must have begun in the adult man, not in the infant,—and attempts to show the gradual formation of the belief through the development of what he calls the sense of awe, the sense of wonder, the sense of admiration, the sense of order, the sense of design, the sense of goodness, the sense of wisdom, and reverence. In what sense the author here uses the word *sense* is not very clear, and we suspect it would be difficult even for him to inform us. He writes with great looseness of expression and indeterminateness of thought. The word *sense* in our language has more than one meaning. It means the faculty of perceiving through external organs, as the eye, the ear, &c.; sometimes it means the organ itself; sometimes, again, the exercise of the perceptive faculty, sometimes its object, and, finally, sometimes simple feeling, or affection of the sensitive soul, in modern language, of the sensibility. When we say *sense* of a thing, we use the term to denote a feeble or obscure perception. Thus a sense of awe would mean a feeble and obscure perception of awe, which, if not nonsense, means that we are conscious of a slight degree of awe. This of course is not the meaning of the author, and by sense of awe he would have us understand most likely either the feeling of awe or the faculty or capacity of feeling awe, or of being affected by the emotion termed awe. So of the sense of wonder, and of admiration. Thus far we presume the author understands by *sense* the power or capacity of the soul to feel awed, to wonder, and to admire. But when he speaks of *sense* of order, of design, of wisdom, and of goodness, he cannot use the word in the same sense, because order, design, wisdom, goodness, are not feelings or emotions of our soul, but objects intellectually apprehensible by it, and he must here use the word to denote either the intellect itself or an exercise of intellect, either the power to apprehend order, design, wisdom, and goodness, or the actual apprehension of them. Reverence, again, is the

affection of the rational soul, and demands as its condition the intellectual apprehension of its object, and follows instead of preceding such apprehension.

But passing over the unphilosophical use of language, a common fault of our author, let us inquire if it be possible either to obtain the conception of God or to establish the belief in his existence in the way Mr. Newman indicates. Awe, wonder, admiration, order, design, wisdom, goodness, are all considered by him as properties or affections of the soul, and as affections of the soul they lead us gradually, as they are developed, to the belief in God. We demand how this is done. By way of deduction or induction? Not by way of induction, for there is no induction in the case. Induction is concluding from a number of particulars a general law or principle common to them all, and the law or principle is not applicable beyond the particulars enumerated. In the present case, regarding the particulars enumerated as subjective affections, the principle or law obtainable by induction from them would be subjective also, and pertain solely to the human soul, or be the human soul itself. Not by deduction, for deduction is simply analysis, and analysis can give you only what is in the subject analyzed. But these affections are subjective, human, and therefore do not contain God, and therefore God cannot by analysis be obtained from them. This is sufficient for the refutation of Mr. Newman's theorizing.

But omitting the awe, wonder, and admiration, and confining ourselves to the sense of order, design, wisdom, and goodness, as a feeble or obscure perception of them, we are still unable from it alone, as assumed to be developed in the child, to obtain either immediately or by way of inference the belief in God. Men must hold the principle of casualty, must believe in a first cause and a final cause, and in the necessary relation of cause and effect, before they can either intellectually apprehend order, design, wisdom, or goodness, in nature, or dream of inferring the existence of God from them, and therefore must really believe in necessary and eternal being, cause and end of all things, that is to say, in God himself. This fact alone condemns the whole physico-theology of your Bridgewater Treatises, and the ordinary argument *a posteriori*, so much insisted upon by the pretended natural theologians of modern times.

The argument *a priori*, or from cause to effect, as it is usually defined, is no more conclusive. It proceeds on the

supposition that there are certain principles, at least in the order of our knowledge, more ultimate than God, from which his existence may be logically concluded. But either God is contained in those principles, or he is not. If he is not, he cannot be concluded from them, for nothing can be in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If he is, he can be said to be contained in them only in the sense that he is identical with them, or identically those principles themselves, and then he is not concluded from them, but is immediately apprehended in the immediate apprehension of them. In the order of reality there can be no principles more ultimate than God, for he is himself prior to all not himself. If at all, he is himself ultimate, the first principle conceivable or possible, and therefore there can be no principle from which his existence is concludable. There can be none in the order of our knowledge. In what we know, God is either apprehended or he is not. If not, he cannot be concluded; if he is, then he is apprehended prior to the logical process, and not obtained by it, and all it can do is to clear up and establish the fact that what we do really apprehend is God.

Let us understand this. Reasoning consists in deducing conclusions from given premises. It can neither operate without premises, nor furnish its own premises, and therefore it does and must always proceed from premises furnished it, and, in the last analysis, from premises furnished or given to the mind prior to all reasoning or logical process. The mind cannot by reasoning obtain its first principles, because without first principles it cannot reason at all. Hence the first principles of all reasoning are *given*, not obtained; therefore are called *data*. As there can be nothing in the conclusion not obtained in the *data* or premises, so nothing can be assented to in the conclusion which had not been really assented to in them.

Reasoning is not an operation by which knowledge is extended to new matter, a process by which we go from the known to the unknown and make new conquests to the domain of our knowledge. All it does is to distinguish, clear up, and establish what we already know in its premises, or is given us in the *data* from which we reason. It changes the state or form of our knowledge, but does not give us knowledge of any new matter.

In the order of knowledge, distinguished on the one hand from faith and on the other from opinion, the principles,

premises, or *data* are intuitively evident, and consequently nothing not intuitively evident can be concluded. It is therefore impossible to conclude God by any logical process, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*,—for the principle of both arguments is the same,—unless he is intuitively evident in the premises, and therefore apprehended prior to the commencement of the reasoning. Hence the belief in God has not been and cannot be generated by any simple logical process whatever.

Reasoning is an exercise of the reflective, as distinguished from the intuitive understanding, and its premises must be distinctly apprehended as the condition of its operation. But in the intelligible order, as distinguished from the sensible order, reflection cannot take its premises immediately from intuition, as modern Transcendentalists and exaggerated spiritualists maintain, because we are not pure intelligences, but intelligences united to body, and, unless by a miracle, can act in this life only in conjunction with the body. Hence we are capable, in the reflective order, the order in which we properly act, of no pure intellection, or intellectual operation. We are incapable of performing any intellectual process in which the senses do not take part. We must act as we are, soul and body, intellect and sense united, and consequently cannot reflect or reason on any object which is not either sensibly presented or sensibly represented.

This is the great fact on which Aristotle insists against Plato, and St. Thomas against the Platonists, and is the fact intended in the famous maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu.* Neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas ever intended to teach that nothing is apprehensible by us which is not an object of sense, or to deny that we may have, and have, intuition of the intelligible; for Aristotle makes philosophy properly so called consist in the knowledge of principles and causes, which he holds to be supersensible, and St. Thomas concedes that we have in our desire for good at least an obscure apprehension or intuition of God, who is our sovereign Good. What they mean is, that nothing can be in or present to the mind as an object of the reflective understanding which is not either a sensible object or an intelligible object sensibly represented. Neither held the modern doctrine of Sensism, any more than the modern doctrine of Transcendentalism. All they meant is the well known fact, that the intuition of the intelligible,

though real and the basis of all science, as of all demonstration, is not, and cannot be, immediately an object of reflection. To be such, the object of the intuition must be sensibly represented to the mind.

But the intelligible has no sensible representative in the order of nature, for by its own nature it is always supersensible. The pretence of some, that the sensible world is the image and representative of the intelligible world, is unworthy of any serious consideration.

The material is, and can be, no image of the spiritual, and all theologians agree, that the image and likeness of God to which man was created pertain to man's soul, not to his body. Analogies may be detected between the forces operating in the sensible world and those of the spiritual, and on the exhibition of these much of the charm and vivacity of poetry depends; but these forces are not themselves sensible; they are invisible and immaterial, save in their effects. The correspondences of the Swedenborgians are too fanciful to be entertained. Intuition of the intelligible must, in order to be an object of reflection, be sensibly represented; and as it has no natural representative, it must be represented to us through the medium of artificial signs, or words, which are the sensible signs of ideas, or intelligible objects. Sensible objects may be objects of reflection without the aid of words or language. We can reflect, for instance, on a tree, a blade of grass, or a flower, although ignorant of its name, because we are able to seize the object itself and hold it up before the mind's eye, and speculate on its form, its properties, or its uses. But in the intelligible order this is not possible. Mathematics is a mixed science, and pertains only in part to the pure ideal or intelligible, and yet no mathematician can carry on his processes without the aid of sensible signs or symbols. If we could, as our Boston Transcendentalists contend, take our premises immediately from intuition, we should be pure intelligences, and independent, intellectually considered, of the body while in it, which certainly is not the fact. We must take them from the sensible signs which signify them, and therefore from language. The real office of intelligible intuition is not to originate belief or to propound its object to reflection, but to evidence or confirm it when sensibly represented.

Now God, if he be at all, must be in the intelligible order, or rather that order itself, as distinguished from the sensible. He certainly is no object of our senses, as is con-

ceded on all hands; the distinct or reflective belief that he is, is not and cannot be taken immediately from intuition, even assuming that he is intuitively apprehended by us, because in intuition nothing is reflective or distinct. It would by intuition alone be impossible to assert either to ourselves or to others that God exists. Before we can distinctly conceive that he is, we must have the truth that he is, sensibly represented to us, that is, expressed to us by sensible signs, in words, or language. Hence we could not attain to the belief that God is, could have no distinct belief that he is, unless taught it through the medium of words by some one other than ourselves.

But if the human mind is unable to generate the belief, the very fact of the existence of the belief becomes a proof, and a conclusive proof, of its validity. We do not, of course, contend, that the simple fact that a belief is entertained is in all cases a proof that it is well founded, for we are far from believing in the infallibility of the human race; we only say, that the fact that a belief which man could not of himself originate, and which he can have present to his mind only as taught it by another, is in the world, and generally held, is full proof that it is true. For if we can have it only as we are taught it, we must either assume that God himself has first taught us, or else suppose an infinite series of teachers. Your father may have taught you, but who taught him? His father? But who taught his father? These questions may be continued to infinity, and we must either assert an infinite series of teachers, which is an infinite absurdity, or we must stop with the first man, the commencement of the series of generations, and then arises the question, Who taught the first man? God himself, is the only answer conceivable, and then God really is; for if he were not, he could not teach his existence, since what is not cannot act. This is historically the way in which the belief has actually originated. God taught the first man his own existence, and the belief has been perpetuated to us by the unbroken chain of tradition. This of itself sufficiently refutes the atheist.

The tradition of the human race in this respect is uniform and unbroken. History traces the belief from the first man down to us, and the testimony of the human race to the existence of the tradition in every age and in every nation is itself sufficient to warrant belief in its reality, if human testimony is sufficient to establish any fact whatever. There

may have been atheists in every age who have denied the existence of God, but even these are so many unexceptionable witnesses to the fact of the tradition, for these all assailed it and they could not have assailed it if it had not existed; they all arraigned the belief in God, but in so doing they only proved that the belief survived, since men do not arraign what is not, or deny what is not affirmed.

The mythologies and idolatries of the heathen all vouch in like manner for the fact of the primitive tradition, for they are all manifest corruptions or perversions of it,—of the belief and worship of God which preceded them, subsisted with the patriarchs and the Jews contemporaneously with them, and in the Catholic Church have survived them. Even if man could have originated the belief itself, still the universal tradition would be full evidence that he first learned the existence of God from God himself.

But we will not stop here, lest we be supposed to hold one of the errors of La Mennais. This would establish the validity of the belief in God, it is true, but it would not make his existence a matter of science.

Here was the error of La Mennais. He made the belief traditional, assumed the original revelation by God himself, but made the belief rest for its evidence, not on intuition, but on the testimony of the race, and therefore left it a matter of faith, of mere human faith too, and not a matter of science. The belief is proved to be true by the tradition, but to be a matter of science it must be evident not merely from testimony, but from intuition, or, in other words, it must be intuitively evident, and that it is intuitively evident we proceed now to show.

We allow the atheist to doubt all things if he wishes, till he comes to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe, —to deny as it does to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, simply an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You cannot doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts would be to doubt that you doubt, for without intelligence there can no more be doubt than belief.

Intelligence, then, you must assert, for without intelli-

gence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence in the very act of denying it. Doubt, then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not cannot act.

This much, then, is certain, that however far the atheist may be disposed to carry his denials, he cannot carry them so far as to deny intelligence, because that would be denial of denial itself. Then he must concede intelligence, and then whatever is essential to the reality of intelligence. In conceding any thing you concede necessarily all that by which it is what it is, and without which it could not be what it is. Intelligence is inconceivable without the intelligible, or some object capable of being known. There is no intelligence where there is no knowledge; there is no knowledge where nothing is known; and there can be nothing known where there is nothing to be known. So, in conceding intelligence, the atheist necessarily concedes the intelligible. He who asserts intelligence asserts the intelligible, for without the intelligible intelligence is impossible. But as what is not cannot act, so what is not cannot be intelligible. The intelligible therefore is something which is, is being, real being too, not merely abstract or possible being, for without the real there is and can be no possible, or abstract. The abstract in that it is abstract is nothing, and therefore unintelligible, that is to say, no object of knowledge or of the intellect. The possible, as possible is nothing but the power or ability of the real, and is apprehensible only in the apprehension of that power or ability. In itself, abstracted from the real, it is a pure nullity, has no being, no existence, is not, and therefore is unintelligible, no object of intelligence or of intellect, on the principle that what is not is not intelligible. Consequently, to the reality of intelligence a real intelligence is necessary, and since the reality of intelligence is undeniable, the intelligible must be asserted, and asserted as real, not as abstract or merely possible being. The atheist is obliged to assert intelligence, but he cannot assert intelligence without asserting the intelligible, and he cannot assert the intelligible without asserting something really is, that is, without asserting real being. The real being thus asserted is either necessary and eternal being, being in itself, subsisting by and from itself, or it is contingent and therefore created

being. One or the other we must say, for being which is neither necessary nor contingent, or which is both at once, is inconceivable, and cannot be asserted or supposed. Whatever is, in any sense, is either necessary and eternal or contingent and created,—is either being in itself, Absolute Being, as the Germans say, or existence dependent on another for its being, and therefore is not without the necessary and eternal, on which it depends. If you say it is necessary and eternal being, you say it is God; if you say it is contingent being, you still assert the necessary and eternal, therefore God, because the contingent is neither possible nor intelligible without the necessary and eternal. The contingent, since it is or has its being only in the necessary and eternal, and since what is not is not intelligible, is intelligible, as the contingent, only in necessary and eternal being, and therefore can be known only in knowing necessary and eternal being, the intelligible in itself, in which it has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. So in either case you cannot assert the intelligible without asserting necessary and eternal being, and therefore, since necessary and eternal being is God, without asserting God or that God is; and since you must assert the intelligible in order to assert intelligence, and since you must assert intelligence even to deny it, it follows that in every act of intelligence God is asserted, and that it is impossible without self-contradiction to deny his existence.

The conclusion here is evident, but if we analyze it we shall find that it is not that God is, but that what is really apprehended in every act of intelligence as the intelligible, without which the act were impossible, is God. The whole argument proceeds on the assumption that the mind has immediate and direct intuition of being. We find that in every act of intelligence there is apprehension of real being, and it is only in virtue of such apprehension that there is any actual intelligence at all. But this apprehension is immediate, intuitive, not discursive, by virtue of a prior act of intelligence, or a previous apprehension, because without it there is no apprehension, and no intellectual act at all. As certain, then, as it is that there is intelligence at all, so certain is it that in the first, as in the last, act of intelligence there is intuition of being, and of real being. It is equally certain that this real being is necessary and eternal being, and therefore God; for only that which is necessary and eternal, which is being in itself, subsisting by and from

itself, absolute, perfect, independent being, is intelligible in and by itself alone. Nothing but being is intelligible, and consequently that which has being only in another is not intelligible in and by itself alone, and can be known only in the being in which it has its being. Hence Malebranche rightly maintained, after St. Augustine, that we see all things in God, in whom we live, and move, and are. If nothing but being is intelligible *per se*, it follows that the being which is the intelligible, and without which there could be no intelligible, is independent being, being that has its being in and from itself; for otherwise it would not be intelligible *per se*, and could be known only in knowing another being on which it depends or in which it has its being. But being which is independent, that has its being in itself and not in another, is necessarily necessary and eternal being, therefore God. Consequently that of which we have immediate intuition in every act of intelligence as the intelligible is God which is what was to be proved.

It may help us to understand this if we bear in mind that there are no abstractions in nature, and that whatever is is real. We may say this or that which does not exist is *possible*, but we cannot say the possible *is*, for in that it is possible its characteristic is that it is not, but may be. Abstracted from the real, from the power or ability of the real, as we have said, it is a mere nullity, and is unintelligible, the subject of no predicate whatever. Between that which really is in itself or in another, that is, between real being or real existence, and nothing, there is no medium. A thing is or it is not, exists or does not exist. Existence as distinguished from being is that which is not in itself, but in another, and has being only by virtue of the creative act of him in whom it is. The word itself, from *ex-stare*, says as much. It is never necessary and eternal, but contingent, with a beginning in time, and therefore is inconceivable without the independent, necessary, and eternal being that has created it, and on which it depends. All conceivable, all possible reality is that which is and exists, that is to say, creator and creature. Hence, between God or creator and existence or creature, and nothing, there is no *tertium quid*, no medium, and consequently whatever is intelligible to us, or essential to intelligence, which is not existence or creature, is God. Now it is certain that in reasoning, for instance, we have immediate intuition of cause and effect, and of the necessary relation of the one to

the other, and we could not perform a single act of reasoning if we had not. In the syllogism we hold there is necessary *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion, and in all languages the conclusion is said to follow *necessarily* from the premises. Here is evidently apprehension of the necessary. This apprehension is necessarily intuitive, and not the result of reasoning, and is the basis of every discursive process. But the necessary, as the eternal, wherever we encounter it, must have a real entity,—is in the language of the schools, *ens necessarium*, necessary entity, and therefore God. Consequently, that of which we have immediate intuition in every process of reasoning, and without which no such process would be possible or conceivable, is God the Creator.

In all the operations of the mind concerning numbers, for instance, there is always intuition of unity; for all numbers, as says Thomassin,* .

"Are only unity more or fewer times repeated, and since it is seen as unchangeable and eternal, God himself is seen. The truth of unity and of numbers, and of their innumerable and ineffably wonderful properties, and the necessity of this truth which could not not be, its immutability whence it cannot be otherwise than it is, and its eternity whence it cannot not always be, are evidently perceived and clearly seen, and since it has so many of the Divine attributes, it can be no other than God himself. * * As to figures also, there are in the universe no circles, no spheres, no figures which exactly agree with the laws and definitions, which the understanding alone perceives to be prescribed to them * * In God, therefore, as in the supreme principle of numbers, as in the very citadel of unity and equality, as in the art of arts and law of arts, all these things are seen, and are clearly seen, with the fullest light and evidence. Finally, the truth of these figures and of their properties, and the necessity, immutability, and eternity of this truth, surpass all created nature, and yet are plainly and certainly seen with the eye of the mind; and therefore God himself is seen [or intuitively apprehended]."

We may add to the same purport the following passages from St. Augustine, with Thomassin's commentary on them, as cited by Gerdil:

"*Aug.* By these and many similar arguments are those reasoners, to whom God has granted understanding, and who are not led by pertinacity into error, compelled to acknowledge that the truth and reason of numbers do not belong to the external senses, and that this truth and reason are real and unchangeable, and common to all who reason.†

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* Apud Gerdil—Tom. IV., p. 24.
† Lib. II. de Lib. Arbit., cap. VIII,

Thom. Therefore this truth, since it is intelligible, unchangeable, and eternal, is God."

"*Aug.* There is a thing worthy of being known, which is, how from corporeal and spiritual, but mutable numbers, we can come to the immutable numbers which are in that immutable truth, and thus the invisible things of God are already seen, being understood by the things that are made.*

Thom. You see the numbers, which are so plainly evident, appear immutable, and are seen in God, who is the immutable truth."

"*Aug.* The immutable truth of numbers is as the chamber, the inmost recess, the region, habitation, or seat of numbers."†

And again:

"A sort of light in a wonderful manner, both secret and public, is present and illumines all those who perceive immutable truths.

And further on:

"Pass, then, beyond the mind of the artificer, that you may behold the eternal number, then will wisdom shine upon you from its inner recess and from the dwelling-place of truth.

Thom. He therefore most constantly asserts that God, the eternal and immutable truth of numbers, is seen [intellectually apprehended]."‡

As to figures, St. Augustine says:§

"Since agreement, by which alone all things are beautiful, pleases in all arts, and this agreement requires equality and unity, either in the similitude of equal, or in the gradation of unequal parts, who is there that can find supreme equality or similitude in bodies, and would dare to say that any body is truly and simply one, if carefully considering that all bodies are changed either by passing from one form to another, or from place to place, and that they are composed of parts occupying their places, by which they are divided into different spaces? Moreover, the true equality and likeness, the true and first unity, are apprehended not by the eyes of the flesh, nor any external sense, but by the intellect. For how should any equality be desired in bodies, or how should the most of them be known to be imperfect, if that which is perfect were not apprehended by the mind,—if indeed that may be called *perfect* which is not made?

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* Retract. Lib. XI.

† Lib. II. de Lib. Arbit., cap. II.

‡ A little further on St. Augustine says: Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum * * Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est. Si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse negare non poteris; quæ nobis erat ad disserendum et tractandum quæstio constituta.—*De lib. Arbitr.* L. II. c. XV. Ed.

§ De Ver. Relig., cap. 30.

Thom. He argues, then, that the transcendental equality is seen neither by the senses nor the imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that works are judged by it as by the law of all arts. But since this equality is immutable and immense, having no relation to place or time; since it is perfect, though not made; since it is the law which may not be judged, but according to which, as being supreme and above them, all created minds judge,—it must necessarily be God himself, the law of all arts and the art of the Almighty Artificer, as the same St. Augustine immediately adds: But since this law of all arts is in all respects immutable, and the human mind to which it is granted to apprehend this law is liable to the mutability of error; it is evident that there is a law above the mind of man, which is called truth."

And again:

"*Aug.* The immutable nature, which is above the human soul, is God; and there is the first wisdom where is the first life and the first essence. For this is that immutable truth which is rightly called the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Artificer. *Thom.* Hence it is evident that God is seen [or intuitively apprehended], since this law or truth of equality and unity is apprehended by the intellect alone. *Aug.* Is it easy for the soul to love those things in which after diligent search it can hardly detect the least trace or shadow of equality and likeness? Is it difficult for the soul to love God in whom, as far as is possible for it, still thinking of earth, it sees nothing unequal, nothing unlike, nothing extended in place, nothing varied in time? For I find nothing else which may be said to be similar or equal in them which discipline may not deride. If this be so, why do we descend to these things from that citadel of most true equality, and build on its ruins? *Thom.* You perceive that the equality itself is God, and is seen by our understanding, and seen so clearly and surely as to be more evident than bodies.

"*Aug.* It belongs to the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons, which, if they were not above the human mind, would not be immutable; and unless some thing of our own were added to them [that is, if we were not in relation with them, or could not apprehend them], we could not by them judge of corporeal things. But that of our own which is employed in treating of corporeal and temporal things, and is not common to us with brutes, is indeed rational, but proceeds from that rational substance of our mind by which we adhere to the intelligible and immutable truth [that is, intuitively seize or apprehend it], and is given us to handle and direct inferior things.* As we said of the nature of the human mind, both when as a whole it contemplates the truth, it is the image of God, and in the case when any thing is divided from it and directed in purpose to the dealing with inferior things, nevertheless, on that side on which it con-

*De Trinit. Lib. XII., C. II-III.

sults the truth perceived it is the image of God, yet on that side on which it is directed to the dealing with inferior things it is not his image."*

We come to the same conclusion from the notion of justice. St. Augustine must speak for us:—

"What the mind is we know from ourselves, for there is a mind within us. But how shall we know what the just man is, since we are not yet just? If we know it without ourselves [in space], we know it in some body. But this is not a thing belonging to a body. In ourselves then we know what the just man is; for I do not find this anywhere when I seek to utter it, except within myself. And if I ask another what the just man is, he seeks within himself what to answer; and whosoever hence can answer truly he has found within himself what to answer. Is that which he sees an inner truth present to the mind which is able to behold it? Yet all are not able to behold it, and those who are able are not all of them that which they behold within themselves, that is, they are not just minds because they can behold and tell what is a just mind. And whence can they be so except by adhering to that very same form which they behold within themselves, so that from thence they may be formed and made just minds? The man, then, who is believed to be just, is loved through that form and truth which he who loves him sees and understands within himself; but which form and truth cannot be loved from any other source than itself."†

The soul, as Gerdil remarks, knows itself, in the manner in which it knows itself in this life, by its interior sentiment of itself, but it knows justice only in beholding the very form of justice. Now this form and this truth is God himself; for, as St. Augustine says, it is loved for itself, and, besides, justice can be represented to us by no idea of it distinguished from itself, as St. Augustine says again in express terms:—

"For we find nothing such except itself that, when it is unknown, by believing we love it because we already know something similar. For whatever you see like it is it, since it alone is such as it is."

And again:‡

"Hence, even the wicked think of eternity, and rightly blame and praise many things in human morals. By what rules, then, do they judge, unless by those in which they see how each one should live, although they themselves do not live according to them? Where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since they are certainly seen by the mind, and it is evident that their minds are changeable, and whoever sees these rules sees they are unchangeable. Nor do they see them in the

*Ib. Cap. VII.
†De Triuit, Lib. VIII., cap. VI
‡Ibid, Lib. XIV. cap. XV.

habit of their mind, since they are the rules of justice, but their minds are evidently unjust. Where are these rules written? Where do the wicked see what is just and what is unjust? Whence do they know they should have that which they have not? Where are these rules written if not in the book of that light which is called truth? Hence, every just law is written in and transferred to the heart of the man that works justice, not by migration, but as it were by impression, as an image passes from the ring to the wax, *yet does not leave the ring*. But he that does not do that which he sees should be done, is turned from that light by which, notwithstanding, he is enlightened."

"Behold, you blame God," he says,* "as if for injustice. You could not blame him for injustice if you did not see justice, for how could you know that this is unjust, unless you know what is just? You see this to be unjust from some rule of justice, and comparing with it the evil that you see, and finding that it does not agree with the rectitude of your rule, you blame it, distinguishing, as an artificer, the just from the unjust. I ask you, then, whence do you see that this is just? Whence that I know not what with which your soul is sprinkled,—for it remains on many sides in darkness,—that which flashes upon your mind? Whence is this *just?* Has it no origin? Is it from you, and can you give justice to yourself? No man gives himself what he has not. Therefore, since you are unjust, you can be just only in turning to some permanent justice, which you cannot depart from without being unjust, nor come to without being just; when you go from it, it is not wanting, when you approach it, it does not increase. Where then is this? Go where God has once spoken, and you will find the fountain of justice where you find the fountain of life."

These extracts, which are only a specimen of what we might make from St. Augustine, and which we introduce both for their merit as arguments, and as authority for our Catholic readers, fully sustain our position. They prove that in all our intellectual operations, as their necessary condition, we have intuition of real being, of the unchangeable, the necessary, and the eternal, and real, necessary, unchangeable, and eternal Being is God, and therefore they prove that we have intuition of God. This intuition is like all intuition, indistinct, indefinite, and we do not from it alone ever know or become able to affirm that its object is God. To know this, it is necessary to reflect on the object of the intuition as re-presented to us in language, or sensible signs. Here is the place for the various arguments ordinarily adopted by theologians. They do not prove to the mind, that has no intuition of God, that God is, for God is the

*Enarr. in Ps. lxi.

first principle of all proof, of all demonstration, of all science; but they do prove to the mind that the object of its intuitions, by virtue of which it knows or reasons, is God. These arguments, whether from effect to cause or from cause to effect, whether from the order and design of nature, the necessity of a prime Mover or of a universal Governor, do not prove from principles distinct from God that God is, but that principles which we did not know to be God are God, and nothing else, which is still better.

Another branch of the subject, namely, the evidence that God not only is, but is the creator of all things, or has created the world, and which contains the refutation of pantheism, remains to be considered; but as it would make this article quite too long to take it up now, we reserve it for a future occasion. Pantheism is the form which atheism now assumes, and the great point to be proved to complete the refutation of atheism is not to establish the fact that we have intuition of God as being, but of him as creative being, for it is the creative Deity that is now generally denied. We live in an age marked by the revival and prevalence of heathenism, and the grand error of heathenism originated in the loss of the conception of God as creator. Heathen philosophy forgot the first verse of Genesis: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." It lost sight of the creative act of the Divinity, and hence it was never able to attain to sound theology even in the natural order. The philosophers of our age lose sight of the same fact, and hence their errors. We will endeavor hereafter to recall the fact to their minds, and establish it. But we have said enough for the present. We have shown that God is, and that he is the very principle of all our intelligence, the fountain of all truth, and the source of all light. As such, we are in immediate relation with him, are in our own minds intimately united to him. Let it be our study to be as intimately united to him in our hearts by a never-failing charity, which loves him above all things for his own sake.

SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1854.]

The author of the first named of these works is a French Sulpitian of rare merit, formerly Professor of Philosophy at Clermont, now, we believe, at Issy. He is a young man, but he has made good philosophical studies, and is animated by a noble philosophical spirit. His work, which might, perhaps, gain by condensation and vigor of style, is certainly one of great value, and, saving the part which treats of ethics, one of the best manuals of philosophy we are acquainted with. It strikes us as a very great advance, as to its principles, we say not as to the ability of the author, on the *Lugdenensis*, the popular work of Bouvier, the manuals of Liberatore, Dmowski, and even Rothenflue. The author, perhaps, adheres too closely to Malebranche, but he rejects Cartesianism and modern psychologism, and bases his system on sound ontological principles. If we should object at all to his *metaphysics*, it would be to his having failed to adapt his method to his principles. But we are so thankful to find a philosophical work, in these days, generally sound in its fundamental principles, that we can overlook minor faults, and give it a most hearty welcome, although we may not regard it as perfect. The philosophical student will not fail to prize the author's *Prolegomena* very highly, and his refutation of pantheism is decidedly the best we have ever seen, and leaves on that head, as far as we can judge, nothing to be desired.

The author, undoubtedly, departs in some respects from the philosophical system of our more generally used manuals, and many will regard him as an innovator; but if he innovates, he innovates antiquity, for the school to which he inclines is older than the school which will oppose him. The ontological school, both among the Gentiles and among Catholics, is older than the psychological or Peripatetic school, as it was formerly called. The latter school hardly makes its appearance in the Catholic world till the Middle

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*1. *Prælectiones Philosophicæ.* Claramon-Ferrandi. 1849.

2. *L'Autocrazia dell' Ente. Commedia in tre Atti.* Roma: La Civiltà Cattolica. Vol. III. 1853.

Ages, and owes its introduction in a great measure to the influence of the Mahometan schools in the East, on the coast of Africa, and in Spain. If its adherents can produce a catena of great saints and doctors from the twelfth or thirteenth century down to our times, their opponents can produce a catena of no less eminent saints and doctors from the Apostolic age down to our own. If the school which would charge the author with innovating can plead in its favor an Abelard, an Alesius, an Albertus Magnus, a St. Thomas, an Occam, a Suarez, he can plead in his favor a St. Augustine, and nearly all the fathers, St. Anselm, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, St. Bonaventura, a Duns Scotus, a Gerson, a Ficinus, a Malebranche, a Thomassin, a Vico, a Gerdil, and a Bossuet and a Fénelon, who were Cartesians only in name. If it comes to the authority of great names, our author has nothing to fear; for if the single name of St. Thomas is a host, that of St. Augustine is not inferior to it, nor to any other name in philosophy; besides, it is evident to the student of the works of the Angelic Doctor, that, if he adopted the Peripatetic philosophy, it was not so much because he preferred it as because he found it generally received, and because he would use it against the enemies of religion, who for the most part professed it, and compel it as a slave to serve the cause of revealed truth. Wherever he breaks from the old Stagirite, and philosophizes freely, so to speak, on his own hook, he accepts and defends ontological and realistic principles.

The second work named at the head of this article is from the modern psychological school, and is a very successful attempt to turn the shafts of wit and ridicule against those who have the temerity to defend the principles and method of the ontological school. As a *jeu d'esprit* we can read and enjoy it, but as an argument we cannot respect it so highly as we could wish, for it confounds the bastard ontology of the heterodox with the views of the so-called ontologists among Catholics, and concludes against the truth of the latter from the absurdity of the former. We are sorry to see this mode of warfare adopted by any philosophical school, because it presents a false issue to the public, and is calculated to arouse passions in poor human nature any thing but favorable to the cause of truth. We are ourselves as strongly opposed to the bastard ontology as is the writer of *L'Autocrazia dell' Ente*, and it is not pleasant to be held up to the public as embracing it, because we

do not happen to embrace the psychological school. There is an ontological school as far removed from the heterodox German ontological school, or the Rosminian *ens in genere*, as from the school defended by the *Civiltà Cattolica*.

We like earnestness, we like zeal in the defence of what one holds to be truth, but we should not dare to defend even dogmatic truth by unfairness towards its opponents, much less mere philosophical opinions. Two schools of philosophy, it is well known, exist among Catholics, each aspiring to the throne of the philosophical world. These schools, under different forms and different names, have subsisted among us for a long time, and both are tolerated by the Church, which leaves each free to maintain its own opinion in Christian charity, and to dispute that of the other, so long as it does not advance its opinion as Catholic dogma, or maintain any thing repugnant to the decisions and definitions of Popes and Councils, and the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. Undoubtedly this does not imply that both schools are equally sound, that their respective opinions are equally probable, and that there is no ground for preferring one to the other; but it does prove that one may belong to either without imperilling the salvation of his soul, and therefore that the differences between the two schools may be discussed without heat or passion on either side. These matters of difference lie in that sphere where the Church wills us to be free, and where, as long as we advance nothing immediately against faith, or that immediately tends to weaken its defences, she leaves us to follow our own reason and will, as she does in political or domestic economy. We say *immediately*, because, no doubt, every error even in the natural order has some bearing, more or less remote, on revealed truth, since the revealed order presupposes the natural. But to tolerate no error of reason, however remote from the revealed dogma, would be to deny to man all free intellectual activity, which is contrary to the uniform practice of the Church. Her authority is full and universal as representing the Divine authority on earth, but her uniform practice is to leave men in philosophy, in government, in social and domestic economy, all the freedom compatible with the end for which she has been instituted; for her wish is to rear, not a race of mere slaves, but free and loyal worshippers of God.

The philosophy more generally taught in our schools is what we term the psychological, though of course free from

the glaring defects of the psychologism which obtains in the schools of the heterodox. But though permitted to be taught, there is a wide and growing feeling among earnest and devout Catholics, that it does not afford that strong defence to religion and society, and those facilities for the refutation of modern heresies, which we have the right to demand of a philosophy taught to Catholic youth. That we, to some extent, share this feeling, we have no disposition to deny, but we are not very warm on the subject, and we guard against blaming, in any degree, our professors. That philosophy may have, in our opinion, remote bearings injurious to faith; but it is not heretical, and may be held without any impeachment of one's orthodoxy. Moreover, it is not the professor's business to construct a new or revive an obsolete system of philosophy; his business is to teach a system already constructed, and approved by his superiors. The introduction of new, or the revival of old systems, by individual professors, each on his own responsibility, would produce no little confusion in philosophical teaching, and tend to generate that scepticism in the minds of youth which it is so important to guard against. It is always dangerous to disturb the settled order of things, even though that order may not answer to the highest and most perfect ideal. If the hostility of kings and princes to the Pope, and their desire to possess themselves of the goods of the Church, had the principal share in preparing the revolt of the sixteenth century, the quarrels of the Schoolmen, the attempt to dislodge Aristotle and enthrone Plato as the philosopher, had no little to do in detaching the minds of men from the theology of the Church, and preparing the way for the Protestant heresies. When the whole method of public teaching was adjusted to the scholastic philosophy, it was not easy to attack that philosophy without seeming in the minds of many to be attacking the Church, who had permitted her theology to be cast in its mould, and some of whose most revered saints had professed it.

However objectionable many may regard the philosophical system embodied in our more generally used text-books, it must be conceded that the objections which might be urged against it are to no inconsiderable extent modified and practically obviated by the manner in which it is applied; and even if it were not so, what have we to take its place? Its modern opponents have criticised it, and written able essays on the principles and method of philosophy, but we are not

aware that there is any better system of philosophy drawn out in that systematic order and completeness which fit it for the professor's use. Suppose, for a moment, that the ontological principles and methods insisted on by Gioberti are sound, what is the professor to do with them before his class? They are not systematized; there is no philosophy based on them drawn out in all its parts and adjusted to the general system of public teaching. What is the professor to do? Is he to interrupt his lessons till he has constructed all the parts of philosophy in harmony with them, —a work demanding years of patient study and labor, and that high order of metaphysical talent and genius scarcely to be found in one man in a century. Whatever changes may be demanded in the public teaching of philosophy, the time has not yet come for them, as the professor before us, as well as Father Rothenflue, fully proves, for while he adopts in his *Prolegomena* the principles of the ontological or synthetic school, he has not dared to depart from the language and method of the scholastic psychologists.

With these feelings towards the school with which we do not wholly agree, we cannot enlist with much zeal in any controversy against it; or in an animated defence of a rival school; and if we take part now and then in the controversy between them, it is more through our love of fair play than through any strong feeling of the absolute necessity of dispossessing one school and establishing another in its place. On certain questions we undoubtedly sympathize with the so-called Ontologists, but properly speaking, we have for ourselves no philosophical system, belong to no school, and swear by no master, neither by Gioberti nor by Father Curci. We regard, as we often say, philosophy simply as the rational element of supernatural theology, never capable by itself alone of being moulded into a complete system even of natural truth, and never worthy of confidence when it aspires to disengage itself from revelation, and to stand alone as a separate and independent science. All we aim at is, to make a right use of reason in discussing those questions pertaining to reason which come in our way when defending Catholic faith and morals. Indeed, logic is the only part of philosophy we set much store by, and if we enter into the discussion of the higher metaphysical problems, it is chiefly for the sake of logic, because we cannot otherwise make sure of a logic which conforms to the real order of things. It is with a view to

defend such a logic, not for the sake of one or another school of metaphysics, that we ask our readers to follow us a little into the question in dispute between the two schools respectively represented by the authors of the works we have cited, and perhaps, after all, we shall end by showing them that these two schools can much more easily be made to harmonize with each other than is commonly supposed.

The difference between the ontological and the psychological schools is perpetuated by the very general adoption in our schools of the Aristotelian logic, and what we regard as the errors of the psychological school we think have obtained among Catholics in consequence of that adoption. Aristotle's logic partakes of the general error of his philosophy. We wish to speak with all becoming respect of one whom the great St. Thomas terms the Philosopher; but he was, after all, a Gentile. He went, perhaps, as far as a Gentile could go; but we must remember that all Gentile philosophy was incomplete and fragmentary. The whole Gentile world had lost or corrupted the dogma of creation, and resolved creation into emanation, generation, or formation. They had broken the unity of the primitive language of mankind, had lost the integrity of the primitive tradition, and lacked the light which supernatural theology sheds on the great problems of human science, and hence, whatever their genius, their talent, or their industry, they were utterly unable to construct a complete and self-coherent system of philosophy. Ignorant of the dogma of creation, and holding the doctrine of formation in its place, it was not in Aristotle's power to construct a logic that should correspond to the order of things. He might have a wide and varied knowledge of phenomena, he might have a marvellous sagacity and great subtilty, he might reason powerfully and justly on many aspects of things, but he could never explain the syllogism, or render a just account of reasoning. The fundamental vice of his logic is, that it does not conform to the real order of things, whether taken subjectively or objectively. It does not bring us face to face with reality, although no man ever labored harder to find a logic which would do so; it always interposes a *mundus logicus* between the reason and the real world, and deals with the lifeless forms of abstract thought, instead of the living forms of things. Always is there interposed between the cognitive subject and the intelligible object a world of phantasms and intelligible species, which are neither God nor creature,

neither nothing nor yet something, but a *tertium quid*, by means of which in some unintelligible way the cognitive subject comes into relation with the cognizable object. A little meditation on the fact that God has created all things by his own power from nothing, would speedily have made away with these intermeddling phantasms and intelligible species, annihilated this *mundus logicus* unnecessarily interposed between subject and object, by showing that whatever is not *thing* is *nothing*, that whatever thing is not God is creature, and that whatever thing—*entity* in scholastic language—is not creature is God, and that his intelligible light, indistinguishable from him, is the only medium between the cognitive faculty and its object, that can be asserted or conceived.

The old Scholastics, of course, knew and held the dogma of creation, and vindicated it whenever it was an express thesis; but, unhappily, when that dogma was not immediately in question, they adopted without modification the Aristotelian logic, and attempted like him to explain the facts of human cognition and reasoning without its light. Hence their everlasting abstractions, their subtile distinctions of forms of mere thought, not of things, and their unreality, which have so hurt their reputation, and so vitiated a no small portion of their philosophical labors. Of course we speak of the Scholastics as philosophers treating freely rational questions, not as theologians treating Catholic dogmas, or even rational questions in their immediate relation to faith. This same Aristotelian logic has served as the model of that still in use, and hence we find in the present scholastic philosophy traces of the original vice. In all that immediately touches dogma, it conforms to the dogma of creation, and is, as we should say, ontological, while in all else it conforms to the Aristotelian notion of formation, and thus is not in harmony with itself.

The psychological school is divided into two principal branches, the Cartesian and the Scholastic. It is possible that the modern Scholastics will object to being termed psychologists, but we see not how they can with propriety. The characteristic of the psychologist is to assert the soul, a contingent existence, as the starting-point of all philosophy, and that the necessary, the absolute, as real and necessary being, is not apprehensible in immediate intuition, and is attained to only by a logical induction from intuition of the contingent, that is, intuition of creatures. The Scholastics

of our time, as well as those of mediæval times, assert this, contend that the contingent only is immediately known, and that God in the natural order is known only logically, as a logical induction, and therefore are really psychologists. We shall so call them, not to offend, but to distinguish them. They differ from the Cartesians as to evidence or the criterion of certainty, and especially as to the methodical doubt, real or feigned, recommended by Descartes. They profess to commence with a certain truth or fact, and to proceed from the known to the unknown, by demonstration, which rests for its certainty on the principle of contradiction; the Cartesians profess to begin by doubting or questioning every thing, and they place evidence or certainty in clearness and distinctness of ideas. The Scholastics regard philosophy as *demonstrative;* the Cartesians as *inquisitive.*

The Scholastics have certainly as to method the advantage over their Cartesian brethren. Descartes lays it down that a man should begin by doubting all that he has been taught or hitherto believed, and believe henceforth only what he is able to prove by bringing it to the test of clear and distinct ideas. But this method, which is precisely the Protestant method of examination and private judgment, is obviously inadmissible, for the doubt, if real, is in a Catholic impious and forbidden; if unreal, it is no doubt at all, and amounts to nothing. To begin in a feigned doubt is to begin in a fiction, in falsehood; to begin in a real doubt is to begin in uncertainty, and there is no logical alchemy by which certainty can be extracted from pure uncertainty, or truth from pure falsehood. Descartes himself proves this, for he gets out of the doubt he places as his starting-point only by a shallow sophism, *Cogito, ergo sum,* "I think, therefore I exist,"—which is a sheer begging of the question. We know that, when hard pressed by his opponents, Descartes denied that he intended this as an argument to prove his existence, and maintained that he only gave it as a statement of the fact in which he became conscious of existing. But if so, only so much the worse for him, for it was precisely an argument to prove his existence that he needed. It is true that he might allege that proof in his system consists in clearness and distinctness of ideas; but in the act of thinking he has a clear and distinct idea or conception of his existence, and therefore he really does prove his existence. But that evidence is in clear and distinct ideas he

does not anywhere prove, and that always, in thinking, one has a clear and distinct idea of his own existence, is not true, for ordinarily we have only an obscure and indistinct conception of ourselves as existing. Moreover, reasoning is always from premises, and if these be uncertain, so must be the conclusion.

But if the Scholastics are right against the Cartesians in adopting the demonstrative instead of the inquisitive method, they seem to us to fall into a very grave error as to the province of demonstration itself. They assume that demonstration proceeds from the known to the unknown, and enables them to conclude beyond the matter intuitively presented. The whole question between them and us lies precisely in this assumption. They deny all intuition or direct cognition of real and necessary being, and yet they contend that real and necessary being is legitimately concluded from the cognition of contingent existences. They must hold, then, that they can conclude more than they have in their premises, contrary to the well-known rule of logic: —

"Latius hunc quam præmissæ conclusio non vult."

If they contended that the demonstration simply distinguishes real and necessary being from the contingent in the intuition in which it is presented only in an obscure and indistinct manner, their conclusion would not be broader than their premises, and there would be no essential disagreement between them and the Catholic ontological school. But they do not admit this; they deny that we have any direct apprehension of real and necessary being at all, and then either they conclude what is not contained in their premises, and their conclusion is invalid, or the necessary and absolute which they conclude is a mere logical abstraction formed by the mind itself. Their God, then, whom they profess to demonstrate, would be only an abstract God, and they would have no right to laugh at Fichte, who remarked to his class as he concluded one lecture, "In our next lecture, gentlemen, we will make God."

Demonstration is the work of reflection, and reflection is never primary. The Italians happily express it by the word *ripensare*, to re-think, or to think again, and surely the mind must have thought before it can re-think; it must have had the matter of reflection presented before reflecting on it. Reasoning, the syllogism, demonstration, is only the instrument of reflection, whose sole office is to distinguish, clear

up, systematize, and verify our immediate intuitions, and though it may and usually does contain less, it can never contain more than the matter presented in our direct cognitions, or by faith, human or divine, in things natural or in things supernatural. As to the reality contained in it, our science begins and ends where begin and end our immediate intuitions or direct cognitions; all beyond is not science, but faith, and can never be legitimately included in our philosophy.

We do not deny that the mediæval Scholastics—the Peripatetics, we mean—have the air of asserting that the syllogism is an instrument by which we advance from the known to the unknown; but this is to be understood of knowledge under a reflective and scientific form, not as to its matter, and their own expression is from the better to the less known. Reality simply presented or merely apprehended in intuition they do not regard as known, because known only in an obscure and indistinct manner; but they never suppose that in formal science they ever advance beyond the reality thus presented. Their real doctrine is not readily seized, because they do not admit, precisely in our sense, immediate intuition. We know according to them only by means of phantasms and intelligible species; but when we have penetrated to the real fact which they mean to assert, we shall find that the phantasms are simply the means by which we actually cognize sensible or corporeal things, and the intelligible species are the means by which we really apprehend intelligibles or incorporeal things. The sensitive faculty does not, according to St. Thomas, terminate in the phantasms, but by them attains to their objects, and the intellective faculty does not terminate in the intelligible species, but through it attains to the intelligible reality. The phantasms and species present to the intellect their respective objects, and St. Thomas expressly teaches that nothing can be known by us not so presented. But as so presented, the reality is only the *materia informis* of science, and becomes science only as abstracted from the phantasms and species in which it is presented. It is easy to understand, then, why the Angelic Doctor regards the syllogism as the instrument of advancing science; he does so because on his principles it is by it that the intellect impresses on our simple apprehensions the form of science, and it is the form that gives actuality to the matter; but he was too good a logician to hold that the matter concluded can exceed the matter apprehended.

The scholastics followed Aristotle, and held that all cognition begins in sense, *quod principium nostræ cognitionis est a sensu;* but we must beware how we suppose that such scholastics as St. Thomas held that only objects of sense are really apprehended in the phantasms or sensible species. They held that the intelligible is really apprehended in the phantasms, but under a sensible form, and is distinctly known only as abstracted or distinguished from them by the reflective intellect; and as nothing is really scientifically known except under an intelligible form, we see again how they could assert that the syllogism, the instrument of reflection, is a means of extending knowledge. But they do not represent it as extending knowledge beyond the matter apprehended, for their meaning is not that the intelligible is obtained from the sensible by a strictly analytic judgment, but that the intelligible is presented in the phantasms, or along with the sensible. That is, in our own language, what is called simple apprehension is simultaneously the apprehension or intuition of the sensible and intelligible as conjoined one with the other.

Under a certain point of view we are disposed on this last point to agree with the Peripatetics in opposition to the Platonists, or at least in opposition to Platonism as represented by Aristotle and understood by St. Thomas after the Neo-Platonists. Aristotle represents Plato as teaching that we have immediate intuition of intelligibles as separate from all apprehension of the sensible. We are far from being satisfied that Plato held this, and certainly, though we have been a somewhat diligent student of his works, we have never found it in them. Plato's problem, as we understand it, was not so much how we know, or by what faculty we are first placed in relation with reality, as what we must know in order to have real science. He placed science in the knowledge of the essences of things, which he called ideas, not in the knowledge of their exterior or sensible forms, which are variable and corruptible. But that these ideas are apprehensible in themselves without apprehension of the sensible to which they are joined, we have not found him teaching. But be this as it may, St. Thomas, after Aristotle, argues, and justly, that the intelligible is to the sensible as the soul is to the body, and that as man is in this present life always soul united to body, he can perform no operations which are not conjointly operations of both. Not being a pure spirit, but spirit united to matter,—not

being a pure intelligence, like the angels, but intelligence united to sense,—he can apprehend the intelligible only as united to the sensible, the spiritual only as united in some way to the material. We apprehend the intelligible indeed,—the *idea* in the language of Plato,—but only in conjunction with the sensible, and therefore God never as separate from his works. Thus far we agree with the Peripatetics, and hold that every intuition of the intelligible even includes the sensible.

But we do not accept the doctrine that our cognition begins in sense, or the sensible species. The argument from the union of soul and body admits a double application, and if it proves that we can have no intellections without sensations, it proves equally that we can have no sensations without intellections, no sensible intuition without intelligible intuition. Indeed, it proves more than this. The intellective is to the sensitive, the intelligible is to the sensible, what the soul is to the body. But the soul is *forma corporis*, the form of the body. The intelligible, therefore, is the form of the sensible, intellect the form of sense. The *principium* is in the form, not in the matter, for the matter is potential, simply *in potentia ad formam*, and is made actual by the form. Therefore it is the intellect that gives to sensation its form of cognition, or that renders it actual perception of the objects of sense. Without intelligible intuition, sensation is a mere organic affection, and no actual perception at all. Cognition is the basis of all sensible perception, for whatever the objects or conditions of knowledge, the cognitive faculty is one and the same. We have not, as Aristotle perhaps held, one faculty called sense by which we know particulars, and another called intellect, by which we know universals. We know both corporeals and incorporeals, sensibles and intelligibles, by the intellective faculty, the former through sensible affection, and the latter on the occasion of such affection, or more simply, in conjunction with the former. Properly, then, though both the universal and the particular, the intelligible and the sensible, are presented simultaneously in one and the same intuition, the *principium* of our cognition is in the intellect, not in the senses, for till the intellect is reached there is no commencement of cognition. The Scholastics were misled by Aristotle, who, denying creation and asserting an eternal matter *extra Deum*, in which he placed the possible of determinate things, was obliged to place the *principium* in

matter, that is, in the potential, which, since not actual, should be regarded as nothing at all. The Scholastics, knowing perfectly well the dogma of creation, ought not to have fallen into this error, for they were not ignorant that the possibility of things is in the Divine essence, and that the potential in that it is simply potential is a nullity. To say of any thing that it is potential, is simply saying that it does not exist, but that God has power, if he chooses, to create it. God is the creator and creability of all things, is both their formal and their material cause, in so far as material cause they have, and therefore the potential regarded as *extra Deum* is, as we have said, simply nothing. To place the *principium* in the potential is then a simple absurdity, and in the Scholastics wholly uncalled for, an inconsequence. To place the *principium* of cognition in sensation, which is only *in potentia ad cognitionem*, were as absurd as, after having declared the soul *forma corporis*, to pretend that the *principium* of the soul is in the body, or that the soul derives its life and actuality from the body, as pretend our modern materialists, instead of the body being made an actual and living body by the soul, and being, when separate from the soul, not a body, but a carcass.

The Scholastics, having placed the *principium* of our cognition in sense, were obliged to assume intelligibles or universals only as abstracted from the phantasmata or sensible species in which they are originally presented. This abstraction they suppose the intellect is competent to make by its own powers, and does make, as St. Thomas says, *dividendo et componendo*, or by ratiocination. Hence we find them uniformly, after Aristotle, and like all our modern inductionists, reasoning in a *vicious* circle. They tell us all knowledge begins *a sensu*, and that through the senses we know only particulars, and universals, genera and species, are obtained by reasoning, abstracting them from the particulars. Experience furnishes the particulars, and reason by way of induction obtains from them the universals, which, reapplied to particulars, give *sapientia*, or wisdom, the end of all philosophy. But they also tell us that all reasoning, all demonstration, proceeds from universals to particulars! So they assume universals in order to get particulars, and particulars in order to get universals. They prove their particulars by their universals, and their universals by their particulars. The universals are obtained by reasoning, and yet there is no reasoning without uni-

versals. And we are to be held up to ridicule and made the butt of Italian wit, because we cannot accept this as sound logic! Nay, denounced as pantheists, as enemies of religion, and as laboring only to destroy the defences of the Catholic faith! Yet no man who has made himself even superficially acquainted with the Aristotelian logic, can deny that it involves this *vicious* circle.

The mistake of Aristotle was not so much in denying the distinct intuition of universals, as it was in supposing that reflection originally obtains them by abstraction from the sensible species. The intellect does not, and cannot, so obtain them, for the reasons already assigned to prove that we never have intuition of the intelligible without the sensible. Intellect is joined to sense in the reflective order as much as it is in the intuitive, and therefore it cannot in reflection, any more than in direct cognition, apprehend the purely intelligible. As in intuition it is sensibly *presented*, so in reflection it must be sensibly *represented*. Here is a point which, as far as we have seen, neither Aristotle nor even St. Thomas sufficiently elucidates, and in the elucidation of which we must find the method of escaping from the Peripatetic circle. This sensible representation is not furnished by the sensible species or phantasms, for in them the intelligible is presented, not represented,—presented to the intuitive, not represented to the reflective understanding. It is impossible for man himself to furnish the medium of sensible representation, and it cannot be furnished by the objects themselves, for the precise work to be done is to separate the purely intelligible from the sensible species, or the sensible, in the intuition or apprehension of objects themselves. The Creator then must himself furnish it, and he does furnish it in language, which is the sensible sign, symbol, or representation of the intelligible. And hence man cannot reflect, or perform any operation of reasoning, without language, as has been so ably proved by the illustrious De Bonald, although his arguments would have been more conclusive, if he had taken pains to distinguish between reflective and intuitive thought. Intelligibles or universals are intuitively presented, as we say,—presented in the intelligible species, as the Schoolmen say; but they are objects of reflection, of distinct apprehension, or reflex cognition, only as sensibly represented in language. So represented, they are supplied to the mind prior to the intellectual operation of abstracting them from the sensible species or intuitions,

and therefore may be legitimately used in reasoning before they are thus obtained. Consequently, by language, which sensibly represents the universals, we can get out of the Peripatetic circle. It is, in fact, by means of the word, of language, that Aristotle himself escapes from that circle; for he very nearly identifies logic with grammar, places the elements of the syllogism in verbal propositions, and makes the explanation of reasoning little else than the explanation of the right use of words. He avails himself of the fact of language, but he does not render a proper account of it, or legitimate the usage he makes of it. His practice was truer than his theory. This fact of the divine origin of language, and its necessity as the sensible representation of the intelligible in the reflective understanding, is one of vast importance, and, if attended to, would save philosophy from that too rationalistic tendency objected by the respectable Bonnetty and others, and teach our scholastic psychologists that to their demonstrative method they must add tradition or history, and prove to the heterodox that true philosophy can be found only where the primitive tradition and the unity and integrity of language have been infallibly preserved, therefore only in the Catholic Society or Church. Outside of that society there is no unity of speech, no integrity of doctrine; the primitive tradition is broken, and there are only fragments, *diejecta membra*, even of truth pertaining to the natural order. Alas! heterodoxy, whether in the natural order or the supernatural, is that wicked Typhon of Egyptian mythology, who seized the good Osiris and hewed him in pieces, and scattered his members far and wide over the land and the sea. So deals it with the fair and lovely form of Truth, and no weeping Isis, however painful her search, can gather them up and mould them anew into a living and reproductive whole!

It is these mistakes into which our Scholastics fall in their laudable efforts to avoid, on the one hand, the pure materialism of old Democritus, and the pure spiritualism or incorporealism of the Platonists on the other, that have induced them to deny all immediate intuition of the intelligible, and to maintain that the necessary is obtained only by induction from the contingent. Correcting these mistakes, dismissing their vexatious phantasms and intelligible species, and understanding that we stand face to face with reality, whether corporeal or incorporeal, spiritual or material, intelligible or sensible, with nothing but the intelligible light of God

between as the medium of both intelligible and sensible intuition, they might easily find themselves in accord with the Catholic ontologists, and their philosophy corresponding to the order of things. They might then easily perceive that their principal objections to the ontological method are founded in misapprehension, and that they, though formally denying, do virtually admit all that we ourselves contend for. Their objections to the ontologists are based on the supposition that they assert pure and distinct intuition of God by our natural powers, or clear and distinct intuition of the necessary and intelligible prior to and without the contingent and sensible; but this, though true of the heterodox or bastard ontologists, such as we find among non-Catholics, is by no means the case with all who reject the psychological and assert the ontological method. The alternative presented is not, either that the necessary and intelligible must be concluded, by an analytic judgment, from the intuition of the contingent and sensible, or that the contingent and sensible must be concluded from the necessary and intelligible. These are two extremes alike false and dangerous, the one leading to nihilism through atheism, the other through pantheism. We have already explained that the intelligible is never presented alone, or separate from the sensible, but that both are in this life presented together, in one and the same intuition, and therefore that we have no simple intuitions or apprehensions, but that every apprehension, intuition, or thought is a complex fact, including both the intelligible and the sensible. As the sensible always represents the subject, it follows that there is never intuition of the object without intuition or apprehension of the subject, and none of the subject without the object, and therefore that there can be no intuition of God, real and necessary being, without the apprehension of the soul, contingent and relative being, or existence. Then the *primum philosophicum* can be neither the necessary, the absolute, the *primum ontologicum* alone, as maintain the German ontologists, or rather pantheists, nor the contingent, the relative, the *primum psychologicum*, as maintain the psychologists, but must be the simultaneous presentation of the two in their real synthesis or union. Real and necessary being, or God, is really presented in the intuition, not separately, but in relation with the soul, or the contingent, not as clearly and distinctly known, but, as in all direct cognition, as known only in an obscure and indistinct manner.

This view, which we may call the synthetic, is opposed, as our readers cannot fail to perceive, alike to those who make the intuition of real and necessary being their starting-point, and profess to descend, by way of deduction, to contingent existence or to creatures, and to those who profess to start with the soul alone, and to be able from intuition of the contingent to rise by induction to necessary being, that is, to God. When by ontologists are meant the former, we must disclaim the name, for deduction is simple analysis, and attains to no predicates but such as lie already before the mind in the subject, and from the single conception of being can be obtained only being and its attributes. Here is, in our judgment, the principal fault of the work of the excellent Father Rothenflue. Father Rothenflue represents real and necessary being—God—as first in the order of intuition, but he does not take note of the fact that the necessary is never, in this life, presented to us without the contingent; for we never, in this life, see God as he is in himself, and at all only as he is related to us, or in his relation *ad extra*, as the theologians call it, of Creator. We see not, then, how Father Rothenflue's intuition of real and necessary being is to be distinguished, save in degree, from the intuitive vision of the blest; nor do we understand how he contrives to include in his philosophy contingent existences, or, in other words, after having assumed the *primum ontologicum* as his *primum philosophicum*, how he can by any legitimate process escape pantheism. He can relieve himself from this objection only by taking note that along with the necessary, as that on which it depends as its *principium*, is always presented the contingent in the same complex intuition, and therefore that the *primum philosophicum* cannot be being alone, any more than it can be the soul or contingent existence alone.

On the same principle, we object to those who profess to rise from the contingent discursively to the necessary, because, if they have only the *ens contingens*, they can conclude only the contingent and its phenomena. The scholastic psychologists teach that the first object of the intellect is *ens reale et actu*, a real or actual *ens*, but they deny that this is *ens necessarium*, and pretend that it is simply the soul or *ens contingens*. From this *ens contingens* they profess to be able to conclude *ens necessarium*, or God. But this is not possible by deduction, or analytic reasoning, which requires the predicate to be already in the subject, because

the *ens necessarium* is not in or a predicate of, *ens contingens;* since if it were the contingent would not be contingent, but necessary,—a manifest contradiction in terms. It is equally impossible by synthetic reasoning, which adds to the subject a predicate not contained in it; for the judgment cannot join to the subject an unknown predicate, or a predicate not intellectually apprehended, as Kant has sufficiently proved in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft.* And here it is denied that the predicate *ens necessarium* is apprehended, since the very object of the process is to find it. In all synthetic or inductive reasoning, the conclusion is invalid if it goes beyond the particulars enumerated or the reality observed, and in the case before us it is contended that the *ens necessarium* which is to be concluded escapes all observation, and is wholly unknown. How, then, is the mind, in its judgment, to add it, bind it, to the subject, *ens contingens?*

The fact is, that our Scholastics do really assume the necessary to be apprehended by the intellect, although they imagine that they do not. They hold that God can be demonstrated by way of induction from contingent existences, and this argument holds a prominent place in their ontology. We do not question, nay, we maintain, the validity of this argument when properly understood. But what is their process? The contingent is known to exist, but, as its very name implies, it does not suffice for itself, has not the reason of its existence in itself, and cannot stand alone, and therefore it is necessary that there be something else on which it depends for its existence, which has caused it to exist, and sustains it. This something, since what is not real cannot act, and since we cannot suppose an infinite series of causes, must be real and necessary being, or the eternal and self-existent God. That is, in the apprehension of *ens contingens* they apprehend or have intuition of the *necessity* of *ens necessarium et reale.* The intuition of this necessity must be conceded, or the argument is good for nothing, and the conclusion cannot be asserted as *necessary*, and, indeed, cannot be asserted at all. Now this *necessity* of real and necessary being which is apprehended in apprehending the contingent, and which is the principle of the conclusion, what is it? The Scholastics, no doubt, regard this necessity as something really distinct from the necessary being itself. Otherwise they could not assert a progress in their argument from the known to the unknown, or deny the immediate

intuition of real and necessary being. But is it something distinct? And does not their mistake lie precisely in supposing that it is?

This necessity is either something created or uncreated. It is not something created, for if it were it would be the contingent itself, and a contingent necessity is not admissible. If uncreated, it is either *ens* or *non-ens*. If *non-ens*, a nonentity, it is simply nothing, and can be no medium of concluding the necessary from the contingent. If *ens*, then it is *ens increatum*, and *ens increatum* is God, real and necessary being. Consequently, the distinction contended for, between the apprehension of the necessity of real and necessary being, and the apprehension of real and necessary being itself, does not and cannot in reality exist, and the apprehension of the necessity is *ipso facto* apprehension of real and necessary being, of God himself, although we may not always, and certainly do not always advert to it.

The Scholastics have been misled on this point by their devotion to Aristotle, who was obliged, in his theory, to explain the production of things and human knowledge without the fact of creation. Their error, if they will pardon us the word, lies precisely in supposing a logical necessity distinct from necessary being, and that from the apprehension of the necessity of real and necessary being to the judgment such being is, there is a progress. Hence why we began by insisting so strenuously on the recognition of the fact of the creation of all things from nothing, as essential to the construction of a sound logic, or a logic that conforms to the order of things. It is not till we learn that God has created all things out of nothing, that we are able to say that whatever is not God is creature, and that whatever is not creature is God. God and creature comprise all that is or exists, and what neither is nor exists is simply nothing, and is and can be no object of thought, as both St. Thomas and Aristotle teach. "Ens namque est objectum intellectus primum," says the Angelic Doctor, "cum nihil sciri possit, nisi ipsum quod est ens actu, ut dicitur in 9 Met. Unde nec oppositum ejus intelligere potest intellectus, non ens."* Yet Aristotle, who confounds creation with formation, and makes the essences of things consist partly in the form and partly in the matter, imagined a sort of *tertium quid*, neither God nor creature,

* Opusc. XLII. Cap. 1.

not precisely something, nor yet absolutely nothing. Corresponding to this *tertium quid*, he imagines a sort of *ens logicum* distinct from *ens physicum*, a sort of middle term between *ens* and *non ens*. Hence a *mundus logicus* distinct from the *mundus physicus*, and a logical necessity distinguishable from physical necessity, or necessary being. Our Scholastics will not say the necessity of necessary being which the mind apprehends is literally nothing, nor yet will they admit it is a real being or entity. They regard it as an *ens logicum*, or as a logical relation between two terms; but relation apart from the related is inconceivable, for it is a sheer nullity. It exists and is apprehensible only in the related. Nothing exists *in abstracto;* all reality is concrete, and it is only in the concrete that things are or can be apprehended.

The Scholastics forget this, and, as they agree that only what is *ens aliquo modo* can be an object of the intellect, they clothe their abstractions with a sort of entity, and imagine them apprehensible *extra Deum*, and apart from their concretes. It is only by so doing that they can pretend that the necessity they apprehend in apprehending the contingent is distinguishable from real and necessary being. All conceivable necessity is in God, is God, for there can neither be necessity out of being, nor necessity in a non-necessary being. Necessity is in being, not in non-being. The necessity that there should be God is not any other necessity than the necessity of his own being; and the necessity of his being, which we assert when we say he is necessary being, is in him, not out of him, necessitating him to be. It is a necessity in him to be, and to be precisely what he is, and simply implies that his being is itself its sole and sufficient cause or reason of itself. When we say this or that is necessary or unnecessary, we have reference always to his Divine Essence, and the real meaning is, that this or that is or is not necessary in the eternal and immutable nature of God. God is himself, in his own essence, the eternal reason, nature, or fitness of things, of which philosophers speak, that is, in so far as it is necessary, and in his power, in so far as it is contingent. But all this is obscured by the Aristotelian logic, which places the necessary as well as the possible in some sense *extra Deum*. Indeed, an assumption of this sort runs through all Gentile philosophy. Hence the *fatum* of the Stoics, and the Destiny of the Poets, which binds alike gods and men in the

invincible chain of an inexorable Necessity. Neither Greek nor Roman philosophy ever succeeds in steering wholly clear of Oriental Dualism. Pythagoras and Plato assert the eternity of matter, and place in it the origin of evil; and Aristotle finds in this same eternal matter a limitation of the power of God. The Scholastics struggle bravely against this Dualism, and to harmonize their Gentile logic with their Catholic theology, but perhaps not always with complete success. They define the possible as that in which there is no repugnance between the subject and predicate, and the impossible as that in which there is such repugnance; but they are not uniformly careful to inform us that the subject is the Divine Essence, and that the possible or impossible is what is or is not repugnant to that, and that both have their reason, not out of God, but in the fulness and perfection of his own being. The same remarks are applicable to the necessary and the unnecessary. Not being ordinarily given as predicates of the Divine Being only, they are not seldom regarded, even by men who pass for philosophers, as predicates, either of no subject, or of an unknown subject, which is neither God nor creation, neither something nor yet nothing. .

We do not, say the Scholastics, in apprehending the contingent, apprehend *ens necessarium et reale*, but the necessity there is that there be *ens necessarium et reale*. But can you apprehend the necessity of a thing which you do not apprehend? You apprehend the imperfect, but can you apprehend that it is imperfect, and that it needs something which it has not, if you have not the apprehension of the perfect in which it can find its complement? Not without conceiving the perfect, it is answered, but without apprehending the perfect. Without apprehending or knowing the perfect perfectly, we concede, but without knowing that it is, we deny. We do not pretend that our intuition of real and necessary being gives us a full and comprehensive knowledge of what it is, for our knowledge, at best, whatever its sphere or its object, is extremely imperfect, and hardly deserves the name of knowledge. We do not comprehend real and necessary being, we only apprehend it; and we apprehend it only in its relation to created existences, never in itself. We do not apprehend it at all, say the Scholastics, we apprehend only its necessity. But its necessity is not distinguishable from itself, for necessity can be apprehended only in necessary being, since the abstract

apart from the concrete is a mere nullity, and no object of thought. Surely the necessity must be either something or nothing. If nothing, it is nothing, can do nothing, and nothing can be made of it. If something, it is either absolute being, or created existence, for created existence is the only medium between absolute being and nothing. It cannot be created existence, for that would imply a contradiction in terms, and because creation is, on the part of God, a free, not a necessary act. Then it must be absolute being. Then it is God, and then whoever apprehends necessity apprehends God. Then all who accept the argument from the contingent to the necessary, since the reasoning is synthetic, not analytic, do really assume, whether they are aware of it or not, that we have in the apprehension of creature the apprehension of that which is not creature, therefore, of God, the creator. The argument from *entia contingentia* is a good argument, when properly explained, and is objectionable only when presented as an analytic argument, or as a synthesis, which adds to the subject an unknown and unapprehensible predicate.

Every thought, intuitive or reflective, is a judgment, for, as we have seen, we have and can have no apprehension which is not simultaneously apprehension of both subject and object, the mind and that which stands opposed to it and is really distinguishable from it. In every thought, as in every enunciable proposition, there are three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. The subject is *ens necessarium et reale*, real and necessary being; the predicate is *entia contingentia*, or contingent existences. The copula, then, must be the relation of the necessary and contingent. This relation, the *nexus* that unites subject and predicate, can be nothing else than the creative act of God, which produces the predicate from nothing. We know this is so, from the dogma of creation, and we know furthermore, that *entia contingentia* can exist only inasmuch as they are created, and that the act by which they are created is and must be solely the act of God, for prior to their creation they are nothing, and nothing cannot concur in making itself something. It is of the nature of contingents not to have their cause or the reason of their existence in themselves, and therefore they cannot exist separated or disjoined from the creator. Consequently, the predicate *existence* can begin or continue to exist only as really joined to the subject, real and necessary being, by the creative act of God. This act

must be an *actus perdurans;* for though an existence could be conceived to have been created, it can be conceived as continuing to exist only in its continuing to be created. Suppose the creative act of God to cease, or to be suspended, with regard to any particular existence,—and we may so suppose, because the act is, on the part of God, a free act,—that existence ceases at once, and is literally annihilated. It is only on condition, then, that the creative act is *actus perdurans*, that existences are continued, and what we call conservation is in reality only creation. So that the original and persisting relation between God and the soul, God and existences, is the relation of creator and creature. God, by his creative act, creates existences from nothing, and establishes a relation *ad extra* between them and himself. It is only on condition of the reality of such relation that thought is possible, for it is only by virtue of that relation that we exist at all, or that there is any thinker, except real and necessary being. The relation of creation is then the copula in the real order or in the judgment as the judgment of real and necessary being, and therefore its real apprehension must be the copula of the judgment regarded as ours, or else the order of cognition will not correspond to the order of things. The three terms of the judgment objectively considered are, then, Being, the subject; contingent existences, the predicate; and the creative act of being, the copula. And we may assume as our formula of thought, or *primum philosophicum*, and as the basis of all sound logic, *Ens creat existentias*, or Being creates existences.

This formula has been objected to as pantheistic, as placed first in the order of cognition when it should be last, and as being given as a philosophical when it is a theological truth, known only as supernaturally revealed. It is not easy to understand how it can be pantheistic. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of second causes or the production by the Creator of real effects *ad extra*. The formula, therefore, cannot have a pantheistic sense, unless it denies the predicate existence, or the subject apprehending as existing distinct from God and operating as second cause. This it certainly does not do, for it is given as a formula of thought, and its very purpose is to assert that the mind intuitively apprehends the subject thinking and the object thought as really united by the creative object, and this necessarily asserts the reality of the soul or subject of the intuition distinct from the object God, and its activity as

second cause, for without such activity it could not think or be the subject of an intuition. The principle we proceed upon is, that the order of cognition must agree with the order of things, for we hold, with St. Thomas, that the intellect is essentially true, and that truth is in the correspondence of the thought to the thing. We have proved that, in apprehending the object or thing, we invariably and necessarily apprehend ourselves as subject apprehending; that we can never apprehend what is not ourselves without apprehending ourselves, nor ourselves without apprehending what is not ourselves; that is, every thought affirms the subject simultaneously with the object, and the object simultaneously with the subject. The formula then no more denies the subject than the object. It expressly asserts existences distinguished from as well as united to God by his creative act, as really placed *ad extra* by his creative act, which creates them from nothing,—the direct contradiction of pantheism, which denies that any effects are produced *ad extra*, or that there is any thing really produced distinguishable *ad extra* from God.

The charge of pantheism, we have been told, is warranted by the fact that the verb in the formula is placed in the present tense. The present tense, it is contended, expresses an action unfinished, whose effect is in the process of completion, but is not yet completed. *Ens creat existentius*, means, God is creating existences, and this means that the existences are only in the process of creation, therefore that they are only incomplete or inchoate existences. Such existences cannot act, and therefore the whole thinking activity asserted is that of God, which, as it denies the proper activity of second causes, is pantheism. But this conclusion, if possible, is not necessary. The verb is placed in the present tense, not to express the act as incomplete in relation to its proper effect, but to express the fact that the act is a present act. The act may be present and yet terminate in its complete effect. The effect is simply the extrinsic terminus of the causative act. Existences cannot be supposed to be once creat d, and then to be able to subsist of themselves, without the creative energy that produced them. Their conservation is their continuous creation. Being only the extrinsic terminus of the creative act, they are, if separated from it, simply nothing. They are produced and subsist only by virtue of the creative energy of that act, and the cessation of that act would be their annihilation. When I

consider myself as having existed, I use the perfect tense, and say, God has created me; but when I wish to consider myself simply as existing, I say, God creates me; for he does literally create me at this very moment, and if his creative act were not a present act to me, and did not this moment create me from nothing, I should not exist, or be an existence at all. The act of creation and conservation is the one creative act, and hence to every actual existence the creative act is necessarily a present act, and can be expressed only in the present tense. The Church indeed, as does Genesis, uses the perfect tense, and says *creavit* instead of *creat;* but because, though she expresses the same fact that the formula does, she does not express it from the same point of view, and it did not enter into her purpose in defining the dogma of creation to assert the identity of creation and conservation; and when it is not necessary to express that identity, the perfect tense must be used.

Our modern Scholastics, who imagine that they detect pantheism in the formula *Ens creat existentias*, have, we must believe, studied it rather for the purpose of finding some error in it, than of ascertaining its real meaning. Their psychological habits and prejudices very naturally dispose them against it, and the fact that they have found some of its most distinguished modern advocates among the worst enemies of the Christian religion and civilization, is not very well fitted to win their respect for it. They seem to have hastily inferred, from the fact that Gioberti—an able but a bad man—used the present tense of the verb, that he meant in his formula to represent Being simply as the immanent cause of existences, in the sense of Spinoza, who opposes *causa immanens* to *causa transiens*. Immanent cause, as thus opposed, means only a cause that operates within its own interior, without placing any real effects *ad extra*. In this sense existences are not an external creation, but effects produced by Being within its own bosom, as modes or modifications of itself, which is pure pantheism. So far as the present tense decides any thing, the creative cause asserted in the formula might be understood in this sense, and we suppose our scholastic friends do so understand it. But the character of the cause is determined by the nature, not the tense of the verb. The verb to *create*, according to all Christian usage, means to place real effects *ad extra*, and therefore can no more have the sense of Spinoza in the present than in the perfect tense. The word

existences, from *ex-stare*, to be from another, by its own force expresses an external effect, distinct, though, like every effect, inseparable, from its cause. Attention to the real sense of the verb to *create* and of the substantive *existences*, placed in the plural number expressly to render the idea of plurality distinct, would, we think, have removed all ambiguity occasioned by placing the verb in the present tense, and convinced our scholastic friends that no pantheistic or heterodox sense can fairly be extracted from the formula, regarded as expressing the reality apprehended in the primitive intuition.

The only point on which a reader might doubt Gioberti's orthodoxy is as to the relation of the copula of the judgment, regarded as our judgment, with the real relation of things, or copula of the judgment, regarded as the judgment of God. Thought is composed of three elements, subject, object, and their relation, the soul, God, and the relation between them. Now there can be no doubt that the relation between God and the soul in the real order is the Divine creative act; but if we say that this act is the relation in the order of cognition, we make the judgment God's judgment, not ours, and therefore fall into pantheism. Gioberti, as far as we have examined him, does not seem to us to be very clear on this point, and we are not sure that he does not identify the real relation of the intuitive subject and the intelligible object with the copula of the judgment or the form of the thought. He gives *Ens creat existentias* as his *primum philosophicum*, and calls it a Divine Judgment, and seems to represent the mind as purely passive in regard to it. If so, what is the human judgment, or what is the part of the human intellect in the formation of thought? We have no call to defend Gioberti, and even if he has erred here, it is only an error in his interpretation of the formula, not an error in the formula itself. We have not studied Gioberti's works with any great care, for we felt from the first, long before they were prohibited, that he was a dangerous man, whom it would never do to take as a master, and certainly we cannot bind ourselves to any defence of his philosophy. It seems to us that his explanation of cognition makes intuitive thought an act of God rather than of man, and that he sometimes comes very near identifying the order of cognition with the order of things. Nevertheless, we must remember that he gives *Ens creat existentias* as the ideal formula, which with him means the formula as

the intelligible object of the intuition,—not the apprehension, but that which is apprehended; and so taken, it has and can have no pantheistic sense. Whether he sufficiently distinguishes, in the fact of intuition, the intellective action of the subject from the concurrent activity of the intelligible object in the production, not of things, but of intuition, may, perhaps, be a question, and therefore it may be a question whether he has or has not been justly accused of pantheism. But however this may be, it is certain that the formula itself, regarded as the formula of things and the reality asserted in every thought, is in no sense pantheistic.

The objection, that this formula is placed first, at the beginning of the order of cognition, instead of last, or at its conclusion, will vanish the moment we learn to distinguish between direct and reflex intuition. Nobody pretends that, in the historical development of the understanding, we commence with a reflex intuition, or a clear and distinct cognition of this formula, or that the mind is able to say to itself at the first moment of its existence, *Ens creat existentias.* All direct intuition is obscure and indistinct, and although this formula is obscurely and indistinctly apprehended from the first, we are far enough from being aware from the first of the fact. Some men never attain to a reflex intuition of it during their whole lives, and no one ever would or could attain to such intuition of it, if not taught it through the medium of language. It had been lost from the language of the Gentiles, and no Gentile philosopher ever attained to it. All the Gentile schools alike are ignorant of the fact of creation, and even for Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle there is no God the creator. Not being able to reflect on the intelligible or idea without the sensible representation of language, the formula, *as a formula of the reflective understanding*, is not attainable till it is represented in language, and a language that has not lost it. But it is represented in language, and children learn it in the Catechism, at a very tender age.

That it is a truth of theology, and known only as supernaturally revealed, we grant; but it does not therefore follow that it is not a truth of the natural order. Superintelligible and supernatural are not by any means the same. There may be truths of philosophy, that is, of the natural order, distinct from the truths of the supernatural order, or the new creation, which we could never by our natural intellect find out, but which when revealed to us we may dis-

cover to be evident to natural reason. We do not believe any man could ever have attained to a reflex, that is, a clear and distinct cognition of the formula, without supernatural revelation, and therefore the holy Apostle tells us, "By faith we understan i that the world was framed by the word of God." Hence creation is a dogma of faith; but when revealed and represented to us in language, we find it to be really expressed in every one of our direct intuitions, and therefore it is also a truth of philosophy. All the truths of revelation are not also truths of philosophy, but some of them are, for the revelation is not restricted to the Christian mysteries, properly so called. And hence the necessity we before remarked, of adding to the demonstrative method of the Scholastics the traditional or historical method, and the impossibility of constructing a complete science of the natural order without the reflected light of supernatural theology. It is the impossibility of erecting philosophy, in our present state, into a complete and independent science even of natural things, that makes us refuse to embrace any school, or to profess any system of our own. We should as soon think of disengaging our politics or our private and social duties from our theology, as of disengaging our philosophy.

One point more and we have done. We have given as the reality apprehended in every thought, Being creates existences. Here is the basis of all logic. But there are here two errors to be guarded against. The formula as given is the formula of the real order, or the Divine judgment. All the activity it expresses is the Divine activity. It is not the cognition, but that which in cognition is cognized. In other words, it is the formula of the intelligible; but to the intelligible corresponds the intellective, to th order of things the order of cognition. What we have here to guard against, then, is placing, as to the order of cognition, the copula either wholly in the intellective or wholly in the intelligible. The former is the error of the Scholastics, and the latter is the error of the Pantheists. We have found the copula of the Divine judgment; it is the creative act of Being placing existences *ad extra*. The copula of the human judgment is the reverberation of the copula of the Divine judgment, or imitation of it by us as second causes. But what is the *nexus* or copula which binds the human judgment to the Divine, that is, the intelligible and the intellective? The creative act of Being, says Gioberti, if we

understand him; but that makes Being create the intellection, denies our interv ntion as second causes, and implies pantheism. The intellective, the *intellectus agens* of the Schoolmen? But that is pure Fichteism, and supposes the subject renders actual, that is, creates its object. The solution is in regarding thought as the joint product of both the intelligible and the intellect, and therefore that cognition, formally the act of the mind as second cause, is yet produced only by the active coöperation or concurrence of the intelligible, as is the case with every act of second causes. It is not the *intellectus agens* that renders the intelligible intelligible *in actu*, as the Scholastics teach, but the intelligible is itself by its own light intelligible *in actu*, and it is the concurrence of its intelligibility *in actu* with our own intellective faculty that forms the intuition. As the intelligible concurs only through its creative act, the creative act of God as the objectively concurring force of thought unites our cognition to the Divine judgment, as it does ourselves as existence to the Divine Essence. In this connection of our judgment with Divine judgment lies the explanation of all thought and of all reasoning, as well as the truthfulness of our cognitions.

The explanation of this connection itself, which involves the whole mystery of knowledge and of the whole activity of second causes, we shall not by any means attempt, for if it does not surpass the powers of the human mind, it most assuredly surpasses ours. Its explanation, however, is in the explanation of the Divine coöperation. But the reader will perceive that, in representing the intelligible as intelligible *in actu*, we reject the *intellectus agens* of the Scholastics as a created light, or participated reason, and therefore the intelligible species and phantasms. To intellectual vision as to external, there are necessary the intellect, the object, and the light. As to the purely intelligible, Being, it is intelligible *per se*, by its own light, and a mediating light distinct from the mind and the object is needed only in apprehending existences, and the light by which we see these is the same Divine light of Being, diffused over them by the Divine creative act. But as we apprehend not the purely intelligible in itself, owing to its excess of light and our weakness, we apprehend God only in the light of his creative act, and therefore only in relation to the things he has made. But as that light proceeds from his essence, and is simply his relation *ad extra* to the things he has made, in

apprehending it we do really apprehend him. We apprehend them, not by their phantasms, but by his light, which through the creative act illumines them. And thus, while we maintain that we do really apprehend him, we do not pretend any more than our scholastic friends that we apprehend him separate from the apprehension of his works.

WHAT HUMAN REASON CAN DO.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1855.]

We feel ourselves much indebted to Father Chastel for his learned, conscientious, and elaborate work on *The Value of Human Reason*, a copy of which he has been so obl ging as to send us. We have occasionally seen things from the author which seemed to us to savor of exaggerated rationalism; but we have neve arranged ourselves on the side of the exaggerated supernaturalists, against him; and we assure him, that we find very little in this new volume, that, with some distinctions and qualifications to which we think he would not seriously object, we cannot and do not in fact most cordially accept.

It is due to ourselves to say, that we have never attempted to set forth a philosophical theory of our own, and in discussing, in hastily prepared essays, various philosophical questions, for a special purpose and under a special aspect, which is all we have done, it is very likely, even when our own general views were just, we have used expressions which are too exclusive, and which need more or less qualification. We came to Catholicity from a school of exaggerated rationalism, and though it has never been in our thought or intention to underrate natural reason, our main purpose has been to show the necessity of supernatural revelation, not only in regard to truths of the supernatural order, but even to a full and systematic view of the higher truths of philosophy. Bred amongst those who gave all to human reason and human nature, we have wished to bring out and establish the opposing truth, and it is not unlikely that we have, on many occasions, apparently expressed an undue sympathy with the views of the Traditionalists, as we should not have done had our special purpose been to vindicate the value of human reason; yet we think our pages afford ample evidence that we have never denied or underrated that value. Our natural tendency, no doubt, has been to sympathize with the Traditionalists, and we have believed that less

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* *De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, ou ce que peut la Raison par elle seule.* Par LE P. CHASTEL, S. J. Paris: 1854.

danger was to be apprehended in our times and our country from an exaggerated supernaturalism than from an exaggerated rationalism.

But we confess that some attention to the study of Jansenism has latterly led us to suspect a more practical danger from Traditionalism than we had at first apprehended. Traditionalism, as Father Chastel understands it, is, after all, only a form of Jansenism, and the controversy which he is now waging with the Traditionalists is at bottom only the old controversy waged by the Fathers of his Order with the Jansenists, a hundred and fifty years ago; and very likely the charge of rationalism is as undeserved by him as that of Semi-Pelagianism was by them. The essence of Jansenism is the destruction of nature to make way for grace; and if our author rightly represents it, the essence of Traditionalism is the denial of reason to make way for the assertion of revelation,—an error precisely analogous, indeed precisely the same. We are by no means prepared to admit that the Traditionalists intend to go thus far, or that they will accept this statement in its full extent; but the principle of their error, which with many of them is certainly only a tendency, if logically developed and reduced to its last expression, is nothing else. Man is essentially a rational animal, and to deny his reason, or to suppose it acquired or adventitious, is to deny his nature, is to deny man himself; and the error of the Traditionalists, if carried out, would resolve itself into pantheism, and in an opposite direction into that very rationalism and humanitarianism against which it seems to be a protest. Looking at the question from this point of view, the danger from exaggerated supernaturalism, if less immediate, is perhaps not less serious, than the danger from exaggerated rationalism.

It is worthy also of note, that exaggerated rationalism has not originated exclusively in excessive confidence in human reason. It has to a great extent originated in the reaction of the mind against the Calvinistic and Jansenistic exaggerations of the supernatural. The immediate origin of French infidelity was in French Jansenism, and some persons have believed that the leading Jansenists intended to drive men into infidelity by making religion a burden too heavy to be borne. Certain it is, that Calvinists and Jansenists do place religion and nature in opposition, so that we must reject the one in order to follow the other. It is the feeling that to accept grace we must annihilate nature, or to accept revela-

tion we must forego reason, rather than any overweening confidence in reason itself, that drives not a few into rationalism and naturalism. It is not that they do not feel the insufficiency of reason and of nature for themselves, but that they are repelled by a religion which seems to them to place itself in opposition to their natural reason, and to demand its destruction. As between Calvinism or Jansenism, and rationalism and naturalism, they are right. A religion which requires us to divest ourselves of the nature God gave us, and to forego the exercise of that reason with which he endowed us, cannot be from God. That is certain, if anything is certain. Their repugnance is not to the Catholic religion, which presents itself simply as superior to reason, and as its necessary complement, not in opposition to it, but to Calvinism or Jansenism, which latterly they are prone to confound with Catholicity, and which certainly does present itself in opposition to reason, and seek to supersede it. We think, therefore, that, looking to the world as it is, it is not less important to the interests of religion to rescue it from the exaggerations of the supernaturalists than from the exaggerations of the rationalists, and perhaps even more important, although we are always to be on our guard against excessive rationalism. We are inclined to believe, with the Abbé Gratry, that it is more necessary, just now, to labor to rehabilitate reason than revelation; for, after all, scepticism more than rationalism is the disease of our times.

Father Chastel divides his book into four parts. The first part is devoted solely to the refutation of Traditionalism, as he finds it in the writings of De Bonald; the second part discusses what human reason can do in a society without tradition; the third part, what it can do in civilized society without revelation; and the fourth part, what it can do in Christian society by itself. He is always learned and able, but we hope he will permit us to say that he seems to us to succeed in the negative part of his work better than in its positive part. His refutation of the theory of the Traditionalists, as he sets it forth, and of the grounds on which they defend it, is triumphant, and leaves nothing to be desired; but his account of what reason is, how it can develop itself, and what it can do, is far less satisfactory. In this part of his work he is less clear, less definite, and leaves us in much doubt and uncertainty. He convinces us that reason can do something, but we do not see precisely what it has done, or what it is intrinsically able to do. In

fact, he leaves us with the impression, that, though man by reason alone is theoretically able to do a great deal, practically he really has done little or nothing without revelation. He might have invented language, but as a fact it was given him originally by his Creator; he might have discovered the elementary truths of natural religion and morality, but as a fact Adam was created in possession of them, and they have since been learned from society, for man has always been taught them. The savage tribe might, perhaps, spontaneously rise to civilization, but there is no well-authenticated instance of its ever having done so. He concedes that, practically, men have received their ideas very much in the way the Traditionalists contend, and limits himself, for the most part, to proving that they do not prove that they might not have received them in some other way. This is something, but it is not all that we could wish he had done. M. de Bonald, whom Father Chastel regards as the father of the Traditionalists, apparently maintains that all ideas, and reason itself, are acquired, and that in purely intellectual matters, in general, moral, and religious truths, man knows only by being taught, and only what he has been taught from without by society, and originally by a positive revelation from God. His great proof of this theory is that man cannot think without language, and that he has and can have language only as he has been taught it. This proof Father Chastel examines at great length. He alleges, in opposition, that man can think without language or words, and that he might even have invented language for himself. We think it quite certain that man can *think* without language, and M. de Bonald's famous saying, that "Man thinks his word before speaking his thought," says nothing against it. To make language or sensible signs absolutely necessary to the production of thought seems to us absurd; for to a non-thinking being signs have and can have no significance. M. de Bonald himself, on more occasions than one, concedes that thought must precede its verbal expression, and it may well be doubted if he ever held the contrary. Words can present no meaning to a mind that has not as yet thought, and none to a mind that has not already thought their meaning; otherwise a foreign language could be understood before having been learned. Language, that is, a sensible sign of some sort, is necessary, not to *present*, but to *re*-present or represent the purely intelligible; but we assure Father

Chastel that we have never for a moment entertained the notion that man cannot think without language.

The error on this point of which the Traditionalists are accused, and a grave error it is too, seems to arise from their not sufficiently distinguishing between the *presentation* and the *re-presentation* of thought, or between intuition and reflection in the intelligible order. To think, *pensare*, as the Italians say, does not require language, but to re-think, *ripensare*, does require it in the case of intelligibles. This distinction is from Gioberti, and, in our judgment, is true and important. *La Civilità Cattolica* rejects it, as it does every thing from that able but unhappy man, and contends, too hastily, we think, that to maintain that we cannot reflect on the purely intelligible without language, is to assert the whole error of the Traditionalists. We should say, it is to recognize and accept their truth without their error. Father Chastel takes note of the distinction, and maintains, contrary to what we suspect is the fact, that it was not recognized by M. de Bonald; but whether he rejects it or not for himself, he does not expressly say. We believe the Traditionalists have an erroneous theory, but every erroneous theory even has as its basis some truth, or truth under some aspect. We are not willing to believe that M. de Bonald was all wrong in his theory of language. Judging from Father Chastel's citations, we should say he erred in his expression rather than in his thought. We see no objection to admitting that in reflection, in distinguishing, in comparing, in reasoning, language, or artificial signs which represent the thought, are indispensable, and we believe this is all that M. de Bonald ever really meant. Father Chastel does not, perhaps, feel the necessity of language in this respect, because he apparently does not admit direct and immediate intuition of the intelligible. He appears to be undecided whether ideas are innate, or whether they are obtained, as Aristotle taught, by the active intellect, abstracting them from phantasms. Either, he seems to think, is a tenable doctrine. When ideas were regarded as a sort of intelligible *species*, image, or representation of the intelligible, distinguishable alike from the object apprehended and from the intellectual apprehension of it, it was not impossible to conceive it possible for ideas to be innate; but now, when we must regard ideas, not as something intermediate between subject and object, but either as subjective or as objective, either as the intelligible

object apprehended or as the subjective apprehension of it, to call them innate borders, to say the least, very closely on the absurd. Descartes asserted that the idea of God is innate; but, when hard pressed on the subject, he explained his meaning to be simply, that man has the innate capacity to think or apprehend God, in which he is followed by Malebranche and Leibnitz. Faculties we can well understand are innate, but that ideas, which are either the object of the faculty or the product of its exercise, are innate, we cannot. Ideas regarded as subjective are coeval with the soul's existence, for the soul is intellective in its essence, and is as soon as it exists placed in relation with the intelligible. If by innate ideas is simply meant that the soul even in the mother's womb intuitively apprehends the intelligible, we do not object; but this we suspect is not the meaning of those who assert innate ideas. They regard them, not as the product of the mind, but as something inserted originally in it, as constitutive of it, and which it develops and applies on occasion of experience. They are the inherent funds of the soul itself. This in substance is sheer Kantianism, and would conduct, as it has conducted, to the doctrine of identity of subject and object, as asserted by Schelling, and of thought and being as maintained by Hegel.

They who contend for innate ideas, do not, as it seems to us, take sufficient note of the fact we have elsewhere signalized, that the human soul, though active, is not pure act, and can display its activity only in conjunction with the activity of the object. It is not purely passive, as Condillac and his school taught, and formed in its faculties by agencies from without; but it is incapable of purely independent action, and can act only in conjunction with another activity. It cannot know where there is no object to be known, or understand where there is nothing intelligible. It cannot know itself in itself, or by itself alone be its own intelligible object, for if it could it would be God. It can know itself only in knowing something not itself. This law holds true of all its activity, of its voluntary as well as of its intellectual activity, since, as all confess, it cannot will, save when the intellect presents it some object. All its thoughts are the resultant of two factors, and there can no more be thought without the concurrence of the object than without the concurrence of the subject. Ideas are either thoughts or the object of thought. We usually understand them in

the latter sense, and identify them with the objective reality in that it is intelligible. We regard them as the reality in its relation to our intellective faculty. To call them in this sense innate would be to place the objective reality in the mind, and to make subject and object identical. If, on the other hand, we take ideas as the thoughts or simple apprehensions themselves, and regard them as innate, not formed by actually apprehending the objective reality, we fall into pure idealism, and can never logically assert any reality but the soul itself, or *le moi*, and its affections,—pure Fichteism. The solution of the difficulty is only in regarding thought or idea, subjectively taken, as the product of the simultaneous action of subject and object, formed by the intuitive apprehension or perception of the object actually and actively present to the subject, and concurring with it. Intellectual ideas are, then, not innate, in the sense of pertaining to the *inneity* of the subject, but are intuitions, that is, actual perceptions of the intelligible actively present, or present as a *vis activa* to the intellect. We as really and as truly apprehend in intellectual intuition intelligibles, as in sensible intuition sensibles. If intellectual, moral, and religious ideas pertain to the purely intelligible world, and are really intuitions, we must either admit that man can act as a pure intelligence, or else assert that these ideas cannot be represented to the mind, and made objects of the reflective understanding, as distinguished from the intuitive, without sensible signs of some sort, that is, without what we call language.

The Peripatetics—and our author at times seems to agree with them—suppose that they have these sensible signs in the sensible world itself, or rather in those phantasms from which they hold that the intelligible is obtained by abstraction. We concede at once that man is incapable of pure intellections, and that he never has intuition of the intelligible without at the same time and in the same intuitive act having intuition of the sensible. To have the purely intelligible, he must distinguish it from the sensible apprehended along with it. But what we contend here is, that the intelligible is really, though indistinctly, apprehended, and is not obtained mediately through the sensible, or by way of abstraction from phantasms. We cannot admit this *phantastic* origin of ideas. The intelligible is presented *with* but not *in* the phantasm, or sensible perception, and therefore cannot be said to be sensibly represented. The sen-

sible is the concomitant, but not the sign, of the intelligible. How then seize the purely intelligible, and separate or distinguish it from the sensible? Man is not a pure intelligence, and yet only a pure intelligence could do this, without a sensible sign representing the intelligible. To this process, therefore, which we call reflection, a process of distinguishing, separating, comparing, &c., we contend that language is necessary, and thus far we agree with the Traditionalists. In fact Father Chastel himself seems to concede all we here assert.

"Voyons donc sur quoi peut être fondée cette nécessité absolue de la parole pour penser. Nous tenons à le professer hautement: nous sommes loin, très-loin de méconnaître l'importance du langage, non-seulement pour l'échange de nos pensées avec nos semblables, mais pour les opérations les plus solitaires de notre esprit. Nous pouvons, à la vue d'un objet sensible, en concevoir l'idée; nous pouvons conserver cette idée et la rappeler, au besoin, à notre souvenir. Là n'est pas la nécessité des mots ou des signes. Mais lorsqu'il s'agit d'abstraire les qualités diverses des choses, de les considérer à part et indépendamment des objets perçus; de comparer ces objets, de recueillir leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, leurs innombrables rapports et tous les phénomènes, de cause et d'effet; lorsqu'il s'agit de combiner à l'infini ces rapports et ces phénomènes, et de former d'une manière quelconque des idées abstraites, générales, insensibles; lorsqu'il s'agit surtout de conserver et de fixer sous le regard de l'esprit ces idées si mobiles et si fugitives; de les préciser et de les classer, pour empêcher qu'elles ne s'effacent, ou qu'elles ne se confondent; pour être en état de les rappeler à volonté, de manière que chacune d'elles se présente toujours la même et sous le même aspect; alors on sent de quel secours, de quelle nécessité sont les mots et les expressions. Sans un signe particulier, attaché à chaque idée, en quelque sorte comme une étiquette, pour la déterminer et la caractériser, tout ce monde d'idées subtiles, légères, indécises, flotterait dans l'esprit, tourbillonnerait, s'évanouirait comme les atomes dans l'espace.

"Mais conclure de là qu'aucune idée ne peut jamais précéder le mot dans l'esprit; que sa présence, même momentanée, y est impossible avant celle du mot, est une autre exagération non moins insoutenable, et que ne fera jamais accepter la nouvelle école."—pp. 94, 95.

We agree entirely with Father Chastel in his conclusion. We hold that ideas in his sense of the term, that is, as apprehensions, always precede the word, and that language is never necessary to *present* the intelligible to the intuitive faculty of the soul. It is necessary only to re-present it. This necessity does not exist in relation to sensible things, or those which have natural sensible signs. It is not

thought, strictly taken, even in the reflective order, that demands language, but memory, and hence only in those operations of the understanding in which memory intervenes do we, or can we, assert the necessity of language. In contemplation, in meditation even, the mind often proceeds without the use of language; but reflection always implies memory, for it is a return of the mind upon its own past thoughts, or intuitions, which is possible only in case these intuitions, or the reality held in them, are re-presented to it. These cannot be retained and represented without sensible signs, which fix them for the memory. Without these signs they would fall into what in the schools is called direct consciousness, where they are seizable only by a pure intelligence, which man is not.

The other point, whether man could or could not have invented language, is one which we cannot now discuss at length. We have maintained, as our readers know, that he could not, and Father Chastel concedes that he has not, for he holds with us that the first man was created thinking and speaking. We have never meant to assert that it is metaphysically impossible; all we have meant is that it is practically impossible. In matters of this sort a moral impossibility is all that any philosopher ever denies or affirms. Language implies society, and society is inconceivable without language of some sort. Absolutely speaking, every thing natural to man is possible naturally to him; for if not, it would not be natural but supernatural. And yet no theologian would venture to maintain that it is practically possible for a man in his present state to comprehend and conform to the whole natural order without supernatural assistance. It may be said, that, as society is natural and as language is necessary to it, man must have had the natural capacity to invent it, and to deny it would be to deny that God could have created man in a state of pure nature. But this by no means follows. We might as well say that man must have been able to invent or acquire his social instincts, or the natural elements without which he cannot live. We have the right to assume, that when God made man a social animal and intended him for society, he gave him all that was necessary to render his social life practicable. As speech is necessary to society, to assume that God gave it, and that man could not otherwise have had it, is only assuming that God created man a social animal, and gave him what was essential to his destiny as such.

Language may be regarded as a part of man's original social endowment, as included in those things which were necessary to enable him to live in society. To maintain, then, that man could not have himself invented language, involves no theological difficulty that we can see, and interposes no obstacle to the assertion of pure nature against the Jansenists, or human reason against the ultra-supernaturalists. All that we are required to maintain in this view of the case is, not that man could have invented language, but that he can by his natural powers use it, or speak without the grant of a supernatural faculty.

We confess, therefore, that we cannot understand the importance that Father Chastel attaches to the hypothesis that man might have invented speech. He admits that he defends it only as a possible hypothesis, for he himself holds that God created man not only thinking, but speaking, or endowed him with language the first moment of his existence. What practical consequence then follows from the hypothesis of the Traditionalists, that man could not have invented language, providing they do not go further, and say he cannot think without language? It may be that they have not proved their hypothesis, but, as far as we can judge, he has not proved his. The only argument he uses to prove that man could have invented language, that is, a system of artificial signs for the communication of ideas, is drawn from those who are born deaf and dumb. On the authority of professors, he asserts that the deaf and dumb do invent a real language of signs. But we beg him to take note, that, though they really have such a language, he presents no facts which prove that they have themselves alone invented it. The system of signs followed in our institutions for the deaf and dumb has been invented for them by those who had language; and the signs they followed before, in the bosom of their families, were not their sole invention, but even more the invention of those members of their families who were neither deaf nor dumb. This all-important fact he overlooks. But till he has shown that the possession of language by their families has had no part in the invention of these signs, he can conclude nothing from them in favor of his hypothesis. All that he can conclude from his long and even wearisome discussions with regard to deaf mutes is, not that man can invent language, but that he can translate the language of the ear into the language of the eye, and that he does not need language to enable him to think in the

intuitive order. Indeed, the learned author seems himself to be aware that he fails to prove his hypothesis, and very nearly admits that all he has done is to prove that the Traditionalists have not proved theirs.

We are not insensible to the importance of asserting the possibility of the state of pure nature, and we are well aware that Calvinism and Jansenism originate in denying that God could, if he had chosen, have created man, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, as he is now born, whence they are led to assert that what man lost in the fall was a part of his nature; but we see not how denying that man could have invented language, although conceded to be necessary to his social life, can by any possibility affect that question, any more than to deny that man could have invented air, fire, or water. Suppose it in some sense external, it amounts to nothing, for there are many things external, which, if God had not given them, man could never have obtained. Moreover, we must not forget to be on our guard against excessive rationalism. If we concede to the rationalists, that man, beginning without language, could by his own unaided powers have gradually invented a language so complicated and so perfect in its structure, so rich in its resources, and so beautiful in its expressions, as the Greek, for instance, we hardly know what degree of progress we could deny to our modern humanitarians. There is, we venture to say, no system of human thought, ancient or modern, that equals the perfection of any of our modern cultivated languages. English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, any of these languages contains in itself a truer and richer philosophy than is entertained by any of those who speak it. How could men invent a language without language, and embody in it a philosophy far superior to any they have ever been able to embody in their systems?

Father Chastel recognizes the distinction we make between discovering truth and proving it. It will not do to build science on faith, or to maintain that the existence of God, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and the difference between good and evil, regarded by our theologians as the preamble to faith, cannot be certainly proved by human reason. These, though originally communicated by revelation, must be naturally demonstrable, be truths of science, as well as of faith. Father Chastel, therefore, contends that man must have been able to *discover* them by his natural reason. In this, as against the Traditonalists, who appear to

deny them to be truths of natural reason, and to contend that we can in no sense know them but as taught by a revelation from without, he is certainly right. But may not the Traditionalists also be right against him, when they contend that man was originally taught them by his Maker, and could never have discovered them, as truths in the reflective order, if he had not been so taught them? May not he and they find a point of agreement in distinguishing between discovering and demonstrating, and in saying that, although man could not have discovered them as objects of distinct reflection without being taught them, yet now they are represented to him in language he can by his natural reason demonstrate them? This would combine both the Traditional and the rational proof, leave man capable of real science, make a real distinction between science and faith, and avoid all confusion of the truths of the natural order and those of the supernatural order, as Father Chastel very properly wishes. Is it not possible that our author has dismissed this distinction a little too cavalierly, and that it deserves a little more attention than he seems to have paid it? He himself resorts to it when he wishes to prove that Bergier and others, claimed by the Traditionalists, were not of their school. The only argument he brings against it is, that language could not present these truths to the mind of the child ignorant of them. But this is not conclusive. That the words which represent them could not present, that is, express, them to the child that as yet has no intuition of them, we concede; but whence the necessity of supposing that the child is destitute of the intuition? The author has not disproved intelligible intuition, or proved that we apprehend the intelligible only in the sensible, and the general only in the particular. He does not pretend that Peripateticism is any thing more than a probable hypothesis, and he is, therefore, not entitled to conclude from it as if it were certain and undeniable truth.

The difficulty with both Father Chastel and the Traditionalists arises, we think, from their denying, overlooking, or not appreciating the fact that human reason has immediate intuition of the intelligible. The Traditionalists, not conceding this fact, are obliged to assume that the human mind is in no relation with the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible, till instructed by society, which preserves the tradition of the revelation originally made to the first man. This necessarily denies all science,

properly so called, or, what is the same thing, builds science on faith, making the act of faith precede the act of reason, which is impossible, since there can be no act of faith unless there has been previously an act of reason. Father Chastel sees this, and, fortified by the decisions of the Church, the teaching of doctors, and common sense, refutes it successfully; but denying, or at least not holding, intelligible intuition, he himself fails to give any satisfactory explanation of the real problem, or any clear and certain statement of the truth opposed to the error of the Traditionalists. After all, it is more as a theologian than as a philosopher that he refutes them. The fact is, both he and they are virtually sensists, and hold the Peripatetic maxim, that *nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu.* They, starting from this maxim of Aristotle, maintain that the human intellect can have cognition only of sensibles, and can come into possession of intellectual ideas, as they call them, only by means of external instruction; he, recoiling from this, and not quite prepared to accept the doctrine of innate ideas, contends that we possess these ideas only by way of mental abstraction from sensible intuitions or phantasms. He sees clearly enough, that, admitting neither innate ideas nor intelligible intuition, the Traditionalists place the human mind out of the condition of being even the recipient of the instruction they suppose, for they leave nothing in it to correspond to the meaning of the words through which it must be communicated. There is no magic in language, in mere words, that can put the mind in possession of ideas of an order of which it knows nothing, and can of itself know nothing. We do not know a language by committing its words to memory, but by learning the meaning of the words themselves. In the case of a foreign language we learn it ordinarily by translating its words into the corresponding words of our own language. We know our own mother tongue only in so far as we know the things its signs stand for, and we may say it is only by the *verba mentis* that we can understand the *verba vocis*, or external speech. It would be impossible through external language to teach any thing to a mind that was perfectly blank, for we can teach the unknown only by attaching it in some way to the known. It is only by virtue of a correspondence or analogy between the natural and the supernatural, that man is capable of receiving a supernatural revelation, or of finding in the mysteries of faith any thing for his own understanding

beyond empty words. The Traditionalists, by representing the mind as destitute of intellectual ideas, and as unable to behold the intelligible intuitively, really deny the possibility of such ideas, even in the natural order, and therefore really, though unintentionally, deny that man can even be the subject of a supernatural revelation.

But while Father Chastel sees all this clearly enough, he does not see that, by assuming that the intelligible is apprehended not immediately in intuition, but only mediately in sensation, he has to encounter a strictly analogous difficulty, because the intelligible by no conceivable mental process whatever is attainable from sensations or purely sensible data,—from the intuition of sensible things any more than from sensible signs. We readily concede that the intelligible is never intuitively apprehended by itself alone, and is always presented to us along with the sensible; but if it is not actually and immediately presented, actually and immediately apprehended, it cannot be obtained at all. The analysis of sensation can give only sensation, or the sensible object. To hold the intelligible, or to contemplate it by itself, we must undoubtedly separate it from the sensible phenomenon, as St. Thomas teaches. But if it was not originally distinct from the sensible element of the phenomenon, we could not separate or distinguish it, and all we should have for it would be a simple mental abstraction, formed by the mind, and without the least conceivable objective value. Our cognition would be restricted, objectively considered, to the sensible or non-intelligible world, and we should have no knowledge at all, properly so called, —none at least above that which we detect in brutes. We should be compelled to reduce all our ideas, with Condillac, to "sensations transformed." The intelligible would be to us as if it were not, and we could never receive a revelation of the supernatural, because we should want the natural ideas by which its mysteries could be connected with our natural intelligence. The only way we can see of escaping this conclusion is to regard the sensible as naturally corresponding to the intelligible, which in a certain sense it does, since God is *similitudo rerum omnium*. But we must remember that it is nature that copies or imitates God, not God that copies or imitates nature; the sensible that imitates the intelligible, not the intelligible that imitates the sensible. We must know the original in order to detect the resemblance in the copy. So, unless we suppose intelligible intu-

ition, which puts the mind in possession of the original, the *idea exemplaris*, the fact alleged can avail nothing.

The recognition of the fact of immediate intuition of the intelligible solves every difficulty in the case, and we confess that we do not understand the unwillingness of Father Chastel and the Traditionalists to accept it. Man is intellective as well as sensitive by nature; and if so, he must be as capable of intelligible as of sensible intuitions. Why, then, is there any more propriety in supposing the intelligible is obtained from the sensible, than in supposing the sensible is obtained from the intelligible? All Catholics must hold, that *ratio Dei existentiam cum certitudine probare potest*,—reason can prove with certainty the existence of God,—and therefore that the existence of God is a matter of science as well as of faith. But how can reason prove with certainty what it does not intuitively apprehend? Men certainly do and can know God, at least that he is, and is God, by the light of reason, but who will pretend that our cognitions can embrace matter not included in our intuitions? Why, then, since God is the intelligible, and, if we can know him, intelligible to us, hesitate to say that we have intuition of the intelligible? All knowledge is either intuitive or reflective. But as reflection is a return of the mind on its own past thoughts, reflective knowledge can never include any matter not included in our intuition. This is not a theory or an hypothesis in our understanding of the subject, but a plain matter of fact. We cannot understand, therefore, the fear which many of our friends have of it. Is it attachment to routine, adherence to system, a reverence for great names, or a fear of being found to agree on any point with Gioberti? Or is there something in it which we do not see, that militates against faith, or the approved methods of explaining or defending the Christian mysteries?

There is no name in philosophy that we respect more than we do that of St. Thomas, but in philosophy we swear by the words of no human master. "Call no man," said our Lord, "master on earth, for one is your master in heaven." In heavenly things, in all that pertains to faith, we own a master, and we are content to sit at his feet and learn; but in earthly things, in matters of pure reason, so long as we keep within the limits of faith, we hold ourselves free. And it will not do for men who are vindicating the rights of reason, and who contend that reason without revelation is able to discover and prove all the great elementary truths of natural

religion, to restrict our freedom by the authority of great names. The single name of St. Thomas, if against us, would, no doubt, be a presumption that we were in error; but on a point of simple natural reason we should not regard it as conclusive, for we believe it is lawful to dissent from even his philosophical opinions, when one has solid reasons for doing so. There are passages in St. Thomas which seem to us quite too favorable to modern sensism; but, as we have shown on another occasion, we do not believe that, fairly and honestly interpreted, he can be said to have held any of the errors of that system. We do not pretend that he formally taught the doctrine on intuition we have set forth, but we have studied him to no purpose if he teaches the contrary. He explains, after Aristotle, cognition by means of intelligible *species* and phantasms, or the *intellectus agens* and sensation; but he teaches expressly that the intelligible *species* is that by which the mind attains to the cognition of the intelligible, not that in which it terminates, and that what the mind really obtains or apprehends through them is the intelligible object itself. The intelligible *species* furnished by the *intellectus agens*, translated into plain English, is simply the intellectual light, or that property of the intellect by virtue of which it is capable of cognizing the intelligible, and in our modern modes of thought is included in the intellectual faculty itself. The doctrine of St. Thomas, as we understand it, is, that man is intelligent by virtue of a created light, or reason, which is made in the image and likeness of the Divine Reason, and therefore contains in itself, in a participated sense, the ideas, types, *species*, or images of whatever we are naturally capable of knowing. It is by virtue of these ideas, types, images, or *species*, that the intellect is capable of cognition. Evidently, then, the intelligible *species* is really a property of the intellectual faculty, and that which makes it intellective. It is included in the subject, and goes to make up what we call the intellect. Hence, to say that man takes cognizance of the intelligible by means of the intelligible *species*, means, in the system of St. Thomas, precisely what we mean when we say man has direct and immediate intuition of it. There is then really no discrepancy between the doctrine of St. Thomas and ours, and the apparent discrepancy arises from the fact, that he carried his analysis of the intellect a step or two further than we do ours. St. Thomas never really taught the sensist doctrine which some would father upon him, that

the intelligible is merely inferred or concluded from sensible data. All he taught was that the intelligible is never apprehended without the sensible, and that, to be distinctly apprehended, it must be abstracted, that is, separated or distinguished by reflection, from the phantasms along with which it was originally presented, which is precisely the doctrine we contend for. At least, it is so we understand the Angelic Doctor, and therefore we do not seem to ourselves to depart from the real sense of the Thomist philosophy.

But we have no disposition to enter further at present into this discussion. We think, if the two parties now so fiercely pitted against each other in France would recognize the fact that reason has two modes of activity, one intuitive and the other reflective, and understand that in the reflective order language is necessary to represent—not *present*, but *re*-present—the intelligible, and that reflection proves, but does not discover, rational truth, they might shake hands and be friends; for no Catholic will pretend that reason in our fallen state is able without revelation to build up a complete system of even natural religion and morality. We beg Father Chastel to do us the justice to believe that we have made these remarks more by way of suggestion than of criticism, and for the Traditional system no less than for his own. We certainly have no intention of dogmatizing on philosophy, and we every day feel less and less our competency to do so. We see and feel deeply the importance of sound philosophical views, and the necessity of maintaining in all its rights and value the natural reason with which God has endowed us, and which, though darkened by the Fall, still remains reason. We cannot forego it, for if we should we should cease to be men, and cease to be able to receive and believe the Christian revelation. Calvinism, by its exaggerated supernaturalism, by its doctrine of total depravity, and its annihilation of nature for any thing good, declaring our best acts done without grace sinful and deserving eternal damnation, drove us into infidelity, into a denial of the proper supernatural, and the assertion of an exaggerated rationalism. Catholicity has redeemed us, and taught us that the supernatural presupposes the natural. The old problem which tormented us and so many of our friends, how to reconcile reason and faith, is no longer a problem for us, for we cannot conceive how it is possible there should be any discrepancy between them. Each has its place, and

each may be said to serve the other. We can no more consent to decry reason than we can faith, or to restrict the sphere of the one than of the other.

We always mean to recognize in its fullest sense the whole body of rational truth; but we have no great confidence in our ability to set it forth in its systematic completeness. We feel that it becomes us to be modest and diffident of ourselves, and we may well fail where such a man as Father Chastel does not completely succeed. For ourselves, we feel that to ascertain and accept the truth of different schools is the best way to refute their errors. We should have been better pleased if the author had taken more pains to find a good sense in M. de Bonald's writings, and disengaged his truth from the errors which too often accompany it. It is clear to us, from the extracts the author makes, that he has done M. de Bonald scant justice, and that, had he been as generous to him as he is to Bergier, he could have proved him far less of a Traditionalist than he represents him. We do not like to see that great and good man, who did so much for religion and philosophy in France at a time when there were comparatively few manly voices to speak out for either, pursued with so much *acharnement*. It is evident to us, that in his real thought, we say not in his expression, he went very little further than we should be disposed to go. Indeed, we think a more conciliatory disposition on the part of either school, and less of exclusiveness, would be not only to the advantage of charity, but also of philosophical truth. Mutual explanations might lead, we should think, to mutual understanding.

GRATRY ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1856.]

ARTICLE I.

M. GRATRY has here attempted a work of the highest importance, and much needed to meet the moral and intellectual wants of our times. No higher subject than God can occupy our thoughts, and no knowledge can compare, in dignity, interest, and value, with the knowledge of God. Indeed, as without God there is nothing, for all things are by him, in him, and for him, so without knowledge of him there is no knowledge at all. He who knows not God knows nothing, and hence the deep significance of the Holy Scripture which calls him a fool who denies God,—*Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus.* The highest wisdom is to know God, and the supreme good is to know and love him. The greatest service, therefore, which can be rendered to genuine science and to mankind, is to furnish solid instruction as to the means and conditions of the knowledge and love of God, and to stimulate men to seek him as the "first good and the first fair."

A service of this sort is attempted by the learned, pious, and philosophical author in these profound and highly interesting volumes. Whether he has succeeded in all respects or not in accomplishing the end he proposed to himself, he has certainly made an attempt in the right direction, and the most considerable attempt that has been recently made. His work may not be faultless, it may fail in some respects to satisfy the truly philosophic mind, but it is full of rich and suggestive thoughts, and well fitted to raise modern philosophy from a dead scholasticism, and to breathe into it the breath of life,—to give it a living soul, and to render it vigorous and productive.

The author enters his protest against the dead abstractions of the schools, against the dry and barren logic of mere speculative reason, and rejects all speculation that leaves out the heart and its wants, as well as all philosophy

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**Philosophie. De la Connaissance de Dieu.* Par A. GRATRY, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception. Paris: 1853.

detached from theology. He seeks to rehabilitate reason indeed, depreciated by modern sceptics, sentimentalists, and traditionalists, but also to give the heart a place in our speculations, and revelation its share in raising us to a knowledge of God. He calls his philosophy *Theodicy* (from *θεός*, God, and *δίκη*, justice), the Divine Justice, in order to show that our primary and chief knowledge of God is under the relation of morality, as the object of the heart, rather than of the pure intellect. If we understand him, we are first moved to seek God by a moral want, and we recognize him first in the heart as the object to which it tends, under the relation of good, or beatitude, and our knowledge of him increases in proportion as the heart becomes pure, and its love free and strong. But as the desire of beatitude cannot be satisfied without the intuitive vision of God as he is in himself, which is not naturally possible, there is necessary to complete the knowledge of God craved by the soul supernatural revelation or faith, and ultimately the *ens supernaturale*. In other words, as the soul cannot find the beatitude it desires in the natural order, a philosophy confined to that order, or detached from supernatural revelation, can never be adequate to its wants. The soul taken in its actual state has, so to speak, a natural want or desire of the supernatural vision of God as the complement of its beatitude. The supernatural is not naturally attainable, and therefore a purely natural or rational philosophy, since by its own nature confined to the natural order, is inadequate even to the natural wants of the soul. Hence its deficiency must be supplied by supernatural philosophy, or the Christian revelation. The author takes here philosophy as the answer to the moral wants of the soul as well as to its intellectual wants, and includes under it what is supplied supernaturally as well as what is supplied naturally, or by our natural reason and strength. He therefore labors to enrich philosophy by introducing the element of love, and to complete it by supernatural revelation. Certainly we are not the man to complain of this. We applaud the attempt with all our heart. It is a work of no slight importance in our day to restore reason to its rights, and to recall the age to its dictates. The author is perfectly right when he maintains that reason is at present more in danger than revelation. Men, we mean the men who represent the age, have lost their faith in reason, and will not use it reasonably. One class distrust it, and tend to universal scepticism. They do

not believe that any thing can be known; they despair of all certainty, fall into religious indifference, and live and die as the beasts that perish. Another class, and much more numerous than is commonly believed, decry reason in order to exalt sentiment. These are such as decry doctrine and praise feeling, and say, "Away with your dogmatic theology, your philosophical abstractions, and your ethical rules, and give us the heart,"—the modern cant of your Evangelicals, Methodists, and Transcendentalists. You cannot reason with these people. If you address their understanding, they fly to feeling; if you address their feelings, they fly to understanding. Sustain your positions by logic, and they tell you that the logic of the heart is far above the logic of the head; bring forward evidence that no reason can gainsay, and they remain unmoved, for they do not *feel* with you. Another class decry reason in order to exalt tradition, and, like Kant in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, "demolish science to make way for faith." These have honest intentions, are moved by praiseworthy motives, but they damage the cause they have at heart; for never can we build faith on scepticism, or science on faith. Revelation presupposes reason, and in denying reason you deny equally revelation and the possibility of revelation; for revelation can be made only to a rational subject. It is well against these to assert reason, and to let all the world know that in asserting revelation we presuppose reason instead of denying it.

This point is capital. Man is a rational animal, and reason is his characteristic, as well as his noblest attribute. He cannot suppress his reason without suppressing his humanity, without foregoing his manhood and making himself practically a brute. We do not, by asserting that God has made a revelation to man, supersede reason, or forbid him to exercise it. The revelation assists reason, it does not annul it. It brings to reason a higher and purer light than its own, but removes none of its laws, abridges no sphere of its activity, and impedes in no respect its free and full exercise. It elevates it, clarifies it, and extends its vision, but does not deny, enchain, or enslave it. The authority which the Catholic claims for revelation, or for the Church in teaching and defining it, does not enslave reason, or require it to surrender a single one of its original rights; it enables it to retain and exercise all its rights, and to attain lovingly to a truth higher and vaster than its own. Man is natu-

rally bound to receive and conform to the truth, and is it to offer an indignity to his freedom to present him more truth than he is naturally able to apprehend? Does the astronomer complain of the telescope, because by it he explores vast fields of the heavens invisible to his naked eye? Is his natural eye superseded or closed, because, in order to see more than it can attain, a telescope must be used, or because he must govern himself by what he sees through his telescope as well as by what he sees without it? Why then complain of revelation, that it is derogatory to reason? or of the assertion of its authority? Is not truth always authoritative? Why should revealed truth be less so than natural truth? The astronomer would be as angry at us were we to deny the objects revealed by his telescope, as he would were we to deny the objects visible to his naked eye, and he would call us fools for disputing them, because visible only by means of the telescope.

The author has also done good service to the cause of truth by introducing the element of love into philosophy. It cannot be denied that the tendency of scholasticism, with its dry abstractions, its syllogisms, and subtile distinctions, is to lose sight of the true under its form of the good and the beautiful, as addressed to the heart and the affections. Man is not pure intellect, any more than he is pure sentiment. He is body and soul, and his soul is endowed with the power to know, to love, and to will, and his need to love is greater than his need to know, and indeed he needs to know only in order to love and obey. Knowledge distinctively considered is never the end. It is but a means to an end. The end is to love and enjoy, and the beatitude of the soul is rather in the supernatural possession of God as the object of its love than as the object of its intelligence. The knowledge of God and Him whom he has sent is not a knowledge separate from love, but a knowledge which includes love and is informed by it. Love is the distinguishing mark of the Christian. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another." Love is the fulfilling of the law, the bond of perfection, the evidence that we have passed from death unto life. The Gospel is addressed to the heart, and the whole law is summed up in supreme love to God, and the love of our neighbor as ourselves. The age in which we live adopts as its watchword Love, and certain it is that if we would reach it, make a favorable impression upon it, or recall it to faith in our Lord Jesus Christ,

we must recognize its craving to love, and show it the object it ought to love, and which is adequate to all the wants of the heart. There is, however, as we shall by and by show, a serious danger in all this to be guarded against. We must certainly take care not to separate love from intelligence, or to run into sentimentalism, which loses sight of moral obligation or duty,—of obedience to law. We must remember that Christian love is a rational affection, not a blind instinct, sentiment, or feeling; but we must not forget that faith is in order to charity, and that no philosophy, no religion which does not meet the craving of the heart to love, is of the least conceivable value. The moral wants of the soul, as well as its intellectual wants, must be met and answered. We are happy to see that our author has fully recognized this fact, and endeavored to conform to it. He recognizes the two wings of the soul, spoken of by Plato, by which it rises to God, that is, science and love, and insists that we are led to God by the heart even more than by the head.

Starting from the wants of the heart, from the natural desire of the heart for beatitude, the author finds that this desire can be satisfied with no created, with no limited, with no natural good, but demands a supernatural good, the possession of God as he is in himself. Hence a complete theodicy, a theodicy adequate to the wants of the soul, cannot be constructed by natural reason alone; for natural reason is by its own nature confined to the natural order, and cannot present the supernatural. Hence no adequate philosophy detached from supernatural revelation. This is in its terms what we always ourselves assert, although we probably do not maintain it in the precise sense of the author. He seems to us to suppose that natural or rational philosophy may begin and go a certain length alone, and only needs supernatural revelation to complete the knowledge of God or to reveal to us by faith God in the sense in which he is the adequate object of the soul's craving for a supernatural beatitude. He in this does nothing to reconcile the rationalists and traditionalists, but takes the ground of the rationalists, and differs essentially in no respect from Father Chastel, the unrelenting opponent of the erudite Bonnetty. We take a somewhat different view. We do not assume revelation as necessary simply to elevate reason into the supernatural order properly so called, but also as necessary to enable reason to explain and rightly understand

even the first principles of rational truth. Reason and revelation must go hand in hand from the first step to the last, and there is no philosophy, in any stage, independent of revelation. Philosophy is nothing but the rational element of supernatural theology, and is incomplete on every point if detached from the supernatural light reflected from revelation. Nevertheless, the principle we contend for M. Gratry concedes, and if there be any difference between us, it is merely one of application. Perhaps, after all, the difference is not even so much, and may be resolved into one of mere expression.

The central principle of the author's doctrine is, that God is apprehended primarily by the soul as the object of its moral wants, its craving for beatitude, and that the soul attains to a knowledge of him by love, by an interior movement or spring by which it passes at once from the finite to the infinite,—a process which he labors to prove is purely geometrical, of which geometricians in the infinitesimal calculus make merely a special application. In this he thinks he is borne out by all the great philosophers, theologians, and sublime geniuses of all times. In order to prove it, he gives us a learned historical sketch and a masterly analysis of the theodicy of Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, Descartes and Pascal, Malebranche and Fénelon, Bossuet and Leibnitz, Petau and Thomassin. His work is valuable here as a history of philosophy, from Plato to Leibnitz, if for nothing else. He finds, or thinks he finds, in all these sublime geniuses the same method, the same conclusions, the same theodicy, substantially his own. He places St. Thomas of Aquin at the head of the list, and considers him greater than St. Augustine by the addition of Aristotle to Plato. We are not quite prepared to accept this estimate, as much as we reverence the Angel of the Schools. St. Thomas knew Aristotle thoroughly, and followed his method, though in some points rejecting his conclusions; but his knowledge of Plato was less complete. He added Aristotle to St. Augustine, but he did not add Plato to Aristotle. In his *Summa Theologica*, and especially in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, he is as nearly an Aristotelian as a Catholic theologian can be, and if he departs from the Aristotelian method at all, it is where he is forced to do so by his Catholic faith and his profound reverence for St. Augustine, who, we dare hold, combined in himself all of both Aristotle and Plato that is of permanent value.

We are somewhat surprised that M. Gratry omits from his list of sublime geniuses St. Anselm of Canterbury,—the sublimest genius, the profoundest and most original philosopher of the Middle Ages, who by his own thought and contemplation reproduced all of Plato that is worth reproducing, and to whom M. Gratry is apparently more indebted than to any other philosopher for his own theodicy. There is here either strange injustice or a still more strange forgetfulness. We cannot excuse an author who includes Descartes, Pascal, and Petau in the list of sublime geniuses and profound theologians and philosophers, and excludes St. Anselm from it. St. Anselm was, so far as we are aware, the first who adopted the method of demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of God, which is the method M. Gratry himself insists upon and follows.

We are not prepared, moreover, to admit that all these great and sublime geniuses adopted the same method, and attained to their theodicy by one and the same process. We have no disposition to speak slightingly of Plato, the "divine Plato," as some of the Fathers call him, and who in our judgment stands at the head of all Gentile philosophers; but we think M. Gratry makes him talk quite too much like a Christian philosopher. We think that, in his translations of the passages he extracts, he gives him a meaning far more in accordance with Christian thought than Plato himself entertained, and interprets not unfrequently his mythology in a non-Platonic sense. That Plato clearly and distinctly taught the unity of God in the Christian sense, we do not believe. He held substantially the Pythagorean doctrine of the eternity of matter, had at best only a confused conception of creation, and though he asserted the immortality of the soul, he was ignorant of the future life and beatitude brought to light by Christian revelation. How, then, he could have a sound theodicy, as far as it went, is more than we are able to understand. But be this as it may, how does our author know that Plato attained to the great truths which he unquestionably held, and those still greater which he supposes him to have held, by the sole virtue of his dialectic method? Was there no tradition in the age of Plato, no wisdom of the ancients which had come down to his time? May not Plato have been indebted for these truths to tradition, to the primitive revelation, which was made to our first parents, and handed down in its purity through the patriarchs and the Syna-

gogue, and in a corrupt and fragmentary form through the Gentile sacerdocies and philosophies? Is it certain that all in a theodicy is attained to by the method professed by its author? Have we never known honorable inconsequences, sublime inconsistencies? How many Christian philosophers do we not meet, in whom faith triumphs over their philosophical method, and who give us sound and sublime conclusions never attained by their method of reasoning, and which they hold only at the expense of their logic? We are far from being willing to ascribe all we find in Plato to the virtue of his dialectic method, and we have not the least doubt that the sublime truths contained in his theodicy were borrowed, directly or indirectly, from the primitive revelation preserved in its purity and integrity in the Synagogue. He himself, if we recollect aright, ascribes them to tradition, to the wisdom of the ancients.

We cannot agree that Aristotle follows substantially the method of Plato, whom he continually combats and is perpetually misrepresenting, or that St. Thomas, who follows the method of Aristotle, follows the method of Plato, St. Augustine, and St. Anselm. His method is very nearly the reverse of theirs. He combats, and in his school is held to have refuted, St. Anselm's famous demonstration of the existence of God. St. Thomas follows the syllogystic method throughout, and nowhere, so far as we have been able to discover, does he adopt the dialectic method,—the method insisted on by our author, and represented by him as that adopted by all the great philosophers and theologians in every age. Des Cartes, Fénelon, Thomassin, Malebranche, Bossuet, and Leibnitz follow, perhaps, the dialectic method, but Pascal did not, and, though an able geometrician, he was no philosopher. He was a sceptic, and founded his dogmatism on the denial of reason, and religion on despair. He was a brilliant genius, if you will; he had many profound thoughts, and has left behind him many pregnant remarks; but he should never be named with the great philosophers and theologians of mankind. Pascal was indeed a Frenchman, but we do not know that we are for that obliged to cite him as one of the great men of the earth. He belonged to Port-Royal, and with it we would leave him to pass into forgetfulness, or the execration he deserves for his *Provincial Letters*.

But leaving all considerations of this sort by the way, we are not quite sure, after all, what it is that M. Gratry means

by his dialectic method. He says reason has two processes or modes of operation; the one he calls the syllogistic, the other he calls the dialectic, and represents the former as deductive and the latter as inductive. We think we understand what Plato means by the dialectic method, for with him it is based on his doctrine of ideas, and is explained by his doctrine of reminiscence. According to Plato, the soul existed prior to its connection with the body, in close union with the Divinity, and its knowledge here is a reminiscence of what it knew by virtue of that union in its pre-existing state. By being clothed with a material body, it lost in great measure its previous knowledge, and can recover it only in proportion as it detaches itself from the body, and rises on the wings of love and contemplation to union with God, in whom are the ideas or archetypes of all things, the only objects of real science. The way for the soul to know here in this state is to recover its former knowledge, and the way to do that is by moral discipline to recover the lost union with God, in whom the real objects of science are open to the soul's contemplation. The soul must detach itself from the body and all material things, ascend by its love and contemplation to the empyrean it originally inhabited, and there contemplate in calm spiritual repose the first Good, the first True, and the first Fair. Or, in other words, the soul must enter into itself, and silently contemplate its own reminiscences of that ideal world from which it has been exiled. Setting aside the doctrine of reminiscence founded on Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, there is no doubt a shadow of truth in this; but it would then resolve the dialectic method into the contemplative, and assert that the object obtained is obtained by intuition, not by induction. M. Gratry must reject the doctrine of reminiscence, and therefore, it seems to us, must mean by the dialectic or inductive method, as distinguished from the syllogistic or deductive method, that of simple contemplation; in which case all he says of the infinitesimal calculus avails him nothing.

But contemplation of what? Of God? Then he must concede that we apprehend God intuitively, or at least apprehend intuitively that which is God. But this he seems to deny, or to be afraid to assert. Of the creature, or the finite, as he would seem to hold? Then he attains to a knowledge of God, if at all, by reasoning, and by reasoning which in no respect differs from the syllogistic or deductive

reasoning, which he rejects. He says we dart at once from the finite to the infinite by mentally suppressing all conception of bounds and limitations, as in the infinitesimal calculus; that is, by abstraction of the finite, and consequently by deduction, or syllogistic reasoning. But this is not all. If the author means by our darting at once to the infinite, that the infinite is immediately and simultaneously apprehended in the apprehension of the finite, we accept it, but the process is then intuitive, not dialectic. But if he means, as it would seem, that we attain to the infinite by a process, however rapid, of abstraction, his infinite is only an abstract infinite. Abstract from the finite its finiteness, or suppress mentally its bounds and limitations, and you suppress the finite altogether, annihilate the whole object, and there remains not the infinite, as supposed, but simply nothing.

M. Gratry professes to adopt the method of the geometricians, and says formally, that the process by which all men, learned and unlearned, philosophers and poets, attain to a knowledge of God, is precisely the method of which the infinitesimal calculus, invented by Leibnitz, is a special application. He labors at great length to prove that the demonstration of the existence of God is strictly geometrical. In this consists the original and novel part of his work. Others have indeed asserted it, but he is the first who has demonstrated it. But, with all deference to the learned and scientific author, we must say that the God he demonstrates by his geometrical process is simply zero. Mathematics is a mixed science, at once ideal and empirical. The mathematical infinities belong to the ideal, and the ideal is always God as the intelligible; for, as M. Gratry well maintains, the infinite is God, and there is no infinite separate or distinguishable from him. At the bottom of all your mathematical infinities, as the plane, so to speak, on which they are projected, is the intuition or conception of God, without whom they could not be conceived. Take away from the human mind the intuition of God, which accompanies all its conceptions as their ideal element, and the infinitesimal calculus would not only be an error, as Berkeley maintains that it is, but an impossible error; for there is and can be out of God no infinitely little or infinitely great, even in thought. St. Thomas, we believe, somewhere says, an atheist may be a geometrician, but without God there can be no geometry. We will add, that without the intuition

of God as infinity no man can be a geometrician. Having through that intuition the conception of the infinite God, the conception of the infinitely real, we can speak of mathematical infinities, for in so doing we only make a special application of that conception. But these infinities are purely ideal, not empirical, and aside from their reality in the essence, wisdom, or power of God, not distinguishable from God himself, they are nothing, simply zero. But as we always have that conception, though we do not always take note that it is conception of God, we take it into our heads that mathematical infinities are something, and conceivable outside of God, which it is certain they are not. The suppression, empirically considered, of all bounds, limitations, or fixed, definite, or determinable quantity, gives us not infinity, but simply zero, which is nothing at all. Between zero and a determinable number, between nothing and something, there is no medium. Zero multiplied or divided by zero gives simply zero, and hence, regarded in the concrete order, the infinitesimal calculus of Leibnitz, as the fluxions of Newton, is only a superb error, and harmless mathematically only where the error is equal on both sides, which is by no means always the case. Mathematicians do not detect its fallacy, because there is in their minds the intuition of the real infinite, in which their imaginary infinities have, so to speak, a basis or support.

But M. Gratry cannot have so much as this, for he professes to dart from the finite to the infinite without a previous intuition of the infinite, by simply suppressing or disregarding in the finite apprehended its bounds, limitations, or determinable quantity. But this is a complete abstraction of the finite, and the remainder is simply zero, not only empirically but even ideally; for the very conception of the finite is the conception of a fixed or definite quantity. Remove that conception, and nothing remains; for, according to the hypothesis, there is no previous or concomitant intuition of the infinite which, as in mathematics, survives, so to speak, the suppression, in thought, of the finite or determinable quantity. M. Gratry, then, by his process, that of abstracting the finite or disregarding the determinable, attains for his God simply zero, *das nicht Seyn*, and, strangely enough, finds himself in perfect accord with Hegel, whom he ridicules without mercy. It would perhaps not be difficult to show that his dialectic method is at bottom identically the *constructive* method of the Hegelians.

We must say, therefore, and we do so with profound respect, that we do not think he has added any thing valuable to philosophy or theodicy by his geometrical demonstration, for the alleged demonstration, strictly taken, is an error even in geometry, inasmuch as it starts with the assumption that zero is not nothing, but something.

It may be our own blindness and stupidity, but we confess that we do not understand how there are or can be two distinct methods of reasoning, and we have never yet been able to see wherein Aristotle erred when he termed induction an imperfect syllogism. Reason has two very distinct modes of operation, which we term intuition and reasoning or ratiocination. It is intuitive and discursive. But all discursion, all reasoning, is, as far as we are able to understand it, syllogistic; and all induction, in so far as it is a logical process at all, may be reduced to a regular syllogism, as all the old masters of logic have taught. We agree entirely with M. Gratry, that we do not and cannot obtain our principles by syllogistic reasoning, for the principles must be given prior to reasoning. The office of the syllogism is not to discover new principles, or to extend science to new matter, but to clear up, systematize, and confirm what in some form is already held by the mind. Principles, or the matter from which and on which the syllogism operates, must be furnished prior to and independent of it. These, according to Plato, the soul brings with it, and are reminiscences of its knowledge in its pre-existing state, or previous life; according to us, they are furnished objectively by intuition, and reach us through simple intuitive apprehension. To extend our knowledge in this direction, Plato recommended silence and recollection. We recommend tranquil contemplation, or observation. Beyond these two methods, which differ from one another only as seeing or beholding differs from remembering, we are unable to conceive any other. A dialectic or inductive method, which is neither intuitive nor syllogistic, we cannot understand, and a logical process distinguishable from intuition, by which the reason can be furnished with principles, is to us inconceivable. M. Gratry is frequently on the verge of the truth, but seems either not to apprehend it, or to fear to assert it. What he wants is, to perceive that what he calls dialectic is, so far as distinguishable from the syllogistic, intuitive, and that the infinite is affirmed to us in direct intuition; not attained by a logical process, or by way of abstraction of the finite. He is prob-

ably afraid to do this, because our theologians have, as it were appropriated the term intuition of God to express the beatific vision of the Blest, the vision of God in his essense, or as he is in himself, which is not naturally possible, and is attainable only by the supernatural light of glory. He fears, most likely, that, were he to say that we have intuition of God here, he would fall into a condemned heresy, and be thought to teach that we are naturally capable of the beatific vision, and may even naturally enjoy it on earth. But we think this fear is groundless. To have intuition of God as the ideal, the intelligible, is, in our judgment, something very different from having intuition of him as he is in himself, or in his essence, and we think may be asserted without danger to faith; for it is asserted by St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Père Thomassin, and Cardinal Gerdil, and implied by St. Thomas, and in reality by M. Gratry himself.

Nevertheless, M. Gratry is not, as a matter of fact, deceived in supposing that, after suppressing the finite, he has not zero, but the infinite, present to his apprehension. His mistake lies in supposing that he in that way obtains it, or attains to a conception of it. The fact is, in every intuition we have direct and immediate intuition of both the infinite and the finite, of the necessary and the contingent, of God and the creature, and by disregarding or mentally suppressing the finite we only detach the infinite from the finite presented along with it in the same intuition, and turn our minds to its direct and distinct consideration. We do not thus obtain it originally, but we thus obtain it as a distinct conception. If we suppose the mind destitute of all intuition of the infinite, the method proposed by our author would give us simply zero, as we have said, not the infinite, for the infinite is not deducible from the finite; but since we really have all along the intuition, as a matter of fact the infinite by the suppression of the finite remains present to the mind, and is, what it was not before, distinctly apprehended. The fact is as the author asserts, but his account of it is not correct, for the idea is not obtained in the way he supposes. It is not obtained by his dialectical process; it is only made an object of distinct recognition and contemplation.

M. Gratry will permit us, however, to say, that he seems to us, throughout his work, to confound two things which in our judgment are very distinct; namely, the process by

which we know that God is, with that by which we learn what he is. That God is, we know intuitively, in that we have direct and immediate intuition of real and necessary being, which is God; but what he is, what are his moral attributes, and what are our relations to him, we learn only by a process similar to that which he calls the dialectic. His work is less a demonstration of the existence of God to those who deny it, than a discourse to advance in the knowledge and love of God those who, though they deny not that he is, have no lively sense of his existence, and seek their beatitude, not in loving and serving him, but in loving and serving the creature. It is philosophical, indeed, but practical rather than speculative, and moral rather than metaphysical. We complain not of this in itself, but the author does not avow it, or seem to be fully aware of it. He seems to proceed on the assumption, that both objects are to be effected by the same process, and to regard his work as fitted alike for both speculative and practical atheists. He would have us believe that he is writing a purely metaphysical work, demonstrating and elucidating the first principles of all science, as well as inciting to growth in the knowledge and love of God. There is, therefore, to us some discrepancy, in his work, between what he really does and what he has the air of doing, or of supposing that he is doing.

We think M. Gratry makes a mistake in regarding metaphysics and theodicy as precisely one and the same thing. We cannot for ourselves consent to resolve ontology into theodicy, for we believe that in our intuition God is presented as the object of the intellect prior to his being presented as the object of the will, and therefore as the *summum Ens* or *Verum* before he is presented as *summum Bonum*, or as the True before being presented as the Good. We have duly considered what the author says to the contrary, but it does not convince us that the heart darts away to God as the object of its love or its beatitude before he is presented as the object of the intellect. The heart has its movements, its affections, and these may urge the soul to action, yet without the light of the intellect they are mere blind cravings, torment the soul, and render it restless and incapable of repose; but they are all interior, and can fasten upon this object only as intellectually apprehended. The age experiences these cravings, and is crying out day and night for some object on which to fasten, and which shall

be adequate to its wants and fill its empty heart. Hence the universal unrest which is its grand characteristic. It craves it knows not what. The intellect does not present the object that could satisfy its vague longings, and in which its heart can find repose. Its malady is moral, but also intellectual. The author, undoubtedly, wishes to render his philosophy living and practical, adequate to the wants of the heart as well as to those of the understanding. He wishes to give fair and full play to the moral feelings. He thinks they ought to count for more than they do in our modern scholastic philosophy; that there is a logic of the heart which is, perhaps, superior to that of the head, and he endeavors to prove that we first know God as the good, first apprehend him in his moral attributes. If we understand him, the intellect apprehends God as the True because the heart has already apprehended him as the Good and the Beautiful. Hence he resolves, virtually, philosophy into ethics, and makes its first division theodicy. But the soul, though endowed with several faculties, is a simple spiritual substance. It has the power to know, to will, and to feel, but it cannot act as the one power without also acting in some degree as the other. It has no cognitions without volitions and emotions, no volitions or emotions without cognitions. It acts never as three distinct activities, but as a simple *vis activa* with a threefold capacity of acting. Now suppose the heart apprehends God before he is apprehended by the head, must it not still apprehend him intellectually? If the heart, that is, the power either to will or to feel, taken distinctively, is blind, it cannot apprehend any thing. Has it then some other light or medium of placing itself in relation with its object than the intellect? M. Gratry, indeed, speaks of a "divine sense," a "divine instinct," by which the soul is drawn to and placed in relation with God as the Good, as the adequate object of its love; but is this divine sense or instinct intelligent? does it present its object to the soul's contemplation? How then distinguish it from reason or intellect? If it is not, how say that by it the heart *knows* God? If it is not intellect, it must be will or feeling, and if simple will or feeling, it is in itself blind, and has no light to know except from the intellectual faculty itself; for to know is one and the same phenomenon, whatever its conditions, its region, or its degrees.

We confess that we distrust this talk about a divine sense, or divine instinct, which is supposed to be distinguishable

from our common intellectual faculty; and when we find an author placing in the acquisition of knowledge the heart above the head, we are tempted to suspect that he does not himself very well understand what he is about. We very readily concede that the end is not simply to know, and that all knowledge should be in order to love or charity; and in this sense we place the heart above the head. But the heart taken distinctively for the affections or emotions is not a light, is but a blind craving to love, or aspiration to our Supreme Good, which it sees not, and finds not by any light of its own. The heart craves beatitude, and torments itself till it finds it; and from this we may learn that it wants what it has not, and may conclude, if we already believe that a good God has made us, that there is a beatitude for us, and which we may attain unless we have forfeited it by our fault; but the heart itself, regarded as unenlightened by natural or supernatural intelligence, cannot tell where its beatitude is to be found, or in what it consists. Its supposed divine sense or instinct is in reality intellectual intuition, or an obscure perception of God as the Supreme Good, as St. Thomas teaches when he says the soul has an obscure apprehension of God in its desire for beatitude, which is to be found only in God.

We are ourselves supposed to have no heart, and are regarded as a mere logic-grinder, logic-chopper, or dialectic gladiator; and therefore our inability to accept M. Gratry's doctrine will most likely be ascribed to our own psychological defects. But be this as it may, we can understand very well the cravings of the heart, its deep power of love. We know very well that man is not all dry intellect. We can imagine that he has a heart, and that this heart craves beatitude,—nay, that its deepest want is to love, and that all love seeks to lose itself in the beloved. We can very well understand that God is the only adequate object of the heart, and that he only can satisfy its love. The heart was made for God, and nothing less than blessed union with him, the full possession of him as the beloved, can fill it, give it fullness of joy, and sweet repose. Here we should be sorry not to be able to go all lengths with the Christian mystic; but it is through the understanding, by natural and supernatural light, that God as the adequate object of the heart, or as our Supreme Good, is presented to the soul. Without this light presenting the object, the heart's love fastens upon nothing, or fastens upon low and unworthy

objects, which serve only to disappoint or to disgust it. God, then, as the adequate object of the heart, must be presented as the adequate object of the intellect, as the *summum Verum*, prior to being apprehended as the *summum Bonum*; and therefore metaphysics should precede in our philosophy theodicy, as it does with nearly all our theologians. We prize Plato very highly, as we have always said, but we do not think him always a safe guide. It is worthy of remark, that all the mystagogues of the Middle Ages were Platonists, and setting up Plato against Aristotle was the signal of rebellion against the Church, which has resulted in modern Protestantism. Plato is the favorite author of our Transcendentalists, and was the philosopher of predilection of the Patarins, Cathares, or Albigenses, and the followers of the Gospel of Love, so widely asserted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, against the Papacy and Catholic theology. We cannot think that this is purely accidental. Plato, though he mitigates the Oriental doctrine that matter is evil and the source of evil, still holds it, and teaches that we attain to a knowledge of God and divine things only in proportion as we trample on the body. We must despise it, and practically disengage ourselves from it, and rise on the wings of pure spiritual contemplation and love into intimate union with God. This is a satanic imitation of the Christian doctrine of charity and mortification; and so close is the resemblance, that it deceives not a few, and never was there an age in a more fitting temper to be deceived by it than our own. Christianity does not place the origin of evil in matter, nor regard matter either as evil or unclean; for it teaches the resurrection of the flesh, honored by its assumption in the womb of the Virgin by the Son of God. It sees evil only in sin, and sin only in the perverse will, or abuse of our moral freedom. Its works of mortification are not performed in hatred of the body, nor to release the soul from it, but in honor of the sufferings of our Lord in the flesh, and in purification of the soul from its own fleshly desires; for these desires are not, as with the Platonists, the desires of a sensual soul distinct from the spiritual soul, but are desires of the spiritual soul itself united to the flesh. By mortification the Christian purifies his soul and sanctifies his body, and keeps it holy as the temple of the Holy Ghost. He rules the body, but loves and cherishes it. The Platonist contemns it, and seeks to act as a spirit without a body. He falls back on the spirit,

which in his view is separated from God only by the body or material envelope. He regards his purity and holiness as independent of the body, as dependent solely on that higher, or, as Plato calls it, demonic region of the soul, in which it is still united, or attached perhaps substantially, to the Divinity, and therefore treats what concerns the body as wholly unconnected with the moral state or character of the soul. Hence the lawlessness and irregularities of the body, its wild disorders and debaucheries, have nothing to do with the soul's purity and holiness. They belong, as it were, to another person, and no more defile the soul than the filth on which it shines defiles the sun's ray. Hence the Patarins or Cathares, while claiming the greatest spiritual purity, abandoned themselves to the grossest sensual indulgences, and practised such abominations, that the Church, in order to save Christian morals and prevent the dissolution of society, was obliged to proclaim a crusade against them, and to call upon the secular princes to exterminate them, as we shall have yet to do with our Mormons.

The doctrine of Plato, that we attain to a knowledge of God by love, is also liable to a gross abuse, as we see in the same heretics. Who has not heard of the old minstrels, Troubadours, and Trouvères? Their songs, ballads, lays, sirventes, fabliaux, seem to us in these days mere songs in honor of the poet's lady-love; but the love they sang, at least they who sang in Provençal and Italian, is the heretical Love of the Cathares and other sects. The Beatrice of Dante and the Laura of Petrarca only symbolize the Gospel of Love, the Johannine Gospel as distinguished from the Petrine and Pauline Gospels, so boldly proclaimed by Schelling a few years since at Berlin, defended formerly, we are ashamed to say, by us, and still by Chevalier Bunsen, as the basis of the Church of the Future. The doctrine is, that the Church is progressive, at first authoritative with Peter, then intellectual with Paul, and now is to be love with John. In the thirteenth century this doctrine was widely diffused, and was cherished and defended by secret societies all over Europe, especially in Northern Italy and Southern France. The sect held that love alone was required, and that authority and dogmas were not only superfluous, but absolutely repugnant to the spirit of true Christianity. This love, the Platonic love, is the *love* that was sung by the Provençal and Ghibbeline poets, whose real purpose was to corrupt the people, to detach them from

the Holy See, and to carry on the wars of the Emperors and secular princes against the Papacy. The readiness with which Plato's doctrine could thus be turned against Catholicity, as it was by Jews and Greeks, as well as the Patarins, is probably the reason why St. Thomas attached himself so rigidly to the Aristotelian method. It was the only way in his time to escape the abuses of the Platonic method, and to combat with success the heresies which then prevailed.

We avow our preference in many respects for Plato, but we dare not take him for a master. The Fathers to some extent were Platonists, but none of them followed him throughout, and St. Augustine, the greatest of them, always masters him, and never suffers himself to be mastered by him. Such men as St. Augustine are in no danger from Plato, but in the hands of men of more erudition than genius, or more imagination than judgment, Platonism has almost invariably led to heresy, to moral abominations, and armed its followers against the Church of God. We therefore fear that M. Gratry, in following Plato, and giving us theodicy for metaphysics, and love for science, may be opening the way to errors and disorders which no man would deplore more than he. He is a mystic, and writes from the mystical point of view. But though there is a true mysticism, and though the highest and deepest knowledge of God is the mystic, yet the line which separates true from false mysticism is so subtile, that it is easily mistaken, and none but the spiritually enlightened in an extraordinary degree can be sure of not mistaking it. We are afraid, if we give way to the mystical tendency, and undertake to substitute mysticism for scholasticism in popular philosophy and theology, we shall only be making bad worse. While we would by no means exclude or discourage the mystical, while we would study the Blessed Henry Suso, St. Catharine of Genoa, and St. Theresa, we would retain the speculative, and study diligently St. Thomas; we would aim at exact science at the same time that we gave way to the motions of the deepest and most burning love.

These criticisms we have felt it our duty diffidently to offer on M. Gratry's remarkable book, for we look upon its author as one of the few living men of our times, and as one from whom much is to be expected. He is full of life, zeal, and energy; he is learned, pious, and endowed with a philosophical genius of a high order. He writes with freedom,

strength, and eloquence, and wins our heart and kindles our enthusiasm. The defects of his work are comparatively few; its merits are many and great, and to these we shall return in another article, especially to the part of the work that treats of the supernatural, of the higher demands of reason which only the supernatural can satisfy, and of God as the adequate object of the wants of the soul. In the mean time we would direct our readers more particularly to meditation on the adaptedness of our holy religion to the wants deeply felt by all men. The age in which we live is to be pitied rather than declaimed against. It is restless and unhappy. It is seeking rest and finding none. Its heart is loving, but has no object it can love. It is empty and desolate. Its song is the low, melodious wail of sorrow, or the wild lament of despair. Can we not speak to this age a word of hope? Can we not give to these sorrowing souls the object their hearts crave? We have that word of hope. We know what their hearts need, what it is, and where it is to be found. Their sorrow has been ours, their despair we have felt, and in their unrest we have shared. We have found faith, we have found hope, we have found a sweet, ineffable repose. Why can we not aid them?

The Catholic has, and he only has, what this age needs, what especially our own countrymen want. Is there no way in which we can convince them of this? Is there no way in which we can speak to their hearts, and be to them messengers of love, joy, and peace? Alas! we feel at times that we have been too ready to despair of them, and too distrustful of the Divine assistance. We fear that we have suffered our hearts to grow cold towards them, and to forget the good which Almighty God may have in store for them. We have been too easily overcome by difficulties, and have been too loath to make sacrifices to bring souls to God, or rather to persuade them to let God come to them. But it is not too late to redeem the time, and we trust thousands and thousands of young Catholics are growing up among us, who will never be content to let our countrymen perish for the lack of the bread of life.

ARTICLE II.

In our last number we gave a brief and hasty notice of the Abbé Gratry's profound and learned work, and intimated that we might resume on a future occasion our

examination of it. We regret that we have not yet seen the author's promised work on Logic, in which he had proposed to develop and vindicate his geometrical method of proving the existence of God, for it is possible that he may in that work have advanced something which will require us in some respects to modify the objections we urged in our former article against that method. We should be glad to find the author in the right, for he is a man from whom we do not like to dissent, and from whom we cannot dissent without an uncomfortable feeling. But as at present informed, we must abide by the objections to his method which we have urged.

We are bound in justice to the excellent author, certainly one of the ablest and most learned men in France, and with whom we have numerous points of sympathy, to confess that the more deeply we study his volumes, the more highly do we appreciate them; and we are not a little pleased to find that they have met with a success very unusual in the case of works so really learned and profound. We see that they have some time since passed to a second edition, and perhaps a third edition may already be called for. The author is just such a man as France in our times needs, and he can hardly fail to exert a wide and salutary influence on the French mind. He is in a good sense a man of his age, and admirably fitted to bring out and render popular those great philosophical principles, which are now so much needed to reconcile conflicting parties, and to restore to full vigor and activity our expiring intellectual life. Amid the despotism of an exaggerated supernaturalism and a new-fangled Cæsarism on the one hand, and the no less odious despotism of socialism, Red Republicanism, or centralized democracy, on the other, it is refreshing to hear a free voice speak out in true manly tones, in defence alike of reason and of revelation. Even one such voice goes far to redeem the age. It proves that our God has not abandoned us to our own folly and wickedness, and that we are still under his gracious providence. Whatever faults we have found or may still find with the author on certain points, we look upon him as one whom God has raised up to render most important services, in these unhappy times, to the cause of truth, both natural and revealed.

The real differences between us and M. Gratry, in regard to philosophical matters, are not, we apprehend, after all, so great as they appear. Every man who really philosophizes,

who really thinks, and not merely repeats, has his own special point of view, and in some respects a language of his own. No two men approach the same problems under precisely the same aspect, or use even the same general terminology in precisely the same sense. M. Gratry denies that we have or can have naturally direct and immediate intuition of God, and maintains that our natural view of him is indirect and implicit only; yet we think a few words of mutual explanation would show that there is between him and us no essential difference even on this point. He maintains, after St. Augustine, Malebranche, and Fénelon, that we see things by the light of God (*la lumière de Dieu*), which alone renders them visible either to the senses or the intellect. What more have we ourselves said?

The light of God, which renders things visible or intelligible to us, is, according to the author, as well as according to St. Augustine, Malebranche, and Fénelon, God himself, in relation with our intellective faculty, and therefore not distinguishable from God. It is the divine intelligibility, and therefore the divine being itself. It must be either God or something created, *quid creatum*; for there is no intermediate existence between God and creature. Whatever is not creature is God, and whatever is not God is creature. The author does not hold that this light is created, for he distinguishes it with Fénelon from our light or reason, and calls it the universal, eternal, and immutable reason. He represents it as the light of our light, the reason of our reason, the medium by which created intelligences see or apprehend the world and our own soul. It must then be not creature, but God, as Fénelon asserts, when he asks, "Is not this the God I seek?"

But if God is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world, if he is the light by which we see our own soul and created things, the medium by which they are visible to us, we do not see how the author can deny direct and immediate intuition of God. He vindicates the right to explain intellectual vision by the analogy of sensible vision. Now in sensible vision the light is that which first strikes the eye, and is that which is first, directly, and immediately seen. Other objects are seen by it as the medium of their visibility. In intellectual vision it must, if the analogy holds, be the same. Then the view of God as the light, or intuition of God as the intelligible, cannot be indirect and implicit only, as the author maintains, but must, on his own principles, be direct and immediate.

We must bear in mind that God alone is intelligible in himself, that is, intelligible without any borrowed light, and that all creatures in themselves are unintelligible. Objects are invisible in the dark, and are visible only when illumined by a borrowed light. St. Thomas teaches that man, that is, the human soul, is in itself unintelligible. This being so, it follows necessarily that created things can be intelligible to a created or participated reason, such as is ours, only as rendered intelligible or as illuminated by an uncreated light, that is, by the light of God, or the light of his own eternal being; that is, again, only as enlightened by him, or made intelligible by his own intelligibility. He then is himself the medium of their visibility, and of our apprehension of them. Then, since the medium must be immediate, for if not we should be obliged to suppose an infinite series of mediums, and is that which is seen itself without a medium, we are forced to say, with Malebranche, that "we see creatures by God," and that our view of him is direct and immediate, unless we are prepared to say that we can see objects by the light without seeing the light itself.

The author shrinks from this conclusion, and says: "The soul in the present state does not see God directly. It sees itself and its ideas in the light of God, as the eye sees objects in the light of day. But to see the day is not the same thing as to see the sun itself, although the day comes from the sun; to see colors and the forms of objects is still not to see the sun, although forms are visible only under the sun, and colors are only the very light of the sun, broken, refracted, and partially reflected by objects. So it is impossible to say that every idea, every view, every cognition, is immediately and directly an intuition of God, although there can be no idea without God, and every cognition implies God, as every sensible vision implies the day, and the sun's presence as its source." This is very well said, and would be conclusive against us if we were at liberty to suppose a distinction between God and his light, analogous to that between the sun and the day, or between the sun and the light. The sun elicits the light, but is not itself the light; it makes, in the order of second causes, the day, but is not itself the day. The analogy therefore will not hold, for God is himself in his own being the light, and not simply its occasion or cause. To distinguish the light from God, as we distinguish the day from the sun, would be to make the light a creature, something created, and

therefore in the last analysis to identify it with our own created reason, or with the created objects rendered visible or intelligible by it. We must therefore reject the distinction, and say, not indeed that every idea, every view, every cognition, is a direct and immediate intuition of God, but that *in* every idea, view, or cognition there is immediate and direct intuition of him, as in every vision there is sensible intuition of the light by which the sensible object is seen.

But in sensible vision, though we directly and immediately see the light, that is, see it without any medium between it and the eye, we do not see it in and by itself alone. We apprehend the light only in apprehending the object it illuminates, and only as it is reflected from the illuminated object to the eye. So in intellectual vision, we directly and immediately, in the same sense, apprehend God, but not in and by himself alone. We apprehend him only in apprehending creatures luminous by his light, and only as he, so to speak, is reflected or mirrored by them. Here we are not left to doubt or speculation, for St. Paul says expressly, *Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate*,—We see God *per speculum;* that is, as in a mirror. To see him in himself, to see him alone, by himself, separate from the perception of the illuminated object, is not naturally possible; for if it were, the beatific vision would be possible without the *ens supernaturale*, or light of glory. If therefore what the author means to deny is that we see God in himself, directly and immediately by himself, not as reflected or mirrored by his works, we fully agree with him. But this no Catholic, not even Gioberti, ever affirms. What we mean by the direct and immediate intuition of God is, not that we see him separate from his works, in himself, but that we see him without any medium between him and the eye of the mind. As between the eye and the light, the intuition of the light is direct and immediate, just as much so when reflected from the illuminated body as when seen by and in itself; so as the light which is God strikes the eye without any thing between it and the object it illuminates, we say we have direct and immediate intuition of God, although he strikes the eye only in illuminating created things.

The author says that Malebranche, instead of saying, "We see creatures by God," should have said, with St. Paul, "We see God by creatures." As we understand the

matter, we ought to say both. St. Paul nowhere teaches that we can see creatures without God illuminating them, and we certainly see nothing in what we hold inconsistent with what he says of our seeing him by creatures. *Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas*, is truth for us as well as for our author. We believe it is by God that we see creatures, and by creatures that we see God. We believe both propositions may be and are true. The dispute arises from the fact that most philosophers overlook the primitive synthesis of thought. Malebranche says truly, that it is by God that we see creatures, but having assumed very unnecessarily that we see God without creatures, and that it is *in* him that we see creatures, he was unable to affirm logically any actual creatures at all; for creatures seen in God are their ideas or archetypes, possible creatures, not actually existing creatures. He had a possible creator and a possible creation, nothing more, and in order to explain our perception of actual existences he was obliged to resort to what is called occasionalism, and to assume that our ideas of things are produced in us by the immediate and direct action of God on occasion of our impressions and sensations. Spinoza and our modern Germans, starting with the same assumption that God is seen or apprehended without creatures, lose creation itself, and fall into unmitigated pantheism. Startled by this conclusion, our author says we must say, "We see God by creatures." But if he understands by this that we can see creatures without seeing God, he will owe it to his theology, not to his philosophy, if he does not lose God and fall into unmitigated atheism. Indeed, nearly all ancient and modern philosophy tends, when not corrected by theology, to one or the other of these two errors.

The only way to avoid both errors is to recognize the fact that the primitive thought is a synthesis, and that God and creature in their real relation are given primitively and simultaneously, in one and the same intuition, neither, chronologically considered, prior to the other. Modern philosophy can boast of having stated and established two important facts, which had not previously been clearly and distinctly recognized. These facts are,—1. That thought is the joint product of subject and object, and can be the product of neither alone. Therefore both must precede thought, be independent of it, and therefore really exist. Here is

the refutation of both idealism and scepticism. 2. That thought is not only a synthesis inasmuch as it includes both subject and object in their joint activity, but is also a synthesis inasmuch as it embraces the objective synthesis, or God and creature in their real relation in the order of being. Philosophers long disputed about the passage from the subjective to the objective, and from the objective to the subjective. It is now seen that there is no passage from the one to the other, and that none is needed, because one is never given in thought without the other, but both are given simultaneously, though distinctly. Philosophers have also disputed about a scientific passage from the idea of creature to that of God, and from the idea of God to that of creature. We think it has been conclusively shown that no such passage is possible or needful, for both terms in their real relation are given immediately and simultaneously in the primitive intuition, and neither is left to be deduced from the other. We never think God without thinking creature, nor creature without thinking God. The one term is never apprehended without the other, and never the one save by the apprehension of the other, any more than we can apprehend the light without the body illuminated, or the body without the light that illuminates it. If philosophy, as we hold, has succeeded in establishing these two capital facts, it has at length succeeded in harmonizing itself with theology, and placing itself in perfect accord with revelation,—one of the great aims of the Abbé Gratry in the volumes before us.

All sound philosophy, as we many years ago maintained, must be synthetic. The grand error of philosophers in all ages has been in overlooking the primitive synthesis of thought, and endeavoring to deduce all natural truth from a single term. M. Victor Cousin saw this error, and sought to avoid it by what he called eclecticism; but unhappily his eclecticism was no genuine eclecticism at all, but a crude syncretism. Pierre Leroux saw clearly enough where M. Cousin failed, and recognized and distinctly set forth the synthesis of thought as to subject and object, but failed to recognize the synthesis in the object, or the ideal synthesis. Gioberti, with a rare sagacity, detects the objective or ideal synthesis, and shows that the intuitive object is the synthesis of being and existence in their real relation, expressed in the formula, Being creates existences, *Ens creat existentias;* and thus escapes the syncretism of

Cousin and the pantheism of Leroux. The other synthesis, the one so fully developed and so greatly exaggerated by Leroux, Gioberti seems, as far as we are acquainted with his writings, to have left undeveloped. He implies it, but he does not appear to have considered it, or to have clearly and distinctly apprehended it. Consequently he fails to present to the common philosophic understanding a psychology in harmony with his ontology, which is the principal reason, we suspect, why his ontology has encountered so much and such violent opposition. He is understood either as neglecting psychology or as deducing it from his ontology, and therefore is supposed to favor pantheism; whereas his real doctrine is, that the psychological and the ontological are given simultaneously, the one by the other, and never the one without the other. This he affirms over and over again; but this he does not show, as he might by the analysis of thought regarded as a fact of consciousness. On this point he might have profited by Leroux, for whom as an intellectual man he expresses a contempt which we are very far from sharing.

The merit of Leroux is not in discovering, but in developing the fact, that both subject and object enter into every thought. What concerns the object, the ontological element af thought, Gioberti has well developed, but he has left undetermined, in great obscurity, the psychological element, or the part of the subject. Undoubtedly the object, the ideal formula, according to Gioberti, presents and affirms itself, to the subject, or the human reason, which has and must have its part in the affirmation; for it is it that apprehends what is presented and affirmed. It will no more do to assert the pure passivity of the subject in the fact of intuition, than the pure passivity of the object. Thought is always psychological as well as ontological, subjective as well as objective; and we can never be more certain that the object presents itself, than we are that we apprehend it. This apprehension or this intuition of the object is a subjective act, as well as an objective act, for in fact it is the joint action of two concurrent activities. Gioberti implies, indeed concedes, this; but he passes it over too lightly, and makes, apparently at least, too little of the subjective activity. The subject enters actively into every intuition, as well as into every reflection.

But the subject enters for what it is, according to the laws of its own nature, and therefore philosophy must ana-

lyze the subject as well as the object; and as the psychological is not explicable without the ontological, so is the ontological not explicable to us without the psychological. As we have recognized an objective synthesis, and a synthesis of subject and object, so must we in fact recognize a subjective synthesis; for the subject in all its operations acts as it is and according to its own nature. Man is defined by the Schoolmen to be a rational animal, and reason includes at once and indissolubly intellect and will, the faculty of apprehending the true and that of aspiring to the good,—of knowing and of loving. Every thought is at once a perception and an aspiration. It is to this synthesis of perception or intellection and aspiration, or of knowing and loving, that M. Gratry devotes no inconsiderable portion of his work. In most of our philosophical systems, knowing and loving, intellection and aspiration, are disjoined, and regarded as operating in some sense independently one of the other, and hence science is presented without life, and morality without light. The one is blind, the other is lifeless. Our systems therefore do not accord with reality, for in actual life reason operates as understanding and will, intellect and love. To bring our systems into harmony with reality, we must then, in addition to the two syntheses we have already signalized, add a third, that of intellect and will, perception and aspiration, or knowledge and love.

We here experience some difficulty in expressing our meaning, for nearly all the terms we must use have been on one side or another abused. When we speak of rational love we are in danger of being understood to speak of sensitive love, or of favoring modern sentimentalism. The Greek Eros in our times is confounded with the Greek Anteros, and *erotic* has only a bad sense. The difficulty is to speak of rational love without being understood, on the one hand, to speak of the operations of free-will, or on the other, of the love of the senses, or carnal love. The love of which Plato speaks is in our sensual age reduced to a licentious love. Nevertheless love is a word we must use, and the love or affection which Plato represents as one wing of the soul must be recognized, and reaffirmed.

In reason as a faculty of the human soul we must distinguish three things, intellect, will, and free-will. Free-will, *arbitrium liberum*, is the subjective principle of all virtue or morality strictly so called; but we must distinguish it from will taken generally. Free-will is simply the faculty

of election, and without it man could be the subject neither of praise nor blame. But all our theologians distinguish between will and free-will, the *voluntarium* and the *liberum*. Cousin makes the distinction a distinction between the spontaneous will and the reflective will, the indeliberate and the deliberate, which we may accept, if we confine our praise or blame to the acts of deliberate will.

Now if we consider will in this sense as distinguished from free-will, which in us is deliberate, not spontaneous, we shall find with St. Thomas, that it is *appetitive*, and really the element of what Plato calls love, or of rational love as distinguished from the love of the senses. It operates rationally, but indeliberately. Its essential nature is to become one with its object, the nature of all love, and, if we consider it, of all volition. Being an integral element of reason or the rational soul, it necessarily enters into every rational operation of man, and plays an undivided part in every thought. Hence it is that every object of the mind is apprehended alike as the object of intellect and of will, of knowledge and of love, therefore under the forms of the true and the good. We can then give in our philosophical systems a correct account neither of the subject nor of the object, — in the barbarous language of some writers, the me and the not-me (*le moi et le non-moi*),—without recognizing both intellect and will; for as the subject can operate only in concurrence with the object, it could not operate at all were the object not simultaneously the object of both, and therefore under the aspect apprehended good as well as true.

But though the soul operates simultaneously in all its operations as intellect and will, the will is the commanding faculty, the monarch of the mind, as it has sometimes been called, and it is in some sense as its servant, not as its master, that the intellect operates. The motive power of all intellectual life is the will, love, the love of good. This love of good is resolved by many into the desire of happiness, or of our own beatitude, and hence the desire of happiness is said to be the spring and motive of all our natural actions. That there is in this love of good a reference to self, to our own good, is certain from the fact that the subject enters into all its operations; but as the object also enters, there is also a love of the object, of the good for its own sake, and in the purest and highest kind of love, the soul seeks the union desired by giving itself wholly to the object, rather than by

appropriating the object to itself. But be this as it may, this love of good is at the bottom of our whole intellectual life. It is the spring and motive, or rather *mobile*, of all our actions, and must therefore hold the first place in our philosophy, whether we speak of the subject or of the object.

The great merit of M. Gratry, in our view, consists in his recognition and development of this truth,—in taking his point of departure in reason on the side of love rather than on the side of intellect, and in the object under the form of the good rather than under the form of the true. In our previous article we pointed out the dangers to which this mode of considering the question is exposed, especially that of falling into an unintelligible mysticism on the one hand, or an unintelligent sentimentalism on the other. But this danger does not grow out of M. Gratry's doctrine itself, or even his statements taken in themselves. It grows out of the perversion of men's minds and hearts in our times, which leads them to misapprehend or misinterpret the truth, however clearly and guardedly expressed. But this is a risk that must be run. The doctrine is sound and important, and perhaps the danger will much diminish, if we are careful to state what M. Gratry does not take the trouble to state, that will is a rational faculty, and therefore the love we speak of is not a blind love. Reason, which is alike the general faculty of knowing and loving, exists always in its unity, and its operations are simultaneously knowing and loving, and therefore in the love itself there is not only the desire, but the intuition, of good. Individuals differ, and in some the knowing and in others the loving quality predominates, as God gives to some saints greater grace of understanding, and to others greater grace of love. Science may in this predominate over love; in that, love over science. Not every saint of equal heroic love is qualified to be a doctor of the Church. True heroic love may be found in souls of no great intellectual capacity, and with but little knowledge. Nevertheless, rational love is never wholly blind, and in all love there is intellectual apprehension, more or less full, more or less distinct, of its object.

Love is the aspiration of the soul to good, whether it be to possess the good by giving itself to its object, or by appropriating its object to itself. In either case it is alike an aspiration. This aspiration is the genuine Platonic love, without which the soul cannot rise even by science to God. It is that other wing of the soul by which it rises to the

empyrean, to "the First Good and First Fair." In this aspiration of the soul, this love, this craving for good, is the source of the universal belief in God. It is not by any process of reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, whether syllogistic or dialectic, that men are primarily led to believe in God. They believe in his existence as the Supreme Good, because they naturally, in their own natures, aspire to him, and are carried away by a natural prayer of the heart towards him. When the word God falls on their ears, it expresses or it names what their hearts have already believed and loved, though without a name. And this aspiration is no mean proof of the existence of God, because it is not, we must remember, a purely subjective phenomenon, and because it is not a mere blind craving, but includes a real intuition—obscure if you will, yet real—of its object, and therefore of God as the Supreme Good. It is indeed the testimony of the heart, but at the same time the testimony of the highest reason, and therefore worthy of the fullest confidence.

Now, bearing in mind that love is the spring of our whole rational life, it follows that the true point of view for philosophy is to consider man primarily as loving or aspiring, rather than as perceiving and knowing. It must consider him primarily under his moral relations, therefore under the point of view of his end or destiny, or as related to God as the end craved, or the good to which the soul aspires. This is what our author maintains with much clearness and force. Hence he considers theology as the answer to the wants of the heart, to the soul's love of good, before considering it as the answer to the questions of pure intellect. Understood as we have endeavored to explain it, we like this, because it conforms to the order of life, and redeems philosophy from dead and repulsive abstractions, beneath which it has been buried, and renders it living and attractive.

Taking his point of departure in love or the soul's aspiration to good, the author easily demonstrates that no created good, that no good less than God, the Supreme Good, can fill the soul, and satisfy its love. He does not even stop here. He further shows that even God, as attainable by our natural powers, cannot completely satisfy the natural wants of the soul, and therefore concludes that there can be for man no natural adequate beatitude, and that for his complete satisfaction the supernatural is necessary. In this way

he passes from philosophy to revelation, from reason to faith, and shows the connecting link between the natural and the supernatural, and the accord of nature and grace.

But here the author touches debatable ground, and has a powerful th ological school against him. The author's doctrine seems to imply that man naturally aspires to the supernatural, and that his natural wants even cannot be satisfied without the beatific vision, or the vision of God as he is in himself. This would imply that the beatific vision is due to man's nature, for that is due to nature which is necessary to the realization of its end. Certain it is, that the supernatural can never be due to the natural, and therefore the beatific vision, if due to man's nature, must have been naturally possible, and therefore natural, not supernatural. But it certainly is not naturally possible to man as we now find him. Then man by transgression must have lost a part of his nature, some of his natural powers, and then God could not have created him, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, as he is now born, which is a condemned proposition. It is the 55th proposition of Baius: *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.* That only can be called natural which is of pure nature, and that only is pure nature in which God might have originally created us, if he had chosen. Now, as the beatific vision is confessedly supernatural, it must be in every sense above our natural powers, and consequently can be no object of natural desire, or necessary to satisfy the soul's natural craving for beatitude, especially if in every desire there is even an obscure perception of the object.

There is undoubtedly some force in this reasoning, but perhaps it is not conclusive. The proposition of Baius was not condemned by St. Pius the Fifth as false in every sense, but solely in the sense of its asserters, as we are told in the Papal Bull itself. The doctrine of the author, moreover, has been maintained since the condemnation of Baius, by a host of eminent theologians, without the least mark of censure, and is certainly a free opinion at least, as is evident from the fact that these volumes themselves were examined at Rome by the Consultor of the Index, and declared to contain nothing contrary to faith. We must also remark, that, though God could have created us in the state of pure nature, it is certain that he did not, at least did not leave us in that state. He might, we doubt not, have created us for a purely natural beatitude, but we believe it is allowable to

say that he has not. Man was originally intended by his Maker for a supernatural destiny, not indeed to be gained by his natural powers, but by the supernatural elevation and assistance of grace. Strictly speaking, man has no natural destiny, and is destined only to a supernatural heaven or to a supernatural hell. In reasoning of man now, we must take him as he is. He certainly has no complete natural beatitude, and the actual wants of his soul certainly cannot be satisfied with any thing less than the beatific vision. Yet it may be that these wants do not in all respects belong to the soul as pure nature, and it may be that they are to some extent due to the secret operations of grace, which will not suffer us to find repose anywhere this side of our supernatural destiny. Take man as we find him to-day, and it is certainly true that nothing short of the beatific vision can satisfy his longing to love, or completely fill his soul. And whether this is the result of pure nature or of the secret operations of grace, the argument for the supernatural is equally strong.

It is no part of our office to enter into the dispute on this point between the Augustinians and the Jesuits, for both are Catholics without reproach. But this much is, we think, certain, that man, as we now find him, in the present decree of God, as say the theologians, has in fact no natural destiny; and nothing natural, not even the natural vision of God, which is only a vision *per speculum*, not an intuitive vision of his essence, can satisfy the wants of his soul. He certainly has desires both to know and to love which transcend the whole natural order. He has these desires prior to faith. Whether these desires belong to him as pure nature or not, certain it is that he has them, and with them enters into all his acts, or rational operations. It is impossible to find a mind which has not aspirations beyond nature, and which nothing in nature can satisfy. Every man proves it in his own experience. The natural vision of God is insufficient to satisfy our craving to know, for it is remarkable that Reason, when she has attained the ultimate limits of rational knowledge, seems to herself to know perfectly well that there is an infinite unknown reality beyond. She never can persuade herself that the limits of what she knows are the limits of what is. Now how explain this? How explain this knowledge, if we may so say, of the unknown and the naturally unknowable. Gioberti explains it by claiming for man a faculty of superintelligence, of seizing, in some sense,

the superintelligible, and regards it as the soul's secret apprehension of her own potentiality. We do not attempt to explain it; we only call attention to it as a fact, a mysterious fact, no doubt, but a fact of the last importance. We do not know how to explain it, but we are disposed to regard it as the natural aptitude of the soul for the supernatural, by virtue of which the supernatural is as it were linked with the natural, joined on to it, and so that it can elevate the natural without superseding it. From this it would follow that in the highest sense man is completed, perfected, only in the supernatural, which is, if we understand it, the doctrine of St. Thomas, and which should be the case, if man was originally intended for a supernatural, not a natural, destiny.

There are, as M. Gratry after the theologians maintains, two degrees of the Divine intelligibility, or of knowledge of God,—the knowledge of God *per speculum*, a knowledge of him by his works as the light which illuminates them, and the knowledge of God in his essence, as he is in himself. The first is within the powers of natural reason, the second is not, and is possible only in heaven, by the light of glory. But these two degrees are connected even in this life, by supernatural faith, which, resting on the first as its basis or preamble, is a beginning or a foretaste of the second. There are then really three degrees or stages in the knowledge of God, philosophy, faith, and the beatific vision. The last two are supernatural, the first is natural. But is the natural without any connecting link with the supernatural? Must there not be a natural relation of philosophy to faith, as well as of faith to the beatific vision? If we examine the great philosophers, Gentile as well as Christian, we shall find a distinct recognition of the first two degrees of knowledge of God which we have described, but a confession that one of them is not naturally attainable. Whence this recognition by Philosophy of the existence of an order of knowledge confessedly beyond her reach? All men naturally, that is, prior to faith, aspire to it, at least implicitly, and find no real repose short of it. Whence this aspiration to the unseen, the unknown, and the naturally unknowable? Does it not result from some aptitude in the soul for the supernatural, a consciousness of an undeveloped power, or the secret perception of the infinite, that is, that the infinite really is, with the consciousness that we neither possess it nor know what it is? As every perception is also an aspira-

tion, and as every man does perceive, in perceiving God *per speculum*, that the infinite is, though he perceives not what it is, why may we not say that man naturally aspires to the infinite, and that in this aspiration there is in some sense a natural basis of supernatural faith? Faith, and even the beatific vision, though above reason, cannot be wholly foreign to it; for if they were, how could we speak intelligibly of them, and how could what we say of them have any meaning for the natural understanding? It seems to us, therefore, that the three degrees of the Divine intelligibility are to be considered, not as three separate itineraries, but as three stages in one and the same itinerary of the soul to God. Philosophy, if worthy of the name, has then a natural aptitude for supernatural faith, and conducts to faith, as faith conducts to the perfect knowledge of God in the beatific vision. This, if we understand our author, is what he holds, and what he has attempted in these volumes to bring out and establish, and, so far as we are able to judge of such profound matters, with complete success.

Our readers will readily excuse us from doing more here than stating as well as we are able the doctrine of the author. We shrink from its discussion, as being altogether beyond our depth. But they will see, if his doctrine be admissible, that, while it confines philosophy within the sphere of the natural, it removes all discrepancy between it and faith, and enables the natural understanding to perceive the unity of man's whole intellectual life, or at least the possibility of such unity. Revelation gives us a foretaste of a knowledge of God far above that which is possible by natural reason alone; but revelation must be made to reason, as its subject, and there must be in some sense a fusion of the natural and supernatural into one uniform light, or else the revelation would be to us as if it were not. But this could not be if reason had not in itself a certa n aptitude for the supernatural, if reason were not the preamble to faith, as faith is the preamble to the beatific vision. Supposing this to be so, all true philosophy, though falling always below faith, though never faith itself, yet conducts to faith, and finds its complement in it; and therefore all those intellectual systems, called Philosophy, which conduct to doubt or scepticism, are false, and unworthy of the least attention.

The doctrine here asserted is the reverse of that of the Eclectic school founded by M. Cousin. That school regards

faith as symbolic of the truths attainable by natural reason, and therefore as the preamble to philosophy, and destined to disappear in the light of natural science. It places faith below philosophy, and harmonizes them by making philosophy a higher form of intellectual apprehension than faith,—that is, by simply denying the truths revealed by faith, and recognizing no truths but those evident to natural reason! Faith is supposed to fade away in the clearer light of philosophy, instead of philosophy finding its complement in the higher truths revealed by faith. Catholic dogma is all very true, says this school, but it is the truth of the natural order expressed in a poetical or symbolical form, adapted to the wants of the simple, the rude, and the vulgar. It is not the office of philosophy to deny Catholic dogma, but to disengage the natural truth from the poetic form, and express it in a clear, distinct, and scientific form. For the vulgar, the mass of the people, dogma is necessary; but for philosophers, the *élite* of the race, it ceases to be necessary, because they have science, and where science begins, faith ends. But unhappily for this school, our natural science ends where faith begins, and is never a complete science, and, without that higher order of truth of which faith is a foretaste, can never rest satisfied with itself.

Faith undoubtedly is in some sense symbolic, and so far the Eclectics are right. But of what is it symbolic? Faith undoubtedly ends where the light of science begins; but of what science? The error is, not in assuming faith to be symbolical, but in assuming that it is symbolical of the truths naturally apprehensible, and that the science in which it ends is natural science, the science attainable by the natural light of reason, instead of that superior science attainable only in heaven by the light of glory. Faith is a medium science between the two sciences, beginning where natural science ends, and ending where the supernatural science, or the Science of the Blessed, begins, and partakes in some sense of the nature of both. Instead, then, of pitying the poor people who have only faith, we should pity the poor philosophers who have only philosophy. There is no exaggeration in saying that the youngest child who has learned his Catechism is above them, and is introduced to an order of reality far above any thing they have attained to,—not because the Catechism supersedes natural science, but because it adds to the highest philosophy the revelation of an order of truth for ever above and beyond the reach of the profoundest philosopher.

But to return. The itinerary of the soul to God includes, as we have seen, three stages, reason, faith, the beatific vision, and the true and direct science of God is complete only in the last stage. Without undertaking to explain here the precise relation of these stages to one another, we wish to remark, that through them all the itinerary is one and the same, and is the itinerary of one and the same soul, or rational subject. What is begun in reason is completed only in the beatific vision. "I shall be satisfied when I awake in Thy likeness." The journey terminates, and we can repose, only when we have attained to direct and immediate knowledge of God in his essence, or as he is in himself. Of course this last and perfect degree of science is not obtained by a simple development of our natural powers, and is obtained only by the supernatural elevation of our natural powers, first, by the grace of faith, and, second, by the light of glory. As the natural desire of the soul to know cannot be completely satisfied, in the present providence of God, without this last degree of science, it follows that it is only in this that the soul can find its supreme good, or the object adequate to satisfy its natural craving to love. We do not, of course, pretend that man is naturally able to love God as so beheld, because he is not naturally able so to behold him; and though love may surpass science, and as it were overflow it, we cannot love what we do not in some degree intellectually apprehend. We do not say, by any means, that God could not have so made man that he would have been satisfied with that knowledge of him which is *per speculum*, but we do say, that as we find him now, even prior to faith, he does not so exist. Hence we learn that the soul can find its supreme good only in the complete knowledge and perfect love of God, and that this knowledge and love are not naturally attainable.

Without faith our philosophy is incomplete, and without the intuitive vision of God, *in patria*, our faith cannot be perfected. To this conclusion we are conducted by all sound philosophy. As Reason is able to detect her own limits, and to be well assured of the knowable infinitely surpassing the known, so Philosophy is able to detect her own insufficiency, and to assert the necessity, in order to appease the cravings of the soul, of faith or supernatural revelation. Reason itself is able to assert God, and to assert him as the final cause as well as the first cause of our

existence. It is able, not to secure us unaided our supreme good, but to tell us that our supreme good is in the knowledge and love of God, who is the Supreme Good itself. It tells us, that we have a supreme good, and where that supreme good is to be found; but it cannot show it to us, tell what it is, or of itself obtain it for us. For this last, grace is necessary to enlighten the understanding and to elevate the will, that is, to make us a revelation of God in a sense above that in which he is naturally apprehensible. It is idle, then, for any of us to seek any real and permanent good save as elevated by grace and guided by faith, or, in other words, without the teachings and sacraments of the Church.

This has been admirably set forth by Father Hecker in his exceedingly interesting and profound work, entitled, *Questions of the Soul.* Assuming the great truths which underlie M. Gratry's philosophy,—that man loves as well as knows, and that every one of his thoughts is an aspiration, a real demand for good,—he shows what are the natural and unceasing wants of the soul, and that these wants cannot be satisfied out of the Catholic Church; but that in that Church Almighty God, in the excess of his bounty, has made the most ample provis on for their complete satisfaction. The vain sophist, the unhappy worldling, may not believe this, but we can tell either, that it is in strict accordance with the deepest and truest philosophy.

It will be seen from what we have said, that M. Gratry has really given us a living and practical philosophy. It explains our moral and intellectual constitution, and harmonizes reason and faith. It thus satisfies the intellect. It harmonizes intellect and love by showing the innate synthesis of perception and aspiration, of science and morality. He harmonizes thus our whole intellectual and moral life, and shows that, while all genuine love is rational, all rational operations have union with God, as the supreme good of the soul, or as the supreme good in itself, for their end. He does not war with the Schoolmen, but he presents their teachings in a more life-giving form to our age; and, while he is no innovator in thought, he will, we think, impress a new movement on the mind of the age, that will be as salutary as powerful. We most cordially commend his work, notwithstanding the few faults we have found with it, to all lovers of sound philosophy.

GRATRY'S LOGIC.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1856.]

Pere Gratry is writing on all parts of philosophy, which he divides into Theodicea, or Knowledge of God, Psychology, Logic, and Ethics. His *Psychology* and *Ethics*, we believe, are not yet published. His *Logic*, published last year, is now before us, and a more unsatisfactory book of its pretensions it has seldom been our lot to read. Not that it is not learned; not that it is not full of rich and striking views on particular questions of great interest, and admirable practical remarks for the conduct of reason, but that it makes logic a mere development of psychology, and nowhere enables us to fix its basis in the reason and nature of things. After reading him, we find our head full of ideas and half ideas, but wholly ignorant even of what the author means by logic, and less able, apparently, than we were before to understand what logic is, or should be.

Logic, in the enlarged sense in which Père Gratry would seem to understand it, is the most important part of philosophy, and the only part, as detached from theology, on which we set much value. A work on logic, determining the principles and the use of reason, giving us the science as well as the art of reasoning, and showing its foundation in the real order of things, and conforming to the order of being, is a desideratum, and, if executed by a master hand, would be of great utility to the progress of true scientific culture. Such a work, we are very sure, Père Gratry meditated, and such a work it is possible he believes he has given us; but such a work we do not find in the one before us. We say not that it is without value, for such a man as Père Gratry cannot possibly write two large octavo volumes without saying something, nor without giving a salutary impulse to the minds of his readers. Some questions he has treated with much science and sagacity. His remarks on the Causes of our Errors are worth considering. His treatment of the question of Certainty, and his explanation of the Infinitesimal Calculus, are worthy of very high commendation. We

* *Philosophie. Logique.* Par A. Gratry. Paris: 1855.

were pleased to find him maintaining that certainty is in seeing and knowing, and that he very properly eliminates the impertinent question, "How do we know that we know?" To know is all that it is to know that we know, since it is impossible to know without knowing, and knowing that it is we who know. We are much obliged to him for his proofs, in opposition to some Thomists, that St. Thomas teaches that God is the light of reason, and that it is in and by the Divine Intelligibility that we see and know whatever we do see and know. We should have been pleased if we had found him proving that God is the immediate object of the intellect, or, at least, more distinctly recognizing the fact, though possibly he does this in his psychology.

We have not the space at present to enter at length into the questions these volumes raise, or to justify by citations and analyses the rather unfavorable judgment we have finally pronounced upon their author as a philosopher. The points on which we were most anxious to consult them were, the elucidation of the dialectic process of reason, and the refutation of Pantheism, which the author told us in his Theodicea he reserved for his Logic. Our readers will recollect that we expressed ourselves puzzled to determine what he meant by his dialectic method, which he seemed to regard as a universal solvent of the mysteries of God, man, and nature. It was evident that he believed that he had got hold of something of vast reach and utility, which had never been fully and systematically recognized, and which was to throw a new and clear light on the great metaphysical problems, give a new impulse to science, and render it living and fruitful; something which would identify, in their principle, metaphysics, ethics, poetry, prayer, and the infinitesimal calculus. We could not see this in his *Theodicea*, a singular medley of eloquence and mathematics, of philosophy and theology, of mystic views and discursive tendencies, and we waited impatiently for his *Logic*, to be put in possession of his wonderful dialectics.

Well, we have his *Logic*, and a full elucidation of this thaumaturgic or theurgic process of reason, and we find that it is simply as we supposed, what every philosopher of any note has always recognized, and what every body practises. Reason, he says, has two processes, the syllogistic, whose principle is the principle of identity, or, as others say, of contradiction, namely, what is, is; or, the same thing can-

not be and not be at the same time; and the inductive, or dialectic process, whose principle is the principle of transcendence, by which we rise from the finite to the infinite, not by way of deduction, but by way of induction. The peculiarity of his system is in the stress he lays on this second process, and the explanation he gives of it. Man, he assumes, is placed in relation with God as his object, who is for him at once the intelligible and the desirable. The root of the dialectic process is in the reason as will or love, seeking good, aspiring to truth, not under the relation of the intelligible, but the desirable,—simply the practical reason of Kant, as distinguished from the pure or simple speculative reason. Hence the author takes reason sometimes as our intellectual, and at other times as our moral faculty, and jumbles together ethics and metaphysics in hopeless confusion. He confounds the faculty which commands us to seek truth and goodness with the faculty that apprehends them, or to which they are affirmed. Reason, taken as the general name for our rational nature, is resolvable, we admit, into intellect and will, and is the subjective principle of both intelligence and love. But to know and to love are not one and the same thing, nor the exercise of one and the same faculty. Either deny the distinction of faculties altogether, or preserve to each its distinctive character. Dialectics based on love, or the desire of good, is ethical, not intellectual, and cannot be given as a method or process of reason, regarded as our faculty of intelligence. In supposing the contrary, Père Gratry fails to understand the language alike of Plato and of the Christian mystics. We are ready to concede that the soul rises to God only by using her two wings, intelligence and love, and that pure love to God is the best preparation of the intellect to know God, as our final cause, and to penetrate the mysteries either of nature or revelation; but it is by virtue of the intellect thus prepared, not by the love that prepares it, that the soul seizes and appropriates the truth. The intellect is the light of love, which, save as enlightened by it, is a blind instinct, or an unsatisfied craving for it knows not what. We reject, then, wholly the doctrine of Père Gratry, which confounds dialectics with love, and identifies in principle metaphysics, poetry, prayer, and the infinitesimal calculus, as we reject the doctrine of the Transcendentalist Emerson, who identifies gravitation and purity of heart. Analogy is not identity.

We can, then, regard induction, or the dialectic process, only as an intellectual process,—a process of reason only in the sense that reason stands for our general faculty of knowing,—the faculty by which alone we know, in all the regions and degrees of knowledge. So taken, what is this theurgic process?* He describes it as that process by which, from the finite, the soul, by a sudden bound or spring [*élan*], rises to the infinite or clears the abyss which separates the finite and infinite. It does not deduce the infinite from the finite, for the finite does not contain it; but it supports itself on the finite, as what Plato calls an *hypothesis*, and rises to that which transcends it, and which is infinite. The soul apprehending the finite leaps at once to the infinite, by suppressing mentally all bounds or limitations. This is as intelligible as any thing not true can be; but we cannot accept it, for it supposes that the finite is apprehensible in itself, without the apprehension of the infinite, which is a mistake. What is not intelligible cannot be apprehended, and without the infinite the finite does not exist, and there is nothing finite for the intellect to apprehend. If only being is intelligible, as Père Gratry himself maintains, we can apprehend things only as they are; and as the finite is not without the infinite, it cannot be apprehended without apprehension of the infinite. This is fatal to Père Gratry's method of attaining to the infinite, and proves that the mind does not and cannot go from the finite to the infinite, either by deduction or induction. He may say very truly, and it is what he does say substantially, that the soul does not find in the finite object, be it what it may, that in which it can repose, or that which satisfies either its desire to know, or its craving to love, and, therefore, is impelled by its own wants to *look* beyond it, and rise above it, to that which is not finite, to that which is infinite, and is God, the adequate object alike of intellect and will. But this does not solve the intellectual problem, prove that the finite is apprehensible alone, or that we seize the infinite by making the finite our starting point. The aspiration of the soul to the infinite, by which it rises above the finite, conceals already an intuition

* We use the epithet, *theurgic*, here by design, for it was precisely the exaggeration or abuse of this process that led to the theurgy of the Neoplatonists, as any one may see who has studied Plotinus and Proclus. Père Gratry stands much nearer the precipice down which tumbled the Neoplatonists than he imagines, and has need of all his piety and theology to save him.

of the infinite, of God as the supreme Good of the soul; and it is this intuition, this apprehension, clear or confused, which prevents the soul from ever being satisfied with a limited intellectual object, or with a finite good. It aspires to the infinite, because the infinite is intuitively before it, and every thing else is too mean and transitory to satisfy it. The fact that the soul, when acting according to its pure and loving nature, does on view of the finite rise in its contemplation to the infinite, we very cheerfully concede, but that it in this way at first gets possession of the infinite, or comes intellectually into relation with it, we deny. The dialectic process, as explained by Père Gratry, is a process, if he pleases, by which we are led to contemplate the infinite in the reflective order, not a process by which we find it, because it presupposes the intuition of the infinite.

The infinite obtained by the dialectic process is a pure abstraction, and the author himself concedes it. He goes into a long, elaborate, and even luminous dissertation on the application of dialectics to mathematics, and shows that in the infinitesimal calculus the mathematician follows rigidly the dialectic process. The infinite of the mathematicians, whether the infinitely little or the infinitely great, is obtained dialectically, by mentally disregarding or suppressing all finite quantities, or in finite quantities the conception of limits or bounds. But he concedes that the infinite thus obtained is a pure abstraction, a pure idea in the mind. "We attain," he says, "by the infinitesimal calculus, applied to pure geometry, the abstract idea of the infinite. That is all. Is the abstract infinite God? No. It is nothing. It is the God of Hegel, and Hegel is an atheist." The process in the infinitesimal calculus, he maintains, is the same as in metaphysics. In metaphysics, as in geometry, then, the dialectic process attains only to the abstract idea of the infinite, the God of Hegel, which is nothing. How, then, does his dialectics refute Hegel? How by it does he rise to the infinite as real and necessary being; or how does it aid him in refuting modern Pantheism, reserved for his Logic, and to be a capital part of it?

We do not say Père Gratry recognizes only an abstract infinite. We do not pretend that he has recognized no principles that refute Hegel. This would be exceedingly unjust to him, and contrary to fact. What we say is that he does neither by his dialectic process, which is his pretension. He has devoted the whole of his second book to

a criticism on Hegel and the refutation of Pantheism. It is very unsatisfactory. The excellent author forgets himself, and declaims instead of discussing, and denounces instead of refuting. He does not appear to have mastered Hegel's doctrine, and nowhere treats it fairly. We hold that in refuting an author it is our duty to reproduce his doctrine, at least so far as we intend to make it the subject of comment, as he holds it in his own mind, and so far explain it that our readers may see the truth which he has misconceived and misapplied. There is no other honest way of dealing with an author's system, or rendering our discussions of erroneous systems of any advantage to the truth. To cite passages from an author which verbally contradict our own doctrines, and then pronounce him a fool, a sophist, a man whose God is darkness, not light, is not becoming the dignity of philosophical discussion. Hegel did not profess to be an Atheist, or a Pantheist; he denied that he was either. We have no right to suppose that he did not intend to avoid both, and that if he has fallen into either error he has been deceived. The proper way to treat him is to point out the source of his deception, and to show what in his principles or method has misled him. We have no right to treat otherwise such a man as Hegel, certainly one of the master minds of modern Germany. Père Gratry has not so treated him, and it is almost impossible from his citations to comprehend Hegel's error.

Hegel understands as well as Père Gratry the dialectic method of Plato, and follows it with as much rigor. Applied to pure geometry Père Gratry concedes that it gives only the abstract infinite, which he says is nothing. Hegel applies it to metaphysics, and finds that it gives him in the last analysis, pure abstract being, *das reine Seyn*, which is nothing real or determinate, and therefore identical with not-being. Hence he concludes with strict logic, that, *in this sense*, being and not-being, *Seyn und Nichtseyn*, are identical. Having by his dialectics been able to obtain, as his *primum philosophicum*, only pure being, abstract being, identical with not-being, he is forced to construct the universe on the principle of the identity of opposites,—the fundamental principle, according to Père Gratry, of the Hegelian Logic. All that is erroneous in the Hegelian system, and which Père Gratry so unmercifully ridicules, follows with an invincible logic, from the assumption of pure being, abstract being, as his *primum philosophicum*, and

Père Gratry virtually admits that the dialectic process, regarded as a purely intellectual process, can give no other *primum philosophicum*. How, then, by his dialectic process refute Hegel? You say that to assert the identity of being and not-being contradicts the principle of identity, the principle of the syllogism, and is absurd. Be it so. But what else do you, when you identify your abstract Infinite with being, as you must do if left to your dialectics alone? To say something and nothing are the same is a contradiction, and therefore false. But your abstract infinite, you say, is nothing; yet you must hold it to be something, or else what have you gained by your infinitesimal calculus? This abstract infinite, you say, is nothing, and yet you proceed to identify it with God, who is all being, being in its plentitude. What then do you but assert that something and nothing, or nothing and something are identical! We are prepared to prove by the most rigid logic, that, without admitting the antinomies of Hegel, and conceiving God as that in which all contradictions meet and are identical, Père Gratry, reduced to his dialectics alone, cannot assert any God or real being at all. That God is affirmed to him as real being, being in its plenitude, intuitively, in another than a dialectic manner, and therefore he is not driven to Hegelism, we readily concede; but taking his dialectics as he himself defines the process, there is not one of the Hegelian contradictions or absurdities that he can escape. He does not then, by his inductive process, refute Hegel, if he takes it as an intellectual process, and as a moral process it is not applicable to the case.

Nor does Père Gratry succeed better in his refutation of Pantheism. Pantheism is the philosophical heresy of our times, into which all heterodox speculation of a little nerve is sure to run. The first labor of the Catholic philosopher should be to refute it. It is not enough to show that it contradicts what Kant calls the practical reason, and is irreconcilable with our moral instincts and necessities. We must show that it repugns, not merely the processes or methods of reason, but the principles without which reason cannot operate at all. We must refute it in its principle, and show its adherents that they mistake the principle of reason which leads them to adopt it. There is no philosophy recognized in the schools that does this, no prevalent philosophy in Europe or America that furnishes us the means of doing it. The great masters, such as St. Augus-

tine, St. Thomas of Aquin, Malebranche and Gerdil, do not in general deal with it, and do not formally adapt their philosophy to its refutation. Père Gratry ought to have been able to meet it, because he is a modern man, is untrammelled by the schools, no slave of routine, and is professedly aiming to adapt philosophy to the wants of the age. But fancying that he had found every thing in his dialectic method, and so carried away by that as not to see the gaps to be filled up in philosophy as transmitted to us by tradition, he has failed to do it systematically and effectually. Indeed, restricted to his dialectics as an intellectual process, he cannot himself escape Pantheism. He defines this process, as we have seen, to be the passage of the soul by a sudden bound from the finite to the infinite. Take any finite existence, fix the mind on what is positive in it, and suppress its limits, conceive it as unlimited, and you have God. This is Pantheism, pure Spinozism. Yet Père Gratry says it.

The dialectic method was defended by Plato, and is, according to him, that process by which we detect the real in the phenomenal, the ideal in the contingent, the general in the particular, the species in the individual, or in every particular object presented to our apprehension what he calls *idea*. The idea he holds to be the form, the essence, the reality of the thing, that which must be known in order to have real or scientific knowledge of the thing supposed. It is that which is not phenomenal, but real, permanent, persistent, positive. Now let us seize this, and say that, stripped of its limitations, it is God. We simply identify all reality, all substances with God, and represent all not God as merely phenomenal, which is very nearly what Plato himself does, for he excludes creation, and supposes not creatures created after the ideas in the Divine Mind, but these ideas themselves detached from the Divine Mind, to which they nevertheless adhere, or from which they are held suspended, and impressed on eternal matter as the seal upon the wax; that is, he supposes the production of existences not by creation, but by the union of matter and form. Dialectics, therefore, taken as the process by which we attain to the apprehension of God, necessarily conducts to Pantheism. The process is safe only when we include in it the *principium tertii intervenientis*, as Hegel calls it, but which he misapprehends. This *principium* is the creative act of God, the only possible passage from the infinite to

the finite, or from the finite to the infinite. The error of Hegel was in misconceiving this fact, and that of Père Gratry is in not perceiving that it is necessary to correct and legitimate his dialectics. As a theologian he believes in creation, as a dialectician he fails to recognize it.

Père Gratry is the last man towards whom we would be unjust, for he is a man of learning, ability, and devoted heart and soul to Catholic truth. We repeat that he is no Hegelian, no Pantheist, and he recognizes, though timidly, that God affirms himself intuitively to us as the intelligible and the desirable. This is much, and more than he seems to think. He does not like to say that we have intuition of God, we suppose, because he finds that word consecrated by the theologians to the view of God in his essence, which the saints have in the beatific vision; but he maintains with St. Augustine, the Greek Fathers, and all great Catholic philosophers, that God is himself the principle and end of our reason, and that he is the immediate object of reason, not as he is in himself indeed, but as the intelligible and the desirable, or the objective light of reason, and seen by reason as the eye sees the light in seeing the object it illumines. We call this view of God intuitive, for in it God immediately, directly, without any thing interposed between his light and the eye of the soul, presents and affirms his own being; but Père Gratry calls it an indirect, an implicit view of God, which proves to us that he confounds the intuitive order with the reflective. He maintains, that in this view of God, we have present to the mind the real being which responds to the abstract idea of the infinite of the mathematicians. In this way, so far as it concerns himself, he undoubtedly escapes Hegelism, but not, as he supposes, by the inductive process of reason. He does it intuitively, not inductively.

But though by the view of God which he recognizes, he is able to assert the infinite as real and necessary being, he does not yet escape Pantheism; for he does not, in his *Logic*, recognize any intuition of the creative act of God. He tells us in the preface to his *Theodicea*, that the question of creation will be treated in the Philosophy of Nature; but the refutation of Pantheism belongs to logic. Hence, he must suppose it possible to refute Pantheism without establishing the fact of creation. As a theologian, he holds, of course, the fact of creation, but as a logician he seems to have no use for it, although as a logician he pretends to

refute Pantheism! The creative act cannot be deduced from the intuition of God, as real and necessary being, or the judgment, being is, nor can it be ascended to inductively from the finite; for without the creative act of God, the finite does not exist, and therefore is not apprehensible. We can apprehend things only as they are in the order of being. The finite is only in and by the creative act, and therefore can be apprehended only in apprehending that act itself. This important fact Père Gratry entirely overlooks, and consequently, though he asserts what we call intuition of God, he cannot assert any finite existences distinct from God, and created by him. All his erudition, all his citations from Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, together with all his excessive admiration of the great philosophers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fail to save his system, and to satisfy the necessities of a logic that is to refute modern Pantheists. Either we have intuition of the creative act of real and necessary being, as well as of real and necessary being itself, or it surpasses the power of human reason to prove creation; and if creation is not proved, Pantheism is not and cannot be refuted. This is what Père Gratry seems not to have duly considered. Neither Plato nor Aristotle had the conception of creation. Both explained the production of existences as the union of pre-existing matter and form, and both, therefore, were at bottom Pantheists. Neither, therefore, did or could give us a logic that refutes Pantheism. The fathers and the scholastics were saved from Pantheism by Christian theology, and not having to combat directly philosophical Pantheism, they did not perceive the full defect of the Platonic or Aristotelian logic, nor feel the necessity of amending it. Subsequent philosophers have contented themselves with attempts to prove creation by logic, without considering that there is and can be no true logic that does not make the intuition of the creative act of God enter into its *principium*. The scholastic doctrine borrowed from Plato and Aristotle, that the intellect sees things only in their ideas or species, and that we apprehend individuals only by their phantasms, or the senses, of itself places philosophy on the route to Pantheism. This doctrine contains an error which arises from that other doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, that things are produced by the union of matter and form, which is true only when we add, *mediante actu divino creativo*, always expressly or tacitly added by St. Thomas, but never by Plato or Aristo-

tle, and seldom by our own philosophers not of the very first grade. The *form* is usually identified immediately with the idea, the species, and matter is described to be *in potentia ad formam*. Matter and form, then, are but the possibilities of a real individual existence. Their union is simply the union of two possibilities, and how can it give real existence? O+O—A is a formula which we believe is not admissible in any system of mathematics. Yet this formula is the basis of the Aristotelian Logic, still the logic of our schools. Ideas, genera, and species, are simply the possibilities of things, and distinguished from God, are simple abstractions, and purely subjective. They are real, only in God, as the types, or models of things, which he does or may create, eternal in his essence, and identical with it. The union of these with matter described as simply *in potentia ad formam*, that this, the possibility of their determination, does not give existences, for it gives nothing real *extra Deum*, and we have only God regarded as the possibility of things, which is pure Pantheism. The debate between the old Nominalists and Realists has been suspended rather than terminated. The Nominalists maintained that all real existences exist as individuals. So far they were right. Nothing real exists in genera or species; that is, genera and species do not exist in created nature. But when they added, that genera and species, or universals, are empty words, they were wrong, because they are real in God, as the types or models after which he does or may create existences. The Realists, in asserting their reality, if they meant by it their reality in God as the Divine ideas, types, or models of things, were right; but if they considered them as having reality when distinguished from God, and therefore not God, they were decidedly wrong; for that would suppose that things may exist in general and not in particular, *in specie* and not *in individuo*. Some of them seem to have held this, for they were greatly troubled with the question of *individuation*—the real *pons asinorum* of the schoolmen. Holding that God creates existences in genera and species, they were obliged to ask, what are individuals, and how are they produced? As created individuals are said to be composed of matter and form, and matter being only the possibility of formal determination, they defined the individual to be the determination of the species, which supposes the individuality to be a mere circumscription or limitation of the species. This in turn implied that the individual is negative, and as

an individual no real existence at all, and is real only in the species, the *idea*, the form, as Plato and Aristotle both taught. Now come in with your dialectics, which seizes the general in the particular, the species in the individual, and you are on the declivity to modern Pantheism. The scholastic doctrine is true, if you amend it by saying that God creates individual existences, and all existences *in individuo*, after genera and species, or ideas, types or models, which are eternal in his own mind or essence, as the architect builds a temple after an idea, plan, or model in his own mind. The genera and species are not the reality of things, —the error of Pantheism,—but the possibilities of things, and are really related to real existences only *mediante actu creativo divino*, as the Creator to the creature. We can say the individual is the determination of the species, only when we understand determination in the sense of creation from nothing.

Undoubtedly, we see things in the intelligible species, in their ideas, as the schoolmen teach, for we see all things in God; but we see them as they are, not as they are not. As in God, they are possible, not actually existing things. What we see in God is God, who is their possibility. Hence things, as seen in God, are merely possible things, not actually existing things, distinct from God. We see actual things not *in* God, but *by* him; not in their ideas or species, where they are only possible, but *by* them; since God is the light of our reason, and we see all that we do see by his light,—the *intellectus agens* of St. Thomas, which furnishes the *species intelligibiles*, by which we apprehend intelligibles. What we see are things, individual things, as they really exist; not simply the species, or *idea exemplaris*, as St. Thomas himself teaches, in maintaining that the intelligible species is not that in which the mind terminates, but that *by* which it attains to or knows intelligibles, or real existences. It is not true, that the intellect apprehends only genera and species, or, in the language of Plato, *ideas;* it apprehends by them individuals, and things themselves, against Rosmini and the Sensists, who maintain that individual, or real, determinate existences are only apprehended by the senses, or known, as the schoolmen would say, only by their phantasms.

The Aristotelian Logic amended in the sense we have here indicated would have answered the wants of our age, and if Père Gratry had so amended it, he would have done an

immense service to philosophical science. But he is not aware that it needs amendment in its principles, and he seems to imagine that the nearer we can restore it to the state in which Aristotle left it, the better. He has done nothing for the principles of Logic; he has only given new prominence to the dialectic process, which the eighteenth century had neglected, but which in so far as it is an intellectual process, or a process of the intellect as distinguished from the will, had already received as much prominence as he gives it, from the heterodox philosophers of Germany, and had been proved by them to conduct to Pantheism. He grapples only with the question of method, which is a secondary question, and should follow, not precede, the question of principles. The methods or processes of reason are given in reason itself, and are always followed by every one who reasons, by the unlettered peasant, or simple rustic, as faithfully and as rigidly as by a St. Thomas or a St. Augustine. But no man can reason without *data*, principles, or what we call the *primum logicum*. Unhappily for philosophy, the question of principles, since Descartes appeared with his ignorance, frivolity, and philosophical ineptness, which even respectable men have not disdained to admire, has been postponed to that of method, and in fact all philosophy has been reduced by no less an authority than Victor Cousin to simple method. All philosophy, says the brilliant Frenchman, is in method. Given a philosopher's method, it is easy to determine his philosophy. But method does not give principles, for every method presupposes them. The *primum logicum* is attainable neither deductively nor inductively; for neither deduction nor induction can proceed without a *datum*, something known, as its *principium*, or point of departure. Now without determining this, without fixing the first principles, which are neither subjective reason nor its processes or modes of activity, we have no basis for our logic, and can have no logical science. We may, indeed, have logic as an art, but not as a science. This principle, or this *Primum*, that which logic presupposes, is the only point in our logical treatises that is defective, or inaccurately treated. There was no need of a new work on logic as an art, for to logic as an art nothing could be added, and nothing was needed to be added to it as practised in the schools. As an art it was perfected by the ancients. The defect is in logic as a science, and precisely in regard to its principle or foundation.

Père Gratry has thrown no light on the principles of logic, and has done nothing to fix its point of departure. He does not understand, if he does, he does not show it, that logic must follow the order of reality, and therefore that the *primum logicum* must be coincident with the first principle of things. His grand error is in regarding logic as a development of psychology. Logic, he says in his *Theodicea*, "is the development of psychology, and studies the soul in its INTELLIGENCE, and the laws of that intelligence." This is a capital error, and necessarily vitiates his whole logical system, and renders it impossible for him to give us a logic of the least conceivable scientific value. A logic which has its basis in psychology, and merely developes the human faculty of intelligence, can never assert objective reality. This Kant has for ever demonstrated in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, and Père Gratry, if he did but know it, is at bottom, as a philosopher simply a Kantian, and implicitly contains Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. His speculative reason, like Kant's, leads simply to nihilism, and he has to fall back on the practical reason, or the moral reason, in order to assert any reality at all; that is, he asserts, God, man and nature, because there would be great practical inconvenience in denying them. The Aristotelian Logic was defective, but not false; Père Gratry's is far inferior, and far otherwise objectionable. Aristotle's ontology was defective, and hence the defect of his logic, but he was incapable of the folly of making his logic simply a development of psychology. Père Gratry professes profound admiration for Plato and Aristotle. How happens it, then, that he did not learn from them that logic must proceed from a *primum ontologicum*, and develope the order of things, not merely the order of conceptions? Logic must have its principles in ontology, or it can give only the soul and its affections, and develope itself only in abstractions, which are all, inasmuch as abstractions, purely subjective, the human mind itself.

No doubt, Père Gratry holds that there must be reality to correspond to the conceptions of the mind; but his misfortune is that he supposes the mind passes from itself to the objective reality, and that the ontological and the psychological are successive, not simultaneous in the order of thought. His Logic is not based on the ontological, but is an instrument by which the mind is to attain to it. Thus he makes perception a sort of induction, by which we pass

from the internal impression to the external object. But this passage is impossible. The Idealists have settled that point. The perception is itself objective, and the real fact is that the object affirms itself, and in perceiving it we recognize ourselves as the recipient of its affirmation. His ontology he asserts as a theologian, on his faith as a Christian, not as a philosopher, by virtue of natural reason; and his book really retains traces of the errors of the Traditionalists. The great Catholic philosophers whom he cites, till we are almost weary of seeing their names, may not have developed sufficiently on all points their ontological principles, but they never make them an induction or a deduction from the psychological or subjective, and never lay down principles which imply that the ontological is not intuitively evident to natural reason.

The truth is, as we apprehend it, that Logic is a mixed science, but in so far as it is ideal or necessary, it is ontological and rests on an ontological basis given intuitively and simultaneously with the empirical or psychological. "Deus similitudo est rerum omnium," God is the similitude of all things, that is, all things, created things, have their type or *idea exemplaris* in him, and imitate or copy his creative act in the order of second causes. Père Gratry maintains that all creatures have their type in God and copy him. It is the common doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and all great philosophers. The point that he may be disposed to dispute is that creatures, as second causes, imitate the creative act of God; for his grand defect is in contemplating God solely in his being, and not in his creative act, and as final cause rather than as first cause, in which respect he shows himself more of a mystic than a metaphysician. But either creatures are second causes or they are not. If not, they are merely phenomenal, and we must be Pantheists, for the essence of Pantheism is in denying second causes. If creatures are second causes, then, as they have confessedly their type or exemplar in God, they must in the order of second causes copy or imitate the divine creative act.

Logic proceeds from the proposition or judgment, and every proposition or judgment must have three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. The ultimate basis of logic must be the divine proposition or judgment, which is a real ontological judgment, and which the proposition or judgment in the order of second causes must copy or

imitate. Now to determine the real scientific basis of logic, we must determine what is this divine proposition or judgment, copied or imitated by the human; for this is the true, real *primum logicum*. It must be the *primum ontologicum*, or principal of things, or our logic will not conform to the order of reality. and will give us an abstract world, a world of pure mental conceptions, not the world of real existences. The principle of things is not real and necessary being, or the simple judgment. Being is, for that, we have seen, implies Pantheism. The principle of things is not God regarded as simple being, but God creating things, since things, as distinct from God, can exist only by his creative act. The true *primum ontologicum* is, Being or God creating things or real existences. The ontological or divine judgment then must be, God creates existences. God creates existences is then the *primum logicum*. This is a judgment or proposition, for it has the three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. Real and necessary being is the subject, and is not and cannot be either predicate or copula; for real and necessary being cannot be created, or the predicate of any subject, but itself. Things or existences are a true predicate, for they do not exist, that is, are not being in themselves, and are only as joined to the subject. *Creates* is a true copula, and joins the predicate to the subject, and the only copula conceivable, for existences are predicable of God only *mediante* his creative act, since it is only by that act that they are at all. It is ontological, because it expresses the real order of things. This, then, is the divine proposition, the exemplar of ours, and the true ontological basis of logic, which logic does not find, but which it presupposes, and without which it is not conceivable.

This divine judgment being the exemplar, and therefore the first cause of ours, and without which the human proposition which copies it is as impossible as human existence itself without the creative act of God, must be affirmed intuitively to us by God himself. To suppose that we by our own efforts attain to it, and obtain possession of it, would be an error of precisely the same character with that of supposing we can create ourselves as existences. We do not and cannot exist as rational or logical beings without it. It must be divinely affirmed to us in intuition, as the very condition of our being capable of acting as rational beings, or of exercising reason, and therefore must be affirmed or

communicated in the same act that creates us reasonable or intelligent beings. It is not innate in the sense of pertaining to our subjective nature, but is connate, an invariable, and permanent fact, reason itself, in the sense of objective reason; not, indeed, our reason, but its divine light, which enlightens every man coming into this world, and without which our reason would be as the eye without the external light. Père Gratry cannot really object to this, for up to a certain point he maintains it, and proves not only that it is the doctrine of St. Augustine, but also of St. Thomas, which some Thomists deny. The only objection any one can make to it is in supposing that intuition, like reflection, is our act, and therefore that implies our natural ability, without God, to see God, which is not admissible. But in the intuition it is God himself acting, the Divine Judgment affirming itself, and we are only the recipients of the intuition, as we are in the case of every intuition. We are in all intuition simply spectators, and are active only in the sense of receiving it.

This judgment is affirmed in the intuition ontologically in all its terms. Here is the only point where Père Gratry would separate from us. He concedes the subject, real and necessary being, that is, God affirms himself to the view of the soul, and that our intellect is constituted by the intuition of the Divine Reason or intelligibility, and that it can see only by the light of God that enlightens it. Hence he resolves all certainty into the veracity of God. But he does not seem to understand that the intuition—*view*, he calls it —embraces at once the whole judgment simultaneously in its three terms, and in their actuality. But without the three terms it is no judgment or proposition, and if not in their actuality it is no real judgment. We suspect that while he would concede the subject is affirmed immediately as real and necessary being, he is inclined to regard the predicate and copula as affirmed only in their possibility, or idea. But this reduces the proposition to the simple judgment, Being is, for the creative act and existences in their possibility or idea are included in the subject, since as possible or ideal they are real only in real being, and are identically the Divine Essence. To be a real proposition the judgment must affirm the predicate and copula, not in idea only, but also in their actuality, that is, real and necessary being actually creates actual existences. So that we have no room to ask whether God actually creates existences or not.

The ontological basis of logic is this ontological proposition, intuitively affirmed, and a logic based on this *Primum* will conform to the order of things, for it starts from the ontological *data* which include all things in their real relation. God and existences include all reality, and the creative act expresses the real relation between God and existences, and contains the principle of all relation. This divine proposition is the type of every proposition, and is repeated or imitated in every proposition, in the order of second causes, whatever the matter to which it refers. In the divine proposition the subject places the predicate, for the copula is the creative act; so in the order of second causes, the subject places its predicate, and the *nexus* is not merely passive as logicians too often pretend. The predicate is joined to the subject by the act of the subject, as in the syllogism, the premises produce or place the conclusion. The recognition of this would have enabled Père Gratry to have given a briefe. and a far more satisfactory account of the infinite in geometry. The infinite in geometry belongs to the ideal part of mathematics, and the ideal always and every where is God, real and necessary being. The mathematical infinite is not an abstraction, though the mind may consider it *in abstracto*, when acting in the order of reflection, but an intuition of God, and without that intuition the infinitesimal calculus were an impossible absurdity.

Now what we want is a logic constructed on the basis of the divine ontological proposition intuitively affirming itself. Neither Plato nor Aristotle could have constructed such a logic, because both misconceived the copula. The Fathers and mediæval doctors did not misconceive the copula or creative act, but they did not give its formula with the other two terms. Since Descartes there has been no philosophy worth naming in Europe. Gioberti has supplied the gap left in the logic of the schools, but his memory is in bad odor. M. Branchereau, who merits well of philosophy, has attempted to supply, and with some success, on Gioberti's principles, the important gap in the Aristotelian Logic, and has produced a very good text-book, but unhappily with too much of the abstruseness and dry technicality of the later scholastics. He has all the abstractions which belong to logic as a development of psychology, as if he wrote more to conceal than openly to express the truth. He does not seem to feel himself free to express fully his convictions. A true ontological logic, that will proceed from the real prin-

ciple of things and follow the order of reality, is still a desideratum, and he who will prepare and publish it, will render an important service to philosophy, and even to theology. We are passing through one of those crises which render old forms obsolete, and demand new scientific forms and expressions, to meet the new errors and heresies that spring up. It is for us Catholics to meet and satisfy this demand, and nowhere are Catholics more free to do it than they are here, in this republican country.

THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1855.]

We have little sympathy with David Hume, a much overestimated writer, who was an unbeliever in religion, a sceptic in philosophy, and of no remarkable worth or moral dignity as a man; but he is one of the great names of British metaphysical speculation, and no student of the aberrations of the human mind for the last century and over, whether in Great Britain or on the Continent, can safely overlook his Essays. His "Treatise of Human Nature," published when he was only twenty-seven years of age, rewritten and republished some ten years later, under the title of "An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding," provoked a good deal of philosophical inquiry, and gave rise to the Scottish school of Reid and the German school of Kant, the two most widely diffused and influential schools of recent times.

Hume is usually classed among sceptical philosophers, but he was no dogmatist, and originated no school of his own. He arrived speculatively at sceptical conclusions, it is true; but it would be doing him injustice to suppose that he practically accepted or wished others to accept them, for he says that he did not, and that nobody does or can accept them. What he did was to show, that, if the sensist philosophy in vogue in his time is accepted, genuine science is impossible. Whether he had adopted a different philosophy for himself, or not, does not appear; but most probably he had not, and his real aim was to disparage all philosophy and bring men back to what in our language is called good sense. But be this as it may, without much erudition, and no great aptitude for metaphysical pursuits, he succeeded in showing that the empirical philosophy favored by Bacon and Hobbes, and elaborated and defended by Locke, conducts every one of its disciples of a little logical nerve to mere egoism and scepticism.

Hume has the merit of being—in his speculations—a consistent sensist. According to him all the objects of human

* *The Philosophical Works of* David Hume. Boston: 1854.

knowledge are *Impressions* and *Ideas*. The *impressions* are external and internal, and are what we now call *sensations* and *sentiments*. *Ideas*, as he defines them, are not an image or representation with which the mind in all its operations is immediately conversant, as Locke pretended; the simple mental apprehension of the object, as maintained in most of our own schools; the *species* or phantasms by means of which objects themselves are attained, as Aristotle and the Schoolmen taught; the forms or essences of things detached from the Divine Reason and clothed with material bodies, as Plato held; or the intelligible reality in contradistinction from the sensible, intuitively apprehended by our intellect, as we ourselves hold; but feeble images or faint copies of sensations and sentiments, formed by memory, imagination, and reflection operating upon them, as furnished by the senses. All human *knowledge*, then, as to its matter, is confined to our external and internal impressions and their pale reflex in the understanding.

All the objects of human *reasoning* or inquiry, it follows from this, are reducible to two sorts, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. As the ideas are simply images or copies of facts of consciousness, formed by the mind operating upon its own impressions and lying wholly within its sphere, the understanding has no occasion to appeal to experience, or to go out of itself to find or determine their relations. In regard to these relations our reasoning is intuitively or demonstratively certain, and has a solid support in immediate consciousness, and the principle of contradiction, or that of identity. But in reasoning concerning matters of fact, the case is different. We can support ourselves in it on neither. Matters of fact are contingent, and in every instance the contrary is conceivable. The proposition, that the sun will *not* rise to-morrow, is intelligible, and no more implies a contradiction than the proposition, that *it will rise*, and we should therefore in vain attempt to demonstrate its falsity. Yet nothing is more certain than that we do continually reason concerning matters of fact, draw inferences from them, from the presence of some infer that others have been or have not been, will or will not occur, and are obliged to do so in all the practical business of life. Now, what is the principle of this reasoning?

The principle of this reasoning is, apparently, the relation of cause and effect. It is only by that relation that we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If

asked why you believe a matter of fact not present, as, for instance, that your friend is in the country or in France, you give as a reason some other fact,—a letter which you have received from him, the report of an acquaintance who has been there, or your knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. Were you to find a watch or some other piece of mechanism in a desert island, you would conclude that men have been there. All our reasoning concerning matters of fact is of the same kind, and it evidently rests on the supposition that the two facts are related as cause and effect, so that the one necessarily implies the other. It is only by the supposition of this relation that we can *infer* the one from the other, or regard the present fact as a proof of the absent fact. But whence do we obtain our knowledge of this relation?

This relation is not discoverable from reasoning, *a priori*. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities: if it is entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not, from the fluidity and transparency of water, have inferred that it would suffocate him; or, from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever reveals, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existences or matters of fact. The effect is a distinct fact from the cause, and no analysis of either or both can enable us to say, beforehand, that the one is the cause or the effect of the other; for there is no sensible i tuition and no principle of contradiction in the case to support the inference. Our knowledge of the relation can be attained, then, only from experience. It is only from having observed for a long time, in a great variety of instances, that one event is uniformly preceded or followed by another, that we come to regard them as connected by the relation of cause and effect.

But sensible experience gives us what we are accustomed to call cause and effect only under the relation of time, the one as preceding and the other as following, never as *necessarily* connected. It merely informs us that, so far as our observation extends, the one never occurs without the other.

It shows us what we call the effect following the cause, but not the cause by its secret power or energy producing it. Wax placed near a fire is melted; but nothing in experience enables us to say that the fire melts it. We can, then, from experience obtain absolutely no cognition of the necessary connection between cause and effect, or of cause in the sense of power or productive energy. All we do or can obtain is a cognition of uniform precedence and consequence. Hume here refutes in advance the theory of the origin of the idea of the causal *nexus*, or causative power, developed by Maine de Biran, an acute and able French metaphysician, as well as that of the German Fichte. Hume says that it is only from long experience of the uniform appearance of one event following another that we conclude that the relation of cause and effect subsists between them. This may be true. But this applies only to cases of particular causes and effects, not to the origin of the notion as a fact of consciousness; for, as a matter of fact, we have the notion of cause and effect from the first dawn of reason, and long before we have had the experience supposed. Whence its origin? Locke had maintained that we first derive our idea of power from the operations of our own will, from the consciousness of producing effects in ourselves. This view is taken up and developed at great length and with consummate ability by Maine de Biran. But, as Hume remarks, there is no sensible connection between the *nisus* or voluntary effort and any thing which follows. We are conscious, if you will, of the external and internal phenomena, but not of a causal *nexus* between them. I will to raise my arm, my arm rises; but I cannot say that my volition does any thing more than precede the rising of my arm, for experience shows me no necessary connection between the volition and the muscular contraction and the rising of the arm which follow. Leibnitz went so far as to deny all causal connection between them, and maintained that the movements of the body are not produced by the action of the soul, but simply correspond to it by virtue of a preëstablished harmony. Certainly there is nothing more inexplicable to us than the reciprocal influence of soul and body. Cousin sees the defects in the reasoning of Locke and Maine de Biran, but still maintains that we are conscious of a causal *nexus* between the voluntary effort and a following phenomenon. I will to raise my arm, it may or may not rise; but I have produced an effect, to wit, a volition to raise it, and am con-

scious of the causal *nexus* between the voluntary effort and the volition. But perhaps, properly speaking, the volition and effort are not in reality distinguishable; and even if they were, all I am conscious of is of the effort and of the volition as facts, not of a power in the former that has produced the latter.

Hence it follows that the idea of the causal *nexus*, or of causative power, is not derivable from sensible experience. If, then, with the sensists, we make that experience the sole source of our knowledge, the only notion of cause possible is, as Dr. Thomas Brown, the successor of Dugald Stewart, maintained, that of "invariable antecedence and consequence," which excludes entirely the notion of power, and resolves the relation of cause and effect into a relation of time. As all our reasonings concerning matters of fact rest on the supposed necessary connection between cause and effect, it follows, as a matter of course, that those reasonings have and can have no scientific value. If we must abandon the assertion of that connection, give up the idea of power, either as not entertained or as not assertable, we can assert no reality as the objective cause or condition of our impressions, sensations, or sentiments, and therefore no real objective existence. Thus as ideas are nothing but copies of the impressions, all the existence we are able to assert is simply our own sentient subject and its affections, modes, or states. Nay, if the causal connection be denied, we can assert our own existence only as an impression or sensation, as the Abbé Condillac maintained. Hence we lose, not only the external world, all objective reality, but all substantive existence, and fall into pure nihilism, since phenomena cannot exist without a subject.

Here is where Hume shows us, if we accept the sensist philosophy and derive all our knowledge from sensible experience, we do and must come. Let it be understood, however, that he is not dogmatizing; he is only showing the necessary and legitimate consequences of the empirical philosophy rendered popular and nearly universal in Great Britain and France by Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding." He does not by any means accept the conclusions of that philosophy. He says over and over again that he does not, and that nobody can. His specialty does not consist in denying the necessary connection between cause and effect, or the reality of the causal power, as his adversaries have foolishly imagined, but in showing that it

cannot be derived from sensible experience, or asserted on the principles of the empirical or sensist philosophy. In this he was unquestionably right; and no one, on the principles of that philosophy, has ever been able, or ever will be able, to refute him. Hume was not by any means the first to show that the sensist philosophy, by excluding the idea of power, inevitably leads speculatively every one, capable of consistently carrying it out, to scepticism and nihilism; but he, nevertheless, did show it. And it was he, more than any other, that in Great Britain, Germany, and France, provoked those new philosophical investigations intended to save science. In this lies all the value of his labors, and in this consists all the service he has rendered to philosophy.

Dr. Thomas Reid, a countryman and contemporary of Hume, one of the great men of the eighteenth century, entered the lists against him, and endeavored to reconcile philosophy with the common beliefs of mankind. Reid was not a learned man, and was far from being well acquainted with the course of philosophic thought through the ages; but he was a robust, original, and independent thinker, and his influence on philosophical speculation has been great, and, upon the whole, not unsalutary. His philosophy is in the main practically sound, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to place metaphysical speculation, as was his wish, in complete harmony with common sense; for he did not scientifically vindicate what he calls common sense as the test or criterion of philosophical truth. He considered that the errors of philosophers arise from two sources: from their regarding external perception as representative rather than presentative, and from their overlooking the fact that the first principles of all science are indemonstrable. He undertook to refute the former by showing that it is not an image or representation of the sensible object that we perceive, but the real object itself; and the second, by showing that all reasoning must proceed from principles which reasoning does not furnish and cannot establish. These principles are the principles of common sense, the common notions or primitive beliefs of mankind. Among these is the notion of power, or the necessary relation of cause and effect; and therefore it is that all men entertain and believe it, though no reasoning can obtain or demonstrate it.

But this did not meet the reasoning of Hume. Hume frankly admitted that all men have the notion, that all act on it, that none are able to divest themselves of it, and that

it is sufficiently evidenced for all practical purposes. Yet, speculatively, he said, you cannot assert it, because it is no object of experience, and cannot be detected in the observable phenomena. But all our knowledge, all our ideas or notions, are derivable from experience. Therefore you cannot have the notion. Yet you have it, all men have it. Whence do they get it? It is not detected, responds Reid, in the observable phenomena, is not derived from experience, for it is underived, is in the observer as a primitive belief or principle of common sense. But Hume concedes all this. All have the notión, and cannot practically divest themselves of it. But if in the observer, it is subjective and of no objective value or application. You call it a primitive belief, a necessary belief. Be it so. But what is its authority, since there is observable no objective reality to respond to it, no objective evidence to support it?—No such evidence is needed.—For practical purposes, agreed; but if the belief has no objective evidence, it is only subjectively certain, and science is only subjective, and reduced to the simple knowledge of our internal modes, affections, or states. Here is the difficulty which Reid nowhere gets over, for his primitive beliefs are not intuitions of the objective reality, are not supported by any objective evidence, but are mere psychical facts, entirely subjective, for aught he shows to the contrary, and therefore can never be the first principles of the science of things. With all his honest endeavors, Reid did not succeed in solving Hume's problem, and establishing, as he was bound to do, the objective reality of the notion of power, or of the causal *nexus*. With him, as with Hume, the judgment of causality remains a purely psychological fact.

About the same time with Reid in Scotland, Immanuel Kant—through one parent, of Scottish descent—took up in Germany Hume's problem, and solved it virtually in the same way; that is, he did not solve the difficulty at all, but accepted and confirmed by a masterly analysis of reason the sceptical conclusions deduced by Hume from the sensist philosophy. Kant saw that the real question lay deeper and was more general than Hume had supposed, and that it resolves itself into the question, How synthetic judgments *a priori* are formed?

All our judgments are divisible into two classes, analytical or explicative judgments, and synthetic or amplicative judgments. The former are judgments in which the sub-

ject contains the predicate, and are formed on the principle of contradiction or of identity. They add nothing to the subject, but merely explain or unfold its contents. The latter are judgments in which the predicate is not contained in the subject, but is added to it, and are subdivided into empirical judgments, or judgments from experience, and judgments *a priori*. That a body has extension, figure, &c., is an analytical judgment; for the predicates, extension, figure, &c., are contained in the original conception of body. That a body has weight is a synthetic, empirical judgment, because the predicate is not contained in the primitive conception of body [a disputed fact in physics], but is added to it from experience. But that whatever happens must have a cause, is a synthetic judgment *a priori*, because the predicate, *must have a cause*, is added to the subject, *whatever happens*, and because the judgment involves the conception of necessity, not in any way derivable from experience. The characteristic of synthetic judgments *a priori* is this conception of necessity. Thus far Kant is admirable, and his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and between synthetic judgments from experience and synthetic judgments *a priori*, though not absolutely new in the history of philosophy, is of great importance, was never more finely marked, and leaves nothing on that head to be desired.

The possibility of empirical synthetic judgments depends on the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*; for in every empirical judgment or particular experience we apply a synthetic judgment *a priori*. The empirical judgment, fire liquefies wax, is only a particular application of the judgment, whatever happens must have a cause. That is, before we can assert any particular and contingent cause, we must have the notion of universal and necessary cause. The possibility of experience, and therefore of all empirical knowledge, depends on the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*, which are the indispensable condition of every fact of experience. How, then, are they formed? To this question Kant devotes his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, or Analysis of Pure Reason, that is, of reason regarded as subsisting prior to all experience and independent of it. His answer denies that they are intuitions, or formed by the presentation to the mind of their subject, predicate, and copula, as objectively existing *a parte rei*, and asserts that they are simply forms or categories of the

understanding, which is in substance the very doctrine of Reid; for Kant's categories are precisely the first principles, the constituent elements of reason, the common notions, or common sense of the Scottish school. Kant agrees with Hume that the idea of cause is not in the observable phenomena, nor empirically obtainable, but maintains that it is in the observer, a necessary form of the understanding itself, and simply applied by it on occasion of experience.

But this does not solve the sceptical doubt of Hume, for the Kantian categories are not the predicaments of Aristotle, they are not forms of things, or the objective conditions under which things may and must be thought, but the forms of the subjective intellect. The category cause is simply the intellect itself under one of its aspects, and is that in the thought which the intellect supplies from itself, and we think it because in every thought the soul thinks or recognizes itself. It is, therefore, purely subjective, and without the least conceivable objective force or validity, as Hume himself, in other terms, labored to prove.

Kant's "Analysis of Pure Reason" is nothing but a masterly development of the old Stoical maxim with the famous exception suggested by Leibnitz, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu,*—NISI *ipse intellectus.* The only objective existences he pretends to recognize are sensibles. We have, he maintains, intuition only of sensible objects. But without the conception of cause objectively valid, we are unable to assert the sensible intuitions themselves as objectively valid. They are then in the predicament of Locke's *sensations* and Hume's *impressions*, and all that we can affirm is pure idealism,—with which pure sensism is at bottom always coincident,—or the subject and its affections, modes, or states. But as Kant denies all intuition or cognition in any form of the *noumenon*, that is, the intelligible, we can have no cognition of the subject even, and therefore cannot affirm it. If we cannot affirm the subject of our own phenomena, we can affirm nothing, and we are in the universal doubt suggested by Hume. We place here no forced interpretation upon Kant's "Analysis," for he himself expressly says that the result of his critical labors will be to demolish science to make way for faith,—a result not relieved even by the dogmatism he attempts in his later work, "Analysis of the Practical Reason;" for it is idle to attempt to found a dogmatic system on practical reason,

after having proved speculative reason to be good for nothing Moreover, in his "Practical Reason" Kant only follows Hume, who conceded that our reasoning concerning matters of fact is sufficiently evident for him as an agent or actor *

The fact is, that at bottom both Reid and Kant, as to the origin and grounds of our knowledge, agree with Hume, and their philosophy is substantially that which he proves leads to scepticism, with the exception in favor of Reid, that he denied the representative character of perception, and asserted, without proving, that we apprehend things themselves, not merely their mental images or representations,—an important step in the right direction, we cheerfully concede.

In the Scottish school has followed Sir William Hamilton, a psychological observer of rare sagacity, and, after old Ralph Cudworth, perhaps the most really erudite philosophical writer in our language. He has that acuteness and that knowledge of systems which Reid lacked. He attempts a new explanation of the judgment of causality, which he derives not from intuition, experience, ratiocination, custom, or a special psychological power or faculty, but from the impotence of our nature to think the unconditioned. He makes it "a derivation of the condition of relativity in time:" "The mind," he says, "is restricted to think in certain forms; and under these thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily true." "We must think under the condition of existence,—existence relative, and existence relative in time." Existence relative implies,—"1: That we are unable to realize in thought, on the one pole of the irrelative, either an absolute commencement or an absolute termination of time; as, on the other, the infinite non-commencement or an infinite non-termination of time; 2: That we can think neither on the one pole an absolute *minimum*, nor on the other the infinite divisibility of time. Yet these constitute two pairs of contradictory propositions; which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot

* This appears to be the doctrine of Dr. Newman in his "Essay at a Grammar of Assent," which maintains that probability is sufficient for the practical conduct of life.

both be true, while at the same time one or the other must. But as not relatives they are not cogitables. Now, the phenomenon of causality seems nothing more than a corollary of the law of the conditioned in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of existence relative in time."

This we suppose must be regarded as perfectly intelligible, and yet some people may think it might have been more clearly, as well as more elegantly, expressed. But what first strikes us in this barbarous statement is, that it resolves the judgment of causality into the judgment of the non-commencement of existence, which, if it means any thing, is a denial of the relation of cause and effect. The phenomenon to be explained, we are told, is this: "When aware of any new *appearance*, we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new *existence*, and are constrained to think that what now appears to us under a new form had previously an existence under others. These others are called its cause." "Our judgment of causality simply is: We necessarily deny in thought that the object we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins, but, on the contrary, affirm, as we must, the *identity* of its present sum of being with the sum of its past existence." That is, no new existence is ever caused, but new phenomena only. Effects are only changes in the forms of the cause, that is, are only the cause under new forms. This, we think, is not the judgment of causality as a psychological fact, for it eviscerates the judgment or the conception of the power, whereby the cause places an effect distinct from itself, which is, if we mistake not, the essence of the judgment. Sir William then explains the judgment by identifying cause and effect, that is, by denying both. A cause which places no effect distinct from itself, or only exhibits itself under new forms, is in reality no cause at all. That we do not misinterpret the illustrious baronet, is evident from his express statements:—"The mind is compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its cause, between the *causatum* and the *causa*." "Each is the sum of the other." An absolute identity is a perfect identity, complete in all its parts, and then no real distinction is conceivable between the *causa* and the *causatum*. Then there is really neither *causa* nor *causatum*, neither cause nor effect. "That the phenomenon presented to us did, *as a phenomenon*, begin to be,—this we know by experi-

ence; but that its elements only began when the phenomenon which they constitute came into manifested being,—this we are wholly unable to think." "We are compelled to believe that the object (that is, the certain *quale* and *quantum* of being), whose phenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist prior to the rise, under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under other forms, is only saying, in other words, that it has had causes." Then to say a thing has had causes, is only saying, in other words, that it previously existed under different forms! It is clear from this that the only distinction of cause and effect recognized by Sir William is the distinction of being and phenomenon. But we need not tell him that phenomena are indistinguishable from their subject, and therefore the phenomenon is, so far as it is any thing, being itself, not something produced by it. The phenomenon distinguished from the subject in which it subsists is nothing at all. The resolution of cause and effect into being and phenomenon is the radical error of the Pantheists, for then we can assert only being and its phenomena; and to assert only being and its phenomena is precisely to assert Pantheism, which excludes the judgment of causality.

It is true Sir William says he speaks only of second causes, for, as he alleges, "Of the Divine causation we have no conception;" but this cannot avail him, for he is treating of the judgment of causality in general, and having resolved the relation of cause and effect into the relation of being and phenomenon, he can assert no second causes. Phenomena cannot be causes either first or second; for they have no subsistence, are unsubstantial, and therefore cannot act or operate. To assert second causes is to abandon his whole theory. Moreover, he illustrates his own definition of causality by express reference to the Divine causation, and makes the relation of God and the universe identically that which he asserts between cause and effect: "When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by supposing that he *evolves* the universe out of himself, in like manner as we conceive annihilation by conceiving him to withdraw his creation from actuality into power." He says this in order to show that we can conceive neither the real beginning nor the real cessation, and neither the increase nor the diminution, of the sum or *quantum* of existence. We have the right then to assume that he does apply his conception of cause in the order of the first cause as well as

in that of second causes. Second causes only copy or imitate in their sphere and degree the first cause; and the conception of cause, in so far as cause it is, must be the same in whatever order we conceive it. If, then, Sir William resolves, as he does, the relation of cause and effect into the relation of being and phenomenon, or existence and its forms, he can assert as existing only being and its phenomena,—therefore the universe only as substantially identical with God: which is to deny all causative force which places an effect distinct from itself, asserted in every judgment of causality, and to fall into sheer Pantheism.

Sir William Hamilton's theory is as inadmissible as Hume's, because it denies the judgment of causality itself, and conducts to Pantheism, and all Pantheism undeniably conducts to scepticism and nihilism. But his doctrine, that the judgment is derived from "the condition of relativity in time," is to us equally inadmissible. He says: "The phenomenon of causality"—that is, our judgment of causality, we suppose—"seems to be nothing more than a corollary from the law of the conditioned in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of existence in relation to time." Does he mean to say that existence is a form or category of the mind? If so, he falls into pure Kantism. We had supposed that he regarded existence as objective, as existing *a parte rei*, and that we apprehend things themselves as really existing independent of the mind, and that, without an object so existing, thought is impossible. But let that pass. "We cannot know," he continues, "we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of existence; we cannot know or think a thing to exist except as in time; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time and think it *absolutely to commence*. Now this at once imposes upon us the judgment of causality." We see not that. That we cannot think it absolutely to commence in time, is very true; but this does not prevent us from thinking it absolutely to commence out of time, namely, in its cause. Sir William says we can think only existence, and existence only in time; but we cannot think existence as absolutely commencing. This is a singular statement; for, to think existence, and to think it not commencing, is not to think it in time, but out of time. We think existence, he says, and we are unable to think it either as absolutely commencing or as absolutely ceasing, or to think any increase or diminution of its sum. Now, to think existence without thinking its beginning or

end, its increase or diminution, is to think existence without beginning or end, increase or diminution; which, if we know the force of words, is to think real, eternal, and necessary existence or being, unconditioned by time or any thing else—precisely what the illustrious Scottish Professor maintains, as the basis of his whole theory, we cannot do. His real difficulty, according to his own statements, is, not in thinking existence without the relation of time, but in thinking it under that relation; and he in fact denies it under that relation, by recognizing no effects but phenomena, which are not existences in time, since phenomena, aside from their subject, are not existences at all.

It is, no doubt, true, that we are unable to think existence as absolutely beginning; for, if we could we could think absolute non-existence, which is impossible, since to think absolute non-existence is simply not to think at all. But this is true only when we take *existence* in the sense of real and necessary *being*, in contradistinction from contingent existences, as the ὄντος ὄν, or being of being. In this sense we cannot think it either to begin or end, to be augmented or diminished. But it is not true of contingent existences, for we cannot think them at all, save as we think them as beginning to exist,—not in time indeed, for time is only a relation of contingents to one another, beginning and ending with them,—but in the cause, or creative act of God, in which the relation of time itself commences. In this sense we can think both the beginning and end of existence, and both its augmentation and diminution; for God was not obliged to create, and he may, if he chooses, withdraw his creative act; and nothing hinders him, so far as we know, if he chooses, from creating new worlds, since creation has not exhausted his creative power. The reasoning of Sir William rests on the ambiguity of the word *existence*, and therefore on an undistributed middle, a sad vice in so eminent a logician.

Sir William, we fear, uses the word *existence* as the excellent Abbate Rosmini uses the term *being*, in an abstract sense, as existence *in genere*, without reflecting that existence is always concrete, and can be predicated only of something really existing. He says, we can think only under the condition of existence, and only existence relative. Now, as we cannot think existence without thinking something existing, this means, if any thing, that we can think only relative, that is, contingent existences. But to think

relative existences is to think relation, and no relation is thinkable, or cogitable with a single term. We cannot then think relative existence without at the same time thinking that to which it is related, that is, the irrelative,—the contingent without thinking the non-contingent, that is to say, real and necessary being, the *ens simpliciter* of the Schoolmen. Relative or contingent existence, *ens secundum quid*, must be thought, if at all, either as *ens secundum quid*, or as *ens simpliciter*. But not the latter, for that it is not, and what is not cannot be thought; not the former, unless there be thought at the same time that which is not contingent, but absolute or necessary being, because without that it is nothing. In thinking contingent existence as contingent, there is a comparison made of the contingent with the necessary, and no comparison can be thought without intuition of both terms. Then we cannot think contingent or relative existence without thinking necessary, absolute, or unconditioned existence. Either then we must be able to think the unconditioned, or we cannot think the conditioned. To say that we can think existence without thinking it either as conditioned or as unconditioned, will not answer, for existence so thought is simply *ens in genere*, existence in general, in which nothing is thought as being or existing, and is the *reine Seyn* of Hegel,—merely possible existence or a mental abstraction, which cannot be thought without the real and concrete. All existence is the existence of something, is being, either real and necessary, or relative and contingent, and therefore must, if thought at all, be thought either as the one or the other. When, then, Sir William says we think only under the condition of existence, he must either mean that we think something really existing, or existence where nothing exists. If the latter he falls into pure Kantism or scepticism; if the former, then he must concede that we do actually think, that is, intuitively apprehend, real and necessary being, without which there is and can be no relative or contingent existence.

We do not forget Sir William's reply: Only relatives are cogitable. Relation is cogitable only between correlatives, and the relation between correlatives is reciprocal; each is relative to the other. All thought is dual, and embraces at once subject and object in their mutual opposition and limitation. The subject thinking conditions the object thought, and the object thought conditions the subject thinking.

Therefore the unconditioned cannot be thought. But this is to confound the condition of the thought with the condition of the object, that is, to confound, in the very act of distinguishing them, subject and object. The cause conditions the effect, but not the effect the cause, for the very conception of cause presupposes it to be independent of the effect. If, then, I think the object as my cause and myself as its effect, I do not think myself as limiting or conditioning it. If I think myself as the effect or creature of the infinite, I do not think myself as its limitation, and therefore may, although thought is dual, think the infinite, though of course not in an infinite mode. But to think the infinite in a finite mode is still to think the infinite, otherwise we must say, whenever we do not think the object adequately, we do not think it at all. This will not do, unless you deny us all thought, for only God can think, that is, know, adequately any object whatsoever. My thought is limited, but the limitation is of the subject, not of the object, comes from myself, not from the object thought, and is negative, not positive. I cannot think God infinitely, but I can think God who is infinite, and though in thinking him I distinguish myself from him, I do not think myself as limiting him, for I think myself as dependent on him, as his product, effect, or creature, and him as my cause or creator. The mistake of Sir William arises from his not considering that the only conceivable relation between the finite and infinite, the conditioned and the unconditioned, or, as we prefer to say, between existence (from *ex-stare*) and being,—*ens secundum quid* and *ens simpliciter*,—is the relation of the effect to the cause, or of creature to creator, and therefore cannot be thought as a relation of reciprocity, but as a relation in which the former term is related to the latter, though the latter is not related *in se* to the former. Consequently we never can think ourselves as limiting or conditioning the infinite object, but must always think it as conditioning or placing us. If Sir William had considered the thought not solely as a fact of consciousness, that is, on its subjective side, as a conception, but in the real existence thought, he never could have denied our ability to think the unconditioned, that is, real, necessary, and infinite being, for he would have seen that we have intuition of it in every thought, and could not think a single thought if we had not.

The illustrious Scotsman tells us that our conception of the infinite, the unconditioned, is negative. Negative of

what? Of the conditioned? But the conditioned can be denied only by proposing its contradictory, that is, the unconditioned. Of the unconditioned? Then it is the denial of the unconditioned by the positive conception of the conditioned. But the conditioned affirms, not denies, the unconditioned, since without the unconditioned the conditioned is not cogitable. We confess, then, that we are totally unable to understand the process by which the learned and acute professor derives the judgment of causality from our inability to think the unconditioned, or from the negative conception of real and necessary being. Our inability to think the absolute commencement of existence must, according to his own statements, be regarded as resulting from the fact that we think contingent existence as originating in the non-contingent, that is, in real and necessary being. We should, therefore, reverse his doctrine, and say that the judgment of causality originates in our ability, not in our inability; in the fact that we can and do think both the unconditioned and the conditioned, and always think the latter as the effect or creation of the former, that is, from our ability to think things as they really exist; and the only inability to be noted in the case is our inability to think things, and not to think them in their real relations.

But denying that we have any intuition of the unconditioned, or, as we prefer to say, of the Ideal or the Intelligible, and yet maintaining that we do and must believe it, Sir William is obliged to represent the judgment of causality as simply a belief, though a primitive and necessary belief, in which he coincides with Reid, and does not differ essentially from Kant. He denies it to be a fact of science, and boldly takes the ground that the first principles of our knowledge can in no instance be themselves objects of cognition, mediate or immediate. He admits a νοῦς or noetic faculty in man, the *intellectus* of the Latins and the *Vernunft* of the recent German philosophers, but he makes it the *locus* or place of first principles, rather than the power of apprehending them objectively in immediate intuition. They are then beliefs, not cognitions, and beliefs which not only cannot be demonstrated, but of which we have and can have no objective evidence. They are therefore purely subjective; and as all science must repose on them, and follow their law, all our science is purely subjective, as Hume maintained. Hence Sir William Hamilton, decidedly the most learned man of the Scottish school, and the

first metaphysician in Great Britain, coinciding with Reid and Kant, leaves us in the same speculative doubt in which Hume himself had left us. The Scottish school, which originated in the laudable attempt to refute that doubt, and to reconcile philosophy and common sense, has then undeniably failed.

Perhaps French Eclecticism, founded by M. Victor Cousin, one of the ablest philosophers and best writers of our age, has succeeded better. M. Cousin is as learned, as erudite as Sir William Hamilton, and far surpasses him in brilliancy of genius, and in simplicity, clearness, beauty, vivacity, grace, and elegance of style. He commenced his philosophical career under the auspices of M. Royer-Collard, as a disciple of Reid and Stewart, whom he soon abandoned for Immanuel Kant, and subsequently for Schelling and Hegel. His pretension is by a broad and scientific eclecticism to mould all systems of philosophy, in so far as affirmative, into one harmonious system, which reconciles all differences, and affords a complete and solid explanation of human science. He recognizes a rational or non-sensible element in all the facts of experience, and makes the judgment of causality a revelation or inspiration of the spontaneous or impersonal reason, which he assumes to be objective, and of which this judgment is one of the constituent elements. But though he calls the spontaneous or impersonal reason objective, he identifies it, save as to its mode of operation, with reason as our faculty of intelligence. Now, if reason be our faculty of intelligence, the only faculty, as he maintains, by which we know, whatever the sphere or degree of our knowledge, it is our self; for though faculties may be distinguished *in* the soul, they cannot be distinguished *from* it, and therefore cannot be objective, but are really subjective. In this case, M. Cousin coincides with Kant and the Scottish school. If, however, he insists that it is objective, then we have no faculty of intelligence, are irrational and unintelligent by nature, as much so as a plant or a mineral. How, then, are we capable of receiving the revelations or inspirations of reason? We have no intellect to correspond to the intelligible, and then cannot know any thing at all.

M. Cousin seems to be aware of some difficulty of this sort, and, while representing reason as our faculty of intelligence, identifies it in its spontaneous activity with the reason, λόγος, or Word of God. But this only involves him in a more serious difficulty. Reason is one in all its modes, and

M. Cousin's distinction between the spontaneous, or, as he says, *impersonal* reason, and the reflective or personal reason, is only a distinction between indeliberative and deliberative activity,—the distinction which our theologians make between the *voluntarium* and the *liberum*, or between *actus hominis* and *actus humanus*. The actor, the *vis activa*, is the same in both, and differs only as to the mode of its operation. As the Word or Reason of God is God in the Unity of the Divine Being, the identification of reason in its indeliberative operations with the Divine Reason is to identify the human and divine natures, and to deny all but a modal distinction between God and man, which is Pantheism or Egoism, either of which necessarily excludes the judgment of causality, and therefore all science founded on it.

M. Cousin, moreover, resolves being into cause, and tells us that it is only in that it causes. But what is not cannot cause, and if being is only in causing, then it cannot be at all, for it cannot cause unless it is. Therefore neither cause nor being can be asserted, and we have pure nihilism. If being is only in that it is a cause, and is cause only in that it causes, cause and effect must reciprocally depend each on the other, and each is merely the other's complement. M. Cousin sees this, and hence he places cause and effect in the same category. If in the same category, they are indistinguishable save as the two poles of one and the same existence, and then neither is conceivable as the product of the other,—the cause is as dependent on the effect as the effect on the cause. In this case the relation of cause and effect is resolved back into the relation of being and phenomenon, which, as we have seen, excludes the judgment of causality. If being is only in that it causes, the causative act is necessary. This necessity must be either extrinsic or intrinsic; extrinsic in the case of the first cause it cannot be; then intrinsic. Then the effect can be only the evolution or emanation of the cause, and save as a mode indistinguishable from it, which makes the effect a mere phenomenon, a form or mode of the cause, and we are back in Pantheism; for the essence of Pantheism is in denying all substantial existences distinct from God, and asserting only being and its phenomena.

M. Cousin then affords us no refutation of Hume's scepticism. He has done much to break down the gross sensism and materialism of Locke and Condillac, and before his end manifested, not in his philosophy, but in his personal dispo-

sitions, tendencies which we cannot deny ourselves the honor of applauding; but presenting the ideal element of thought as the constituent element of reason, not as an object apprehended by our noetic or intellective faculty, immediately presenting itself in intuition, he has no more than Kant, than Reid, than Sir William Hamilton, than Hume himself, been able to present a solid basis for science, for he has not been able to present the first principles of science as objectively evident, and a science based on principles not objectively evident is simply no science at all, and, however irresistible it may be, it is only a subjective belief.

Rosmini, a really eminent as well as a truly pious man, one of the greatest recent glories of Italy, made some earnest and laudable efforts to redeem philosophy from the charge of scepticism; but at bottom his system seems to us to coincide with those we have just dismissed. Like Sir William Hamilton, like Kant, like Cousin, the illustrious Italian recognizes, in words at least, a non-sensible element in our cognitions, which he calls the *idea of being* or existence, and which the mind applies to every fact or object of sensible experience. This idea is not, according to him, the intuition of real and necessary being, or of actual or concrete existence, but of being in general, existence indeterminate and abstract. Then it is not, as he supposes, primitive, for we must conceive the concrete before we can conceive the abstract, since the abstract without the concrete is a pure nullity. The abstract is a mental conception formed by the mind, operating upon the concrete intuitively apprehended. We cannot think or affirm existence without thinking or affirming the existent. Sir William Hamilton says we cannot think without thinking the attribute of existence, as if existence, or being, which is the term he should have used, is an attribute. He who says *being*, says *being is*. Being is ultimate, and, though it may have attributes, it is not and cannot itself be an attribute. We may distinguish between real and necessary being and contingent or created existences, but not in being itself between *essentia* or *substantia*, and *esse* or *existere*, for being which exists not, is not being. The primitive conception of God is that of being; hence he names himself, I AM THAT AM, Ego Sum Qui Sum. Being in general, *ens in genere*, then, is inconceivable, and is not only an abstraction, but even an impossible abstraction. We have then, and can have, no idea of being which is not either real and necessary being,—*ens necessarium et reale*, the *ens sim-*

pliciter of the Schoolmen, that is, God,—or contingent existence, that is, creature, *ens secundum quid.*

But passing over this, Rosmini cannot, from the idea of being or the judgment, Being is, arrive at the judgment, Being is cause or creator. The first principles of philosophy, from which our whole intellectual life flows, are, according to Rosmini, the idea of being, and the sensible object. These are the primitive *data.* How from these two, being and a sensible object, obtain the judgment of causality, or conclude the existence of a causal *nexus* between them,—that being creates or places the sensible object? He must connect them in some way, or else deny the existence of the sensible object, and he can connect them only as being and phenomenon, which excludes the judgment of causality, and renders it impossible for us to refute the doctrine of the identity of substance and phenomenon, of God and the universe, of God and man,—which we have seen neither Cousin nor Sir William Hamilton escapes,—or the nihilism of Hegel.

Schelling maintains the doctrine of the identity of subject and object, the contingent and necessary, the relative and absolute, and therefore cannot help us, though he asserts the absolute, the unconditioned. Hegel starts with the conception of pure being, *das reine Seyn*, which in his view is identical with not-being, that is, with indeterminate, unreal, or mere possible being. But the possible cannot be prior to the real, for it is the power or ability of the real to place the contingent, and is intrinsic in the real and necessary. Hence Hegel, placing the possible before the real, begins and ends in nullity. The common error of the pseudo-ontologists is, that they start from the object, not as real being, objectively existing, and simply presented in intuition, but as a conception, and thus give us no real ontology, but a pure ideology. The being they assert is no real being. But even if it were, they could not assert the judgment of causality, because it is not contained in the judgment, Being is. Hence they fall inevitably into Pantheism.

The school which, among us, professes to follow St. Thomas, and which is the more prevalent as well as the soundest school we have, denies that it is a psychological school, and in its origin it certainly was not. It professes to proceed from *notum*, or something known, to the unknown, by the way of demonstration. But this is no more nor less than a Cartesian would say. It merely defines a method, not

a philosophy; and though it proves that the school is faithful to the method, it by no means proves that it is faithful to the philosophy of St. Thomas. What is this *notum?* What is the *principium* of the school? The question of principles is prior to the question of method, and far otherwise important. Your method may be good, but if your principles are bad, you can never arrive at the truth unless by an inconsequence, by a violation of logic. The *principium* of this school is a sensible *datum*, that is, a contingent existence taken from sensible experience; from this it professes to proceed demonstratively, by the principle of contradiction, to the assertion of the necessary; that is, from the *ens contingens* sensibly apprehended to demontrate the *ens necessarium et reale*, which is not apprehensible at all.

But Hume has settled it forever that the judgment of causality cannot be obtained from sensible experience, either intuitively or demonstratively; and without the judgment of causality we can never conclude real and necessary being from contingent existence, nor contingent existence from real and necessary being. If the professors of this school will examine it, they will find that this judgment is the very principle of their demonstration, for the principle of contradiction, without it, gives only the possible, not the real. They have, therefore, the judgment of causality prior to their demonstration, and do but apply it in their demonstrative process. How did they come by it? As they do not concede it to be an intuition, they can give only some one of the answers we have already found to be insufficient.

There has recently sprung up, principally in France, another school, called the Traditional School; but what are their precise doctrines is a matter of dispute between them and their opponents. But if they mean that tradition is necessary only in regard to the superintelligible, or that it is necessary only as an assistant in the order of the intelligible, they are so far unquestionably right; but if they mean that the first principles of science are known only as learned from a teacher, they apply in all its rigor to the natural order, in which St. Anselm did not apply it, the maxim, *Crede ut intelligas*, and thus found science on faith. Judging from M. Bonnetty's criticisms on Gioberti, we should say this is their doctrine, and this is only a form of Jansenism. But judging from some of M. Bonnetty's disclaimers, we might be inclined to think it is not. He says expressly, that he recognizes reason as a faculty of the soul, a natural power

of knowing truth; but he denies that it is a power to invent —*discover*—truth. We suppose he means the first and necessary truths of morals and theology. But this is not decisive, for he leaves it in doubt whether he means morals and theology in the superintelligible order only, or in the intelligible order. If the former, all Christians agree with him, and he utters only a truism; if he means tl e latter, then he either means simply that, though man is able to know these first principles or necessary truths, the foundation of what is called natural theology and ethics, when supernaturally revealed, he could never have discovered them by his own unaided efforts; or he means to deny that we can either discover or know them by our natural reason. If the former of these subdistinctions, he coincides with Gioberti, and we see not why he should combat him; if the latter, which we suspect to be the case, when he is of his own opinion, he denies all science of principles or necessary truth, and really founds science on faith; which St. Anselm certainly never did, for St. Anselm professes to demonstrate the existence of God from the idea of the most perfect being, which the human mind has naturally. If this be the doctrine of the school, as their opponents allege, the Traditionalists are, in regard to human reason, like Pascal, Lamennais, Bayle, Kant and Hume, really sceptics.

Now none of these philosophers and schools are practically sceptical, and we call them so only in regard to the tendency or result of their speculative systems. There is a common sense which directs, to a certain extent, most men in their practical judgments, and prevents them from running as wild in practice as in speculation. Amongst Catholics, speculation is held in check by theology, and philosophers are obliged to assert, whether logically or not, a sound ontology; but for the most part, they borrow it from Catholic theology, instead of obtaining it from their philosophical speculation. "What is taught in our schools under the head of philosophy," said an eminent Catholic bishop to us one day, "is some fragments of Catholic theology, badly proved." But where there are no theological restraints, philosophy almost invariably runs into Pantheism, scepticism and nihilism. Certainly none of the great philosophical schools of our day, none of the distinguished philosophers whom it is counted lawful to cite, have been able to solve Hume's problem in favor of science.

Yet let us not for this despair of human reason or of human

philosophy. All the great men we have cited were much nearer the truth than at first sight would seem. They have all failed, and failed because misled by Descartes, who converted philosophy from a science of principles into a science of method,—from the science of human and divine things in the natural and intelligible order, into the science of knowing. They have been thus led to the investigation of conceptions instead of things, the object thought in the respect that it is the correlative of subject, instead of contemplating it in the respect that it is thing, and exists independent of the thinking subject. Modern philosophy, at least the philosophy in vogue, is nothing but a methodology. The investigation of principles should always precede the investigation of method, for it is the principles that determine the method, not the method that determines the principles

Principles must no doubt be taken from thought, but from thought as objective, not as a fact of consciousness simply. Sir William Hamilton has well corrected the error of Reid, who made consciousness a special faculty distinguishable from our general cognitive faculty; but he has himself mistaken the true character of the fact of consciousness. He says consciousness is dual, and in thought we are alike conscious of both subject and object. This is not exact. Pierre Leroux says, more correctly, that consciousness is simply the recognition of ourselves in the act of thought as the subject thinking. We see, perceive, or apprehend the object, and are conscious that it is we who see, perceive, or apprehend it. The fact of consciousness is simply this recognition of self as subject. This distinction is important; for, if we include under the fact of consciousness the thing thought as well as the subject thinking, we can include it only in correlation with ourselves, simply as the objective terminus of thought, and have still the question to settle whether it be placed by the subject, or whether it exist as thing independent of subject. It is this confusion of the object with the fact of consciousness that has led Sir William Hamilton to deny that the unconditioned can be thought, and Professor Ferrier to represent the *scibile*, or the knowable, as the synthesis of subject and object, which supposes nothing to exist save as known, and thus confounds existence and knowledge, thought and being, conceptions and things.

The correction of this fatal error lies in taking our principles, not from the object as *perceptum*, but as *res*,—not as object perceived, but as thing existing *a parte rei*, and

which is object because it is thing, and not thing because it is object. Etymologically, to *think* is to *thing*, for the two words are from the same Anglo-Saxon root; but this does not mean that the thought gives to the object its reality, but a thing or reality to itself; that is, presents a thing or reality to the apprehension of the subject, in the sense in which the word *realize* is sometimes used even by Sir William Hamilton, as when he says, *realize in thought*, that is, bring distinctly before the mind the thing or reality with which the thought is conversant. Strictly speaking, to think is to judge, that is, to judge or affirm the *perceptum* is *res* or thing. It declares the fact, but does not create it. Let this be borne in mind that to think things conditions the object as object thought, but not as thing existing in the order of reality. This done, we must take our *principium*, not from the object as object, but as thing or reality. It is the reality we must contemplate, not the reality as object, or conditioned by our act of thinking, which is not the thing itself, but our conception. In this way our *principium* will be the *principium* of things, which must be the *principium* of all real science, of all science that is not sujective and illusory.

Now our solution of the problem we have been considering has already been foreshadowed. The judgment of causality is a primitive judgment or first principle, and is embraced in the *principium* of all human science as in the *principium* of things. All philosophers, not excepting even Hume, if he understood himself, do really admit a non-empirical element in all our cognitions, ideal and apodictic. This element Reid calls the principles of common sense; Kant calls it a form or category of the reason or understanding; Cousin, a revelation, inspiration, sometimes the constituent element, of the spontaneous reason; Rosmini, the idea of being or existence in general, which precedes and accompanies all our empirical judgments; Sir William Hamilton seems to call it a primitive and necessary belief, arising from the impotence of our reason to conceive the unconditioned; but however they call it, they all in some form or other assert it, or at least concede it. All agree, with the exception of the pseudo-Thomists, that it is indemonstrable, for it is the principle or basis of all demonstration. Now, we think philosophers here lose themselves in a fog, and make a great mystery of what is in reality very plain and simple. This ideal element is the *principium* of

things, and simply presents or affirms itself to us intuitively. Say, with Rosmini, that the idea of being precedes and accompanies every one of our judgments, only that it is the idea or apprehension of real and necessary being,—you have then the intuitive judgment, Real and necessary being is. Add the judgment of causality, that is, Real and necessary being is cause or creator, that is, as Gioberti expresses it, Real and necessary being creates existences, and you have an ideal formula or judgment which at once is the *principium* of things and of science. Say now that this ideal formula or judgment affirms itself in immediate intuition, and you have our solution of the problem. Real and necessary Being, *Ens simpliciter*, is God, though we do not always advert to the fact, as St. Augustine says, and thus we have the judgment of causality, because God reveals or affirms himself to our noetic faculty, and affirms himself as creating existences or the universe, and we assist, if we may use a Gallicism, at the spectacle of creation. The origin of the judgment is in intuition of the creative act of God, and is therefore, though indemonstrable, except *ex consequentiis*, objectively evident, and therefore knowledge, not merely belief, as Sir William Hamilton pretends. To clear up all this and establish it satisfactorily would require a volume; but it is not necessary to attempt it here, since it has already been done in our metaphysical articles from time to time. It is enough for the present to say that this judgment, formed by intuition of the reality, enters as an integral element into every one of our empirical judgments, and forms the necessary, apodictic, and infallible element of those judgments, from which there is and can be no appeal. The judgment of causality in the order of second causes copies or imitates the judgment in the order of the first cause, and, like that judgment, has one term necessary, the other contingent. When we see an event happen, we judge at once that it has a cause; for we know, as it happens, that it is in the order of contingents, and that contingents cannot come into existence uncaused, since they are not God, and nothing not God can exist but by his causative or creative act. So far, then, as the judgment affirms that the event has had a cause, it repeats the primitive judgment, and is infallible; but so far as it assigns this or that particular cause for this or that particular event, it depends on experience, and may or may not be just. Here the judgment is not apodictic, and has only probability, or what is called moral certainty.

Our solution, it will be seen, differs in only one respect from that of the so-called Thomist school, a school which has not wholly broken with the past, and which retains many traditions of the ancients, the greater Fathers and more distinguished scholastics. This difference is, that we begin intellectual life,—not philosophy,—with the intuition of the principle of things, and it begins it with a sensible fact, and ascends, by way of demonstration, to that principle. But the principle once obtained, we proceed alike, and come to the same conclusions. In this we think the members of this school mistake the real sense of St. Thomas, and suffer themselves unconsciously to be affected by the conceptualism of Descartes. The state of the question has been changed since the time of St. Thomas, and involves now, as it did not then, a discussion of the principle of demonstration itself. Certainly St. Thomas teaches that God can be known, though not *per se*; but this does not necessarily imply that we cannot have intuition of real and necessary being, which is God, or of real and necessary being creating existences, which is at once the principle of things and the principle of science. No doubt this judgment, though intuitive, becomes clear and distinct to reflective intellect only by a process of reasoning. What St. Thomas really does, is to clear up and render this judgment distinct, by what he calls demonstration. The question as to the origin of the judgment of causality, the real basis of all demonstration, was not debated in his time. He finds the mind in possession of it, and uses it without further question. But if he had been asked its origin, it is not to be believed that he would have said we obtain it from demonstration. Then again, though he appears to start from the sensible element, his real process is not to infer the ideal or noetic element from it, but to disengage it, and to show that it is the divine judgment. To this process, well understood, there is nothing to object, and it is the very process we are ourselves obliged to follow in order to show that our *principium* is really the principle of things, that is to say, is really God by his act creating the universe. The pseudo-Thomist seems to us to confound the method it is necessary to follow in *teaching*, with the method the mind follows in its own intellectual life. Whoever teaches philosophy must follow the Thomist method, but it will not do to confound it with the method of that which the teacher has to explain and systematize.

PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1858.]

The Abbé Hugonin is a professor of philosophy in l'École des Carmes, Paris, and in these two volumes has given us the first division of his course. He defines philosophy, the science of thought, its laws and principal objects, considered as such, and divides it into four parts: 1. Ontology, which treats of the laws of thought, or that which makes thought such as it is and not otherwise; 2. Theodicea, which has for its immediate object God, and studies thought in its first and principal object; 3. Cosmology, which studies the world, or the secondary and mediate object of thought; and 4. Anthropology, or Psychology, which studies the soul considered as at once the subject and object of thought. In these two volumes, the only ones yet published, we believe, we have a very full, a very elaborate, and a really learned treatise on Ontology, in the author's classification, the first part of philosophy. In it and the General Introduction which precedes it, the author, no doubt, shadows forth his whole system, but we can offer no final judgment on it, till we receive the treatises on the other parts, as he postpones to them the consideration of several important problems that we are in the habit of discussing in the prolegomena, before proceeding to the discussion of philosophy in its several divisions or subdivisions.

The Abbé Hugonin, whose name has hardly been heard in the philosophical world, possesses a philosophical genius of a high order, and various and profound philosophical learning. He deserves to rank among the very first living philosophers of his country. He is far superior to M. Cousin and his most eminent living disciple, M. Saisset, as a theologian, and his superiority as a theologian enables him to surpass them both by many degrees as a philosopher; for his theology gives him the true ontology and serves as a touchstone to his ontological speculations. Though less remarkable than M. Cousin for the eloquence and brilliancy of his style, or the exquisite charm and grace of his diction,

*Études Philosophiques, Ontologie ou Étude des Lois de la Pensée. Par M. l'Abbé F. Hugonin. Paris. 1856–7.

he thinks with depth and force, and expresses himself adequately. He writes with modesty, calmness, and candor, as a conscientious man and a sincere and earnest lover of truth and wisdom. His ultimate conclusions are in general sound and indisputable, whatever the judgment we may form of the process by which he obtains them. We own, however, that we should sympathize more fully with him, if we found him a little bolder, and less under the influence of the schools. He follows the method and adopts the language of the schools wherever he is able, and in deference to scholasticism raises and discusses a great variety of questions which by a little care bestowed in correcting or amending its *principium* he might easily avoid or show to be simply no questions at all. No small portion of scholastic philosophy is an idle waste of thought, the consequence of adopting a false or erroneous point of departure, and serves only to perplex and mislead the student,—to conceal or obscure instead of disclosing and illustrating the truth. The learned and estimable author would, if he will permit us to say so, have greatly abridged his own labors and those of his readers, if he had meditated more attentively the importance of settling the question of principles before proceeding to that of method. It is not the method that finds and settles the principles, but the principles that disclose and determine the method. It was M. Cousin's mistake,—a mistake which modern philosophy owes in great measure to René Descartes,—of making the question of method in the study of philosophy precede the question of principles, that has prevented him from taking rank with the greatest philosophers of ancient or modern times. But for that mistake, instead of an unscientific Eclecticism, sure to run into a more unscientific Syncretism, he would have given us a sound and living synthetic philosophy. Yet M. Cousin has great merits, and we should have taken it kindly in our author, if, while pointing out the errors of his illustrious countryman, he had shown himself more ready to recognize those merits, and to award him the honor he deserves for the services he has unquestionably rendered to philosophy in France.

In the classification of schools, the Abbé Hugonin is a decided ontologist, and like all the ontologists of his country we are acquainted with, too much under the influence of Père Malebranche to suit either our taste or our judgment. Malebranche was, we admit, a great philosophical genius,

and in his theory of Vision in God revived a great truth, which the prevalence of Peripateticism had caused to be well-nigh forgotten. He was a great improvement upon Descartes, but he left philosophy one-sided as he found it. He did not, and could not with his theory, legitimately assert any thing but a simply possible universe. He asserted essences but not existences, and left the vital question of the relation between essence and existence, *esse* and *existere*, unsolved. As an ontologist, the learned Abbé has in these volumes established that thought is not a purely subjective fact, that it is governed by laws independent of the subject, and that it depends for its production on the object. By a profound analysis of thought he has proved that it contains invariably and necessarily, as the very condition of its existence, an ontological element which is its law, and identically real and necessary being. In this he establishes the reality and objectivity of ideas or the ideal element of thought, and refutes at once both those who make the object or the ideal the product of the subject, and those who maintain that being is no object of thought, and only phenomena are actually perceived. This, though it had been done before him, and is nothing new, original, or peculiar, is much, and we know of no one who has done it with greater depth of science, more thoroughly, or more conclusively. They who make philosophy purely subjective, or reduce it to mere phenomenology, denying all perception of the *noumenon*, are, in these volumes, so far as sound logic can go, reduced to silence forever.

In the discussion of ideas, essences, universals, genera, and species, and the different theories respecting them, the author is learned, profound and exhaustive. It may, perhaps, be a question whether he is quite just to Plato in reviving Aristotle's charge against him of regarding ideas as subsisting independently and outside of the Divine Being. From the little study we have been able to give to Plato's works, we think Aristotle either misunderstood or from rivalry wilfully misrepresented his theory of ideas. As we understand that theory, Plato held that ideas are the essences or realities of things, what in the variable and perishing things of sense we must know in order to have real science; that they are invariable, universal, and eternal, subsisting in the λόγος, the divine reason or wisdom, and independent of God only in the sense in which his essence, reason, or wisdom is independent of his power, or incapable of being changed by his

will. They subsist necessarily and eternally in the divine intelligence, are that intelligence itself, and the law according to which the divine will or power operates. God may produce any existence he pleases, but no existence contrary to the eternal conception of his own mind, which is only saying he cannot, from the very perfection of his nature, contradict his own wisdom or annihilate himself. On this point St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and our author, in making ideas the uncreated forms or essences of things subsisting in the Divine mind, immutable, stable, universal, and eternal, are, we think, only strict Platonists. Plato's error was not, as we understand him, that he made ideas which are necessary, invariable, universal, and eternal, distinguishable from God and independent of him, but that he asserted the preexistence of matter, and totally misconceived the creative act of being. In producing existences, God, according to Plato, simply impresses the idea, subsisting in his own mind, on the preëxisting matter, as the seal upon wax, and this too whether we speak of the production of the soul or of the body, which on the one hand asserts the Pythagorean dualism, and on the other denies the substantiality of existence, since the impression made by the seal has no existence in the seal, and no substantive existence in the wax, distinct from the wax itself, which involves a double pantheism, the one spiritual, the other material. If we trace Platonism in its historical developments, we shall find that, when unrestrained by Christian theology, it has invariably tended to dualism, pantheism, or both at the same time. But, however this may be, the author holds ideas to be objective, and the essences—*essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ* of the schoolmen, subsisting in God himself as the concepts of his own eternal reason, identical, since God is *actus simplicissimus*, with his own real, eternal, and necessary being.

The author distinguishes very properly between idea or essence and existence. The essence is being. It does not *exist*, it *is*, and is the Divine concept or conception of an existence, which may, but does not exist; or, in other words, of his own perfections or the plenitude of his own being. From our point of view the essence or idea is simply possibility; from the point of view of being, it is the power or ability of being to produce existence. What the author means by existence, as distinguished from the idea or essence, is not very easy to collect, but he seems to regard it as the actuation of essence, or the concretion of the idea, and terms

it limited being. Ideas or essences are possible existences, the eternal concepts of the Divine intelligence, and really the Divine being itself. We think them in the ontological element of thought, and really perceive them in perceiving being as we perceive being in perceiving them. But essences are not existences, and the perception of them, which is the perception of being, is not the perception of existences. What we perceive in the Divine Being is not existence, but the Divine being itself, and in perceiving the essence in God we make not the slightest advance towards the perception of existences. How, then, do we perceive existences or the physical essence? The author, if we do not mistake his meaning, holds that we perceive them in or by their ideal or metaphysical essences; that is, the actual in or by the possible. But essences are not existences, for existences are not being. How, then, can we perceive existences even in or by their essence? Here is the difficulty

The author takes his point of departure in thought, not in thought as a purely subjective fact, but thought in its contents, or the reality presented in it. Reducing thought to its simplest form, or simple perception, he finds that it simultaneously and invariably contains two elements, subject and object, subject thinking, and object thought. The object is distinct from, and independent of, the subject thinking. In perceiving the subject is passive, receives, but does not produce the perception. The object, in the act of thinking, is not produced, sought, or found, but presents itself as the necessary objective element of thought. It is precisely because it so presents itself that it is perceived, or rather its presentation of itself is the perception. Without the object there is nothing to be perceived, and therefore no perception; for to perceive nothing, and not to perceive, are one and the same thing. Then the law of thought, that which governs it, determines it, makes it what it is, and forbids it to be otherwise, is the object. We think the object such, because it is such, not because we are such. Hence what we will call the first law of thought,—the author calls it a fact of thought,—is that every thought must and does present the object, as well as the subject, and present it distinct from, and independent of, the subject.

The object, the author tells us, is idea, or the idea of being; and the idea of being, is being perceived or thought. Only ideas are immediately perceived, for only being is intelligible *per se*, and they are always perceived as univer-

sal, invariable, eternal, and necessary, and therefore are and must be the one real, universal, necessary, immutable, and eternal being; that is, if we consider it, the Divine being itself. Hence the law of thought is ontological, is being; and therefore the second law of thought is, the direct and immediate object perceived in every perception, must be and is real and necessary being, or the Divine being itself, who is the truth perceived, and the light by which we perceive it and whatever else we perceive or know.

But here is the precise difficulty. The law of thought, as asserted by the author, is purely ontological, and he restricts the object of perception to being alone. Hence he says, positively, existences except the soul perceiving or receiving the perception, are not perceived,—are not perceptions. We perceive or have intuitive perception of being, the Divine Being, and our percipient soul. How, then, do we arrive at the knowledge of existences? We cannot know them in their metaphysical essences, for that would be saying that we know them in God; but we cannot know them where they are not, and, though essences are in God, existences are not. We cannot know them in the percipient soul, for the soul contains no existence but its own. We know existences, the author says, by their essence; not by perceptions, but by a judgment, which, as he defines it, is not their act, but ours. But how explain a subjective judgment, which, with the perception only of essence or being, and our own soul, enables us to affirm scientifically existences distinguishable, on the one hand, from the essence, and on the other, from the soul? A judgment, to be a judgment, must have three distinct terms—subject, predicate, and copula. The copula at once unites and distinguishes the other two terms, and forms them into a synthesis, an organic whole. To be a valid judgment, the three terms must be perceived, and therefore be objective and real. We cannot understand, then, a real judgment, when one of its terms is unperceived and therefore unnoted. The author says the copula in every judgment, expressed by the verb *is* or *to be*, is being. We perceive, then, the copula in perceiving being, but what and where are the subject and predicate when it concerns affirming existences, of which we have no perception? He also makes being in every judgment the attribute or predicate. Thus the judgment would be, existences are being, which is as false as the judgment, being is existence, even if we

had the notion of existence, which we are supposed not to have. In either case the judgment has but two terms; in the former the copula and predicate, in the latter the subject and copula are identical; the judgment, therefore, is no judgment at all. No judgment that affirms what is false, is or can be a real judgment, for the false cannot be affirmed, any more than it can be perceived,—a fact, which the author seems not to have duly considered. In every real or synthetic judgment, there must be three distinct terms, and every false judgment is really no judgment, because in it one of the terms is wanting. Hence if we make simple, quiescent being the copula, the only possible judgment will be, Being is being. With simple being for the copula, the judgment can affirm only being, because in that case we must make either the subject and copula, or the copula and predicate, identical. This fact may possibly require a slight revision of the peripatetic logic, still taught in the schools. In maintaining, after Bossuet, that the copula simply identifies the subject and predicate, the author can hardly escape pantheism. The copula unites, but does not identify them, for while it unites it distinguishes them.

The author deserves great credit for asserting thought or perception as a synthesis of subject and object, but he seems to forget that for a proper synthesis, there is necessary a term which he does not include in the primitive perception, a term too without which, we venture to say, neither of the others is perceptible, namely, the relation between subject and object, the real *nexus* or copula that distinguishes and unites the subject and predicate in a real judgment. He adjourns, as we understand him, the discussion of this *nexus* or *copula* to his treatise on Cosmology, not yet forthcoming. How he will treat it there, we cannot say. He may, and we trust he will, accept it in its real character, and give it in its real place in his *principium*. Yet he must pardon us, if we say we see not how he can do it, without essentially modifying much he has said in the volumes before us. He has, so far as we can see, made no provision for it, for he restricts, or appears to restrict, thought to two terms, not only by naming and describing only two terms, but by denying the immediate perception of existences, and identifying the copula and predicate with being. He is bound by his own principles to take thought in its integrity, in all its real elements for his point of departure; and the third term, the relation between object and subject, between being and exist-

ence, is as real, as necessary, and as certain an element of thought as either of the other two. This relation, the real *nexus* of things, and therefore of the elements of perception, we all know from our theology at least, is the creative act of being producing existences from nothing. We never perceive object and subject, being and existence, without perceiving them in their real relation, because in perception, as the author maintains, we are passive, and only the real is perceived. He denies, indeed, the perception of all existences, except the soul, but if he concedes the perception of the soul, he must concede the perception of existence distinguishable from being. Existence cannot be perceived in itself, for it has no being in itself, and it is agreed that only being is intelligible either *in se* or *per se*. Existences cannot be perceived in being, for what is in being, is being, and existence is not being, but distinguishable from it. It is perceived by being, we grant; but it can be perceived, for only the real is perceived, by being, only in the sense that it exists by being, therefore only in its real relation to being. Existence is by being because it is from being, and it is from being only *mediante actu entis creativo*, and therefore can be perceived only *mediante* that act, and consequently by the perception of that act itself, the real relation or copula between it and being.

The author has failed to see this, by failing to note that every perception,—*intuition* is the word we prefer,—is a real judgment, with the three necessary terms of a judgment, subject, predicate, and copula. He denies this, and maintains that in perception we are passive; in judgment we act. Every judgment affirms; perception simply apprehends without affirming. Without *our* affirming, we grant; but not without an affirmation on the part of the object, otherwise there would be no perception, since the affirmation of the object to us by itself is precisely what is meant by the perception, and it is this simple fact that gives objective validity to the perception and saves it from being a purely subjective mode or affection. In perception the object presents itself, and to present itself to the subject perceiving is precisely to affirm that it is or exists. The judgment which is our act must be a reflective judgment, and as reflection supplies no element or term not included in the perception, however you distinguish between perception and judgment, you must concede that perception embraces all the terms essential to the judgment, and as there is no judgment with-

out the three terms, subject, predicate, and copula, you must concede that these three terms are immediately perceived as the three terms of an ideal or objective judgment. Without this objective or ideal judgment, we can form no subjective or reflective judgment, because without it we have not and cannot have the three terms essential to every judgment whether subjective or objective, since it will not do, as the author very well knows, to assume that the subject creates or supplies from itself the terms or any one of the terms of its judgment. To do that would plunge us into humanitarian pantheism. It was the error of Leroux.

The law of thought as defined by the author makes being the copula and the predicate of the judgment, and therefore, as being, not existence, must be the subject, he can affirm only being is, *ens est*, and there, as it seems to us, his philosophy begins and ends. Being contains all the terms of a judgment in itself, for who says being, says being is, and therefore being is the adequate object of its own intelligence. Hence God who is being contains the perfection of his own attributes in himself, and is, as the schoolmen say, after Aristotle, *actus purissimus*, most pure act, and has no need to go out of himself for his perfection or his beatitude. The law of thought is rightly defined to be ontological, in the sense that being supplies the copula, but not in the sense that being is it, for that would imply that the subject and predicate are identical, and the judgment would be either that existence is being, or being is existence, the soul perceiving is God, or God is the soul perceiving. The copula, since it cannot be being in itself, must be supplied by being, be being in its act, and therefore the copula must be the creative act of being, and the ideal or objective judgment, the law of every human judgment, will not be *ens est* nor *existens* or *existentia est ens*, but *ens creat existentias*, or being creates existences, a judgment that expresses the real order or the real relation of things,—*ordo rerum*. The mistake is precisely in supposing that we perceive existence as *ens*, and in making *ens* simply, and not *ens creans*, or being in its creative act, the copula of the judgment. The judgment, as we state it, confounds none of the terms, but preserves them united indeed, yet distinct.

Certainly it does not enter into our head for one moment to accuse the learned and estimable author of denying the creative act; all we mean is that he does not regard it as a primitive perception, or intuition, and fails to include it as

one of the original and essential elements of thought. He omits it from his *primum philosophicum*, and thus fails to include in it all our primitive notions, without which philosophy is not and cannot be a science. Thought, as he presents it, is inadequate, and does not give us all our primitive notions in its synthesis. He is right in holding that only being is intelligible *per se*, and that existences are intelligible only by being, and by a real judgment; but we think he is wrong in supposing that the judgment by which they are affirmed is a judgment made by us in the light of being, and not a judgment made by being itself and simply perceived by us, or in supposing that it is being in itself and not being in its act that renders existences intelligible. Being creates existences, and in creating illumines them; so the medium of our apprehension of them is not our reflective judgment, as we understand him to hold, but the creative act itself, affirmed to us in simple perception as really and as truly as being, or as our own soul as the thinking subject. Thought is then not a perception of one or even two terms only, but is, as M. Cousin, among others, has fully proved in his analysis of what he calls the fact of consciousness, "simultaneously and indissolubly composed of three indestructible elements, subject, object, and their relation." The relation he calls the form of the thought.

M. Cousin's principal merit as a philosopher, and by no means a small merit, lies in his assertion of thought as a synthesis, embracing at once, and indissolubly, subject, object, and their relation. He rightly called the relation the form of the thought, or the copula of the judgment, as we say, although he appears never to have suspected its real character. He made the synthesis, as he understood it, the basis of his Eclecticism, but misconceiving the form or copula, and failing to identify it with the creative act of being, or at least with that act in its real character, he failed to give us a true synthetic philosophy, and left his eclecticism to run now into pantheism, now into pure subjectivism, or to expire in an unscientific syncretism, which embraces truth and error without discrimination. Leroux, who deserves, as a profound philosophical thinker, more credit than he usually receives from his countrymen, appreciated far better than M. Cousin the importance of the formula, and rightly conceived that the relation or the form of the thought, is the act of the force producing the thought; but, by a mistake, not unlike the one we have pointed out

in our author, he confounded this force or being with the subject; regarded the individual man as merely phenomenal, as, in his language, *sensation-sentiment-connaissance*, and placed all productive power in humanity or the race, thus falling into a peculiar sort of humanitarian pantheism. The merit of Leroux consists in having identified the form with the act of being; his error consists in mistaking the character of the act, and placing the being, or the productive force, on the side of the subject, instead of the side of the object, which, logically, forced him to assert humanity as God. The Italian Abbate Gioberti, a theologian, and a man of rare philosophical genius, followed, saw, and avoided the vagueness and uncertainty of Cousin and the fatal error of Leroux, detected and described the real character of the relation, the copula, or form of the thought—derived it, not as did Leroux, from the subject, but from the object, and showed it to be the creative act of being, by which being produces all things or existences from nothing, or *sine causa materiali*, by its own omnipotent energy, thus identifying the synthesis of thought with the real synthesis of things, being and existence. He thus identified the *ordo sciendi* with the *ordo rerum*. Henceforth, philosophy was, what it had never hitherto been, a possible science—the science of reality, not the science of mere abstractions, which, since abstractions are nullities, is no science at all.

It may seem a bold assertion, but we do not hesitate to say, that prior to the perfection of the Giobertian formula, philosophy was not, and could not be, a science. Science is the reproduction in reflection of the real in its synthesis, and before the recognition in its place of the real copula of being and existence, that was not possible. Science is science of the true, and not of the false, and the truth could not be scientifically asserted while its elements could not be asserted with their real *nexus*. In theology, we have and know the truth, truth itself; but we need only a glance at the history of philosophy, to be aware, that philosophy, as a separate science, has never accorded with the ontology asserted by Christian theology. We find it always dualistic and pantheistic as with Pythagoras and Plato, or dualistic, sensistic, nihilistic, as with Aristotle and the peripatetics;—pantheistic with the mediæval realists and the modern ontologists;—sensistic, atheistic, nihilistic, with the mediæval nominalists and modern psychologists. Always do we find it when left to itself, when free to develop its own principles

according to the natural logic of the human mind, running from one direction or another athwart the only ontology that accords with our faith as Christians; always has the great struggle in thinking minds been to accord philosophy and theology, and the great problem of our age, as all the world bears witness, is the reconciliation of reason and faith, so as to bring into mutual harmony all the elements of man's intellectual life. Out of the Church, men attempt this, by modifying their faith, so as to make it accord with what they call their reason; inside the Church, there may be individuals who wish it were lawful for them to do the same; but they, who are *of* as well as *in* the Church, pocket their philosophical formulas when it comes to matters of faith; and believe what the Church teaches, because they know she is infallible through the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and cannot deceive them.

The fact cannot be denied, and hence we find men of strong, practical good sense in every age, from St. Irenæus down to our own times, looking with distrust on all metaphysical speculations, and discountenancing them as far more likely to perplex the mind, and to generate doubts and difficulties which philosophy cannot solve, than to aid any one either in comprehending or in adhering to the truth. It is all very well to tell these men that what they set their faces against is a false philosophy, that there is no discrepancy between reason and faith, and can be none between true philosophy and Christian theology; but where is that true philosophy, or that exposition of natural reason between which and Christian faith there is no discrepancy? It is as unwise to reason against facts as to kick against the pricks. You may talk to us in grandiloquent terms of your pretended Christian philosophy, but though studying the question for no mean portion of our life, we confess, we have never yet been able to find your boasted Christian philosophy. There is no such thing recognized in any of your schools, orthodox or heterodox, as a philosophy that accords with Christianity. Separate from theology, disjoined from the dogma, and taken as an independent science of natural reason, philosophy is Gentilistic, and remains to this day, unless the ideal formula be accepted, substantially, where it was left by Plato and Aristotle. Certainly, the great theologians of the Church, in setting forth, elucidating, and vindicating the Catholic dogma, reason justly, and use sound philosophy, but not one of these same theologians gives us,

outside of theology, unconnected with the dogma, a philosophy, or science of reason, that is complete, self-coherent, and accordant with the Catechism. St. Augustine avoids the chief errors of Plato, and gives us much, more perhaps than any other Father of the Church, that must enter into every sound system of philosophy; but a complete and adequate system of philosophy, a full and complete science of natural reason, he certainly has not given us. St. Thomas, when he uses natural reason as a theologian in face of the dogma, seldom, if ever, errs, but when he leaves theology, and speaks *ex professo*, as an independent philosopher, he is a peripatetic, and can by no means be always followed with perfect security. No man, however ingenious, can free his philosophy from the charge of conceptualism, another name for nominalism, or reconcile his peripatetic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, with the ontology presupposed by faith. That maxim logically involves the sensism of Locke and Condillac, which, as all the world knows, leads to materialism, atheism, scepticism, nihilism. No doubt, St. Thomas holds, as did Aristotle himself, that we have, through the intelligible species, extracted by the *intellectus agens* from the sensible species or phantasms, a real cognition of the intelligible or non-sensible, as Locke pretended to have in reflection another source of ideas than sensation; but this, in a systematic point of view, is no relief, because we have, in the way pretended, no real cognition of the non-sensible, and because if we had, it would only be in contradiction of the maxim assumed. St. Thomas was a great theologian, a man of rare gifts; he knew and loved the truth, and he would adhere to the truth, whether he adhered to his system or not, and much preferred contradicting himself to contradicting that. If so much may be said of these two greatest theologians of the Church, we need name no others.

We know the ideal formula, asserted by Gioberti, is not in good repute in certain quarters, and we have read much, very little to the purpose however, that has been written against it. Men who follow the traditions of the schools, and who never suffer themselves to think beyond the cahiers of the master, or to look at things themselves, save through the blurred pages of their text-books, must find it really difficult to recognize the truth of a formula, which no hydraulic pressure can force within their own narrow and inexpansive systems, and which necessarily shivers them to atoms. Men

of this sort deserve our sympathy, not our reproaches. If the formula be accepted, though strictly in accord with theology and the truth of things, their old formulas are useless lumber, and the greater part of their labor on abstractions, and to overcome difficulties created by their own speculative systems, must be confessed to have been so much labor expended for nothing. Yet, it seems to us that a moderate acquaintance with the history of philosophy would suffice to satisfy men who think for themselves—where free thought is not only permissible, but a duty—that unless that formula be accepted, and the real relation between being and existence be asserted in our *primum philosophicum*, it is idle to strive for a philosophical science that shall accord either with Christian faith, or with common sense. Without it, your philosophy will always either lose the object in asserting the subject, or the subject in asserting the object, and by losing either lose both, or, with Hegel, end by declaring the absolute identity of being and not-being. We undertake no defence of Gioberti as a man, a politician, or an Italian patriot, but we will never suffer our dislike of the person to prejudice us against the truth he asserts. We have no sympathy with his war on the illustrious Society of Jesus—a society we love and honor; we have never been able to read, without indignation, his *Gesuita Moderno*, or his *Del Rinnovamento civile d' Italia;* we find much in his *Del Bello*, his *Del Buono*, and in his *Del Primato*, that we cannot accept; we are far from clear in our own mind as to the faculty he calls *sovrintelligenza*, and which he seems to make a sort of natural bridge between the natural and the supernatural, over which the supernatural may pass and unite itself with the natural; we regret, for his sake, that he did not bear with Christian meekness and patience, the opposition he encountered, when, in his own judgment, he did not deserve to be opposed, instead of yielding, as he would seem to have done, to the dictates of offended pride and wounded vanity. But, we have nothing to do with any thing of this sort. The whole contribution he has made to philosophy is in asserting the creative act of being as a fact of primitive intuition, as the copula of the divine judgment, which must be taken as our *primum philosophicum*, and which is the law, type, and model of every human judgment, in so far as the human judgment is a real judgment. This contribution he has made, and it were cowardly and ungrateful not to give him credit for it. Yet what Gioberti

may have said or not said, may have done or not done, except so far as it bears on this point, does not concern us as a philosopher. It is true, he has asserted the ontological element of thought, and proved that the intelligible is real and necessary being, but this had been done before him, by Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Malebranche, Thomassin, Leibnitz, Fénelon, Gerdil, indeed by all the so-called ontologists. On this point, we needed little more than we had received from Plato through St. Augustine. Others had identified the ideal with the intelligible, and the intelligible with real and necessary being; but no philosopher before him had, so far as our knowledge extends, shown, or even asserted, that the being with which the ideal or intelligible is identical, is not being in itself, not simply quiescent being, being perceived or contemplated in itself, but being creating existence, thus presenting the ideal, not as a unity, but as a synthesis, embracing at once being in its act *ad extra*, and the act in its effect or product—being not as the essence of existence, but as creating existence. This may well be included under the head of being because existence, that is, the creature, is being *mediante actu entis creativo*. Gioberti supplied the *nexus* between being and existence—not by supplying independently of the other two terms conceived to be known without it, the copula needed to unite them, but by showing that the copula is perceived with the other two terms in its proper relation, and that neither of these two terms is ever perceived without it. All Gentile philosophy had overlooked or denied the creative act of being, at least had failed to include it in its *principium*. This was the grand defect of Gentile philosophy, that which ruined it. The Fathers asserted creation, but they borrowed the notion from theology, never included it in their *principium*, and, at best, made it only an *addendum* to philosophy, or a late deduction from principles subsequently taken up. The scholastics, no doubt, have long reasonings to prove creation, or the creative act of being asserted by faith, but they, one and all, omit it from their *principium;* and while, as theologians, they speak in due terms of creator and creature, as philosophers they speak of *ens simpliciter* and *ens secundum quid*, *ens infinitum* and *ens finitum*, unlimited being and limited being, as do all our modern ontologists, even our author, Professor Ubaghs of Louvain, and M. l'Abbé Branchereau, the estimable author of *Prælectiones Philosophicæ*, really, in its second edition,

one of the very best manuals of philosophy we are acquainted with, thus making the difference between being and existence, or God and man, a simple limitation or negation. Defined *per genus*, as they say in the schools, God and man are the same: defined *per differentiam*, God is unlimited, and man is limited being. The *differentia* is the limitation. It is not difficult to understand this in an Aristotle, who denied creation and asserted the eternity of the world, but we do not understand it in a Christian who asserts in his very *credo*, that God is the maker of all things, visible and invisible. It is to no manner of purpose to admonish us that *ens* when applied to man is not used in the same sense —*univoce*—as when applied to God, and therefore, that God and man are not included in the same genus, for the scholastic term *ens* has really but one meaning, and is always used, whatever may be said to the contrary, *univoce*. *Ens finitum*, in that it is *ens*, does, in no sense, differ from *ens infinitum*, and *ens secundum quid*, if *ens* at all, is *ens simpliciter*. Being, if being, is always one and identical; and limited being, unless we use the term loosely for existence or *existentia*, is a contradiction in terms. All being is and must be unlimited, infinite, and therefore, to define existence, as so many do, to be the delimitation, or determination of essence or being, is to fall into the vice of pantheism, or rather, is simply absurd. The Abbé Hugonin says truly, idea, essence, or being, is always thought as one, universal, real, and necessary. Then, how can we speak of *limited* being? Existence is the production or creation, not the limitation of being. Whether we speak of being in itself, or being as the essence or archetype of existence, it is the one real, infinite, and necessary being, and is as unlimited as the being of man, as the being of God himself, and therefore it is the Apostle tells us we have our *being* in God.

It is true, we may speak of essences, possibilities, &c., in the plural, but these terms express conceptions, not intuitions, and they are plural only in the respect that being, in which they subsist, and which they are, may create many existences. The plurality is in the existence, not in the essence, for there is no distinction *in re* between *essentia* and *esse*. The ideas, essences, essential forms of things, which, according to Plato, are the original types, models, or paradigms of things subsisting in the Divine Reason or Intelligence, are not in reality, or in simple perception, distinguishable from the Divine being itself. In intuition they

are not distinguished at all. Conceived as types, or models of existences, they are the Divine intelligence; conceived as the possibilities of existences, they are the Divine power, omnipotence, or ability to create existences according to the eternal concepts of Divine wisdom. But as there is no real distinction, and in the perceptive order no distinction at all, between *essentia* and *esse*, neither *distinctio rationis*, nor *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*, between the Divine being and the Divine attributes, or between one attribute and another. Since God is *actus simplicissimus*, they are on the side of being one in the unity of being. The plurality, the diversity, the limitation, are then in the existence, and not in the essence.

The Abbé Hugonin distinguishes, though not with perfect accuracy, between perception and reflection, which is highly important, but we fear he falls into the common error of confounding them in the actual construction of his philosophy. All perception is synthetic; all reflection is analytic; perception presents the real and the concrete; reflection analyzes and represents the abstract and the possible. Reflection is, of course, the instrument of philosophy, but it is necessary that it take its principles from perception or intuition, and that it take all the principles intuitively presented in their real relation. It is also necessary that it take care not to transport into the *principium*, or include among our primitive notions, any conception of its own. It is the neglect of this rule that has led philosophers to suppose that they could perceive being apart from the creative act, or existence apart from its relation to being, from which it proceeds and on which it depends. We can do this in the reflective order; we may abstract the notion of being, consider it by itself, and construct the science of ontology; we may abstract the notion of the creative act, and construct the science of cosmology; we may abstract the notion of existence and construct psychology and the natural sciences, or we may take the three terms in their synthesis and construct philosopy or natural theology. But because we can conceive the terms separately, we must not suppose that we *perceive* them separately, or that we derive by reflection the notions of creation and existence from the notion of being. Notions are always from perception, never from reflection; for reflection can add nothing to perception, or enable us to note any thing beyond the matter intuitively presented or affirmed; a fact the philosopher must never lose sight of.

Yet it is precisely by losing sight of this fact and confounding the two orders, that the author is led to suppose that we perceive essences, and existences in or by their essences; meaning, as we presume he does, not the physical or created essence, which is the nature of the thing itself, as distinguished from its modes or accidents, but the metaphysical essence, that is, mere possibility. We do not perceive the essence, and then proceed to the existence; first, because the existence is not in the essence, and in perceiving essences we perceive only being; second, because the actual is not inferable from the possible; since *argumentum a posse ad esse, non valet;* third, because we do not perceive the essence, or the possible as essence, or as possible at all, for we only perceive being in which is the essence or the power to create existences. Essence or possibility, formally such, is not a perception, but a conception formed by reflection from the notions of being and existence, as the author proves in a masterly manner in proving that the perception is real, or that the being perceived is always real and necessary being, and in refuting Rosmini, who asserts *ens in genere*, or mere possible being, as the primitive notion. It is the same neglect to keep the two orders distinct, that leads to the supposition that we perceive being and existence without perceiving the relation between them. The relation between essence and existences, that is, between real and necessary being and contingent existences, in plain words, between God and man, our author says, is a mystery. Between them there is a gulf natural reason can neither fill up nor bridge over. We see the two terms, but the *nexus* that unites them is shrouded in thick and impenetrable darkness. Why, then, talk of philosophy, and puzzle our brains and bewilder our understanding with subtile abstractions and wire-spun speculations, that do and can amount to nothing? It is impossible to perceive existence out of the creative act that produces it, for out of that it is nothing, and nothing cannot be perceived. Hence the author tells us in another place that existences are not perceived, that we perceive only being and our soul perceiving. Then we have only two notions, the notion of being and the notion of soul perceiving. These two notions then constitute our *principium*, and nothing can be admitted to be or to exist not contained in these two notions. The notion of existence cannot be derived from the notion of being, unless it is contained in the notion of being, and if contained in the notion of

being God must be necessarily a creator, and can be only inasmuch as he is a *cause*, and a cause *ad extra*,—the error of Cousin, which makes the universe a necessary unfolding, development, or manifestation of God,—decided pantheism. Take, then, the notion of the soul perceiving. The soul perceiving conceived not as united to God and distinguished from him by the creative act, can be conceived only as *ens*, and then it is put in the place of God, and nothing can be asserted not contained in the radical notion of being. We are here forced to the same conclusion we were before, only in this case we identify the soul with being, and call ourselves God,—the doctrine of the Transcendentalists. The universe is then simply a progressive development of the *Ego*, *le moi*, the *me*, and we must claim the Incommunicable Name for our *Ego*, and each of us say of himself, I AM WHO AM. Take the two notions without the notion of the *nexus* or relation, and you have simply the conception of two real, necessary, independent, self-existing beings, each infinite, which we need not say is simply absurd.

It would surprise us, if we did not know the force of routine, after all our experience in every age and on every side, of the fatal consequences of attempting to operate with the ontological notion alone, or with the psychological notion alone, or with both without their real *nexus*, to find men who are deficient neither in acuteness nor in comprehensiveness failing to perceive that unless the two notions are united by a third in the *principium* or ideal judgment, so as to form a real synthesis, a living organism, philosophy is an impossible science, a vain, indeed a mischievous illusion, and that the conflict between it and theology must be interminable. Even making all allowance for routine, it strikes us as remarkable that philosophy, as taught in all our schools, orthodox as well as heterodox, should, as a separate and independent science of reason we mean, not in its connection with dogma, present, after two thousand years of Christian faith and instruction, the very gap it presented under Gentilism. If that gap in its *principium* be inevitable, if natural reason be unable to fill it up by including the creative act in the ideal judgment, why do we still look upon philosophy as a legitimate study, and why has it not long since been banished from our schools, and relegated to the dark regions of the occult sciences and the black art? Why perpetuate a miserable sham? Why not have the courage to look the truth in the face?

Certainly we are far enough from pretending that we can comprehend the mystery of creation. Natural reason cannot comprehend that mystery any more than it can the mysteries of grace. In creation, as well as in redemption, God works in a way incomprehensible to us; but that is not saying that we cannot by natural reason both apprehend and comprehend the fact that he does work. Certainly we cannot comprehend the creative act, but it does not therefore follow, that we have not an intuitive apprehension of it as the *nexus* that unites and distinguishes being and existence. There is no more mystery in *ens creans* than in simply *ens*, and it is only in or through *ens creans* or being creating our intelligence and presenting *ens* as its immediate object and light, that *ens* or being itself is perceived by us, for otherwise there would be no *us*. We should neither exist as intelligent existence nor as existence at all.

We must beware of exaggerating our perception of being. We perceive being *by* itself indeed, but not *in* itself. *Ens* is intelligible *per se*, not intelligible to us in our present state, *in se*. To be intelligible to us *in se*, we must be able by our own act to see God in himself, which is not possible without that elevation of our nature, or that assimilation to the divine nature, which theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, and which is the reward of the Blest in heaven. In this state of existence, we cannot behold being face to face and see as we are seen. We perceive being *per se*, but to perceive being *per se* is to perceive it only by its affirmation of itself. Its affirmation of itself is an act, the creative act itself, creating and illuminating our intelligence, or the very percipient subject that receives the affirmation. It is being, as the learned Abbé admirably proves, that presents and affirms itself, and hence we know being only by the act of being. It is thus we understand the words of the great Apostle of the Gentiles: "Invisibilia . . . ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas." Romans i. 20. Not that either being or the invisible things of being are deduced, concluded, or obtained by reasoning from the things which are made, but *conspiciuntur*, are clearly seen by the creative act of being, since by that act they are *intellecta*, *νοούμενα*, or affirmed to our intellect or noetic faculty.

The learned author sees this and in reality asserts it, though he apparently does not appreciate the full force of

his language, when he asserts that being which is the object perceived is truth, not a quiescent or sterile truth, but living truth, truth in its activity and fecundity. Where to us he seems to err is in restricting the object or the ideal to the purely ontological, which really gives him as his *principium* only the notion of pure being. From the notion of pure being he seems to us to derive the notion of essence or possibility; indeed at times he seems to confound the notion of being with the notion, or rather, conception of essences, the mere possibilities of things, which involves the radical error of Rosmini. But though being contains the essences of things, yet the notion of being is not itself the notion of essences. The conception of being as essence, whether we take the essence in the sense of archetype or possibility, is an abstract conception posterior to the notion of being and that of existence. The ideal must embrace more than the notion of pure being, and if restricted to the ontological, the ontological must be understood to include all that is affirmed ontologically, or by being in the primitive intuition. The notion of pure being does not contain either the notion of creation or that of existence, actual or possible. We therefore cannot accept the theory of Père Malebranche, that we see all things in God. We see things *per Deum*, not *in Deo*. We see *in Deo* only *Deum*. From the notion of pure being, we can obtain only the notion of pure being, and the notion, or conception rather, of essence, is obtained by reflection operating on the joint notions given us in the ideal judgment, and is a fact of experience, as is maintained by Aristotle against Plato. We cannot assume that the notion of being contains the notion either of creation or existence, actual or possible, without assuming that God is necessarily a creator, therefore that *being* is in *doing* or causing, and thus falling into the nihilism of Hegel, that creation is Infinite Possibility realizing itself, or progressively filling up the infinite void in its own being. Then to escape this ontological nihilism, if we may use the terms which exactly express the Hegelian contradiction, and also psychological nihilism, which would equally follow, if we were to take the notion of our personal existence with René Descartes for our *principium*, we must extend the object so that it embraces not only the *primum ontologicum* but also the *primum psychologicum* in their real synthesis, expressed in the ideal judgment, or judgment made not by us, but by being itself to us, that is, Being creating existences, which

gives us the primitive notions of being, creation, existence, and therefore of all the *knowable*, since they are the notions of all the real. Nothing is knowable but the real, and all the real is being, being itself, its act, and the product of its act. What is not being is existence, and what is not existence is being. God and creature are the only two possible categories; what is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God. In these two categories then, and their *nexus*, is necessarily included all the real, and therefore all the knowable.

This formula we call ideal, because it is the object of thought, or what is affirmed in thought; we call it ontological, although it includes the *primum psychologicum* as well as the *primum ontologicum*, because the affirmation is made by being and not by the soul, or subject thinking. The truth of the formula no Christian does or can dispute. The dispute is as to whether it is really given in the primitive intuition, or only arrived at by reasoning as the last word of philosophy. Some admit the notion of being to be primitive; some hold that the notion of existence or the soul is primitive; none, prior to Gioberti, so far as we are informed, have admitted the notion of creation to be primitive, that is, directly and immediately perceived. The only objection that we have to meet is that the three terms of the formula, at least one or more of them, are not perceived or affirmed to us in direct and immediate intuition, and if entertained at all, are obtained from reflection. This object we have already met and refuted in showing, as we think we have done, that unless the three terms are given in immediate intuition, no judgment, no thought even, is possible. If you ask us to go further and prove that we really do think, we must beg to be excused; for we have nothing but thought with which to prove thought, as happily you have nothing but thought with which to question, doubt, or deny thought. Thought thinks itself, and in thinking affirms itself. We cannot go behind thought, and from principles more ultimate than those given in thought demonstrate that we think. We can show that what we think is not ourselves projected, is distinct from and independent of us; we can show that we cannot think without thinking the object, and that the object is the very law of the thought, as the Abbé Hugonin admirably and amply proves; but we cannot prove that those notions we assert enter into every thought or are immediately perceived, except by proving that they are the necessary

principles of thought, and that there can be no thought without them. Further than this we concede we cannot go, but further than this proof in no case ever does or can go, or is ever demanded by any who understands himself.

Principles are given, not found, not demonstrated. Demonstration does not affirm its principles, for it always proceeds from them as already known, or assumed to be known. The mind cannot act or even exist without principles. It does not without principles go forth weeping and wailing, like the poor Isis, in search of principles, for till it has principles, it cannot act, cannot even exist, for the principles are the very elements of its life. All the principles essential to its existence as intelligent existence must be given it in the very instant of its creation, for without them there is not only no thought, no intelligent act, but no intelligence, no mind to think or perceive. These essential principles, the elements of all intellectual power and vitality in the soul, we have proved, are the three terms of th ideal formula, and the affirmation of these three terms by being creates and illumines the thinking substance itself, which is at once the product and recipient of the affirmation. Being creates the thinking subject in and by the very act by which it affirms itself its immediate object and light. The principles are not principles presented or supplied to a mind conceived as existing prior to the presentation and without them. Precisely what we mean, is that without them the thinking substance is not created, does not exist. The affirmation is the creation of the soul itself, and the three terms in their living union are the elements of its intellectual existence and vitality. Unless, therefore, the three terms are given intuitively, in immediate perception, no perception, no thought, no intellectual operation, no human act of any kind is possible, for there is no intellectual subject, no *vis activa*. Having proved that these three terms are the essential elements of our intellectual life, and that there can be no thought without their immediate perception, we have proved that they are immediately perceived, if thought be a fact. The only point we have not proved is that there is thought, and that needs no proof, for it thinks or affirms itself, both apodictically and empirically.

Here we might stop, for our argument requires not another word; but we will add a few considerations by way of explanation and confirmation. We hardly need advertise the philosophical reader that in representing the three

terms of the ideal judgment as immediately perceived, we are not speaking of an empirical perception, which is the act of the subject, what the author calls a judgment, and which we form by means of a contingent fact taken from experience, and the apodictic element supplied by the ideal judgment; but we are speaking of a perception *à priori*, a perception which precedes our perceptive act, a perception which is the judgment of being, the principle of the ideal formula, and of which the subject is the simple spectator or recipient. It is the origin, the law, the necessary condition *à priori* of every empirical judgment, or perception, in the same sense and for the same eason, that the creative act is the origin, the law, and the condition of existences themselves. What renders so many unwilling or unable to admit this *à priori* perception, is that they confound it with empirical perception, and recognize no perception which is not primarily the act of the percipient subject. Certain that they have no empirical perception in the case, they feel perfectly authorized to deny that there is any perception at all. There is no perception in their sense of the word, and which, we believe, is its ordinary and natural sense. To *perceive* is an active verb, and by its own force implies that we seize the object, rather than that the object affirms itself to us. We do not approve its use in the author's sense, and we rarely use it ourselves, except to express an empirical fact, for we admit no distinction between judgment and perception, and hold that every perception is a judgment. We use it in this article simply because it is the official term of the author we are reviewing; but the term we prefer is intuition, a *looking on*, which presents us not as actors, but as spectators, or the whole judgment as the act of being, and therefore apodictic, and nothing as empirical or subjective but the mere reception of the judgment. Understanding by the intuition the judgment of being which places the subject and renders it percipient, and carefully distinguishing it from the empirical judgment or perception, which is our act in union with the apodictic judgment, the difficulty will vanish, and every one who understands the problem will see that the three terms of the ideal formula must be given *à priori* or intuitively by the act of being itself, and therefore are so given since here the *must* and the *is* are identical.

When we say the creative act is immediately perceived or given in immediate intuition, we by no means pretend that

we perceive it in an empirical judgment. The difficulty felt by men not unacquainted with philosophical studies, in admitting our assertion, arises, we apprehend, precisely from their not making this distinction between the empirical judgment and the judgment *à priori*. Certainly the creative act is not empirically perceived, for it has been well proved by Hume, and more especially by Kant, that the *nexus* between cause and effect is and can be no object of experience or empirical perception, and yet we cannot make a single proposition, or utter a single sentence, without assuming it. How could this be, if there did not enter into every empirical thought the non-empirical perception or intuition of that *nexus*? To say with Kant that it is a subjective form, is nonsense, for that would deny alike all empirical and all non-empirical perceptions. Our philosophers, though they exclude the notion of cause from their *principium*, yet undertake, before ending their course, to prove that the universe is created, and that God is creator, creating all things from nothing, by the omnipotent energy of his word alone. How is it that they do not perceive that they have, prior to commencing their demonstration, the notion of creation in their minds, and have everywhere been using it as the principle of their demonstration? Given the notion of being, the notion of creation does not follow, for the notion of being suffices for itself. Being is its own adequate object, and has its perfection in itself; nothing in the notion of it implies that it must or does create or produce *ad extra*. It cannot be deduced from the notion of existence, because it is not in existence, and because the notion of existence itself is not possible without the notion of creation.

The attempt to derive the notion of creation by way of logical deduction from the notion of being, presupposes that being is necessarily a creator, and ends, as we have seen, in pantheism. The attempt to derive it from the notion of existences, the more common attempt in our days, ends in modern deism, as gross an error as pantheism, and even more offensive to the religious sentiment. Pantheism is the error of a religiously-disposed, deism of an irreligiously-disposed mind; the one absorbs the act in the actor, the other the actor in the act; the one makes the creation a mode or affection of the Creator, the other withdraws the creation from God, and assumes that the creation, when once created, stands alone, and suffices for itself. In order

to suppose it possible to have the intuition of existences without the notion of creation, we must suppose them to be substances containing their own *substans*, or that which stands under and makes them *substantiæ* in relation to their own acts, affections, or phenomena. Well accredited philosophers do suppose this, and few suppose otherwise, except pantheists. They call existences substances, and define substance to be that which can be thought *per se*, not *tamquam in subjecto*. *Tamquam in subjecto* is, we suspect, an afterthought, and merely says the substance is not mode, affection, property, or attribute. If the existence is perceptible *per se*, it exists *per se;* and if it exists *per se*, although it may have been created, it contains in itself its own *substans*, and is *substans* as well as *substantia*. This is what we call deism, the error directly opposed to pantheism, and is the doctrine of those who profess to believe in God and creation, and yet deny Providence and supernatural revelation. The doctrine is well known. It calls God an artificer, a mechanic, and likens him to a watchmaker, and the universe to a watch, which, when once made, its springs and wheels properly adjusted, wound up, and set a-going, will go of itself—till run down. It forgets that the force or power that propels the machinery is independent both of the watch and its maker. The watchmaker creates nothing; he only uses materials and forces applied to his hand, only arranges his machinery, and adapts it to a force, which is neither in him nor in his mechanism. It makes *actus creativus actus transiens*, producing its effect and passing from it or ceasing, leaving the effect, as it assumes, to stand alone on its own two feet, or the universe, as the amusing Dr. Evariste Gypendole would say, to go ahead on its own hook. It disjoins Providence from creation, and authorizes pure Epicureanism. Existences depended on God to be created, it concedes, but now that they are created they exist in themselves, and suffice for themselves, and scarcely a cultivator of natural science ever looks beyond them. The laws of nature are sufficient. Perhaps he who created existences may annihilate them, or rather, change their forms; but as long as he suffers them to remain, they are independent of him in their operations, need not his concurrence, want nothing of him, but to be let alone. They have no occasion to think of him, and they have no wish for him to trouble himself about them. He may go to sleep up above, find delight or amusement in contemplating his own handiwork,

and observing how we carry on down here below, or busy himself in creating new worlds in the boundless regions of space. This horribly blasphemous doctrine, as unphilosophical as blasphemous, and which is pushed not unfrequently so far as to assert the inviolability of the laws of nature, and to deny the right and the possibility of supernatural intervention, is involved in the assumption that existences are perceptible by themselves without the perception of the creative act, or that the notion of creation may be derived, with our physico-theologists, from the notion of existence. We cannot derive the notion of creation from the notion of being; we cannot derive it from the notion of existence, and the only reason why people suppose that we can derive it from the notion of existence is, that they adopt, consciously or unconsciously, the deistical view of existences. That view is false. Existence is not being or *ens*, but it is in its essential notion *from* being—*ex-stare*, the *ex* always denoting *from*, or *out of*. It then is not perceptible without the perception of its relation to being. The very notion of it is the notion of that which is dependent, contingent, which cannot stand alone, which is not its own *substans*. To say that it is its own *substans*, is deism; to say that being is immediately its *substans*, is to make it a mode, affection, or attribute of being, and therefore pantheism. The *substans*, while it is from being, must be distinguished, on the one hand, from being, and from *substantia* or existence, on the other. But as the notion of existence includes the existence in its dependency, its contingency, or its relation to the *substans*, since the real not the unreal is perceived, as we have shown, it follows that the notion of existence is not possible without the notion of the *substans*, which must be the creative act of being. Do not say this makes the creative act an inference, not an intuition. The inference is not that there must be a creative act, although that would suffice for our purpose, but that the creative act, which we call the *substans*, not the *substantia*, must be perceived as the condition of perceiving existence, and therefore the notion cannot be derived from the notion of existence, and really is perceived, if existence is perceived, which last cannot be denied, because in every thought our own existence is affirmed, at least, as subject thinking.

The difficulty we experience on this point arises from the fact that we confound *substans* and *substantia*, just as we do *ens* and *existens*, being and existence. We call God sub-

stance, we call existence substance, and through nearly all our philosophical language runs the error that the *differentia* between being and existence, God and creation, is limitation, and that defined *per genus*, both are the same—an error not eliminated by the protest that is sometimes added. Hence we are perpetually vibrating between pantheism and deism, or between deism and atheism. May God forgive the philosophers! There is no calculating the amount of mischief they have done, and we fear that no little of the unbelief and shocking impiety we have everywhere to deplore must be finally laid to their charge. The *substans* is not being, for that would imply pantheism; it is not *substantia* or existence, for that would be deism. It is distinguishable from both, being and existence, and yet is not without being, nor is existence without it. It is the act of being creating existences. The error lies in regarding, on the one hand, the *actus creativus* as *actus transiens*, and on the other, in regarding it as *actus immanens* in the sense of producing only in the interior of the actor. The creative act does not simply produce its effect and pass over or from it, or cease with its simple production; for the cessation or passing over of the act would not leave the effect independent, or a *quasi*-independent existence, but would be the cessation or annihilation of the effect. Between being and existence there is only the creative act, and only the creative act between existence and nothing. Prescind the act, and existence is gone, is annihilated. Thus the creative act is not *actus transiens*, but is *substans*, substantial, that which stands under and supports the *substantia* or existence, that is to say, *actus creativus* is identically *actus conservativus*. Hence we say not only that God *created* existences, but that he *creates* existences, for his creative act is an ever-present act. The universe is created to-day as well as six thousand years ago, and is, in one sense, as new, as young, as fresh as "on creation's morn." Hence we call the creative act *actus immanens*,—not immanent in the sense that it produces only within the actor, for the creative act is essentially *actus ad extra*, but immanent in the effect, as that which produces and sustains it,—simply what theologians mean when they say God is present, efficaciously present, in all his works. God is *eminenter*, as say the theologians, all existence, and the only cause, and concurs in all our acts. This is what and all we mean when we say the *actus creativus* is *actus immanens*, not *actus transiens*. We do not mean that it is

actus immanens in the sense in which the generation of the Word or the procession of the Holy Ghost is *actus immanens;* but that it is an act that remains in its effect as long as the effect remains, as its *substans*, that which makes it from nothing what it is, and holds it from dropping into nothing again. The error of Spinoza was not in his terming God *causa immanens*, but in making him immanent as the substance, or, as we say, immanent in his being, not simply immanent by his act. By assuming the immanence to be that of God in his being, or substance, in his language, Spinoza placed existences in God, and made them merely modes, affections, or attributes of the Divine being. But to say that he is *causa immanens*, in the sense of *causa causarum*, or first cause, creating existences as second causes, involves no pantheistic conception. The word, however, has to some extent been appropriated by the theologians, and its use even in our sense is not to be commended. We have used it partly to avoid the error of the deists, and partly for the purpose of pointing out the abuse of it by Spinoza. All we wish to express is that the creative act is the *substans* of the existence, and that the act of creation is itself the act of conservation. Hence Providence is joined to creation, and proved in proving the Creator.

The creative act, taken as the *substans*, as every instant creating us, presents us in a most intimate and affecting relation to our Creator. Through his act we are brought from nothing and vitally joined to himself, and in him we live, and move, and have our being. We are not placed at a distance from God; nothing but his own act, vitally joined to him, as is the act to the actor, intervenes between us and him, and that instead of separating us from him, joins us in the closest union with him. He made us yesterday, he makes us to-day, for our existence is a continuous creation. We cannot live, think, hope, love, or perform any operation without his act, his concurrence. He is not only beyond and above the world, but he is in the world, producing and interpenetrating all things with his life-giving and love-inspiring presence. We live from, we live in, we live by his presence, and it is with him our souls converse, whenever turning from the outward things of sense, they converse with the True, the Good, and the Fair.

Indeed, so intimate, so vital is the relation asserted between God and his creatures, that able men, men whose study is philosophy, and whom we cannot but respect for

their devotion to principle, although mistaken, have even labored with earnestness and zeal to fasten the charge of pantheism on the formula, which is, after all, only the translation into philosophy of the first verse of Genesis. We impugn not their faith or their motives, but we find it difficult to understand how any one with a moderate acquaintance with theology, or possessing a moderate share of common sense, can dream of preferring such a charge; and they who prefer it, we must be permitted to believe either condemn what they have not taken the pains to understand, or embrace philosophical views of a decided deistical tendency. However this may be, we hold ourselves ready to defend the formula from the charge, or to reject it, whenever we find it preferred by one whose own formula we cannot fairly and logically convict of pantheism or of deism.

Several other questions, connected more or less intimately with the main subject of this article, such as the question of universals, genera, and species, the question of individuation, the *pons asinorum* of the schoolmen, and the question of empirical perception, on which we have but slightly touched, we should like to take up and discuss at length, and perhaps we may do so hereafter, but we have for the present exhausted our space. Our main object thus far has been to reinstate the creative act in the *principium*, and to show that if we mean to have a philosophy that will accord with Christianity, we must include the notion of that act among our primitive notions. That, we think, we have done. In conclusion we must beg our readers not to suffer the occasional criticisms we have offered on the Abbé Hugonin to prejudice them against him, for we are by no means sure that his views when he shall have fully developed them will not be found coincident with our own. He deserves honor and gratitude for his valuable philosophical labors, and we assure him that if we have misapprehended his doctrine on any point, it will give us sincere pleasure to make him the amplest reparation in our power.

MARET ON REASON AND REVELATION.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1857-8.]

ARTICLE I.

M. MARET is dean of the Theological Faculty of Paris and a professor of the Sorbonne. He is favorably known as the author of an Essay on Pantheism in Modern Society, published in 1840, and a more recent work, entitled *Theodicée Chrétienne*, a work, however, which we have not seen. The volume before us is the first volume of a great work on *Philosophy and Religion*, intended to be completed in six volumes. It is in the form of lectures, and occasionally recalls by its language, its thoughts, and its method of exposition the philosophical lectures of the eloquent and brilliant Cousin, really, with all his errors, one of the greatest philosophers France has hitherto produced. Inferior to Cousin in power and originality of genius, in vigor and freshness of thought, he is superior to him in the soundness of his judgment and the justness of his views. He has evidently profited largely by the labors of the Eclectic School, especially in the history of philosophical systems, and follows it more closely in some respects than we could wish; but he is, after all, a truer Eclectic than Cousin, and really has a doctrine which solves all systems and reïntegrates their several elements of truth in a higher unity. He steers clear in his principles alike of modern psychologism and the ontologism of the heterodox Germans, and avoids the exaggerations of the Traditionalists on the one hand, and of the Rationalists on the other. We know no work of the sort that, upon the whole, we can more conscientiously recommend to our young students of philosophy.

The present volume, though really introductory to those which are to follow, is complete in itself. It is devoted to the discussion of the Dignity of human Reason against the Sceptics and the Traditionalists, and the insufficiency of reason and the necessity of Divine Revelation against the Rationalists and those who assert the sufficiency of nature.

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* *Philosophie et Religion. Dignité de la Raison humaine et Nécessité de la Révélation Divine.* Par H. L. C. MARET. Paris: 1856.

The first part is chiefly taken up with the assertion and vindication of the prerogatives of reason, and an exposition and criticism of the several philosophical systems which have obtained from Plato down to Cousin. In the history and exposition of systems, the author falls into the error, as we regard it, of explaining them by their dominant psychological principle, and of classifying them according to their respective views of the origin of human knowledge, rather than according to their respective manners of viewing and explaining reality, and therefore of making philosophy a doctrine of science, rather than the science of things and their causes, human or divine. It is only since Descartes that philosophy has been reduced to a mere doctrine of science, a miserable psychologism. With the ancients it was the science of things, and sought to explain reality. Plato's problem was not, "How, or by what faculty do we know? but, what must we know in order to have real science or knowledge?" His purpose was not to prove that we have a faculty of knowing the non-sensible, but that all real knowledge consists in knowing the non-sensible, ideas, or intelligibles, which, according to him, are the essences of things, the real things or existences themselves.

We should, also, differ from M. Maret and others as to the true historical starting-point of philosophy. He supposes, as do many others, that philosophy, properly so called, originated with the Greeks, and had its first feeble beginnings in the crude speculations of the Ionian school. We are unable to believe this, and could as easily believe that modern philosophy began with the materialism of the last century, and that there were no philosophers, properly so called, before Locke and Condillac. Truth is older than error, and men begin in the true, not the false. Philosophy did not, begin with the Greeks, comparatively a modern people. Plato draws from an older school than that of Socrates, older even than the school of Pythagoras, or that of Thales, and is to be regarded as a restorer of the ancient wisdom, rather than an original inventor. His great master was Pythagoras, and both he and his master travelled in the mysterious East, and drew from a learning which flourished long ages before either of them was born. M. Maret, though teaching a philosophy quite new in relation to the reigning French school of the last century, does nothing in reality but continue the tradition of sound philosophy in all times, from which the greater part of Gentile philosophy, as

well as modern Cartesianism and its psychologic offspring, was a departure.

We agree, for the most part, with the learned author in his estimate of the several systems he analyzes, with the exception of the Cartesian. It may be all our fault, but we fear it is not in the power of mortal man to persuade us that Descartes deserved even to be named among philosophers. He was what Père Gratry calls a Sophist. Even as expounded by M. Maret, his system is nothing but a modified conceptualism, resting entirely on thought regarded as a purely psychological fact. We see in its author no indications of a true metaphysical genius, and no respectable philosophic erudition. There are no doubt true things in his system, for the human mind can never be wholly false, but he holds what truth he has as an inconsequence. Take his starting-point, free his system from its inconsequences and inconsistencies, and it is the pure subjective Idealism of Kant, or the pure Egoism of Fichte. He places all evidence in ideas, and makes all ideas, when consistent with himself, pure conceptions; and conceptions, as he defines them, are modes or affections of the subject. M. Maret has affinities with Père Malebranche, but he has, in reality, none with Descartes. He is in his system,—perhaps not always in his method or manner of explaining himself,—an intuitionist, therefore a realist, holding that the mind has and can have no pure conceptions. We were sorry to find Balmes forming a favorable estimate of Descartes, and we cannot excuse Père Gratry's excessive admiration of this shallow sophist. Père Malebranche we respect as a philosopher. He was infinitely superior to Descartes, and ought never to be reckoned as a Cartesian. He retained, indeed, grave errors from Cartesianism, but his own philosophy is of another order, rests on a different basis, and follows a different method. But these dissidences,—as well as some others, we shall express before we close,—from our truly learned and philosophic author, are of no great importance, and detract nothing from the substantial merits of his work. His philosophy, at bottom, is what we ourselves hold, and have defended for years.

M. Maret's great merit, and a great merit it is, consists in his maintaining, after Plato, the objectivity of ideas, and after St. Augustine, the identity of ideas, objectively taken, with the Divine Intelligence, and in adopting and defending the intuitive method, which requires us to treat the dia-

loctic and syllogistic methods as secondary, or as simply two forms of reasoning operating on intuitive *data*, and never transcending them. The syllogism, or method of deduction, is simply analysis, and can give only the contents of the subject analyzed. It cannot itself furnish premises or advance science, as to its matter, beyond the premises from which it operates. It distinguishes, clears up, or draws forth the matter contained in them, and renders explicit what before was implicit, but it can do nothing more. Dialectics, or the inductive method, by which, in contemplation, we pass from the consideration of particulars to that of universals, cannot itself, any more than the syllogism, furnish premises, Père Gratry to the contrary notwithstanding, for it cannot ascend to or introduce to the mind a universal not given intuitively along with the particulars. Both processes are legitimate, are necessary in their place; but both are secondary, both are in the reflective order, and dependent on intuition without or beyond which neither of them can operate.

According to a recent decision of the Congregation of the Index against the Traditionalists, or in the question between them and the Rationalists, the existence of God may be proved with certainty by natural reason. This decision, in our judgment, imposes upon us the necessity of adopting and defending the intuitive method, for without intuition of God, or of that which ontologically is God, we cannot in any possible way prove or demonstrate by natural reason that God exists. The syllogistic, deductive, or analytic process is that by which from universals we deduce or descend to particulars; but we cannot deduce or descend to particulars from a universal not given in intuition, or any particulars not contained in the universal. God cannot be deduced from a universal, given or not given, for he is not a particular, since he is himself universal, the universal of universals. Dialectics or induction, defined to be the process of ascending from particulars to the universal, and therefore called the synthetic method, cannot enable us to ascend to a universal not intuitively given along with the particulars. A universal not so given, or formed from the intuition of only particulars, would be only a generalization or a classification, a pure mental conception, an abstraction, and no objective reality at all, as we proved at length in our criticism of Père Gratry's *Logic*.

Here is the difficulty. Neither deduction nor induction

can give us any objective reality not intuitively presented. Balmes feels the difficulty, but afraid to say that we have intuition of real and necessary being, for that would imply that we have intuition of God, confesses, though aware that the conception of real and necessary being underlies all our conceptions, that he does not know how to answer it, and thus leaves the fundamental problem of science unsolved, with an intimation that it cannot be solved. Some of our psychological friends, in happy unconsciousness of any difficulty in the case, restrict all intuition to particulars, to the finite and the contingent. But they would oblige us, if they would explain how it is possible to prove, inductively or deductively, the existence of a reality which transcends the finite and the contingent, and which is in no form or manner intuitively presented to the mind; for we very frankly confess that we have and can conceive no process of reasoning that is possible without intuitive *data*, or by which we can attain to a reality which is not, either synthetically or analytically, contained in them. If God is not given in the intuitive *data*, we can neither rise nor descend from them to him; if he is given in them, we have intuition of him in our intuition of them.

Many worthy persons, we are aware, hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, because they fear that it would require them to maintain that we can have the intuitive vision of God enjoyed by the Saints in Heaven by our simple natural light, which all our theologians teach is possible only by the light of glory or *ens supernaturale*. We respect their hesitation, but their fear is unfounded. No man in his senses maintains that the intuitive vision of God enjoyed by the Blest is possible by the simple light of natural reason, or even by natural reason illumined by the supernatural light of faith. We assert by the natural intuition of God nothing of the sort. That vision is intrinsic, the view of God as he is in himself, his own interior life and essence; but our natural intuition of God is extrinsic, apprehensive, not comprehensive, and is a view of God as he is in relation to our intellect, as the principle and immediate object of our intelligence, not as he is in himself, or in his essence. We see him only as the Idea, the Intelligible, the type and cause of creatures, and therefore as the principle and necessary element of our intelligence. This element to which is reducible what philosophers call necessary ideas, necessary truths, first truths, eternal truths, &c., is intuitively pre-

sented, for without it there is and can be no intellectual operation, and in point of fact no human intellect itself; and hence it is that we are never able to stop with the finite and the contingent, but are obliged, as the inductive philosophers allege, to assert at every moment the infinite and the necessary, not as an abstraction, a mental conception, but as an objective reality. All the reasonings ever adopted or that ever can be adopted to prove the existence of God demand, as their principle, the conception of the infinite and the necessary, and this conception, if formed by the mind from the generalization of the finite and the contingent, without intuition of real and necessary being, is an abstraction, and like all abstractions, objectively null.

The failure to recognize this intuition is what ruined the dialectic philosophy of the seventeenth century, which Père Gratry is laboring so enthusiastically to revive, and the logical consequences of which are to be seen in the Sensism and Atheism which followed, and from which we are even now only slowly recovering. That philosophy overlooks intuition and founds all on conceptions defined to be modes or affections of the subject. Hence the God it asserts is simply a mental conception, an abstraction, and no real, living God at all. Descartes no doubt labored hard to prove that the idea in the mind of the infinite and the necessary, is not a purely mental conception, but his success did not respond to his industry or his good intention. Conceptions can give only conceptions,—$0 \times 0 = 0$. As a man, as a Christian, Descartes believed, no doubt, in a living God; but as a philosopher he asserted only an abstract God.

Others, again, hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, because they fail to observe that nobody pretends that we can know without reflection, study, or instruction, that the Idea, the Intelligible, the necessary entity, or real and necessary being, affirmed to us in intuition, is God, or that it can be proved to be God without reasoning, both inductive and deductive, that is, without dialectics and the syllogism. No one thinks of superseding the necessity of reasoning on the subject, and we certainly do not dispute, in its place and with its proper conditions, the validity of the reasoning of St. Anselm, St. Thomas, or even the Bridgewater Treatises in proof of the existence of God. We only say that to the validity of that reasoning a prior fact, tacitly assumed by it, but of which it takes no account, must be recognized, namely, the intuition of the Intelligible, the infinite, the

necessary, the perfect, that is, real and necessary being, the intelligible element of all thought and the principle of all reasoning. That must be intuitively presented, but we do not say that we do or that we must know intuitively that it is God. St. Anselm concludes the existence of God from the idea of the most perfect being, than which nothing greater can be conceived. If he stops there, he concludes only an abstract God, and offers no refutation of Atheism. St. Thomas sees this, and hence refutes and rejects St. Anselm's argument, as he understands it. The conclusion is valid only on the condition that the idea is taken to be the intuition of most perfect or real and necessary being. Taking the idea as an intuition, the argument is conclusive; taking it as a mental conception, or as a conception formed from the intuition of the finite, the imperfect, or the contingent alone, it is not so much as an ingenious sophism. St. Anselm, Descartes, and all Père Gratry's dialectic philosophers, fail to recognize distinctly the fact that conceptions or ideas without intuitions are null, are abstractions, and affirm no reality beyond the human mind itself. This point Kant has for ever settled, and it is really one of the most important steps made by modern philosophy.

Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, concludes the existence of God from the necessity of a prime-mover or of the actual to reduce the potential to act. We accept the argument, providing you concede us intuition of the principle on which it rests, namely, the *necessity* alleged. This necessity is, in the argument, the universal, and must itself be intuitive, or nothing can be concluded from it. But this necessity itself, what is it? Does it exist only in the mind, or does it exist out of it? If only in the mind, it is subjective, and your conclusion contains no objective reality. If out of the mind, it must be being, real and necessary being, and intuition of it is intuition of that which is God, therefore, in reality, of God himself. Either then we have intuition of real and necessary being, which is God, or his existence cannot be proved by natural reason, since every conceivable argument for his existence demands that intuition as its principle. No doubt, the judgment, real and necessary being is, and the judgment, God is, or real and necessary being is God, are formally or subjectively distinguishable; and it is precisely on this fact that the conceptualists found their objections to the intuitionists. The judgment, real and necessary being is, is an intuitive judg-

ment; the judgment, real and necessary being is God, or God is, is not an intuitive, but a reflective judgment. Hence as this formal judgment is obtained only by reflection, by reasoning, by argument, the conceptualists assert truly, from the psychological point of view, that the existence of God is not intuitively given. Not intuitively given as a conception, conceded, for no conception is intuitive; but not really given, or given intuitively as an objective reality we deny; for objectively, in the real order, the judgment, real and necessary being is, and the judgment God is, are one and the same, since all theologians agree that God is real and necessary being—*ens necessarium et reale*, or *ens simpliciter*, as distinguished from *ens secundum quid*,—creature, or created existence; and this is all that the intuitionist ever dreams of asserting, when he asserts that God affirms himself to us in direct and immediate intuition. We never pretend that he affirms himself, conceptually as God, but really, as real and necessary being, as the Idea, or the Intelligible. The difficulty of the conceptualists or psychologists arises from the fact that they confound intuition with conception, and will not allow that any thing is given in the intuition, which is not formally embraced in the conception. In other words, they confound the intuitive order with the reflective, and the ontological with the psychological.

The conceptualists would be relieved of this and many other difficulties, if they could for once place themselves at the point of view of the intuitionists or ontologists, or if they would take the pains to understand before attempting to refute them. Ontologists profess to speak according to the order of things, not according to the order of conceptions. When Gioberti speaks of the ideal formula, defines it to be *ens creat existentias*, and calls it the *primum philosophicum*, he speaks of the real, intuitive formula, not of the conceptual. He presents this formula as the *primum* both of things and of science. It should be noted that the formula in question is asserted as the ideal or real formula, and the real not the conceptional principle, the non-empirical not the empirical element of all human thought. The formula is what Kant would call a synthetic judgment a priori, not an empirical judgment, but a judgment which precedes all experience, and is the necessary condition of all experience, or that which renders experience possible. It enters into all experience as its ideal principle and basis. It

is at once the *primum* of things and the *primum* of science, the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*,—ontological in that it is real and necessary being affirming itself, and psychological in that it is real and necessary being affirming itself to our intellect, which it in affirming itself creates and constitutes. It is the permanent ideal element of all our knowledge, but not therefore does it follow that every conception, every fact of experience, takes the form, Being creates existence, or existences. Perhaps the majority of men never in their whole lives conceive it distinctly, or distinguish it from the facts of experience.

The ideal formula is intended, by those who defend it, to express the intuitive principle of all our judgments, the Divine judgment which all our judgments copy or imitate. As the ideal, the intelligible, it is the basis of all our knowledge, and enters into all our judgments; but not therefore is it the empirical form of all our judgments, nor are all our judgments intuitive. It is not *our* judgment at all, but is precisely that in our judgment which is not ours. Our judgments demand it, presuppose it. but in so far as ours they are formed by reflection, by contemplation, by experience.

The conceptualists find it difficult to understand the intuitive method because they do not regard ideas as objective, or if they do, they fail to perceive their identity with the Divine Intelligence, and therefore with God himself. They regard them as affections or products of our intellect, or it may be, as something distinct from God which he implants in our minds, and therefore termed innate. They think that they sufficiently explain the matter by saying that they are furnished by the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, asserted by the Peripatetics. But what is this intellectus agens itself? Is it our intellect, the noetic faculty of the human soul? Then the ideas, the intelligibles, the necessary truths it furnishes, are products of the subject, the mind's own products or affections, not objects apprehended by it, and therefore introduce us to no objective reality at all. Is the intellectus agens the Divine Intellect, presenting us the necessary ideas in presenting itself? Then you must accept the intuitive method, and the very ideal formula you seek to cover with ridicule. You assert the very doctrine you labor to refute. Is it neither one nor the other,—the *ens in genere* of Rosmini, the impersonal reason of Cousin, which is Divine and yet not God? But what is neither God nor

creature is not at all. Between God and creature there is and can be no middle existence, and no middle term but the creative act of God. What is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God. There is no *mundus logicus* between them. The possible world exists only in God, and what exists in God is God himself. The world of abstractions which is sometimes talked about as if it were neither God nor creature, but something independent of both, and even governing both, is, in so far as neither one nor the other, nothing. There are no abstractions in nature, and abstractions are simply the conceptions of our own minds operating on intuition. The scholastics, though not careful always to note this fact, do not maintain any thing to the contrary, and usually take it for granted. St. Thomas, if we understand him, does not regard the *intellectus agens* as a created intellect, but as our participation of the Divine, uncreated Intellect, that is to say, God himself in his relation to our intellect, or as we say, God as the Intelligible. It is not every man who calls himself a Thomist that understands St. Thomas.

But our psychologists proceed on the supposition that in the facts of knowledge, man, supposing him to be sustained in existence, suffices for himself, and they never understand that the Divine concurrence as the Intelligible is as necessary in order to enable him to know, as is the Divine concurrence as Being in order to enable him to exist. As profoundly as many of them have investigated the conditions of knowledge on the side of the subject, they have forgotten generally to investigate them on the side of the object. They make all facts of knowledge purely human, and leave God out of the account, and they, furthermore, make them all purely psychological, and recognize no activity in their production, but the activity of the soul itself. Here is their capital mistake,—a mistake as capital as would be that of regarding the soul as an independent existence. There can no more be a fact of knowledge without an objective activity, than there can be without a subjective activity. This is recognized by Cousin, and has been proved, although abused, by Pierre Leroux, and in proving it, he has made a contribution to modern philosophy that his wildness and extravagance in regard to other matters have prevented from being generally appreciated according to its merits. In consequence of overlooking the activity of the Intelligible in the fact of intuition, and placing all the activity on the

side of the subject in intuition as well as in conception, the psychologists have failed to recognize the objectivity of ideas, which Plato had long ago clearly established, and which Aristotle really accepts, though he rejects the term *idea*, and substitutes that of *principle*.

We are not writing for tyros in philosophy, and therefore do not deem it necessary to enumerate the ideas and principles which compose the ideal or intelligible world. Every body likely to read our philosophical articles knows that there is in some form and in some manner present to our minds a non-sensible world, a world of necessary ideas, or eternal truths, which enters into all our intellectual operations, and is the principle and basis of all our sciences, physical, metaphysical, and ethical. We cannot speak of an effect without thinking cause, of a particular cause without thinking a universal cause; of the contingent without thinking the necessary; of the finite without thinking the infinite; of beautiful things without thinking beauty, that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—the beautiful in itself; of good actions without thinking goodness, that by which all goods actions are good, the good in itself, and so in many other instances, which will readily occur to the reader. The question to be settled is, what are these absolute, these necessary ideas? Are they objects of the human mind, realities existing independent of it? Or, are they the necessary forms or conceptions of our understanding? The psychologists or conceptualists hold the latter, and this we regard as their fundamental error, an error held by Abelard, and opposed by Guillaume de Champeaux and the old Realists. Plato held them to be objects of the noetic faculty of the soul, really existing independently of the human mind. This was the doctrine of St. Augustine, of St. Anselm, and in reality of St. Thomas, although St. Thomas seems at times to regard them as representatives of the objective realities rather than as those realities themselves. Balmes regards them generally as representatives of the object, seldom as the object itself. He appears to have been led to take this view by the old Peripatetic doctrine, that the soul knows only in itself, and therefore never sees immediately things themselves, and sees them at all only through their representatives, their *species* or *phantasms*. This Peripatetic doctrine seems to have originated in the truth, not well comprehended by Aristotle and his followers, that created or contingent things are not intelligible in or of themselves,

and hence cannot be apprehended by the mind without an intelligible medium. This we hold to be true, but not precisely in the Aristotelian sense. Reid dispelled, forever, the Peripatetic phantasms, and proved that in sensibles we perceive the things themselves, not their images, phantasms, or immaterial representatives. Malebranche, after Plato and St. Augustine and others, had previously done the same thing in regard to the non-sensible world. The things supposed to be represented by the intelligible species, or by ideas, are themselves intelligibles, and therefore cognizable or evident *per se*. They are all resolvable, as far as we are now considering them, into real and necessary being, and real and necessary being is intelligible by its own light, and all that is intelligible by its own light. It needs only to be presented to the mind to be beheld. There is no need and no room between it and our mind for representative ideas. The being itself is as intelligible as can be its idea or representation. Nothing can make it plainer, more intelligible, or bring it into closer contact with the mind. In a word the realities, if realities, represented by the ideas we speak of, are themselves as near and as open to the mind as the ideas or representatives. The *intellectus agens*, supposed to furnish the representative ideas, if not the human intellect, as St. Thomas certainly did not hold it to be, is itself the idea, and the idea is not the representative of the intelligible reality, but that reality itself. The ideas are in that intellect, and it presents them in presenting itself intuitively to our intellect, and hence the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle and the schoolmen is identically the Intelligible, or God affirming himself intuitively as the Intelligible, as maintained by Gioberti, and virtually by Cousin, who represents these ideas to be constitutive of the impersonal or objective reason, which he calls Divine. The only error of Cousin on this point is, first, in not sufficiently distinguishing the objective from the subjective reason, and second, in hesitating to assert the identity of the objective reason with the Divine Intelligence, and therefore with God himself. What is necessary to place philosophy on a solid basis is to explode entirely the representative theory, invented by Aristotle to reconcile his maxim, *nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, with the undeniable truth in the Platonic theory, and retained by St. Thomas, in his unsuccessful attempt to harmonize Aristotle and St. Augustine.

M. Maret has discussed this whole question in a masterly

manner, and has once for all disposed of the representative theory, as well as of the sensist theory, and that of the conceptualists. Having shown that there are present in our minds ideas which cannot be derived from the senses, he says:—

"But there are ideas, the noblest, the most beautiful, and the most pregnant, which can never be considered as simple conceptions, simple perceptions of our minds, and conceptualism or psychology is as impotent to explain the nature of these ideas as sensism itself. These ideas are an *object* of knowledge wholly different from the subject that knows them. Shall we say that our ideas of genus and species are only pure mental conceptions, with no real foundation in the nature of things? But, then, will not all our natural sciences be vain and chimerical? We have the firm conviction that these sciences reproduce, in an abridged picture, the natural world itself. They seek to retrace the plan of the Creator, and rise to the types of the various beings that compose it, and these types are imperishable. Shall we say that our moral ideas are only mental conceptions? Then there will be for us no longer a justice necessary, eternal, absolute, unchangeable, perfect, and the moral order of this world will have no basis to stand upon. All our metaphysical ideas of number, magnitude, proportion, beauty, perfection, participate in these same characters of necessity, eternity, immutability, universality. In fine, in the most elevated region of the intelligible world, we perceive the grand idea of the infinite, which enlightens and dazzles us, which overwhelms us with its greatness, and unceasingly elevates us above ourselves.

"Is it possible to see in all these ideas only simple mental conceptions? Were they only conceptions of our minds our soul would contain in itself the necessary, the absolute, the eternal, the immutable, the infinite! What! the soul in its limited duration contains the eternal, in its emptiness perfection, in its limitedness the infinite! The soul is to itself its own light! I would rather place the sun all entire in the eye which it enlightens. All these necessary, absolute, eternal, immutable, universal ideas, then, exist outside of the soul, above it, independently of it, and conceptualism is reduced to silence.

"It is necessary to reason of principles as we have reasoned of ideas. Principles being the expression of the relations which exist between ideas, they participate in their nature. It would be madness to attempt to explain them by sensation. The senses and experience give us only individual facts, wanting in all the characteristics of principles. An effect is produced before me; I attribute it to a cause, for I know that there is no effect without a cause. Between this particular fact and this necessary, absolute, and universal principle, there is an abyss which reason alone can pass over. On the occurrence of the fact, reason perceives the universal truth, there is no effect without a cause, which is the law of the fact. What I say of my personal experience, I affirm equally of

universal experience, and of all the facts produced on the theatre of the world. The spectacle of the finite world, that is to say, of the contingent, temporal, relative, and changing world, cannot give me necessary, absolute, universal, and immutable principles. Nothing more evident.

"Psychologism is as impotent to explain these principles as sensism itself. Bear in mind, however, that we are not speaking here of the abstract and logical form of principles, such as may be given them by science, but merely of their natural apprehension, as they enter into all the primitive and necessary judgments of nature. In that they are judgments, principles are no doubt acts, operations of our minds. But every judgment is enlightened by a light of truth which gives to the principle all its value, and so little are these truth principles (*vérités-principes*) the pure conceptions of my mind, that I recognize in them laws which bind my intellect and my conscience with an absolute authority. They were before me and will be after me. They reign over all minds. Were there no finite mind to affirm them, no world for them to govern, they would none the less exist in themselves, necessary, eternal, absolute, immutable. Principles, as ideas, are therefore wholly independent of the created mind which apprehends them, and of which they are the light and the law.

"We are forced, then, to confess that necessary ideas and principles are *objects* of knowledge, realities independent of our mind which knows them. But shall we therefore fall into an absurd realism, and attribute to these ideas a separate, an individual existence? The human mind has long been disabused of that error, possible only in the darkness of polytheism. Let us repeat for the last time that ideas, principles, necessary truths, exist as the conceptions and thoughts of infinite intelligence, of God himself. Being necessary, eternal, universal, immutable, they need for their support a substance which has these same characters, and this substance can be only the Divine substance, God. They are in God the types of creatures that he conceives in his infinite intelligence, the laws which he assigns them in his supreme wisdom. Living in God, identical with his own essence, they are loaned to intelligent creatures, and are in them without belonging to them. The world and human reason form, therefore, as it were, a mirror in which God deigns to reflect some features of his infinite perfection, some rays of his light. Then let us say with all great minds, with our masters, that the true nature of necessary ideas and principles consists in appertaining to the substance of God, in being of God, and in God. Bossuet and the greatest theologians, following St. Augustine, have not hesitated to affirm that eternal truths are in a certain manner God himself."—pp. 243–247.

This conclusion is strictly just, for what is in God is God, and God only is eternal, universal, necessary, and immutable being. St. Augustine says: "Sunt ideæ principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommu-

tabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur," and St. Thomas says: "Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei." No man can be really so mad as to affirm that the human mind supplies the principles of things, or even of reasoning, for it cannot operate without them. Ideas are necessarily predicated of some intelligence, and can exist only in some mind. Ideas which are the eternal types of things can exist only in the Divine intelligence, and are therefore indistinguishable, *in re*, from God himself. In having intuition of them we have intuition of him. The ideas being identified with the Divine intelligence, their intuitive origin in our minds follows as a necessary consequence.

"We have proved," continues M. Maret, after some remarks which we would qualify, "that these ideas and these truths, in their true nature, are in God and appertain to his essence. They come then from God and their origin is in him.

"But here arises a grave question. How do ideas come from God? Does he form them in us? Does he deposit them as germs in our souls to be developed with them? You will recognize here the famous theory of innate ideas. In antiquity this theory was attached to that of reminiscence taught by Plato, a pure hypothesis based on mythologic *data*. In modern times Descartes asserted it, but when pressed to explain himself, he answered that he did not pretend that the idea exists in the soul prior to its perception, and that he only maintained that we have an innate faculty of perceiving the idea of God, or the infinite. Innate ideas were thus reduced to ideas natural to the mind, or which it has the natural power of perceiving. Leibnitz took up the question of innate ideas against Locke, and maintained that they are drawn from our own stock. I have already stated and discussed the theory of Leibnitz, and indicated the correctives which he himself has applied to it. He did well to restrict his theory, for it is absolutely false that all ideas are drawn from our own stock. We have already insisted too much on this point to need to return to it. All ideas, the most important ideas, those which alone, properly speaking, merit the name, cannot be innate. You may, if you will, call innate those ideas which depend on us as their efficient cause. There is no inconvenience in that; but the ideas which play the the grand part in intelligence do not belong to this category. Yet, if by innate ideas you understand only natural ideas every body will agree with you, since the ideas constitutive of intelligence must be natural to it. But in that case the question of innate ideas becomes a question of mere words.

"It can be nothing else, for there is one consideration decisive against the hypothesis. If God deposited in our souls necessary ideas as germs,

if he formed them himself within us, they would be, considered in themselves, not in their subject, a real creation. But it is manifest that ideas and principles are necessary, eternal, absolute, immutable, universal truths. Truths of this kind are not and cannot be created. What is created begins and may end, but these truths are without beginning and without end. Being the light and the law of intelligent creatures they cannot themselves be creatures, and does not all tradition of sound philosophy unanimously proclaim the uncreated character of eternal and necessary truth? We have in our previous lectures passed in review the texts which prove it, and it is unnecessary to produce them again.

"Necessary truths being uncreate are in God, come from God; nothing more certain; and the only conceivable way in which they can come from God is that they are communicated by him to us. Who can show them to us but he who possesses them? And where can we perceive them except in him in whom they reside?

"Conceive, then, that these truths are manifested by God himself to our reason, and that our intelligence, according to its capacity, is a participation in infinite truth. We pronounce with love this great word, *participation*, repeated by all the great masters of Christian theology. The manifestation of this truth is a sort of interior natural revelation,—and the word is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world,—although we must not use the word revelation to designate this phenomenon, since it is consecrated by theology to a particular and distinct order of divine manifestations.

"The natural illumination of reason by a ray of eternal truth is the foundation of the *Vision of God*, asserted by Malebranche, divested of all system, and brought back to its legitimate sense, and as it has been held by the greatest philosophers and the greatest Christian doctors. This vision in God supposes necessarily in man the *faculty* of intuition in and by the divine light; and it is in this faculty of intuition that reside the power and dignity of reason.

"Such then is the origin of ideas, of principles, of necessary truths. On the side of God, the manifestation of this light; on the side of man, the faculty of receiving and reflecting it.

"Thus all absolute and necessary truths, all those which constitute the order and beauty of the world, govern reason, oblige conscience, found science and the arts; all these truths, all these laws are manifestations of God, and reveal to us something of his thoughts, something of his will. All the truths we possess, all we can acquire, make us in some manner see God, and every step in advance in the order of truth, in the order of science, is an ascension towards God. Wonderful society of our minds with God! How beautiful this participation in divine truth! Should it not be the subject of our frequent meditations, and we never think of it!"—pp. 248–251.

M. Maret establishes fully the intuitive origin of ideas, but we do not quite agree that man has a faculty of intui-

tion distinct from the general faculty of intelligence. The intuitive faculty is the faculty of intelligence itself, and conception, reflection, reasoning, judging, comparing, abstracting, &c., are only the different modes in which we apply this faculty; but intuition itself is a fact, not a faculty, and it is not, like conception, primarily a psychological fact. It is not by our faculty taking the initiative that the object is beheld. The immediate intuitive object is always and every where the Intelligible, and the intuition is the Intelligible affirming itself to us, not we affirming immediately the Intelligible. In intuition it is not the human mind that by its own inherent power immediately seizes hold of the Intelligible, but the Intelligible immediately affirming itself and thereby constituting our intelligence. Hence the intuition is primarily an ontological fact, though affirming simultaneously the ontological and the psychological. M. Maret does not seem to us to place this ontological character of the fact of intuition in so clear and so strong a light as is desirable, and we seem after all to detect in his expression, if not in his thought, a reminiscence of that psychologism against which he so justly protests. The fact is, the Intelligible is God creating, and in the fact of intuition he creates our intellect, or makes it an actually existing intellect, capable of acting, of apprehending. Our intellect is created, constituted in the fact of intuition, and cannot be conceived as acting or even as existing prior to it. In like manner as we depend on God, as being, for our existence, do we depend on him, as the intelligible, for our intelligence, and he is as immanent and must be as immanent in us under the one relation as the other. This is what is implied in the scholastic doctrine of the *intellectus agens*, what Balmes himself really teaches, and what all the philosophers and theologians mean when they speak of reason as a participation in the Divine Reason. This is the great doctrine of St. Augustine in those remarkable words: "Præsens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis æternæ in quo incommutabilia vera conspiciunt." Psychologism springs from an attempt to dispense with the creative act denied or misconceived by Aristotle still more than by Plato, or from overlooking the fact that the immanence of God in his creatures, or his presence in his works, which all theologians admit, is a creative immanence or presence,—is his immanence or presence in his creative act. It, if it admits God at all, relegates him from his works, regards him as a watchmaker,

and man as a watch, which when once wound up will go of itself until run down.

Cousin has in his Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good, or Absolute Ideas, admirably proved what he terms the objective reason, that in every fact of consciousness or of intelligence there is the active presence of an objective element, which is independent of our personal reason, above it, over it, and without which our reason is not. This is what in our old English writers is called simply reason, and what we all refer to when we say *reason* teaches this, *reason* demands that, this accords with *reason*, that is contrary to *reason*. Now reason in this sense, objective reason, is precisely what we mean by the Idea, the Intelligible. This reason operating in us, and constituting us rational beings, is precisely what we mean by the Idea, or the Intelligible affirming itself to us in immediate intuition. It is the intuitive presence of God in all our intellectual acts. But here is the danger of pantheism, which can be escaped only by understanding this presence to be strictly a creative or creating presence. It was assuming God to be immanent as being only, not also in his creative act, that led Spinoza into his pantheism. It is not sufficiently noting the fact that objective reason creates the subjective reason, that has given a pantheistic tendency to the Eclecticism of Cousin. Understand that the intelligible, the intellectus agens, the objective reason, is truly and literally God immanent in our intellect, and that his immanence is his creative immanence or presence, or that his permanent affirmation of himself in intuition is his presence creating the intellect at the same time that it is its object, and you will escape pantheism and assert the principle of science, as it is in the real order. Here we may see why it is necessary to include in our *principium* the creative act of God, why our *primum philosophicum* must be a synthesis, and the real synthesis of things, —Being creates existence or existences, as Gioberti asserts in his ideal formula,—a formula which so few seem to have understood, and which the odium attached to his name prevents most people from seeking to understand. M. Maret is no pantheist, but he will permit us to remark that he has hardly given sufficient prominence in his exposition to the creative act. He asserts the presence of God in our reason, but does not take care to note with sufficient distinctness that this presence is a creative presence actually creating our reason. Plato, Aristotle, most ancient and modern philoso-

phers, undertake to explain our knowledge without including the intuition of the divine creative act, the key to the whole.

M. Maret very properly represents necessary, eternal, and immutable ideas as intuitive, but he seems to regard their correlatives as empirical. In the categories we have two lines. In the first, being, the infinite, the necessary, the absolute, the eternal, the immutable, the universal, the perfect, all reducible to the category of real and necessary being; in the second, existence, the finite, the contingent, the relative, the temporal, the variable, the imperfect, all reducible to the category of existence, or the contingent. The first, he unhesitatingly asserts, are intuitive, but he seems to regard the second as derived from experience. But Kant has proved that both lines, those included in the category of existence,—*ens secundum quid*,—as well as those included in the category of being,—*ens simpliciter*,—are alike the necessary *a priori* conditions of experience, without which no experience is possible. Then the distinction as to origin between the two categories is inadmissible. Consequently the category of existence as well as that of being must be intuitive, and included in our ideal formula, or *primum philosophicum*. But as all science consists in the knowledge of the two categories in their real relations, it is necessary that the real ontological relation between them should also be given intuitively. As this relation, the copula, or *nexus* between being and existence is, in the real order, the creative act of being, the relation between Creator and creature, either then no real science, or this creative act also affirms itself in the intuition. Clearly, then, the condition of all experience, of all intelligence, of all science, is the intuition of the three terms of the ideal formula, the ideal synthesis, or the divine judgment affirming itself immediately in all our intellectual operations, *ens creat existentiam, vel existentias*, as we never fail to contend. M. Maret does not deny this synthesis as the *primum philosophicum;* he in fact implies it, but he does not seem aware of its importance, and dwells almost exclusively on the first term. In most respects, however, we agree with him, and in no respect have we found him positively teaching any thing we should be disposed to reject. Bearing in mind that we are to understand the presence of God in reason to be a creative presence, and that in the primitive intuition it is constitutive of our intelligence, the reader will find the author's

Twelfth Lecture very much to the purpose, and we take the liberty of laying liberal extracts from it before him:

"The most important character of this presence of divine truth in reason is that it is immediate and direct. Nothing is more easy than to convince ourselves of this grand fact. The proof is in the quality of truth to enlighten by itself the understanding. When we apprehend a necessary, absolute, eternal, universal, and immutable truth, what is there between it and our intelligence? Seek an intermediary, you will find none. There is only this truth, which shows itself, which enlightens you, and which your mind perceives and affirms. Every body asserts that the action of evidence on the mind is immediate and direct. Now what is evidence, but the light itself of certain ideas and of certain principles contained in the divine truth present to our minds? Undoubtedly the truth does not at first show itself isolated from the facts of consciousness and experience. In every perception of divine truth there is a deep sense of our own existence and of that of the external world; we cannot separate it totally either from ourselves or the world; but from these facts it does not follow that the existence of the world and that of ourselves are an intermediary between the divine truth and our reason. The soul is always the subject, and may become the object of knowledge, but never the intermediary between it and the object. The world may also be an object of knowledge, but not, any more than the soul, its intermediary. How is it that I pass from the personal sense of my own existence and of the world to the rational knowledge of myself and the world, if it be not by the necessary ideas and principles which are in reason? Divine truth is not then transmitted to me through the medium of the soul and the world; it does not traverse them in order to reach my reason. It enlightens my reason directly, immediately, on the occasion, and on the condition of the facts of external and internal experience . . .

"This immediate and direct presence of divine truth in reason leads to a consequence which at once confounds and ravishes us, which is at once formidable and consoling, worthy of our admiration, rather of our profound adoration. This consequence is that God is present to our reason in a direct and immediate manner. If Divine truth is present to our reason, God is present to it, as we have already proved at length. If it is present in a direct and immediate manner, he is present in a direct and immediate manner, in the same measure that it is present, neither greater nor less.

"This direct and immediate presence of God in reason has been recognized by the highest philosophy and by the highest theology. St. Augustine says, 'Inter mentem nostram qua illum intelligimus Patrem, et veritatem, id est lucem interiorem per quam illum intelligimus, nulla interposita creatura est.* Cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiæ

* *De Vera Relig.* c. lii. *in finem.*

secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem (Dei), ut nulla natura interposita formetur; et ideo nihil sit Deo conjunctius. . . . Ad imaginem (Dei) mentem factam volunt, quæ nulla interposita substantia, ab ipsa veritate formetur. . . . Iste spiritus ad imaginem Dei nullo dubitante factus accipitur, in quo est intelligentia veritatis; *Hæret enim veritati nulla interposita creatura.*"*

"Notwithstanding some difficulties presented by the theory of St. Thomas, it will be impossible to see a doctrine different from St. Augustine's in these words: 'Omnia dicimur in Deo videre et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et judicamus. Nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quædam est divini luminis, sicut etiam omnia sensibilia dicimur videre et in sole, id est, per lumen solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, primo Soliloquiorum, disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur, videlicet Deo.'† When the sun enlightens us, it is immediately present to our eyes by its rays. The true Sun of our souls, God is as immediately present to our reason as the sun is to our bodily eyes. This, it seems, is the meaning of St. Thomas.

"Has not Bossuet also recognized this immediate and direct presence of God to natural reason? 'We have seen,' he says, 'that the soul which seeks and finds the truth in God, turns herself towards him to conceive it. What then is this turning herself towards God? Is it that the soul moves as a body, and changes her place? Certainly such movement has nothing in common with understanding. To begin to understand what is not understood is not to be transported from one place to another. It is not as a body the soul draws near to God who is always and every where invisibly present. The soul has him always present in herself, for it is by him that she subsists. But in order to see, it is not enough to have the light present; it is necessary to turn towards it, to open the eyes to it. The soul, also, has her manner of turning towards God, who is her light, because he is truth; and to turn herself to that light, that is to say, to the truth, is to will to understand.'‡ It seems to me that it is impossible to express more explicitly the immediate and direct presence of God as truth in the soul it enlightens."—pp. 254–258.

We are not quite so certain of this in regard to Bossuet as is the learned professor. Bossuet, indeed, asserts the immediate and direct presence of God in the soul, but not, what is equally important to M. Maret's purpose, that he affirms himself in direct and immediate intuition. He makes the actual perception of this presence depend on the act of the soul turning towards him, opening the eyes of

* *Lib. de divers. Quæst.* lxxxiii. Quæst. 51.
† *Summa*, pars prima, Quæst. xii. art. 11.
‡ *Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-Même.* Chap. x

the understanding to the light, which is to misconceive the intuitive fact, and to confound intuition with conception. Intuition, according to Bossuet, and we fear according to our author himself, would be *seeing* by *looking*, whereas the intuition proper is seeing without looking, without any voluntary activity on our part, prior to the affirmation of the intelligible by itself. The seeing precedes the looking, and we look because we see, that we may see more clearly, more distinctly, or that we may understand what is presented in the intuition. Nevertheless, the passage from Bossuet undoubtedly *implies* the immediate and direct intuition of truth, though we confess it does not expressly assert it to our understanding. But the author continues:

"Fénelon is full of this same doctrine. He declares that 'the immediate object of all our universal cognitions is God himself.' He terminates an admirable exposition of the idea of the infinite by the words, 'It is therefore necessary to conclude invincibly that it is Being infinitely perfect that presents itself to my mind when I conceive the infinite. O God, O only true Being, before whom I am as if I were not! Thou showest me thyself, and nothing of all that which thou art not can be like thee. I behold thee, thyself, and this ray that darts from thy countenance feasts my heart while I am waiting to behold thee in the noonday of truth.'*

"The most rigorous conclusions of logic are then borne out by the gravest authorities,—authorities equally dear to religion and to philosophy. Thus, gentlemen, in the natural order, in the intelligible and rational order, there is an immediate and direct presence of God, which itself implies a certain view of God, or rather, of the Divine truth he communicates to us.†

"But here certain difficulties are raised against us, which it is necessary to discuss. The first comes from the Kantian school, and has been revived, in 1850, by M. Haureau in his *De la Philosophie Scholastique*. It is pretended that to refer the truth which enlightens us to God himself, to consider the absolute, necessary, and immutable truths of reason

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* *Existence de Dieu*, pp. 270–272.

† Wherefore this qualification, since the Divine Truth communicated is God, and indistinguishable, *in re*, from him? Does not M. Maret know that God is *ens simplicissimum*, and that there is no distinction in him between him and his intelligence, between his intelligence and his essence, as there is none between his essence and his existence? When I see Divine truth, just so far as I see it, and in precisely the sense in which I see it, I see God, though I may not at all times be aware, nay, may not ordinarily be aware that it is God. This, if we understand him, is the doctrine the author is all along endeavoring to establish, and why, then, envelop it in a psychological mist, and lose the results of all his labor? Psychologically, or *quoad nos*, the distinction he makes is

as thoughts or attributes of God, is to make God like man, and to fall into anthropomorphism. God, say the philosophers of this school, is the great Unknown, the Mystery of mysteries, and not without sacrilege can we raise the veil from the sanctuary in which he conceals himself from all mortal eyes. We know that he is, we know not what he is. We should be content to assert his existence, to adore his grandeur, without attributing to him modes of existence which must be wholly unworthy of him, without transferring to him the imperfections of our own ideas and cognitions.

"I confess I very much mistrust that respect towards God which would render him wholly inaccessible, and deny every sort of relation or analogy between him and man. If we can form no conception of God, what reason can we have for asserting his existence? If this were so, scepticism as to his existence would be inevitable, and from scepticism to downright atheism there is but a step. As soon as we have the right to assert that God is, we have in us an idea of him, and this idea is necessarily a relation of our finite intelligence with infinite intelligence. We certainly know much more than that God is what is, although we never comprehend all that he is. But between this perfect comprehension and the absolute ignorance in which these philosophers would retain us, there is a distance. We see clearly that God must possess and does possess all the perfections diffused in creation; and without fearing to degrade him, we ascribe to him all those perfections in the infinite degree which comports with his nature. What, I find in my reason ideas, principles, a necessary, absolute, universal, eternal, and immutable truth, and yet I am not to refer this truth to a Being, necessary, absolute, eternal, and immutable like itself? Is it forbidden me to attribute the laws of reason, of conscience, and of nature to the Supreme Legislator? You might as well forbid me to attribute to God wisdom and goodness because I find proofs of wisdom and goodness in creation, and in free and intelligent creatures! In refusing thus to go out of man, to transport out of him truth, wisdom, goodness, and to see in God their cause and substance, I degrade my own reason, and confine it within purely subjective limits, and inevitably doom myself to scepticism.

"As I would escape scepticism, I refer to God without hesitation the necessary ideas and principles I find in my reason. I know that they

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admissible, but not ontologically, not *quoad Deum*, not in the real order, and he professes to speak as an ontologist, not as a psychologist, and to present the real and not the conceptual order. Indeed, we are obliged throughout to complain of M. Maret, that while the doctrine he contends for is sound, is ontological, his language and exposition smack a little of psychologism, which we are sure he holds in as much abhorrence as we do. He cannot, let him do his best, exhibit the truth in the method of Descartes, nor properly express it in Cartesian language. We pray him to pardon us these criticisms, which touch the form but not the substance of his doctrines.

are from God, are in God, and, in some sense, are God; I know that it is God who manifests them to me, who gives himself to me, and renders me thus a partaker of himself. But I conceive in myself that these ideas and principles are infinitely more perfect than I conceive them. I see clearly that God knows infinitely more and infinitely better than I, and between him and me I place the infinite. I attribute, then, to God all the perfections I conceive, all the truths I know, but in elevating them to infinity."—pp. 258-261.

We omit the rest of the learned professor's answer to this objection of anthropomorphism. In substance the answer is conclusive, but its form is unsatisfactory, in consequence of the author's hesitating to say plainly, what he means, that necessary ideas and principles intuitively affirmed in our reason are God, identically God as the intelligible, or in his relation to our created intelligence. He forgets that intuition is the act of the object, even more than of the subject, since it is an act creative of the human intellect, and not an act initiated by it, as we have already explained. There is, then, no referring to necessary, eternal, and immutable being demanded in the case, for these perfections are it, and are intuitively presented as real and necessary being itself. The question is not of identifying them with being, but of identifying the being they are, and are intuitively known to be, with God. Even M. Maret finds it hard to get rid of prevailing psychologism, and to understand that the Idea, the Intelligible *is* being, and that it is only on that condition that it is idea or intelligible, or that it is intuitively apprehensible or apprehended. The author is mistaken in supposing the perfection of God is the perfection of creatures elevated to infinity, for that is precisely the objection of anthropomorphism brought against him. The perfections of creatures copy or imitate in an imperfect manner the perfections of God; but the perfections of God are distinct from them, and are apprehended not in them and generalized from them, but intuitively as the infinite ideas, types, or exemplars they in their manner copy or imitate.

After disposing of the objection of making God man, the author answers briefly a contrary objection, that of making man God, or of confounding the subject with the object, as Cousin does by representing what he calls the impersonal reason as divine, and yet representing it as that within us which knows. We know by means of that reason, objectively present in the fact of knowledge. From this objection the author proceeds to objections of another order, urged by

theologians. The first of these objections is that we see God only mediately through creation and creatures,—*Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur*, as St. Paul says. This objection has been so often answered in these pages, that it may seem like a sheer waste of time and space to answer it again; but it may still be acceptable to our readers to see what so reserved and judicious an author as M. Maret replies to it. From the words of St. Paul, the theologians, he says,—

"Conclude that it is not by a direct light that we know God, or at least that his existence is not the first truth in the order of knowledge. Here important distinctions become necessary. We undoubtedly raise ourselves to God by the contemplation of nature and ourselves, and thus ascend, as it were, from effect to cause. This is a process of the human mind that gives admirable proofs of the existence of God. But in all these proofs, so beautiful and so certain, is not the idea of God presupposed? Is not the idea of God anterior to the reasonings by which we prove his existence? I have, in the first place, the idea of myself, of the world, of the finite, but at the same time I conceive myself, the world, the finite, I conceive the infinite. These two ideas are primitive, contemporaneous, simultaneous in my mind. I begin not by an abstract idea of being, which would give me only an abstract being. I pass not from the finite to the infinite, nor from the infinite to the finite, which would be a contradiction. With these two primitive ideas, which I find in my mind, the other ideas and principles are necessary. . . . But necessary ideas and principles, although they are the Divine Light, do not at first give us a reflective or reflex knowledge of the existence and perfections of God. We attain to that only by reasoning. For example, I have a certain view of necessary truth, and I see at the same time that it must be referred to (that it is) a necessary substance, and to a necessary intelligence, to which it belongs, and which manifests it. Then this intelligence, this substance exists, and therefore God is. From a certain view of God, implied in the intuition of necessary truth, I conclude his existence, as from the sense of myself I conclude my own personal existence. The existence of God is not then the first truth known by us; between our reason and the affirmation of his existence, there is an intermediary, and this intermediary is at once the Divine truth, the soul which it enlightens, and the world which reflects it."—pp. 264–266.

We are afraid the professor in this last sentence will be thought instead of answering the objection to have got a little confused and to have conceded it. The idea, the divine truth, is the principle or medium of the demonstration, or proof, but not of the knowledge of the existence of God, for it is God, and its existence is known immediately

and directly prior to the commencement of the demonstration, as it has been throughout the object of the author to prove. What he really means, however, is that the idea, our own existence, and that of the world are an intermediary between the existence of God and our knowledge of his existence in the order of reflection, not in the order of intuition, and in this he is substantially correct. Intuition gives us the real order, and in the real order necessary truth or the Idea and God are identical, but we do not know intuitively that the Idea, real and necessary being, is what in the order of reflection is meant by the word God. This identity is precisely what requires to be demonstrated, and the demonstration of this is what is meant by the demonstration of the existence of God. The process of demonstration suggested by the author, so understood, is legitimate and conclusive. He has the right to add:—

"Therefore the doctrine of the presence of God in reason in no sense enfeebles any of the proofs of the existence of God, and in no respect disturbs the ordinary method of demonstrating it. On the contrary, it explains and justifies it. It is still true to say with the Scriptures, with St. Paul and St. Thomas, that we know God, and raise ourselves to him by the spectacle of the world and the human soul."—p. 266.

The last objection the author considers is the most formidable of all in the minds of our theologians. We have briefly answered it ourselves in the beginning of the present article, but it may be well to hear the answer of the author, who is a theologian, as well as a philosopher.

"It is a principle of faith that in this life and by our natural powers we do not and cannot see the Divine essence; that the sight of this essence is disproportioned to our forces, and to our merits, that it is the essential object of supernatural grace, and that it is reserved, in its perfection, to a future life, as the recompense of faith and charity. This high doctrine is clearly taught in the Sacred Scriptures: 'Deum nemo vidit unquam.... Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem... Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum... Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.' The possibility and the gratuity of this vision of the divine essence is a doctrinal point attested and preserved by a unanimous tradition, and established by St. Thomas in the twelfth Question of the first part of his *Summa*, with the superiority and power of his reason.

"But it is, on the other hand, no less certain by scriptures and tradition, that divine truth, the Divine Word himself, is the real teacher of our souls. He is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world; *Lux quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc*

mundum. Before St. John, the psalmist had said that God had stamped our souls with an impression of his light: *Signatti super nos lumen vultus tui*. This second truth has been established by us in the whole of this Course. Our only object has been to prove it to conscience and reason, and to show that it is the true philosophical tradition. The point now is to reconcile these two truths, which appear, at first sight, to contradict one another. But there is no contradiction in the case. The direct view of divine truth and of God himself in this truth is not and cannot be the vision of the Divine Essence, because that vision consists in seeing God face to face and in knowing him as he is in himself. Now this natural view of divine truth is essentially distinct from this perfect, this sublime vision. In fact, the view face to face is not only a direct view, but also a perfect view, without clouds or shadows. But the natural view is very imperfect; by it we see only a few essences, a few laws, and these only dimly and with great difficulty.

"But it may, nevertheless, be objected that the supernatural and beatific vision of God differs from the natural view only in degree, and then the two modes of participation, and consequently the natural and the supernatural are not essentially different. This objection would indeed appear formidable, if the supernatural vision were the participation in the divine only as it is representative of creatures. But it is something more than that; it is the view of God such as he is in himself, *sicuti est; cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum*. A profound theology distinguishes, in fact, in the Divinity two different aspects: God in himself, that is to say, in his simplicity and his Trinity, his interior life, and God in his relations with creation, God the archetype of creation, that is to say, bearing in his intelligence the ideas and laws of real and possible creations. The divine truth which enlightens us here below manifests to us some few of these ideas, some few of these laws. We know that both are images of the Divine Essence; but in them we recognize rather the essence of creatures than the Divine Essence itself. We in no sense see that essence in itself, for we do not see the relation of infinite multiplicity to infinite unity. The view of the infinite Essence would show us on the contrary how the infinite multiplicity of ideas and laws which are in the divine thought, in so much as it conceives creations, forms only one and the same perfectly simple idea, proceeds always from a single act always immanent. We should see, as far as it is given to the creature to see, how this multiplicity is resolved into the most perfect unity, how when we rise to the highest thoughts we conceive, indeed, that God sees in himself, in his perfect simplicity, an infinity of degrees of being, all of which are an image, a representation of his essence; we conceive, indeed, that he sees out of him, in real or possible creations, the limits or relations implied by this infinite multitude of copies of pure and unalterable essence; we conceive, in fine, that this multiplicity introduces no division, no composition, no limit into infinite simplicity; our

reason conceives the strict necessity of this infinite perfection, but without being able to explain and comprehend it.

"The view of the Divine essence would not only unveil in part the relations of God with creation, it would also enable us, as far as given to the creature, to penetrate the mystery of the divine life itself, to see how the divine substance is common to the three infinite and equal Persons, who form only one and the same Divinity."—pp. 266–270.

We see in this answer a satisfactory refutation of the objection, but the author, we hope, will pardon us, if we say we also find in it some looseness of expression, and some inexactness even of thought. Will he forgive us, if we say that he does not appear to us to be fully master of the ontological method, and sometimes speaks as a conceptualist rather than as an intuitionist? The distinction of aspects in God is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*, as say the theologians, not a distinction *in re*, in our manner of conceiving, not in the manner in which God really exists and is intuitively affirmed to us. The ideas in the Divine mind, which are the types and possibilities of creatures, are not images or representations of the Divine Essence, but that Essence itself, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, when he says: "Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei." To make them the image of the Divine Essence would, it seems to us, place them in the Word or second Person distinctively, and deny intelligence to the Father and the Holy Ghost. Intelligence and will belong to the essence, the nature, and are, therefore, one in the three Persons of the Godhead. Ideas in the Divine mind are types, not of the Divine Essence, but of existences which God does or may create, and hence St. Thomas says, "Deus similitudo est rerum omnium." The Divine intelligence is not representative of the Divine Essence, but is that essence itself. This is the doctrine the learned author holds as well as we, and is the same sense in which he says St. Augustine and the Christian Fathers generally understood Plato against Aristotle and some others who pretend that Plato held ideas to be separate individual existences. The real answer to the objection is not that we do not intuitively apprehend the essence of God, for in God no distinction between his essence and his existence,—his *essentia* and his *esse*,—is admissible, but that we see his essence only extrinsically, only in its relation to creatures, not intrinsically, as it is in itself; and therefore we are quite willing to say that we see God only in seeing his works, as in external vision we see the light only in seeing the

objects it illumines and renders visible. The ideal formula —*Ens creat existentias*—contains indeed the three terms of a judgment, subject, predicate and copula; but the three terms are not given distinctly, in three separate intuitions; they are given as a synthesis in one and the same intuition. God—Ens—is not given alone, but as the subject of the predicate, *existentias* or creation. Now the view of God as the subject of the predicate creature,—a predicate joined to him by his own free voluntary act *ad extra*, placing or creating it, can hardly be confounded with that intrinsic view of God as he is in himself, in his own interior life and being enjoyed as their reward by the Saints in heaven. If the ideal formula be accepted, we see God, in natural intuition, only as the subject of the predicate, and therefore only in conjunction with the creatures placed and illumined by the light of his own being. This is the way we understand our natural intuition of God, and it seems to us to harmonize perfectly with the teachings of St. Paul. Understanding now that real and necessary being, though intuitively given, is distinguished from the other two terms of the formula, and proved to be God, only discursively, or by reflection and reasoning, we cannot for the life of us see any reason why the discursionists should hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, or why they should wish to keep up any longer a controversy with the ontologists. Every theologian, however psychologically inclined, is obliged the very moment he comes to set forth and explain theology, natural or supernatural, to adopt the ontological method, and all great theologians, as M. Maret proves in the volume before us, have been avowedly ontologists.

We have dwelt so long on the first part of M. Maret's volume, the presence of God in reason, and the exposition and defence of the intuitive method, or the Platonic doctrine of ideas as rectified by St. Augustine and Christian theology, that we must reluctantly reserve to a future article the consideration of the still more important second part, which treats of the insufficiency of reason, and the necessity of Divine Revelation. The necessity of Divine Revelation and the character of the supernatural is for our age and country the question of questions, for the real doubt we have to combat is the doubt of Christianity as to the supernatural order. The age accepts Christianity as the best expression of natural religion that has been made, but it refuses to believe in the reality of a supernatural order properly so called. M.

Maret sees this, and seeks to remove the doubt of the supernatural without producing a deeper and more fatal doubt, that of the natural. In establishing the presence of God in reason as its principle and light, he has established the high prerogative of reason, indicated its dignity, and obtained a solid basis for his demonstrations. He has asserted and defended the necessary preamble to faith, and notwithstanding the few criticisms we have offered, certainly in no captious or disrespectful spirit, has given us a book of solid merit, and rendered to philosophy a service which those who best understand the subject will appreciate the highest.

ARTICLE II.

When we discussed the first part of this work, that which treats of the "Dignity of Human Reason," we promised to return to it and consider the views of the author in relation to the second part, which undertakes to prove the "Necessity of Divine Revelation." We proceed now to redeem our promise.

In many of the works which attempt to prove the necessity of Divine revelation, there is, at least, an apparent contradiction, which does much to lessen their value as works intended to convince unbelievers of the truth of the Christian religion. The authors usually begin by establishing the dignity and trustworthiness of reason, in order to refute scepticism, and to obtain a solid ground for science and natural faith; they then proceed to demonstrate from the history of human errors, in all ages and countries, the insufficiency of reason, its utter inability to serve us as our sole guide even in the natural order; and they end by concluding from this insufficiency and this inability, the necessity of Divine revelation and supernatural guidance. Theologians in the tract *de Vera Religione*, usually undertake to prove first that a Divine revelation is possible; second, that it is necessary; and third, that it has been given. But all conclude its necessity from the insufficiency of reason, an insufficiency attempted to be proved by reason itself. They assume, then, as it would seem, the sufficiency of reason as the condition of proving the insufficiency of reason. Moreover, if supernatural revelation be necessary to nature, or as the complement of natural reason, it falls itself into the order of nature, and then is natural,

and is not, properly speaking, supernatural. Indeed, every attempt to prove from natural reason the necessity of Divine or supernatural revelation, seems to involve in some form this real or apparent contradiction. Pascal and Huet demolish reason to clear the site for faith; but it is with reason they demolish reason, and a faith that is built on the denial of reason not only has no solid foundation, but is, really, no faith at all, for faith always implies an act of reason. Only a rational subject can elicit an act of faith, or have infused the habit of faith. Hence the Jansenists and Traditionalists, who build science on supernatural revelation and make faith precede knowledge, only build castles in the air.

Acute and logical unbelievers, seeing this apparent contradiction between the first part and the last part of our argument, read our Evangelical Demonstration without being convinced, and remain persuaded in their own minds that, whether a Divine revelation has been made or not, it can never be proved either from or by reason. Our treatises, while they confirm and satisfy those who already believe and have no doubts, leave unbelievers unbelievers still, and, not seldom, tend only to render them more hardened in their unbelief.

Whence comes this? Is the apparent contradiction real? Have all the able men who have used the ordinary method been deceived, or only barefaced sophists? We shall reply to that by and by; but we say now, that the argument as usually presented, is not in all respects logically or theologically valid. Natural reason must suffice for natural reason, and be sufficient in the natural order, if we suppose the natural order to remain in its normal state. Whatever is in the order of nature or due to it is natural. Reason is our natural light, the revelation of God to us in the natural order. It is that light which we receive from God, in and by the simple fact that he has created us rational and intelligent existences, in and by the fact that he has made us men; and to suppose it really insufficient for us in the order of natural existences, or deprived of its complement as reason, would be to deny that God has created us men, or that we are any thing more than inchoate existences. Assuming this, it is evident that the necessity of a Divine revelation in addition to our natural light cannot be concluded *a priori* by natural reason, nor even conceived of naturally, and that a supernatural revelation must be made as the condi-

tion of our being able, not only to prove, but even to conceive, its necessity.

By Catholic faith we are taught that God could, if he had chosen, have created man in the beginning as he is now born, *seclusa ratione culpæ.* Then we must suppose that man is now born with all that can be asserted as essential to his existence in a state of pure nature. If so, we cannot maintain, for it is not true, that Divine or supernatural revelation is necessary to nature, or as the complement of our natural light. Nature, as pure nature, can have no wants, no aspirations beyond nature, or which can be satisfied only in the supernatural. Père Gratry, indeed, argues to the contrary, and contends that philosophy conducts to faith, and faith to the beatific vision, because man naturally desires to see God as he is in himself, which is not naturally possible. Even St. Thomas and other eminent theologians seem to maintain that man has naturally wants and aspirations, which can be satisfied only in the beatific vision. That man has, as a matter of fact, such wants and aspirations, cannot be denied, but that they are purely natural, we are not prepared to concede. No nature can rise above itself, or have a prolepsis of a higher order than that which is present in its own reason. The unbeliever, who ascribes these wants and aspirations, of which he as well as others is conscious, to tradition or education, is not wholly wrong. Though common to all men, they must be something superinduced upon human nature, not something originating in it as pure nature. Natural reason being in itself all that is essential to natural reason, cannot rise by itself alone to the perception or even the conception of the supernatural, nor of the necessity of a higher light than its own. Nothing can be more than itself. Reason cannot see beyond itself, what it has no power to see; and therefore by its own light alone it cannot perceive the unknown, or even be aware that there is an unknown. What is not intelligible to it, does not exist for it. It cannot, then, by its own light discover its own limitations, its own insufficiency, and therefore cannot conceive of the necessity of any higher or clearer light. All existence for it is limited to its light, and beyond what that light illumines, it naturally and spontaneously conceives nothing, for Gioberti's attempt to establish for man a natural faculty of superintelligence is not successful. We then are disposed to question the soundness of the argument that attempts from the insufficiency of natural reason to deduce

the necessity of Divine or supernatural revelation, because that insufficiency itself is not naturally evident to natural reason, and because, restricted to the ends of pure nature, reason is not and cannot be insufficient.

God could have made man, if he had chosen, as he is now born, provided for him a natural beatitude, and left him to the simple light of reason. There is, then, in pure nature no innate necessity of supernatural revelation. The natural presence of God in reason would suffice; and reason would not, on such a supposition, be insufficient. Indeed, absolutely considered, reason is insufficient only on the supposition that man is designed for a supernatural, not a simply natural beatitude. If we suppose a supernatural order exists, and that man has his destiny in that order, the insufficiency of reason is evident of itself, and there is no necessity of attempting to prove it; and we apprehend that the usual arguments to prove the insufficiency of reason, and from that insufficiency to conclude the necessity of Divine revelation, do in reality assume that there is a supernatural order, and that man has his destiny in that order. They therefore assume in the outset the precise things unbelievers in our day desire to have proved, namely, the fact of a supernatural providence.

The Abbé Maret does not seem to us to perceive this defect in the form of the ordinary reasoning on this subject, or to escape entirely the contradiction we have pointed out. He begins by proving, or attempting to prove, that man by his natural light and forces is not able to attain even to his natural ends. Man has intelligence and will. "The natural end of intelligence is truth, and all natural truth; that is to say, a clear, precise, exact, and certain knowledge of the principle, the law, and the end of man; a clear, precise, exact, and certain knowledge of God and his relations with man and the world; a clear, precise, exact, and certain knowledge of the law which God gives to his free and intelligent creatures to conduct them to the end appointed. The natural end of liberty and the human will, of free and voluntary activity, is found in the full and complete observance of the relations which flow from the nature of things, relations which constitute the eternal and necessary order, and which are manifested to us by the law of God." But man, he argues, by his natural light and strength is not able to attain to those ends, therefore a Divine revelation is necessary. To this it may be replied: these ends are above and

beyond our natural powers, or they are not. If they are, they are not natural, but supernatural. If they are not, no Divine revelation is necessary to enable man to attain to them. Nothing can be called the natural end of man, to which man's nature is not, in its normal state, fully adequate. The natural end of any created being, is the end to which it is fitted and enabled by its nature to attain. An end that exceeds the natural powers of the creature to attain is not its natural end, and cannot be. It is supernatural, for the simple reason that it is not naturally attainable. The natural end of intellect is truth, but not necessarily all truth even in the natural order, but only so much of truth as it is naturally able to grasp. The natural end of the free voluntary activity of man is moral good, but not necessarily all moral good. Nature can bind no further than she gives the ability, and the man who attains to all the moral good within the reach of his natural ability, attains to his natural moral perfection.

It seems to us that in the usual reasoning on this subject, authors are not careful to bear in mind that the natural order they speak of in their argument is the natnral order as distinguished from that supernatural order in which we as Christians believe, not the natural order considered solely in relation to the natural powers of creatures in a state of pure nature. That man by his natural powers alone cannot attain to the moral or intellectual perfection conceivable in the natural order as distinguished from the supernatural order asserted by Christians, we readily concede, and therefore we ourselves assert the necessity in our actual state of Divine assistance, not given in nature, to enable us to attain to the perfect good, to which we conceive God might have destined us without creating for us the supernatural order. Still we are arguing as a Christian, as a believer, as one who has the supernatural revelation, and uses that revelation, not merely his natural light alone. But the argument to reach the pure rationalist is not simple and ultimate enough, because natural reason without revelation can show man no higher end as obligatory on him than is naturally attainable. Leave man to nature alone, and his natural ends are simply those to which he is naturally sufficient. The natural ends the learned and philosophic Abbé insists upon, are natural in the sense that they do not lie in the supernatural order, or are not the supernatural end of regenerated Humanity, or the new creation, but, if unattainable by our natural powers,

they are not natural in relation to the natural or unassisted man.

We dare maintain that natural reason left to itself is not able to assert the necessity of a Divine revelation. It could do so only on condition that the necessity of such revelation is inherent in the nature of man, and that, as a Catholic, we are not permitted to assert; for that would imply that it is due to man, a *debitum*, which God contracts in the very act of creating man. But Divine Revelation pertains to the order of grace, not to the order of justice. God could, had he so chosen, have created man and left him to his simple natural light and forces, without doing him any injustice. Divine revelation is a free gift, not a *debitum*, or debt due to man as the complement of his nature. Yet unless it is a debt, unless it is something due to nature, you cannot from nature deduce its necessity.

But if this be so, we ask again whence the popularity of this argument? How happens it that in some form nearly all the great defenders of the Christian Revelation, from St. Augustine down to the author of the *Aspirations of Nature*, adopt it, and attempt to prove by reason the insufficiency of reason, and then to conclude from that insufficiency the necessity of Divine and supernatural revelation? Is their reasoning absolutely and essentially vicious, mere sophistry? He certainly would be a rash man, if nothing worse, who should assert it, and in commenting on it as we have done, we have been very far from intending to impugn the substance of the argument. Our real purpose is to call attention to a fact that seems to us, if not generally overlooked, not to have been generally stated with proper distinctness and formality.

If we take *man* as we now find him, he certainly is insufficient for the perfection we can suppose in the natural order. There are certainly ends supposable in that order, in case man were appointed to a natural beatitude, to which he is not adequate, and nothing is more certain than that in his actual condition, he is not able to fulfil the whole natural law without the gracious assistance of God. From man's actual and undeniable insufficiency to keep the whole law of nature, the necessity of Divine revelation and assistance may undoubtedly be concluded; but this is because man has lost the integrity of his nature, the *indebita*, as theologians say, and because he is not and never has been in a state of pure nature. He has never existed in a state of

pure nature, or been abandoned to his simple, natural light and forces, but has been both before and since the Fall placed under a supernatural providence. From the first God has dealt with him as a creature appointed to a supernatural end, and poured on him a flood of light above and beyond his simple natural light, whence he has wants and aspirations which he is not naturally able to gratify. As a matter of fact, there is that inadequacy of man's powers to his wants and aspirations alleged; but it is due not to the insufficiency of pure nature for pure nature, but to the insufficiency of pure nature for the end above pure nature, which is clearly or dimly revealed to every human intellect and every human heart.

The natural ends of intellect and will, stated by the learned and philosophic Abbé, are not the ends of pure nature, but of integral nature, to which we know from our faith, man was equal before the prevarication of Adam; but man does not exist now in a state of integral nature, and it is not and never was necessary that he should, for God, as the Church has defined against Baius, might have created man in the beginning such as he is now born. Man not being now in a state of integral nature, whence does he know the fact of such a state, or become able to conceive of what in such a state would be his natural end, supposing him destined to a natural end? You place man in a state of pure nature, give as his natural end what is really the natural end only of integral nature, show that he is inadequate to that end, and thence conclude the necessity of Divine light and assistance beyond man's natural light and forces. But your conclusion is not valid, first, because it cannot be necessary that pure nature should fulfil the ends of integral nature, and secondly, because integral nature and its ends are not discernible by pure reason, without the tradition of faith.

Furthermore, the Divine revelation proved to be necessary from the insufficiency of man to fulfil the law of nature, would not necessarily be the revelation of a supernatural order of life, such as is brought to light through the Gospel. According to the Christian revelation the end of man is supernatural, not natural, an end which is not even approached by the perfect fulfilment of the whole natural law. Suppose man in the full integrity of his nature, knowing and obeying perfectly the whole natural law, he is still in the order of nature, and has not necessarily any knowl-

edge or conception of any other than a natural end, than a natural beatitude. He does not even begin to live the supernatural life which is in Christ, the Incarnate God. The proof, then, of the necessity in our present state of Divine revelation to enable us to know and fulfil the whole law of nature, would not, *per se*, advance us a single step in the proof either of the fact or of the necessity of the Christian revelation. The Abbé Maret, then, even supposing him to have proved the necessity of Divine revelation and existence to enable us to attain the ends of intellect and will in the natural order, has done nothing towards proving the truth, reality, or necessity of that supernatural order which we as Christians believe, simply because the end to be attained is not in the natural order, but in the supernatural.

Natural reason, we maintain, in the state of integral nature is sufficient to the end of that nature; in a state of pure nature, it is sufficient to the end of pure nature. It can then be assumed or proved to be insufficient only in relation either to integral nature, in which man is not, or in relation to a supernatural end of which we can know nothing, without a supernatural revelation. Not being in the state of *natura integra*, we cannot by simple natural reason alone attain to the knowledge or conception of such a state, and therefore we cannot by our own natural light in the state of pure nature know the insufficiency of reason in relation to its end; and not being able by natural reason in any state to conceive of a supernatural order and a supernatural end, we cannot by natural reason alone prove the insufficiency of reason in relation even to the supernatural. Therefore in no sense in which reason is assumed to be insufficient can its insufficiency be proved by our simple natural light. The insufficiency of reason can be known only by Divine revelation, and therefore cannot be established as one of the facts known independently of revelation, from which the necessity of revelation may be logically concluded.

But this insufficiency is a fact of which all men are more or less conscious, and is proved by the whole voluminous history of human error and failure. The immense distance between our ideal and our power of realization, is borne witness to by men in all ages and nations, and constitutes the secret of life's innumerable tragedies. Those wants and aspirations, which are insisted on by theologians, preachers,

and apologists, which cannot find their satisfaction in the natural order, and which point to the possession and vision of God as he is in himself, are facts, facts to be found in some measure in the experience of every man, and which no one can seriously attempt for one moment to deny. What do they prove? They do not prove the insufficiency of reason or nature in relation to its own order, as is pretended; they do not prove the necessity of Divine revelation; but they are unimpeachable witnesses in human experience to the fact that a Divine revelation has been made, and that man is under a supernatural providence, destined not to a natural but to a supernatural beatitude. They prove, when rightly considered, more than the *necessity*, they prove the *fact* of Divine revelation, for if no such revelation had been made, they would not and could not have existed. They would have been no more possible in the case of man than in the case of animals.

But those who deny revelation and the supernatural order, usually hold that these wants and aspirations which nothing earthly satisfies are natural, originate in nature alone. Against these the ordinary argument is good. Either these wants and aspirations proceed from reminiscences of a Divine revelation and the fact that the man is under a supernatural providence and destined to a supernatural beatitude, or they proceed from nature herself. If the former, the controversy is at an end, and you concede Divine revelation and the fact of the supernatural order; if the latter, you must concede the insufficiency of nature or reason for itself, and then the necessity of Divine revelation and supernatural assistance. The usual argument is valid as an *argumentum ad hominem*, or when nature is taken not in the *sensus divisus*, but in the *sensus compositus*, as including all that we can affirm of an unsupernaturalized or unregenerated man,—in which sense we presume it is usually taken by those who use the argument. Nature means in their minds whatever is true of man considered prior to his regeneration or supernaturalization, without their distinguishing in him between what is purely natural in its origin, and what he owes to the tradition of his integral and supernatural state, a tradition which has never been wholly lost in any age or country, with any people, tribe, or individual. So taken we accept the argument, and have ourselves urged it more than once with all the force we have.

But we may, we think, obtain a still stronger and more

conclusive argument by taking nature in the *sensus divisus*, in which sense it has not and cannot have the conception of its own insufficiency; for in that sense it is not insufficient for itself, as we think we have already shown. It will then follow that the natural has, and can have no natural conception of the supernatural. The order of grace lies above the order of nature, and though grace supposes nature, nature does not suppose grace. Grace is neither included in nature, nor necessary to it as nature. Evidently, then, nature does not, and by itself alone cannot even conceive of the supernatural. The need of grace is not a natural need; for if it were, grace would not be grace, but debt, and God, having created nature, would have no right to withhold it. Grace in that case would not be, in relation to nature, free grace, which God notwithstanding his decree to create man, is free to grant or withhold. By nature, or natural reason, we may and do know with certainty that God exists; but that he exists as the author of nature, not that he also exists as the author of grace, or as the author of the supernatural. From the fact that God has created nature, we cannot conclude that he has created the order of grace, because his decree to create the order of grace is not involved in his decree to create the order of nature. The supernatural, then, is neither revealed nor implied in the order of nature, and is for it, till otherwise revealed, as if it were not. It would destroy the very fundamental conception of grace to suppose the decree to create nature did not leave God free either to grant or withhold it. Now we say, that what rests, so to speak, notwithstanding the creation of the order of nature, in the free will of God to give or withhold, cannot be asserted or indicated in any way whatever by the existence of the natural order or any thing pertaining to it. Evidently then, man could not by nature or natural reason, know or conceive of the existence of God as author of grace, or of a supernatural order, or infer from any thing in or wanting to nature the existence of such order. Nothing could lead him to conceive of any order above or distinct from the natural order. He could no more conceive of it than a man born blind could conceive of colors, or a man born deaf could conceive of sounds.

Yet we find that all the world has in some form the conception of the supernatural, and is either asserting or denying it; all the world is conscious of wants and aspirations that nature cannot satisfy, and which can find their satisfac-

tion only in the possession of God by the supernatural light of glory. All religions, the gross forms of fetichism, the poetic mythology and gorgeous ceremonial of polished Gentile nations, and the sublime worship of the Jews and Christians, alike bear witness to the fact of these wants and aspirations, and to the fact that man does conceive of the supernatural, and the reality of a supernatural providence. Now whence these conceptions and these wants and aspirations, since they do not and cannot proceed from nature abandoned to itself? These wants and aspirations are inconceivable in pure nature, and could not be experienced, if it were not a fact that man is placed under a supernatural providence, and has not provided for him simply natural beatitude as his end. Their existence from the first with all men is, then, a proof, not of the necessity but of the fact of the supernatural, for unless God had in some way affirmed himself to man as the author of the supernatural, as he affirms himself to natural reason as the author of nature, they could not have existed.

We beg our readers to recall here what we have so often asserted and demonstrated, namely, that man knows that God is, only because he affirms himself in and to natural reason, as at once its creator, light, and immediate object. Suppose, *per impossibile*, that the human mind could exist and operate without the intuition of God, it could never by its natural light and forces attain to the conception of his existence, because the assertion of his existence would not be necessary to the explication of the existence and operations of the human mind. So in the supernatural order. If you suppose the human mind without the affirmation by God himself to it of his existence as author of the supernatural, you cannot conceive of him as such, because it is not necessary to conceive of him as author of the supernatural in order to conceive of him as author of the natural. The supernatural is not and cannot be necessary to the existence or explication of the natural. Suppose, then, the human mind without the conception of the supernatural, and abandoned to its natural light and forces, it is evident that it can attain to that conception only by the affirmation to it by some other than itself, of the supernatural. That is, the human mind must be taught, or have revealed to it, the supernatural, or it cannot conceive of the supernatural, cannot either affirm or deny, believe or disbelieve it.

Unbelievers all maintain that men believe in the super-

natural only because they have been taught it, and they attribute these wants and aspirations which demand the supernatural to tradition or education. So far we agree with them, we maintain the same. But who has been the teacher? "Priests, and crafty and ambitious statesmen," say the sages of the Voltairian school. Crafty and ambitious statesmen may use or abuse existing popular beliefs or prejudices, but they do not invent them for the sake of using them in the government of men. Priests, if wicked, may pervert the religious beliefs of mankind, as Protestant ministers pervert and abuse the reverence of the Christian heart for the Holy Scriptures; but they do not invent the belief in the supernatural, because their very existence as priests supposes it already entertained. The creature does not create its creator. They may perpetuate, but could not have originated it. "The passions," say one class of unbelievers, "originated it." *Timor fecit deos*, sang old Lucretius. Fear or the passions of their worshippers may have given to the gods believed in their special form or character, but could not have originated the primitive conception of the Divinity. Men may anthropomorphize their conceptions of God, but they cannot do so unless they already believe that God, or the Divinity exists. "Imagination," say still another class of unbelievers, "formed heaven and hell, the Elysian fields and the Tartarean Gulf." Be it so. But imagination can only clothe with its own beautiful, fantastic, grotesque, or hideous forms conceptions derived from intuition or revelation. Imagination can operate only on real *data*, and its wildest fancies are simply combinations in its own way of known realities.

However we may attempt to explain the *accidents*, to speak scholastically, of the conception of the supernatural, we are obliged to admit at least that none of the explications we offer account for the origin of the *idea* itself, for they all presuppose it. Your father may have taught you, and his father may have taught him, and so on till you come to the first man. But who taught the first man? Who could, but God himself? The moment, then, that it is conceded or proved that the natural by itself alone does not and cannot rise to the conception of the supernatural, the moment that it is conceded or proved that man can entertain the idea only as he is taught it,—that moment it must be conceded that the supernatural has been revealed by God himself, and therefore that the supernatural is true, is a real existing

order, as truly so as the natural order; for God is no less true in revealing than in creating.

We must remember that only truth is intelligible, and that the human mind can never embrace pure, unmixed falsehood. Pure, unmixed falsehood is absolute nothing, is mere negation, and is and can be no object of the intellect. Error is intelligible only by virtue of the truth it misapprehends, misrepresents, or misapplies. Men may err as to the supernatural, may have false notions of a future life, may people heaven with false gods, and establish and observe false and mischievous forms of worship, but not without having a conception of a future life, of heaven, of the Divinity, of religious worship, which has a substratum of truth, of reality. It is thus that all false religions are witnesses to the fact that there is a true religion. The human mind, whether considered under the point of view of intellect, imagination, or affection, can operate only in conjunction with its object, which it is not itself, and which it does not and cannot create, and which it does not and cannot seek and find for itself, but which presents itself, or is divinely presented, to it. The miserable psychologism, which sends the mind without its object forth into space to seek and find its object, which supposes the mind can operate without an object, *le moi* without *le non-moi*, that it can create its object, or that it can take itself as his own object, that is, stand face to face with itself, and look into its own eyes, has been sufficiently refuted in these pages, and by the great contemporary masters of human thought, and no man pretending to the least philosophical science, can any longer insist on it. God is and can be his own object, because he is intelligible *in se*, since he is pure, absolute, infinite being *in se*; but no creature can be its own object, because no creature is intelligible *in se*, since no creature is pure being *in se*, but lives, moves, and exists in another, to wit, the Creator. "In him we live, and move, and are."

Men cannot then attain to the conception of the supernatural unless the supernatural really exists, and is presented, immediately or mediately, to their mind as an intelligible or as a credible object. The notion that it is purely false, as unbelievers pretend, must be given up, because the human mind cannot conceive of pure falsehood, and the notion that it can be obtained by induction from natural phenomena is a sin against the fundamental principle of logic, that there can be no more in the conclusion than is con-

tained in the premises. Even in the natural order, we do not, notwithstanding all your physico-theological treatises, prove the existence of God even as author of nature, by induction from natural phenomena. If there were no intuition of that which is God, no induction could prove or demonstrate his existence. All we do by our induction is to prove not that God is, but that the being presented to us in intuition is God. So in the supernatural order, we cannot from our wants and aspirations, assumed to be simply wants and aspirations of nature, conclude the fact or the necessity of the supernatural. But from an analysis of these wants and aspirations we may prove that they are not purely natural in their origin, and therefore conclude that the supernatural has been in some form revealed to man, and that he has been placed under a supernatural providence and destined to a supernatural end. We do not conclude by induction that man needs a Divine revelation and a supernatural providence, but that what is affirmed in these very wants and aspirations is that man has received such a revelation and is under such a providence.

What we say here accepts what is true in the teachings of the so-called Traditionalists. They push their doctrines too far, and do not distinguish with sufficient care in the natural order between intuition and reflection, and in religion and morality between the natural and the supernatural. Their grand principle is that man cannot *invent*, that is, find truth. Rightly explained, this principle is sound. If this means that the truth must present and affirm itself to the mind, and that the mind cannot operate without truth, it is correct and what we assert. If it means that there is in the natural order no immediate intuition of truth pertaining to that order, as the Traditionalists seem to hold, it is incorrect, unphilosophical and erroneous, denies all real science or knowledge, and therefore the possibility of faith, as may be concluded from the act of faith itself. If it means that man in the reflective order needs to have the truth not only presented intuitively, but re-presented through the medium of language or sensible signs, we accept it. Man taught through the medium of language that God exists, can, when the idea is re-presented to him, find or prove by reason, that God really is. But without being so taught, or having the idea so re-presented, he would never have conceived of God even as author of nature. So of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, free will, and moral obligation, all

the great truths of the natural order, or of what is sometimes called natural religion. All of these may, when taught through language, or represented by tradition, be demonstrated, proved, or known with certainty by natural reason; yet without the teaching or the tradition they would never have been known or conceived of in the reflective order, although all are intuitively presented.

In the supernatural order the principle is the same, only its truths are truths of faith, not of knowledge, although the effects they produce in the natural order may be known as well as believed. But their effects in the natural could not be produced, if they were not truths, and in relation with the natural. Man could not be intellectually or morally affected by them, if they were not in some manner revealed to him, and if he were not placed within the sphere of their influence. Man does not by his natural intellect find or invent them, and he can know or believe them only as they are presented to him immediately, or mediately through tradition, by God himself in his relation as author of the supernatural. In point of fact, they are presented to us by tradition, and as that tradition must have its origin in Divine revelation, the very fact that they are presented to our minds, and we can think and speak of them or about them, is a proof that they are truths, and that in believing them we are believing God, who cannot deceive or be deceived. Thus far the Traditionalists are certainly right, for tradition in the natural order is the medium of re-presentation, and in the supernatural the medium, except in the case of the immediately inspired, of the presentation of truth to the human reason.

The reasoning we adduce accords with the historical facts in the case. We know by faith that God, when he had created man, placed him under a supernatural providence, and appointed him to a supernatural end,—the enjoyment of God in the beatific vision. He might have provided, but he did not provide, for man a perfect natural beatitude, because it pleased him in his overflowing goodness to provide something infinitely higher and better for him than any natural beatitude could be. Having assigned him in his decree a supernatural end or beatitude, he clothed him with the full integrity of his nature, the *indebita* of the theologians, and infused into him a supernatural or elevating grace, which supernaturalized him and placed him on the plane of his supernatural destiny, and fitted him to merit a

supernatural reward. He made him a revelation, not simply a revelation of the truths of the natural order, but truths also of the supernatural order in which his destiny was placed. Thus man started, not in the natural order alone, not in a state of pure nature, but in integral nature, supernaturally elevated to the plane of a supernatural end, under a supernatural providence, and favored with supernatural instruction and assistance.

Tempted by Satan, and preferring natural, or what he supposed to be natural, to supernatural beatitude, as the race to a fearful extent has ever since done, man disobeyed the command of his Lord and God, and fell from his high estate, and in falling lost his original justice and sanctity which would have merited the supernatural reward; and with the supernatural grace by which he was constituted in justice, he lost also the integrity of his nature, or the gifts superadded to its endowments as pure nature. He also fell under the power of Satan, lost the dominion over his lower nature, and became subject to pain and misery, to error, and to death, temporal and eternal. But though man lost the integrity of his nature, and the supernatural grace of his state of innocence, and though in consequence his understanding became darkened and his will attenuated, he did not lose all recollection of the revelation he had received, nor all reminiscences of his original endowments, and has, unless in here and there an individual case, never wholly lost them. His nature, though it has lost no faculty essential to it as pure nature, bears still traces of the shock it received when violently despoiled of its original integrity and supernatural endowments. Man bears in his secret heart the memory of a great and terrible loss. His nature as it exists to-day is not simply *natura privata*, but *natura spoliata*. What it weeps and longs for is not a good that it has never had yet aspires to, but a good that it has had, and through prevarication has lost. It is not its inability to gain the Eden before it that causes its sadness, and produces the low, melodious wail of sorrow we meet in the poetry of all ages and nations, but the Eden behind it, from which it has been expelled, and whose gates are guarded by angels with flaming swords against all return. Examine all the religions of the Gentiles in ancient or modern times, and you will find them pervaded by a deep and unutterable regret. They recall at every turn the memory of a terrible catastrophe. Their gaiety is the gaiety of despair, not of

hope. What are the wild and frantic dances of the Corybantes, the fearful orgies of Bacchus and Isis, but miserable attempts to drown memory, to obtain a momentary forgetfulness of an irreparable loss? All history, all Gentile superstition, nay, human life itself bears unmistakable testimony to the loss of a good once possessed, and to the incessant efforts of man to forget it, to repair it, or to supply it by another.

St. Thomas and all our theologians teach that there never has been but one revelation, and that that was made, at least in substance, to our first parents, before their expulsion from the Garden, and hence St. Augustine says, "Times change, but faith does not change; as believed the fathers, so believe we, only they believed in Christ who was to come, we in Christ who has come." The tradition of this revelation, a revelation of the supernatural order, the supernatural life and destiny of man, has never been wholly effaced in any age, nor with any people or tribe. It is incorporated, with more or less purity and integrity, into every speech and language of men. It comes down to us in its purity and integrity through the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Church, and in a corrupt, fragmentary, and sometimes in a travestied form through the Gentile nations and heretical sects. It is the one grand fountain from which all religions have drawn. The Patriarchal religion is the type of all the Gentile religions, the Catholic religion is the type of all heretical religions—the type from which they depart indeed, not the type they approach and tend to realize. The Gentile religions corrupted the Patriarchal, and tended from the supernatural to the natural, from God as the author of the supernatural, to God as author of nature; and from God as author of nature, to God in nature; from God in nature, to nature without God; and from nature without God, to demonism. "All the gods of the heathen are demons," says the Holy Scripture. The same is true of heresy. Protestantism having broken from unity, has run, in its advanced guard, through deism, pantheism, nature or soul worship, and is now developing itself in spiritism or demonism, and nowhere more fearfully than in our country, so remarkable for its precocity. Still in all you find not anticipations, but reminiscences of the Divine revelation of the supernatural order, and none of them are explicable without the revelation held by the Patriarchs, the Synagogue, and the Church, or could have existed if such a revelation had not been

made, and been their point of departure, or if man had not been placed under the supernatural providence that revelation asserts.

Here is the grand fact. The supernatural is not created by man, nor is it left to be discovered or demonstrated by philosophy. It is a fact in human history, and always has been, and is as evidently and as undeniably there as the natural itself. Not a single fact in that history is really explicable without its assumption. The whole history of the race is an overwhelming proof of the fact that man is under a supernatural providence, and that God governs and always has governed him in relation to a supernatural destiny. If man is under a supernatural providence, certainly a supernatural revelation is necessary, but not otherwise. Philosophy, therefore, which is only natural reason, can prove neither the need nor the fact of such revelation. The very first step in the process of proof must be, then, the proof of the assumption that man is under a supernatural providence, a fact not provable from reason alone. Before we proceed to prove that man needs a Divine revelation, we must prove the fact to reason, that man is under a supernatural providence; and this can be done, because it is a fact provable, not from reason, indeed, from *data* furnished by natural reason, but to reason, by the undeniable fact that the supernatural is in human history, and presents itself in every page of that history; by the fact that the whole life of man is inexplicable, nay inconceivable, without its assumption; by the fact that it everywhere asserts and affirms itself to human reason. In theory, if man were under a natural providence, nothing could hinder us from explaining human life and human history on natural principles. No *a priori* objection could be brought against doing it. The rationalist, following even a severe logic, affirms that it can be done, and makes the effort to do it, with what success it is needless to say. The facts in the case reject his theory. No man can explain human history on natural principles alone, without mutilating it, leaving out whole classes of well-attested facts, and they the most important and essential facts, which have had the most influence on its general and even particular currents. Explain the history of the Jewish people from Abraham to our Lord, a people whose whole political, civil, and religious existence and life was shaped and moulded by the promise of a Messias, and whose whole national history, as well as religious observances, was

a continuous prophecy for two thousand years of his coming,—explain this miraculous history on natural principles. You know you cannot do it, except by cutting down arbitrarily, and shaping, without the slightest historical authority, the facts to suit your convenience. You can do it only by assuming in the outset that all history must be explicable on natural principles, and then denying, or passing over in silence, all the facts narrated that cannot be explained on those principles. This is not to explain, but to make history, and to make it to suit yourself,—to adapt it to the exigencies of your theory. Explain to us the history of the Church on natural principles, her origin in Judea, her growth under persecution, her persistence, in spite of every species of opposition, for two thousand years, as fresh, as vigorous, and as able to make new conquests, as she was when she went forth from that "upper room" in Jerusalem, to conquer the kingdoms of this world, and to make them the kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ. The thing is impossible. The rationalists have tried their hand at it, but have succeeded only in demonstrating their own impotence and absurd pretensions. Macaulay tried it, and pronounced the Church a masterpiece of human wisdom, but in defiance of the whole series of facts in her history, which prove that if she had rested in human wisdom and sagacity, and had not been upheld supernaturally by the hand of Almighty God, she would ages since have ceased to exist. There is more good sense and sound reasoning in the old-fashioned Protestants, who denounce the Church as the masterpiece of Satan; for no man can explain the fact of her existence without recognizing in her history a superhuman agency. Gibbon in his famous chapters attempts to explain the rise, the progress, and the triumph of the Church in the Roman Empire, on human principles, without recognizing the supernatural, but succeeds, as all the world knows, only by suppressing facts, falsifying history, and rejecting even the principles of sound logic.

We, therefore, cannot speak as highly of the second part of the Abbé Maret's work, which attempts to prove the necessity of Divine revelation, as we did of the first part, which treats of the dignity of human reason. We do not think his method is in harmony with the philosophy he teaches, and it seems to us to harmonize rather with the conceptual or psychological systems he has so ably refuted. The method we have indicated makes the proofs of the

supernatural, or the existence of God as author of the supernatural, parallel with the proofs of the existence of God as author of nature. As reason cannot operate without principles, or furnish its own principles, God himself supplies them in the natural order by his immediate presence in reason as its creator, its light, and its object, and in the supernatural order by revelation, and by his immediate presence as author of the supernatural in faith, its creator, its light, and its immediate object. If God did not intervene supernaturally, and affirm himself in and to our creditive faculty as author of the supernatural, we could have not only no belief in, but no notion or conception of the supernatural.

We differ also from the learned and philosophic Abbé on his two main points; first, that the necessity of Divine revelation is or can be established by philosophy, and second, that in proving the Christian religion, the first step is to prove that necessity. The first point to be proved, we think, is the simple fact that man is placed under a supernatural providence, and the proofs of this are to be sought in history, not in philosophy. Till we have proved that man is placed under a supernatural providence, and destined, not to a simply natural, but to a supernatural end, we cannot in reality assert the insufficiency of reason, or the necessity of Divine revelation. The unbeliever may argue,—and we have no logic that will refute him,—that natural reason being our natural light, and evidently given us to be our natural guide, must be sufficient if we are under a natural providence, and in our normal state. But the fact once established that man is under a supernatural providence, no one will pretend to assert the sufficiency of reason, or to deny the necessity of supernatural revelation and assistance. The only ground we have for asserting the necessity of such revelation and assistance is, the fact that we are not under a natural, but a supernatural providence. Till we have established this fact, our arguments, however learned or elaborate, or however true in point of fact, will fail to convince even the honest and well-disposed unbeliever. He will regard them as irrelevant and inconclusive. We may and do speak here from our own painful experience, for it was not till we had detected the supernatural in history, and learned that man is under a supernatural providence, that we found ourselves in a condition to become a real Christian believer.

The proofs of this supernatural providence, as we have all along been laboring to show, may be adduced to natural rea-

son, but cannot be deduced from it. Suppose man to be just what we know him to be *in hac providentia;* suppose also, *per impossibile*, that he has as yet received no Divine revelation, and that no evidences that he is under a supernatural providence are supplied him in history or from abroad, he could never form the first faint notion of the necessity of Divine revelation to instruct him or of Divine grace to assist him. It is the fact that creates the necessity and supplies the proof. Without the fact,—and if we do not in some form or degree know it, we are practically without it,—we should be in relation to the supernatural, as we should be in relation to the natural if we were uncreated and had no natural existence. As we could not before creation have conceived of the natural, so before revelation we cannot conceive of the supernatural. The natural has and can have no anticipation or prolepsis of the supernatural, can discover no antecedent probability of its creation, and have no *a priori* arguments by which to establish it. We are not ignorant that Plato and the more eminent of the Gentile philosophers have asserted the necessity of supernatural instruction and assistance; but they have done so not by force of pure reason operating upon natural *data* alone, but by reason operating on the supernatural *data* supplied by history and the experience of life. If they had found no such *data*, they never could from their own reason have made their assertion.

We must take care how we assume that the Gentiles were in a state of pure nature, and abandoned to its light alone. The Gentiles were not assuredly supernaturalized, translated into the kingdom of Christ, regenerated in Christ, and united to him, the head of regenerated or supernaturalized Humanity, as Adam was the head of natural Humanity; yet we must not suppose that they had nothing but the simple light of natural reason, or that they were precisely what men would have been, if they had been created in a state of pure nature and abandoned to it. They were indeed in a state of fallen nature; but even in fallen nature they retained reminiscences of what they had and were before the fall. They had, too, some traces of the primitive revelation made in the Garden to the human race, and through their dim and fading, mutilated, and even travestied traditions, some flashes of light from that primitive revelation furrowed the darkness which enveloped them, and gave them momentary glimpses at least of an order not

revealed to them through natural reason. The Gentiles were the schismatics and heretics of the old world, as Arians, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, and other sects are the schismatics and heretics of the modern world, and they no more than these lost all traces of the truth they ceased to hold in unity and in its purity and integrity. Under some points of view, the Gentiles held more elements of the primitive revelation than are held by the majority of our modern sects, and far more than are held by unbelievers in our day, brought up and educated in Christian countries. These lose what the Gentiles rarely lost, all belief in a supernatural providence. If we may believe Clemens Alexandrinus, and others of the early Christian writers, Christ to some extent enlightened even the great Gentile philosophers. He did it by the primitive revelation, which entered into the mind of the race, and the tradition of which is in some measure embodied and perpetuated in every human tongue.

It strikes us as no less unreasonable to reject than it is to accept all the so-called Traditionalists teach. No doubt, as we have said, they push their doctrines too far, and in restricting too much the powers of natural reason lose what St. Thomas calls the preamble to faith, and consequently faith itself. No doubt they fail to draw the proper line of distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and run one into the other and involve themselves in inextricable confusion. But after all they assert a great truth which other schools too often either deny or overlook. We are by no means of M. Bonnetty's school, indeed he does not seem to be always of his own school, or to hold his own opinions; but as between him and Père Chastel, we hardly know which to choose. The latter goes, in our judgment, to an extreme in one direction hardly less dangerous than that to which M. Bonnetty is accused of running in another. The Abbé Maret certainly does not run into the extreme rationalism of the learned, but not very philosophic Jesuit Father; yet he seems too afraid of tradition, and hardly dares give it its proper place and office. Traditionalism is absurd, if you suppose man placed under a natural providence and destined to a natural beatitude, as pure philosophy does and must assume: but that, we think, is an error against fact, and against Catholic theology. The supernatural assumes the natural, and absorbs it, so to speak, in the supernatural, in some sense as in the Incarnation the Divinity assumes

humanity, and the Divine personality absorbs the human personality, or supplies its place by a higher personality. The whole supernatural order has its root in the Incarnation, grows out of it, and in all its parts and its appurtenances in some sense or measure repeats it. All human history is related to the Incarnation, and finds in it and not elsewhere its reason and explication. The humanity of our Lord was true, proper, perfect humanity, and yet by the Hypostatic Union it is humanity finding its last complement in the Divine Person of the Word. In the supernatural order the Incarnate God, the Word made flesh, *Verbum caro factum*, is the first principle and the creator, and it copies or imitates him as nature copies or imitates God as its creator. As in the Incarnation the human and the Divine remain forever distinct, neither nature nor will being confused with the other, so in life the natural and supernatural remain distinct, and without any mixture or interconfusion; but as in the Incarnation, the human and Divine are no longer separable, and the human terminates, so to speak, in the Divine, and are one in the higher and Divine personality of the Son, so the natural loses its own end in the higher end of the supernatural, and in that end both the natural and the supernatural become one. Whoso meditates on the Incarnation, it seems to us, must see that man has not in fact any purely natural end or natural beatitude, to which he is appointed. The natural as to its end loses itself in the supernatural. As the Incarnation is from the beginning, since Christ is the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and God has governed the world solely in reference to the Incarnation of the Word and supernatural life in Christ, we must regard man always in relation to the Incarnation, and therefore always and everywhere under a supernatural providence, though not always and everywhere elevated to and placed in the supernatural order. Assuming this, the supernatural must have always and everywhere entered into human life, and therefore into human history. The proper medium for detecting and establishing the fact of the supernatural providence is history and tradition. Here is the proper place and office of tradition, and the attempt to make natural reason supply its place and perform its functions, will always fail, and end only in obscuring the supernatural, and finally in effacing it from human belief. The supernatural is the tradition of the race, and as it could have originated only in the direct revelation of God, it is true, and reason commands us to believe it.

RATIONALISM AND TRADITIONALISM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1860.]

NOTHING is more certain, than that there is, and has been for the last two hundred years, in Catholic as in non-Catholic schools, no philosophy properly so called. True, there is something taught in our colleges and universities under the name of philosophy, but it is for the most part, as an eminent American prelate remarked to us one day in conversation, simply "some fragments of Catholic theology badly proved." Our Catholic professors generally profess to follow St. Thomas, whom some of them may have really read, at least in part, but there are hardly any two of them who agree in giving the same interpretation to his language. Padre Ventura makes him a decided Traditionalist; M. Bonnetty insists that he was an out-and-out Rationalist; Père Gratry finds that he was an Inductivist; the Abbé Maret suspects that he was a Sensist; one holds that he was a Conceptualist, another that he was a Nominalist, and still another that he was virtually a Realist; this commentator makes him an Ontologist, and that, with equal reason at least, makes him a Psychologist. In fact, we are very much in the position as to the philosophical teachings of St. Thomas that Protestants are as to the teachings of the Holy Scriptures, each one finds in him the doctrine which he learns elsewhere and brings to him.

The principal cause of the present deplorable state of philosophy, is in the lack of free, independent thinkers,—in the fact that we philosophize not for the sake of truth, but for the sake of some philosophical theory, ancient or modern, and always more or less under the weight of authority. No man who philosophizes with a sole view to truth, will neglect the profound and assiduous study of St. Thomas, but at the same time, no one who has any just appreciation of the rights and prerogatives of the reason common to all men, will ever consent to accept him or any one else as authority, from whose opinion it is forbidden to dissent. In matters of faith or Christian doctrine, we are governed by the authority of the Church, or rather, we believe because God says it, and we believe that he says it, on the testimony of the Church, the divinely-constituted witness in the case. But in

philosophy, we hold ourselves bound by the opinions of no man, and can accept as authority from which there lies no appeal, neither Plato nor Aristotle, St. Augustine nor St. Thomas, Descartes nor Malebranche, Locke nor Leibnitz, Rosmini nor Gioberti, Rothenflue nor Liberatori. So long as we run athwart no article, dogma, or proposition of faith, we are free to follow our own judgment and convictions. So long, no man, however he may disagree with us, has the right to cite, as authority, against us the opinions of any philosopher, ancient or modern, Catholic or non-Catholic; for in philosophy, reason, which is the same in all men, and in each man, is the only authority recognizable. The philosophical opinions and theories of the illustrious men in different ages, whom the civilized world has agreed to honor for their rare philosophical genius and attainments, are certainly never to be lightly treated,—are always worthy of the most serious and respectful consideration, and never to be rejected but for grave and cogent reasons; but all theories and opinions on philosophy, as on all other subjects, must be judged on their merits.

It is fatal to the progress of philosophy, to attempt to introduce into its study the principle of authority which we recognize in faith and theology. The principle of external authority is as much out of place in philosophy, as the principle of rationalism is out of place in faith. No Catholic denies this when the point is distinctly made, but the habit of deciding all theological questions by authority, if we are not on our guard, leads us, without our adverting to the fact, to appeal also to authority in the solution of purely philosophical questions. The human mind naturally seeks unity, and seeks when it accepts the principle of authority, to carry authority into all things, and when it accepts the principle of reason, to carry it into faith, and to recognize in no department of life any authority but reason as developed in each individual man. Hence a perpetual tendency in the people either to substitute faith for reason, or reason for faith. It is hard to keep always present to the mind that we live under two orders, the one natural, the other supernatural, and that the authority in the former is reason, and in the latter, the Church, as the keeper and witness of revelation. The Protestant by his doctrine of private interpretation is invariably led to transport natural reason as authority into the supernatural order, and hence all Protestantism tends to pure rationalism, sometimes

avowed, and sometimes unavowed. The Catholic, if only superficially instructed, or not keeping vigilant watch, has a tendency, on the contrary, to transport the principle of authority into the natural order, and to favor a system of exclusive supernaturalism, which denies to reason its legitimate functions, even in its own order. The human mind, left to itself, seeks always to follow one and the same rule in all things. It shrinks from the labor of distinguishing between different orders, and feels a natural repugnance to follow one rule in one order, and a different rule in another.

We lose sight, also, of the true end for which men should cultivate philosophy. Men, in our days, philosophize for the sake of theories, which have been transmitted from their predecessors, or concocted by themselves, not for the sake of the truth, which is anterior to all theories, and independent of them. If we suffer ourselves to contemplate truth at all, it is usually through the distorting medium of some theory, seldom with open vision as it lies before us in the world of reality. We are always studying to confirm, to defend, to refute, or to form some theory, and hence never allow our own minds fair play. We seek to confirm, refute, or reconcile Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, ontologists and psychologists, realists and nominalists, traditionalists and rationalists, not to ascertain and set forth the truth about which these speculate or theorize, and some aspects of which they no doubt really seize and truly represent. We neglect to bear in mind that theories are not the truth, and are at best only the views which their authors take of truth; or to remember that the truth is as near and as open to us as to the most famous system-mongers in the world. We, in this age and country, have all the means of arriving at the knowledge of philosophical truth that Plato or Aristotle, St. Augustine or St. Thomas had, and if we fail to attain to it, it is because we fail to make a wise and free use of the means in our reach, because we suffer our intellectual life to be crushed out by the authority of antiquity, or the superincumbent weight of scholastic systems.

St. Thomas certainly had a philosophical genius of the highest order, but he was never a free and independent philosopher; nor does it appear that he ever philosophized for the sake of philosophy. He was brought up, as to philosophy, in the school of Aristotle, and finding the peripatetic philosophy in vogue, he studied to master it, and to press it

into the service of theology, and to forge from it an effective weapon against the enemies of religion in his time, who generally professed to be peripatetics. He himself, from first to last, is the Catholic theologian, and in no instance does he show that his study was to found a philosophy. His aim was to use what he found accepted as philosophy in the service of theology. Hence he never deviates from Aristotle, except when compelled by Christian dogma. In pure philosophy, when the dogma is not in question, he is a pure peripatetic. In his commentary on Aristotle he simply studies to explain his author, and in every question of pure philosophy, Aristotle is for him *Philosophus*, the Philosopher, whose words are *verba magistri*. The talk we hear of the *Thomist Philosophy* is all nonsense. There is no Thomist philosophy. There may be a Thomist Theology, a Thomist use and application of philosophy in theology; but there is no Thomist philosophy, properly so called. In pure philosophy St. Thomas simply reproduces the philosophy of Aristotle, and our judgment of him as a philosopher must be our judgment of his pagan master. To differ from him in philosophy is simply differing from Aristotle; and if in philosophy it is lawful to differ from Aristotle, it cannot be unlawful to differ from St. Thomas.

We talk, also, of the scholastic method; but, strictly speaking, there is and was no such thing as a scholastic method. The method of the mediæval schoolmen was the peripatetic method, adopted before the advent of our Lord, and their Logic was the *Organon* of Aristotle. We have never, in the little study we have devoted to them, been able to discover any thing new or peculiar in their method, or to lay our finger on a single purely philosophical problem of which they, as philosophers, have offered a new or original solution. As theologians, they were, as a matter of course, since they had the Christian revelation, infinitely in advance of the Gentile philosophers; but as philosophers, they added nothing to what had been transmitted them from their Gentile ancestors. They rendered the western world an important service, both in theology and philosophy, by moulding the Latin tongue, which, as used by the old Romans, was very unphilosophical, into a really philosophical language, almost equal to the Greek, that mother tongue of philosophy, and the only language we know in which the philosopher can express himself with perfect naturalness and ease, and with idiomatic grace and propriety. The merit of the

Scholastics beyond this service, under the head of philosophy, is simply in the use and application they made of the philosophy inherited from the Gentiles in the exposition and defence of Catholic doctrine.

Much, furthermore, is said about *Christian* philosophy, as was a few years ago about Christian architecture, and is still about Christian art. M. Bonnetty calls his periodical the Annals of *Christian* Philosophy. All this has a pious and orthodox sound, as would have *Christian* coats and pantaloons, *Christian* hats and shoes. There is a Christian *use* of philosophy, but, correctly speaking, there is and can be no *Christian* philosophy. The Christian order, we take it, is the supernatural order, and in all that is peculiar to it included in the new creation, whose principle is grace; but philosophy belongs to the natural order, and is restricted to natural reason, essential to and inseparable from human nature itself, whether in Christians or non-Christians, and incapable without the aid of divine revelation, of attaining even to a conception of the supernatural. Christian philosophy, if it could mean any thing, would mean Christian theology, or the sacred science, of which St. Thomas speaks, a science constructed not by reason from its own *data*, but by the use of reason from *data* furnished by faith or revelation. Nor indeed have we a Christian philosophy even in the sense of a philosophy that throughout accords with Christian faith, or that establishes satisfactorily the necessary preamble to faith, the great truths which faith presupposes.

It is all very well to go on repeating from age to age, in all possible variations of tone, that there is no discrepancy between faith and reason, a commonplace which nobody can dispute, when faith and reason are taken each in its true sense and meaning; but nothing is more false than to pretend that there is no discrepancy between faith as revealed in the word of God, and reason as developed in our more approved systems of philosophy. The terrible struggle in our age, perhaps in all ages, in the souls of the great body of earnest thinkers, is the struggle between philosophy and theology, and the great problem of our age is, how to reconcile faith and reason. A large portion of Catholics are indeed hardly aware of this struggle, for they rest in faith, and seldom inquire whether reason harmonizes with it or not. Judging from their practice, we may conclude that there are Catholics who feel no inconvenience in

following, in secular life, principles in direct contradiction to those they hold themselves bound to follow as Christian believers. Yet we apprehend that few Catholics who are compelled by the objections of non-Catholics to consider the problem, and to account to themselves for their faith, do not, at times, find their faith and the philosophy they have learned at odds, and who, though they cling fast to the Rock of Peter, do not do so by the force of will, aided by grace, rather than from clear intellectual perception of the harmony between faith and their reason. They believe faith and reason harmonize, because they have been told so, not because they intellectually see that it is so. In this fact many even place the merit of their faith. Reason, as it exists in man's intellectual nature, as the origin, light, and object of his intelligence, certainly must and does harmonize or accord with Christian faith, as the lower may harmonize or accord with the higher; but as developed and set forth in our philosophical systems, it is, for the most part, directly or indirectly, repugnant to it, as is evinced by the fact that most people brought up believers experience difficulties, if not doubt, the moment they begin to philosophize,—a fact which we must attribute, not, as is too often done, to perversity of will, but rather to the perversion of the intellect by false systems of philosophy generally adopted, and officially taught in the schools.

Certainly we do not pretend that in order to be true believers, all men must be profound philosophers; but we do maintain that in an age and country like ours, where education, however superficial, is generally diffused, and all men read, and to some extent speculate; there must be a true and sound philosophy pervading our schools, our text books, our lighter as our graver literature, and our whole social and domestic life, or it will be impossible to prevent doubt from rising in bold and inquiring minds, or to preserve generally in the community a living active faith, as the present state of Catholic countries where thought is at all permitted but too lamentably proves. Our bishops and clergy see the evil and seek to prevent or counteract it by the establishment and support of Catholic schools, in which children shall be taught the catechism, and an early bias given to the mind in favor of religion; but we should not forget that we can at best only partially counteract the evil by creating an early bias towards faith, that is, a prejudice for religion, unless in the training to which we sub-

ject our children and youth, and the instruction we give them, we really harmonize the natural with the supernatural, faith with reason,—not possible by means of any philosophical exposition of the natural officially accepted either in school or in society.

As long as the natural is not harmonized in our philosophy with the supernatural, or science, as science, with revelation, there will be in the minds of pupils, whether trained in Catholic or non-Catholic schools, a discrepancy between their faith and reason, and faith will be maintained, so far as natural causes affect it, only by their accepting it blindly, and forbearing to think on its relations with reason. A school in which is taught Locke's philosophy, which is little else than the peripatetic philosophy, expressed in popular language, will do little for Catholicity, though the catechism be taught in it at the same time, and the school itself be placed under the charge of the Christian Brothers. It is impossible to reconcile that philosophy with Christian theology, and false to say, so long as it is held to be the exponent of reason, there is no discrepancy between reason and faith. We may say the same with regard to Cartesianism, or any other system officially accepted in the schools. There is no use in reticence or circumlocution on the subject. We yield to no Catholic bishop, presbyter, or simple layman, in our zeal for Catholic education and Catholic instruction, but we cannot persuade ourselves that we secure either in schools where, in what relates to the natural, we contradict what we teach in relation to the supernatural, where the religious instruction is Catholic, and the philosophical is anti-Catholic.

Not only is reason either cramped or developed in a false direction by our systems of philosophy, but our men of routine, and they, being regarded as safe men, are usually placed at the head of affairs, forbid or discourage all efforts to amend these systems, and still persist that our sons shall be trained up in a philosophy under which half the world has lapsed into infidelity. Living men in our colleges, who see the evil and could and would do something to remedy it, are either compelled to teach systems they have exploded or do not believe, or removed from their chairs and forbidden to profess philosophy, and set perhaps to teaching little boys their Latin or French Accidence. The best metaphysical mind in France was obliged to suppress the best part of his *Prælectiones Philosophicæ*, and publish only a muti-

lated edition of his thought, because, forsooth, it was not in harmony with the prejudices of the Superior of the Sulpician Congregation to which he belonged. The man who deviates in philosophy f om the schools, is looked upon very much as a man who deviates from the faith, is denounced as an innovator, abused, insulted, ridiculed, and set down as eccentric, in fact, as a troublesome fellow, whom it is desirable to get rid of as soon as possible. If he is really a man of philosophical genius, and of too much solid merit and strength to be cried down by our pious lackeys or eunuchs, he is praised indeed, but pronounced too profound for the people, declared to be in advance of his age, and it is to be regretted that he has no influence, and that he can be read and appreciated only after his death. Why can he not write what is popular? If that will not do, a cry will be got up against philosophy itself, and men quite innocent of all knowledge of the subject will upbraid him because he is not satisfied with common sense, when, perhaps to bring people back to common sense is the very end for which he labors and suffers reproach. There are wise people who govern public opinion with regard to men and things, and profound thinkers and consistent reasoners are its oracles! Alas, how few men ever rise above routine!

What we want, as we have often told our readers, is not to substitute for the prevailing systems of philosophy a new system of our own, or any new system at all. What we demand is, complete emancipation from all man-made systems, and room for the free and independent exercise of reason according to its own nature and laws. We want no official philosophy, no school system taught by authority, like theology, which our sons must get by rote, and which is ever after to cramp or encumber their intellect. We demand free intellectual development and culture. We insist that our sons shall be trained to a sound and vigorous use of reason, but we do not want them indoctrinated into a ready cut and dried ontological or psychological theory, into which they must compress their whole intellectual life on pain of renouncing reason itself as unreasonable. All of philosophy we want taught in our schools, may be included under the head of logic; logic, both as an art and as a science; and all our articles on the subject, have for their end simply emending the Aristotelian logic now taught, and settling the principles of logic as a real and not a mere sham science. We maintain that the Aristotelian logic, regarded not as an art,

but as a science, is essentially defective, and that, too, whether we take it from Aristotle himself, or from the mediæval or modern scholastics. It is essentially defective, because it omits the creative act, and we may say even false, for it takes its premises from the abstract, not the concrete, and deals with conceptions instead of intuitions and therefore things existing *a parte rei*. A false view of reason is given in the outset, which renders all real science inexplicable, if not impossible. We place a great gulf between the *mundus logicus* and the *mundus physicus*, or real world, which no art, or skill, or labor, can bridge over. All our ideas, and therefore all our science, are representative, vicarious, not real. The idea is neither the reality itself nor is it the direct and immediate intuition of reality, but is simply a representation, an image, or in some sense, a personation of it. In it you have the actor playing the king, but not the king himself. Your science is merely the science of conceptions, a science of abstractions, and whether it correspond or not to things as they really exist, independent of our conceptions, or our subjective ideas, we, with the logic of the schools can never demonstrate or prove.

Now, we contend that it is a wrong done to our youth, a wrong done to the human mind, and a wrong done indirectly, if not directly, to religion itself, to go on age after age teaching this defective logic which vitiates all our science. This is not a matter which concerns the guardians of faith alone; it concerns in even a higher degree parents and the laity at large. The Church has plenary authority in the religious instruction and education of our children, but in their logical and scientific education and instruction we have ourselves a voice, and the right to intervene, for the Church does not claim authority in the natural order, save in its relations with the supernatural. We do not know that in questions of pure reason, the clergy have, by virtue of their orders or their mission, any more authority than the laity, and this much is certain, that the philosophy still taught in our schools and colleges has been drawn from Gentile sources. St. Thomas, on the philosophical aspect of the questions he discusses, cites sometimes even Mahometans, Averrhoës, and Avicenna, as well as the pagan Aristotle. No class, caste, or order of men have a monopoly of reason, for reason is the common inheritance of all men, though some cultivate it more and more successfully than others. If, in a question of philosophy, we show as much reason, we are

entitled, in that question, to as much consideration as though we wore a mitre, and neither our bishops, nor our clergy of the second order, ever think of maintaining to the contrary. Nobody ever thinks of maintaining the contrary, but now and then a philosopherling, who, unable to meet our reasons, seeks to silence us by authority, or by a resort to the *argumentum ad verecundiam*. We do our clergy a great disservice, and show a profound want of respect for our prelates, when we invoke their authority in disputes in which they claim no authority but that of reason, common to them and us, and in which the Church never intervenes, unless to save faith and morals.

As the systems of philosophy which we combat are not given by divine revelation, as they are not, properly speaking, *Christian* systems, are not included in the Deposit of faith, but are really derived from Gentile sources, we hold that we have a right to combat them, when and where we can show good and solid reasons for so doing, although they may have been taught for centuries in schools under the charge of ecclesiastics, secular or regular. For centuries, Catholic professors taught in their schools the geocentric theory, but that does not prevent them from now teaching the heliocentric, even though, in some instances, the language of the Holy Scripture *apparently* opposes it. In faith, or Catholic doctrine, Catholics change not, are not permitted to change; but in science they change, and may as well change in their expositions of reason as in their exposition of the phenomena of the material world. Nothing human is perfect; no human science ever is or can be complete, and to refuse full liberty, within the limits of faith, to change or modify them, were as absurd as to insist that the full grown man shall wear the bib and tucker which he wore as an infant in the nursery. The routinists will, no doubt, resist all such changes and modifications, and endeavor to bring in the Church to settle the dispute, as they resisted the introduction of the heliocentric theory in the time of Galileo, and invoked the aid of authority to help them; but we must never confound these old fogies with the Church, or mistake their clamors or solemn grimaces for her authoritative decisions. The most the Church will do in the case, is to exhort to mutual charity, and where she exercises the temporal as well as the spiritual power, to interfere, if the dispute waxes too hot, to preserve the peace.

We find here one of our chief reasons for opposing tradi-

tionalism, of which M. Bonnetty's *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* is a leading organ, if not indeed the only organ. This traditionalism, if it means any thing, denies philosophy to hold from reason as its principle, and seeks to place it on the same line with supernatural theology, as a discipline to be received on authority. This, if accepted, would put an end to all free and independent development of reason, and after the mental activity provoked by the struggle to introduce it subsided, would superinduce a mental lethargy, fatal to all intellectual vigor or manly thought, spread a dead and deadening uniformity over the human race, and leave no room and no motive for the slightest mental exertion. Men, so far as left to the operation of natural causes and effects, would be active and energetic only in the material order, as we see is now the case in a large part of the non-Catholic world, where reason and faith are despaired of. None of our faculties are developed and strengthened save by exercise, and even our faith grows strong and vigorous only in the battle with heresy and error. God in giving us revelation, has neither superseded nor reversed the laws of the human mind; and Christians and non-Catholics are alike subjected to them. Heresy is often made by Providence the occasion of saving orthodoxy, and rightly used, the temptations of Satan, as all the masters of spiritual life tell us, serve to accelerate rather than to hinder our growth in sanctity or progress towards perfection. Our Lord intended that the Christian life should be a struggle, a warfare, and he requires us to be brave and disciplined soldiers, always ready for the battle.

Even in society, occasional wars are less destructive to the virtue and happiness of a people than a perpetual or uninterrupted peace. The corruption of morals, physical deterioration, and premature deaths, caused by our general prosperity and luxurious habits, to which the general peace we have enjoyed has given rise in this country, far outweigh those that would be occasioned by a thirty years' war. It was the long peace for a half century prior to the French Revolution that ruined the Italian States, and corrupted the people; and Italy rises from her degradation only in proportion as she is obliged to cultivate and exercise her military genius. A sharp war, requiring us to put forth all our strength for years to maintain our national rank and independence, would do much to purify our moral atmosphere, reinvigorate our exhausted virtues, and restore us to our

manhood. The modern commercial system is more fatal both to the moral and physical health of a nation than the old military system, and other things being equal, we would much rather have a soldier than a merchant or a lawyer for our chief magistrate in state or nation. The camp is, any day, a better school than the counting-house or the court-room. Scarcely will you find in all history a great and wise ruler or chief magistrate who has been only a civilian. Even that great statesman, Cardinal Ximenez, priest and archbishop as he was, proved himself at need a true soldier, as was seen in his African expedition. Spain grew up, one may say, in the camp; became great, noble, chivalric, the most Catholic kingdom in Europe, under her military kings and statesmen, and invariably deteriorated, and finally almost ceased to exist under mere civilian leadership.

We may talk as we will, vent as much cant as we please, but the only element in which man grows, is developed, becomes really a man, becomes robust and vigorous, is that of war, that of struggle of some sort. It is only the peace which immediately succeeds to war, giving full scope to the activity generated by the struggle, that is favorable to the greatness of individuals or nations. All history, all experience proves it. Why it is so, we stop not to explain; we only say that it is so, and all the cant in the world cannot make it not so. Even in the spiritual order in this world, experience proves that the most bitter persecution is not so fatal as a long, uninterrupted peace and apparent prosperity. Catholicity in France is infinitely more vigorous and thrifty to-day than it was under Louis XIV., when that precious monarch dragooned the Huguenots into orthodoxy, and never was more vigorous or thriving than under the late Republic. We have no doubt that the present persecutions of bishops and priests in Italy will operate in making the Italians far better Catholics than they have been since the Medicean epoch. A little persecution of us in this country would do us no harm. Without it we are in danger of falling into the condition of the effete Catholic populations of the Old World.

Precisely what we object to, is the attempt to fasten upon us a philosophy by authority, and thus subject us in the natural order as in the supernatural, to dogmatic teaching. Traditional philosophy is a misnomer. What rests on any other authority than reason is not philosophy. It may be faith, it may be history, it may be theology, and very true;

but it is not philosophy in our modern use of the term, for philosophy is a purely rational science, and only what rests on natural reason as its principle, or is cognizable by natural reason, can be included within it. Philosophy is the science of principles in the natural order, cognizable by natural reason, or the reason common to all men. What pertains to the supernatural order, or can be known only through supernatural revelation, may throw light on the natural, and aid us in rightly explaining and setting it forth, but it is itself above philosophy, and no part or parcel of it. The Traditionalists begun by asserting the impotence of reason to know by her own light first principles or necessary truths, without which there is and can be no science. They told us man knows and can know first principles or necessary truths only by being taught them, and he can be taught them only by God himself, or by means of supernatural revelation. Hence they founded faith on scepticism, and science on faith. They denied all rational science, and thus placed man out of the condition even to receive supernatural instruction, since the supernatural necessarily supposes the natural. By reducing all science to faith, they rendered faith itself impossible, and destroyed the very thing they were most anxious to retain and exalt.

They founded their theory on the alleged impotence of reason, and on the fact, that in every age and nation, God has himself been the instructor of mankind, by means of his supernatural communications immediately made to individuals, or transmitted from generation to generation by tradition. But it is time that this question as to the impotence of reason should be settled. In relation to what is reason impotent? In relation to the natural order, or in relation to our natural destiny, supposing us to have a natural destiny? We cannot pretend it. We know, not from reason, but *aliunde*, that we are not appointed to a natural destiny, and are, as a matter of fact, placed under a supernatural Providence, and appointed to a supernatural destiny. But this fact, that we are under a supernatural Providence, does not destroy or modify the adequateness of our natural faculties to what would have been our natural destiny, if we had been left under a purely natural Providence. There must be such adequateness, for the very conception of a natural end of a creature is that to which his natural powers and faculties are adequate, or to which he has the natural ability to attain. The natural destiny remains possible, for God could, had he

chosen, have created and left us in what theologians call the state of pure nature,—*status naturæ puræ*,—and the natural destiny, as a matter of fact, is *assumed*, so to speak, in the supernatural; the natural faculties adapted to it are no more destroyed than the human nature of our Lord was annihilated by its assumption by the Word. Our Lord was perfect man as well as perfect God, and human nature under the supernatural Providence remains as complete and as entire in itself as it would have been under a purely natural Providence. As the whole natural order is presupposed by the supernatural, and remains under it as complete and as entire as it would have been if there had been no supernatural order, reason must have in relation to the purely natural, all the power necessary to know and attain to a natural destiny, or to the natural beatitude of a creature of the rank and character of man in pure nature. The fact of the supernatural, then, does not in the least affect the natural power of any of our natural faculties in relation to the natural order.

Man, by the Fall, lost nothing essential to his nature as pure nature, for the Church has decided that God could have created man in the beginning such as he is now born, for she has condemned the fifty-fifth proposition of Baius,—*Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.* He lost indeed the integrity of his nature, as well as the supernatural justice in which he was constituted; but what is understood by this integrity is a certain gift or endowment, which, though it does not elevate man above the order of nature, is yet *indebitum*, or not due to nature as pure nature. The contradictory proposition, which affirms it to be due, the twenty-sixth of Baius, *Integritas primæ creationis non fuit indebita humanæ naturæ exaltatio, sed naturalis ejus conditio*, has been condemned, and cannot be held. We were certainly wounded by the Fall, but the wound we received was in the loss of the supernatural justice, and in being despoiled of this integrity, not a wound in our nature itself as pure nature, for neither of these belonged to it as pure nature. Now, as it must be conceded, that whatever is necessary for a creature to attain its end in the order in which it is created, is due to that creature, and cannot be withheld by its creator, so God could not have created man without endowing him with a reason adequate to his end in the natural order; and as this reason must still remain substantially unchanged, we deny, and must deny the impotence, and assert the sufficiency of

reason in the natural order; that is, its sufficiency for all our purely natural wants. St. Thomas, in the strongest passage he has on the point, concedes this, for he says the *élite* of the human race can know the natural law without the aid of revelation, and he makes revelation of the natural law necessary only in the case of the simple, or to render the knowledge of it more facile and prompt,—in principle, the doctrine held with regard to grace by Pelagius, only Pelagius committed the fatal error of applying it to the supernatural order, or the regeneration, while St. Thomas confines it solely to the natural order.

The impotence of reason can be asserted only in relation to our supernatural destiny. None of the fathers or great doctors of the Church ever pretend that reason in any other respect is impotent or insufficient. Starting as we did with an uncertain traditionalism, which at the time we were inclined to adopt, we undertook in one of our earlier volumes to prove that reason is insufficient for itself, and is inadequate to the wants of reason; but we soon found ourselves stopped, and unable to proceed, without running athwart more than one definition of the Church; and on reëxamination, and a fuller study of their writings, we found that the insufficiency of reason dwelt upon by the fathers and theologians was not, as we had supposed, reason in its own order, but reason in relation to the supernatural. Man, by reason, cannot find out or attain to his supernatural destiny, and if it is an inadequate guide in our present state, as we readily concede that it is, it is not because natural reason is inadequate to the wants of natural reason, but because man in his present state is not restricted in his wants to the purely natural order. In all nations, in all ages, in all men, and in all times we find traces of the primitive supernatural revelation. That revelation, however it may have been obscured, mutilated, or travestied, has never been wholly lost, and even in the most degraded savage, we find conceptions that transcend the natural,—an unimpeachable testimony to the fact that the human race received a supernatural revelation and intimations from their Maker of a supernatural destiny in the beginning. This supernatural element, which enters in some form and to some extent into the actual life of the race, since it is found to be common to all men, is often confounded with nature, and in our day theories in any number are built on it,—sometimes with a disposition favorable, sometimes with a disposition hostile to reli-

gion,—intended to make it appear that all religion and all superstitions have a common origin, and are the spontaneous production of human nature, the result of man's spontaneous efforts to give *outness* to his own *inness*. With regard to this class of conceptions, convictions, beliefs, or reminiscences, reason is undoubtedly impotent, and by confounding them with nature, we come easily to conclude, that reason is insufficient for reason in its own order. This is the common error of the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists, of Baius, Jansenius, Pascal, and even the learned Huet, Bishop of Avranches. It vitiates the reasoning of the majority of our works on *Evangelical Demonstration*, whether by Catholics or non-Catholics.

The Traditionalists, we learn from the discussions in the recent numbers of the *Annales*, are more guarded in their language than they were in the outset, if indeed they have not in some respects essentially modified their doctrines. From these discussions we learn, which has a little surprized us, that the Professors of the Catholic University of Louvain are treated by the peripatetics as traditionalists. We think this is a mistake. As far as we have learned the views of Louvain, they are somewhat similar to those of Fournier and Rothenflue, and belong in the main to the ontological school,—a school which we prefer to the psychological or the peripatetic, but which, however, it is known to our readers we do not accept in its exclusive form; yet even as their views are set forth by the Abbé Lupus, Honorary Canon of Liège, who combats them, we discover Cartesianism indeed, but no Traditionalism. Their doctrine on the most capital point, is given in the reply to the Abbé Lupus, in the *Revue de Louvain*, by the Abbé Lefebve, Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the University, and is worth citing at length:

"On sait que nous admettons l'*idée innée de Dieu*, idée qui ne peut venir des sens, mais qui *est gravée* dans notre nature par la main du Créateur. Les théologiens, aussi bien que les philosophes, font observer que l'*idée de Dieu* n'est point une connaissance actuelle, mais un vague *pressentiment* de la divinité, que cette idée, comme l'histoire de l'idolâtrie le démontre, a souvent été appliquée de la manière la plus fausse et la plus absurde. C'est ce qui explique que tous les hommes ne connaissent point Dieu, bien que l'*idée de Dieu soit commune* à tous les hommes. Que faut-il pour que l'idée de Dieu devienne une connaissance *actuelle*? Il faut que la raison saisisse cette idée et en fasse l'objet de sa réflexion. Mais il est évident que, pour saisir l'idée *réflexe* de Dieu, la raison doit

être suffisamment *exercée et développée*. Or l'experience prouve que la raison se développe *au moyen de la société* et par les secours qui se trouvent dans la société. Cet enseignement social appartient à l'ordre de la nature établi par la divine Providence. L'intelligence de l'homme, étant suffisamment développée, porte ses regards sur l'idée de Dieu, idée qui sert de base à toutes les idées fondamentales de la raison. Selon la pensée de l'Apôtre, Dieu peut être contemplé dans la créature. Les principes les plus certains de la raisen et tous les êtres de la création démontrent l'existence de Dieu. Ainsi, en admettant la nécessité de l'enseignement, nous nous gardons bien d'amoindrir les forces de la raison, de nier son énergie et son principe interne d'activité; car, selon nous, cette raison, même aprés sa chute, conserve assez de force pour *connaître et démontrer l'existence de Dieu*, sans un secours surnaturel et sans s'appuyer sur la révélation. Autant que personne nous maintenons la distinction entre la raison et la foi, entre l'ordre naturel et l'ordre surnaturel, distinction néccssaire pour éviter les erreurs de Baïus et de Calvin."

We see little here to object to, except the assertion, that "the idea of God is innate, graven in our nature by the hand of the creator." We do not like this use of the word *idea*, which ought to be used either in the sense of the mental apprehension, or of the intelligible object apprehended. What the Louvain Professors mean by an innate *idea* of God, an *idea graved* in our nature, we do not know. Do they mean that God in creating the soul presents it intuitively himself as its creator, light, and object? If so, why not say so? If they mean that God has created the soul with an original or innate faculty of thinking or apprehending his being by its own act, why not say so plainly? Is the idea the object apprehended? or the act of apprehending it? If it is neither, what is it? Is it a picture of the reality painted in the soul, or an image of God carved in our nature? Is it meant that God in creating us stamps his own image or likeness on our nature? Be it so. Is that image himself, or is it his creature, created or non-created; God, or man? Pass over this; and say instead, that God affirms his own being to reason intuitively in the very act of creating it, so that God is always present to reason as the ideal, and the doctrine of the professors is sound, and avoids the errors of Traditionalism as of the peripatetics. We know intuitively that which is God, but we know and are able to say that it is God only by reflection, through the agency of language, the instrument of reflection, or if you please, social instruction and development.

From M. Bonnetty's observations on the reply of the

Louvain professors to the Abbé Lupus, and his approval of the answer of the *Revue de Louvain* to the Letter of Father Perrone against Traditionalism, which has made some noise in Belgium, we gather that the essence of French Traditionalism in its present phase is, that reason indeed is able to know first principles or necessary truths, or as we say the ideal, the intelligible, yet it is reason developed, exercised by intercourse with our fellow men, or reason as developed in society, not reason undeveloped, as isolated and uninstructed. When developed, when duly instructed and exercised, then it is capable not of finding or inventing first principles, but of recognizing and knowing them when presented. Reason is developed in society and by the aids society furnishes. This social development of reason or social instruction pertains to the order of nature established by Divine Providence, and therefore these social succors are natural, not supernatural, consequently the sufficiency of reason in the natural order can be asserted. We understood M. Bonnetty to teach in the beginning that man can attain to a knowledge of necessary truth, or the great truths which are the basis of all science and morality, only as taught them by a supernatural revelation; now it seems he is contented with simple natural social instruction, though he still insists that he must be taught them, or else not know them.

At first sight this would seem to be a renunciation of Traditionalism, and a return to Rationalism, but upon closer examination, since he expressly rejects the notion that the idea of God is innate, we find it only an approach either towards scepticism, or towards Mennaisianism. La Mennais began by denying the competency of individual reason and asserting the authority of what he called the general or universal reason, or the reason of the race. Not contented to hold this error in the region of philosophy, he even transported it into the region of theology, and made the universal reason authority for faith; thus putting the human race in the place of the Church, if not indeed man, or the people, in the place of God. M. Bonnetty, if he calls in society to his aid, must do the same if he chooses to assert the fact of science at all, and to push his premises to their last logical results.

The Louvain professors, in our judgment, err in calling the idea of God innate, for we recognize no innate ideas, but they do not make the social instruction necessary to enable the individual to apprehend the ideal, or to attain to,

or to come into possession of, necessary truth. They suppose man to have the idea in the outset, and though they do not please us in calling it "a vague presentiment," and in speaking of its becoming *actual* knowledge, they rightly contend that in order to know that it is God, it must become the object of reflection; but M. Bonnetty, rejecting the notion that the idea of God is innate, denying also, what we hold, that we have immediate intuition of the ideal, which by reflection we demonstrate is God, and adopting the doctrine that we have only an innate faculty, predisposition, or *habitus*, as he says, of knowing God, can have no object of intellect prior to reflection, and no knowledge or intuition of necessary truth prior to the development of reason by social instruction, which forces him into pure Mennaisianism, or unmitigated Traditionalism. M. Bonnetty, we fear, has never profited by the study of Kant's *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, which it is necessary for every man, who would write or talk on philosophy in our days, thoroughly to master. Kant has settled, if it was not settled before him, that certain conditions *a priori* of all experience are indispensable, that the mind before it can act or form any judgment *a posteriori*, must in some way be placed in possession of certain first principles or necessary truths, which he calls judgments *a priori*, for in every synthetic judgment *a posteriori* there is always a judgment *a priori*, something added, which is not derived from experience, and therefore must have preceded it. The presence of this *a priori* and non-empirical element in all our judgments *a posteriori* is unquestionable. We can never assert any particular act of causation without adding to it the conception of universal and necessary cause, expressed in the axiom, Every effect must have a cause, or, Nothing can begin to exist without a cause. Now this conception of universality and necessity is not derived analytically from the empirical fact, nor is it obtained by generalization from the particular act of causation, for the general is never deducible from the particular, or the necessary from the contingent, since without them the particular and contingent can neither exist nor be conceived. The universal and the necessary, then, must be given prior to the empirical fact,—principles before experience, before the mind has acted or can act. Now these original principles, necessary truths, judgments *a priori*, M. Bonnetty may call innate ideas with Descartes, and thus virtually agree with Kant, who calls them forms of the

understanding, or he may call them with us the ideal element of thought, the intelligible, presented or given us in direct and immediate intuition, but he must in some way recognize them, or else never be able to assert legitimately a single fact of knowledge. He apparently refuses to do either, and therefore, as he will not allow the mind in its operations to start with them, or to possess them till taught them, or till developed in the bosom of society, he can build science only on faith, either human faith or divine, that is, he can assert no science at all.

Yet M. Bonnetty's peripatetic friends have little right to triumph over him, for they come not nearer the truth than he. In fact, he and they set out from the same point, with the same amount of luggage, and he only seeks by taking the traditional method, to escape the termination to which he sees he must inevitably be driven if he continues to follow their peripatetic logic. They, as well as he, recognize no valid distinction between the intuitive order and the reflective, and allow nothing to be known that is not reflectively known. They deny all intuition of God, and treat the universal and the necessary, without which no syllogism could be constructed, not as real and necessary being intuitively affirming itself to the mind, but as generalizations of the particular and contingent, that is to say, pure abstractions, formed by the mind itself, and therefore, mere nullities. They tell us, indeed, that the first and immediate object of intellect is *ens*, being; but they define it to be *vel ens existens vel ens possibile*, which proves that they have yet to learn that, what is not, is not intelligible, that being only is intelligible *per se*, and existences are intelligible only in and by being. A possible *ens* is no *ens* at all, and is intelligible only in *ens reale*. It is an abstraction, and abstractions are nothing in themselves, are mere mental conceptions formed by the operation of the mind on the intuition of the concrete. *Ens possibile* is never apprehensible *per se*. We say such a thing is *possible*, because we see that infinite power may create it; we say such a thing is possible to *us*, because we are conscious of being able to do it; but the perception of the possible in the former case is the perception of the divine ability, and in the latter case of our human or particular ability. The condemnation of the peripatetic logic is, that it proceeds from the principle of contradiction, and deals with possibilities only, instead of proceeding from the principle of being, or that, what is not, is not intelligible,

and dealing with realities. Its universe is a universe of abstract forms, which, after having constructed, with infinite labor and pains, we must seek with still greater labor and pains, and always in vain, to prove that it corresponds to a real universe beyond. The most the peripatetic logic enables us to do is to prove that there *may* be such a real universe, not that there is.

We know St. Thomas asserts that the intelligible form or *species* is that by which the mind attains to the intelligible, not that in which it terminates; but we do not know that either he or his master, Aristotle, proves it, or proves that the intellect attains, in any instance whatever, to any thing in the intelligible order beyond the intelligible form or *species*, or in the sensible world beyond the *phantasms* furnished by the senses. It is one thing to assert, on the strength of theology, or the common belief of mankind, an intelligible and a sensible world existing *a parte rei*, and another to prove it by our logic or our philosophy. St. Thomas was a great man, a great theologian, seldom, if ever, surpassed in history, and he knew and told infinitely more truth than can be compressed into the philosophical theories of Aristotle, or any other "heathen Greek." Nobody pretends that he did not know and assert objective reality, in both the intelligible and the sensible world; but his philosophy never allows him to admit that we have immediate intuition of the intelligible reality. As a peripatetic, he holds that what in every fact of knowledge is immediately present to the mind is never the objective reality itself, but a certain image, representation, immaterial form, or intelligible *species*—the peripatetic interpretation of the Platonic *idea*. Hence, in the peripatetic philosophy, the ideal is not precisely the intellective subject, nor the intelligible object *a parte rei*, but a certain intermediary, distinguishable both from the mind and from the objective reality, and serving to unite them, or, as it is pretended, to bring them into mutual relation. But as what is immediately present to the mind is the image, form, or *species*, not the thing itself, how is the mind to know that there is any *thing* there, that the whole world is not merely ideal, mere form, or *species*? This question is unanswerable on the peripatetic philosophy, as taught by St. Thomas, or as taught in our modern schools, as the interminable disputes respecting it fully evince.

We have been much puzzled to explain to ourselves the origin of this peripatetic theory of perception by *species* and

phantasms, and we are still at some loss to know what led Aristotle to adopt it. Plato taught that all knowledge or science is, so to speak, *per ideam*. But, then, in Plato the *idea* is the thing, the essential thing, the reality itself, and is *idea* in the Divine mind, not in ours. It is that which the Divine mind contemplates in himself, which, in the production of existences, he impresses on prec̈xisting matter, as the seal on the wax, and is that which in knowing any particular existence we know, and must know, in order to know the real existence, or what the particular existence or thing really is. This we can understand; but Aristotle's doctrine of forms and phantasms, intermediary between the intellect and the objective reality, we do not understand; that is, we do not understand precisely what fact he sought to explain by it. We can easily account for its appearance in the Scholastics and more recent philosophers, for they simply repeat the master and one another; but what led Aristotle himself to adopt it, we are not sufficiently acquainted with the history of philosophy in his time to be able positively to assert. We know he envied Plato, and differed from him whenever he could; but we are hardly prepared to say that he adopted it merely for the sake of differing from Plato, more especially because we have some evidence that the doctrine is older than Aristotle, or than the Greek philosophy itself. Perhaps, after all, the doctrine originated in the attempt to explain, in the fact of knowledge, the active concurrence of the object with the subject. Perhaps it has a deeper and more philosophical origin yet, and is really an attempt to explain how a created intellect, which, since created, is not intelligent in itself, can know objects not intelligible *per se*, and is at least a reminiscence of the most ancient doctrine, that we are intelligent, and see all things in and by the light of God,—*lumen Dei*.

To intellectual vision, as to sensible vision, three things are necessary: the subject, the object, and the light which renders the object intelligible and the subject intelligent. In God the three things are identical in his own being; for he is his own light, intelligible object, and intelligent subject, and needs, in order to be infinitely knowing, to go out of himself for nothing. But in creatures it is different. They contain in themselves neither their own light nor their own object, that is, are neither intelligent nor intelligible in or by themselves alone. The light which illumines alike the subject and the object, is not in the intellect any more than

in external vision the external light is in the eye. We must, then, distinguish the light from both the subject and the object, when both subject and object are creatures. Now, if we identify the intelligible *forms* or *species* of the peripatetics with this light, so distinguished, and say that they represent or show the object in the sense in which the light is truly said to represent or show the object it illumines, and if we further identify this light with the *lumen Dei*,—the light of God,—indistinguishable from the Divine Being, or God himself, we have a very intelligible doctrine, and, as we hold, the true doctrine on the point in question. Is this, after all, the real sense of the peripatetic doctrine?

St. Thomas, it is well known, teaches that man is neither intelligent nor intelligible in himself, for he argues that he is not intelligible *per se*, because he is not a pure *intelligens*, or intelligent *per se*. His doctrine is, that no creature can be intelligent or intelligible *per se*, or can either know or be known save as illumined by the light of reason. The light of reason, he says, is a participation of the Divine light, or *lumen Dei*. What does he mean by this participated light of God? Does he mean that God himself is the light of reason, "the true Light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world?" If so, we are agreed, and St. Thomas holds the very doctrine Gioberti and ourselves have been so severely reproached by modern Thomists for defending. But does he distinguish this light of reason from God, and hold it to be *aliquid creatum*, something created, distinguishable from the light of God, as the creature from the creator? On this point we are in doubt, and both St. Thomas and Aristotle seem to leave the matter in a most perplexing obscurity.

There need not be much doubt, perhaps, that we have touched the problem which Aristotle attempted to solve by his intermediary of intelligible forms or *species*, the only way in which he could attempt to solve it, since he did not recognize any more than other Gentile philosophers the fact of creation. That the Thomists, or Christian peripatetics, really understand the problem, and may be said to solve it in the way we do, is very uncertain, for they all maintain, after St. Thomas, that God is not known *per se*, and deny that we have immediate and direct intuition of the divine being, or *ens necessarium et reale*. None of them are willing to say plainly, that the light of reason which illumines both subject and object, making the subject intelligent and

the object intelligible, is the uncreated but all-creating light of God, and, as God is *ens simplicissimum*, indistinguishable from his own being, which is light in and by itself. They will not admit that the universal, the necessary, the eternal, the immutable, without the intuition of which the contingent and the particular are inconceivable, and no syllogism is possible, are identically the divine being, the *ens necessarium et reale*, or God himself. They, at least, seem to regard them as distinguishable alike from God and creature, a sort of *tertium quid*, as if there could be something which is neither the one nor the other, as if what is not creature need not be God, and what is not God need not be creature! They regard them as intelligible *forms* or *species*, which the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, extracts from the phantasms furnished through the senses from sensible objects. Such is evidently their doctrine, and, according to them, the doctrine of St. Thomas.

If we substitute in the Aristotelian cosmogony, creation for formation, as all Christians are bound to do, we can resolve the doctrine of Aristotle without much difficulty into the doctrine we ourselves hold, and which we identify with the most ancient philosophical doctrine, or that we find indicated in the Holy Scriptures. There are numerous passages, too, in St. Thomas, where his theology throws light on his philosophy, which indicate that he might be explained in the way we have suggested; but there are other passages, and apparently much more formal and express, which seem to authorize the doctrine usually ascribed to him by our peripatetics. It appears to us, from the best study we have been able to devote to the subject, that St. Thomas has not always guarded against the error in philosophy, into which Aristotle was led by his cosmogony, of omitting creation properly so called, and adopting the theory of formation. As a Christian, he had of course the true cosmogony, knew that God in the beginning created the heavens and the earth, and all things therein, visible and invisible, but when the dogma is not immediately in question, he seems to have fallen back on Aristotle, and accepted his theory of formation, or the production of existences by the union of matter and form. This seems to have been the case with most of the mediæval schoolmen, and we remark that, regarding the form as the *species*, they make generally matter the principle of individuation. Saved by their theology from the doctrine of Plato, that the *form* or *idea* impressed is identical

with the Divine Essence, and holding very truly that the divine idea is the *idea exemplaris*, or type, after which the Divine Wisdom operates, they were puzzled to define or to say what the forms united to matter,—*species* and *genera*,—really are. The Nominalists said they are mere words, the Realists said they are entities, the Conceptualists said they are purely mental conceptions, that is, abstractions; St. Thomas says they are conceptions *cum fundamento in re*, but what is that reality in which they are founded, whether God or creature, he does not very explicitly tell us, perhaps did not himself very clearly perceive. But whatever may have been the real doctrine of St. Thomas, or whatever may be the explanation of which it is susceptible, it appears to us certain, that his professed followers make them really nothing but abstractions, and do not, and will not accept the solution of the original problem we have suggested, if indeed they are aware of the problem itself. It is evident that they do not understand by the intelligible *forms* or *species*, the light which in every fact of knowledge illumines both subject and object. By adopting as the principle of their logic, the principle of contradiction, it is clear that they start not with intuitions but with conceptions, that is, in the reflective reason, and of course, give us only an abstract universe, which is simply no universe at all.

If we are right in our view of the peripatetic philosophy as generally taught in modern schools and colleges, the peripatetics have nothing to boast over the Traditionalists. Both alike neglect or misconceive the order of intuition, and consequently have no *principium* in the real world from which to set out. The peripatetic takes a mental conception, or an abstraction for his *principium*, or his *primum*, as does Rosmini in his *ens in genere*, and seeks by his logic to arrive at reality; the Traditionalists, with more propriety and better reason, attempt to supply the *principium* from tradition or social instruction, yet necessarily fail, because without intuition of principles no instruction is possible, since there is then in the mind no ability or capacity to receive instruction. Neglecting intuition, or making no account of the principles intuitively given, both, systematically considered, start from nothing, and arrive at nothing. Every philosopher knows that principles are given, not acquired, because the mind cannot operate without them, and yet it is rare to find even one who does not virtually deny it the moment

he begins to philosophize, or to construct his system of the universe. All principles are intuitive, given intuitively, as the condition *a priori* of the existence and activity of the mind, and our knowledge never extends beyond what is embraced in our intuitions. Judgments without intuitions are blind, and of no value; conceptions where there is no object intuitively apprehended, are empty, mere forms of thought, in which nothing existing *a parte rei* is thought. Why is it our professors, who know this as well as we do, and perhaps better, will not observe it, and construct their systems in accordance with it? The mind is as a fact furnished intuitively with all the principles needed, why then start with a mental creation, which can be only a pure conception or abstraction, and attempt to give the lie to the axiom, *Ex nihilo nihil fit?* Why doom ourselves, as Pharaoh doomed the Children of Israel, to make brick without straw, when straw is abundant and within our reach?

Yet every error conceals a truth. We have suggested the truth which probably underlies the Aristotelian philosophy, and is improperly expressed by their doctrine of intelligible forms. The Traditionalists, too, are playing round and seeking to express a fact. As a matter of fact God originally instructed man in the natural order as well as in the supernatural. He infused into the first man, when he made him, language and the knowledge language embodies, so that Adam was even in science at the head of his race. God created him a perfect or complete man, and gave him even in the natural order all the knowledge necessary to a complete or perfect man. This knowledge, which we must be careful to distinguish from the revelation of the supernatural, being embodied in language, and through language entering into society, has in a more or less perfect state been transmitted by tradition down to us, and is taught by parents to their children, and by society to its members. As a fact, man never has invented language; as a fact, man has never by his unaided efforts found out first principles or necessary truths, the existence and natural attributes of God, the immortality and immateriality of the soul, liberty, and moral obligation, for they were taught to the first man by his Maker, and have been taught to all since by society, which inherits the original instruction. The Traditionalists in asserting all this assert only a fact.

So far we must all be Traditionalists. But the Holy See has required M. Bonnetty and others to subscribe to the

four following propositions, published December 12, 1855:

"1. Etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen vera dissensio, nullum dissidium inter ipsas inveniri unquam potest, cum ambæ ab uno, eodemque immutabili veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriantur atque ita, sibi mutuam opem ferant.

"2. Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest. Fides posterior est revelatione, proindeque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem, ac libertatem contra naturalismi ac fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.

"3. Rationis usus fidem præcedit, et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit.

"4. Methodus, qua usi sunt D. Thomas, Divus Bonaventura et alii post ipsos scholastici non ad rationalisimum ducit neque causa fuit cur apud scholas hodiernas philosophia in naturalismum et pantheismum impingeret. Proinde non licet in crimen doctoribus et magistris illis vertere, quod methodum hanc, præsertim approbante vel saltem tacente Ecclesia, usurpaverint."

These four propositions, however, are to be understood in relation to the alleged teachings, on the several points involved, of the Traditionalists. They had maintained, or were charged with having maintained, that by reason we cannot arrive at the knowledge of necessary truth, that we cannot by reason alone know and prove with certainty the existence of God against the atheist, the spirituality of the rational soul against the materialist, or liberty against naturalism or fatalism. The Holy See does require us to deny these assumptions, but does not require us to deny that these great truths lying at the basis of all natural science and morality were first made known by revelation, or that we who live now have learned them from tradition or social instruction; but to maintain that they can be proved by natural reason with certainty against their impugners. It will not answer the requisition of the Holy See, to say that they are proved by reason proceeding from principles taken from tradition or social instruction. It is necessary to maintain, as we understand it, that the principle of the proof is itself rational or furnished in reason common to all men and to each individual man. The Traditionalists cannot, then, say these things can be proved from reason, only as reason borrows her principles from tradition. They must concede that reason can prove them with certainty from her own *data*. At least it is so we understand the second proposition. But this does not

require us to say that we could of ourselves have invented language, or that without the medium of language in which they are embodied, we could have taken by reflection immediately from intuition the *data* which furnish the principle of proof, or that, although we should have known that which is God intuitively, we should, without the social instruction supplying us the conception, ever have been able to say, reflectively, that it is God. The sensible representation in some form of the idea is essential to it as an object of reflection, which it must be in order to be a subject of proof.

The fourth proposition, which relates to the method followed by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and others, may seem at first sight to strike at some things we have ourselves advanced; but it was framed expressly against M. Bonnetty and his school, who maintained that the method of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and other Scholastics, leads to rationalism, and has produced the naturalism and pantheism of the modern schools of philosophy, *because it took its point of departure in reason, instead of tradition, and attempted to prove from reason* the great principles or truths treated by St. Thomas and theologians generally as the preamble to faith. That is they objected to it because it was a rational and not the traditional method. What they really objected to was, the attempt to prove or establish from reason the great truths of natural religion or theology, which supernatural theology supposes. In this sense, it is not allowable to condemn the method of the Scholastics, for in this sense, it has been at least tacitly approved by the Church; and, we will add, for this would be to condemn reason itself. But in this sense we have offered no strictures on the method of St. Thomas or any other of the scholastics. We do not oppose the peripatetics because they undertake to prove from reason the existence of God against atheists, the spirituality of the rational soul against materialists, or human liberty against fatalists or necessitarians. These are all questions in the natural order, and must be capable of being answered by reason, or faith can have no authority. All we complain of is, that by adopting as the principle of their logic the principle of contradiction, the peripatetics are not truly rational, and do not succeed in proving what they undertake to prove, and what reason, rightly used, can and must prove. In what strikes us as the sense obviously intended by the Holy See, we accept cordially these four propositions, and maintain them. If

we mistake their sense, we, of course, are ready to be corrected; but as we understand them, we maintain what the Holy See requires us to maintain, and deny nothing she forbids us to deny. But we do not understand by these propositions that we are forbidden by the Church to question the soundness of the peripatetic philosophy. It is the method of the Scholastics only in the sense in which it is common to both St. Thomas and St. Bonaventura, condemned by the Traditionalists, that we are forbidden to charge with leading to rationalism, naturalism, and Pantheism. As a matter of fact, St. Bonavèntura differed in his method from the method St. Thomas adopts from Aristotle in precisely the same respect that we do.

M. Bonnetty and his friends contend that these propositions, published by the Congregation of the *Index*, on the part of the Holy See, for their subscription, condemn nothing that they hold or ever have held. If so, so much the better; although, if so, we must say the Traditionalists have not only been greatly misunderstood, but have shown great facility in using language which misrepresents their meaning. M. Bonnetty is an active and industrious man, commendable for his various and extensive erudition, an erudition far above the average attainments of modern French scholars, venerable for his virtues, and sincere and earnest devotion to the Catholic cause; but he has never appeared to us as a great philosopher, and he seems to lack that clearness, we may say, that sharpness of intellect which never mistakes resemblance for identity, and never confounds in the same category things which are essentially distinct. In this respect, we think, he is the type of his school. But we war not with persons, and if we did, M. Bonnetty would not be the chief object of our hostility. As we have understood the Traditionalists, these four propositions are rightly directed against them; but we do not understand these propositions as sustaining, at all lengths, the opponents of the Traditionalists, who seem to hold that man isolated, without language, or the development of his reflective reason by social instruction, can arrive at a reflective knowledge of all the great truths of what is called natural religion, or natural theology, and that, too, when they deny him all intuition of the ideal. We presume the Congregation of the *Index* mean by reason, reason as including the whole of man's natural intellectual power, in which sense it takes in language, as necessary to natural reason in the reflective order,

as the earth, light, and air to our natural life. We take it, then, that the essential point for the Traditionalists to guard against is denying that the evidence or *data*, whence reason proves her propositions, are taken from reason herself, and maintaining that they are taken from tradition. Safe on this point, we presume they and we are free to assert for the development and exercise of reason, and as the conditions of constructing a solid system of natural truth, all the traditional instruction, both natural and supernatural, we can show man has ever received.

Reason precedes faith, *Rationis usus fidem præcedit, et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit;* yet faith, when we have come to it, or revelation, when it has come to the mind, throws light on reason, or so employs reason that we better understand its use, and the problems really within its reach. The discussions occasioned by the great Mysteries of faith, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Real Presence, foreknowledge and predestination, free will and necessity in connection with grace, the Beatific Vision, &c., have poured floods of light on both ontological and psychological science, and given to natural reason some of its finest developments. It is a striking fact, that the philosophy used by our theologians in explaining and defending the dogmas of faith is rarely, if ever, at fault, even though when philosophizing not in relation to the dogma, but in relation to the ends of natural reason itself, they run into very gross errors. There is in all the great theologians a double philosophy, the philosophy they use as theologians, and the philosophy they set forth as philosophers. This proves that theology may be in some sense an instrument in constructing philosophy, not in furnishing it *data*, but in placing natural reason in a position to perceive and use her own *data*. In this sense, tradition, both as to the natural and as to the supernatural, renders an important service in the development of reason, and in conducting us to philosophic truth. This is, no doubt, the real fact the Traditionalists have in their mind, and we can discover nothing in the four propositions of the Congregation of the *Index* that forbids them or us to insist on the importance of this fact. We believe this fact so important, that we doubt if any man, deprived of all traditional knowledge in either order, severed entirely from the past, isolated from his race from childhood, deprived of all instruction through the medium of language from his like, would be able by his

natural reason alone to attain to a single one of the great truths of philosophy. His intuitions would be what they now are, for reflection only brings out, clears up, and sets in order our intuitions; but these intuitions would, for the most part, remain in direct consciousness, without ever appearing in reflex consciousness, that is, without the individual taking note that he has them. In the lowest grade of savages we find little except animal life, very few conceptions that rise above the brute; but the most degraded savages have still some traditionary intelligence, for they have a past, and they have language, often very beautiful, and even very expressive, and have relations with their race.

We see what work the philosophers, who, in the last century, sought to divest themselves of all traditional knowledge and social instruction made with philosophical science. Let those who would deny the aid of tradition in the cultivation of philosophy study the *statue* of Abbé Condillac and *l'Homme-Plante*, and *l'Homme-Machine* of La Mettrie. Man is a social being; he is born in society, and developed, and matured only in society. We aid one another, and no man, living in absolute solitude from infancy, ever acquires a full and perfect command of all his faculties. Full-grown men have retired from an active, busy life, to hold communion in solitude with God and nature, and have grown in heavenly wisdom without losing their capacity for things of this world; but those who live retired from infancy, even though not in perfect solitude, are usually found to lack a full and rounded development. If, then, one must be a philosopher in order rightly to read the past and explain the course of history, one must also study the past, study history, and concentrate in himself, so to speak, his whole race in order to be a great philosopher. Our experiments must extend over nations and centuries. The philosopher can never be the mere hermit or mere solitary thinker; he must be a social man; he must be a scholar, a man of erudition, who can avail himself of the knowledge and thoughts of his race in all ages and nations, or he will never achieve a name worthy of veneration.

END OF VOLUME I.

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